VZCZCXRO0289
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0454 1042035
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 142035Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4043
INFO RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9367
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7562
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 3865
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 000454 
 
C O R R E C T E D COPY - ADDING ADDRESSES AND CAPTION 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/A - TOM REOTT AND EUR/RPM - AARON COPE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2019 
TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MARR BR AF
SUBJECT: BRAZILIAN REPLY TO REQUEST FOR CONTRIBUTION TO 
AFGHANISTAN 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 31102 
     ¶B. 08 BRASILIA 1312 
 
Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION LISA KUBISKE, REASONS 1.4 B, D 
 
¶1.  (C) Charge delivered assistance request (ref A) on April 
8 to Ambassador Roberto Jaguaribe, Under Secretary for 
Political Affairs, who had recently returned from the Hague 
Conference on Afghanistan.  In response to the specific 
requests, he noted that the Brazilian congress recently 
reduced the foreign technical assistance budget, although 
that did not rule out seeking funding, but he estimated 
Brazil's capacity to make a cash contribution as "very low." 
On food contributions, Jaguaribe said it might be possible 
and he would get back to us.  There are three main obstacles 
to overcome with regard to the assistance requests: a) 
Brazil's budget, b) political receptivity, and c) Brazil's 
difficulty in "buying into something it did not formulate." 
 
"Brazil is not a relevant actor" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Jaguaribe shared with Charge a few observations 
about Afghanistan and Brazil, in part based on his 
participation at the Hague Conference.  Noting that 
Afghanistan is "remote and distant" for Brazil, Jaguaribe 
said Brazil follows developments in Afghanistan but is not "a 
relevant actor," although were Afghanistan to open an embassy 
in Brasilia, Brazil would give consideration to opening one 
in Kabul.  He said the new U.S. policy has many positive 
elements, and the USG was correct to identify a need for a 
very broad regional stategy.  He said it is very important to 
incorporate Afghanistan's neighbors into the strategy, above 
all Pakistan and Iran.  It was a positive development that 
Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke spoke with Iranian 
representatives recently, and this should be continued.  Iran 
could turn out to be the most important player in the 
process, he added. 
 
Security for whom? 
- - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Afghanistan needs internal political support to 
succeed since a military solution will never be definitive, 
and military action must complement the goal of greater 
internal political strength, Jaguaribe commented.  Military 
actions in Pakistan and Afghanistan erode rather than fortify 
internal political strength, he added, although he conceded 
that the U.S. has better information than Brazil about the 
situation on the ground.  He recommended looking for ways to 
expand President Karzai's political base; "Security for 
whom?" he asked, suggesting that security for the goverment 
and the capital are insufficient conditions to build the 
broad support that success in Afghanistan requires. 
 
¶4.  (C)  As with earlier requests (ref B), Mission does not 
expect any further response from the GOB on this matter. 
SOBEL