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INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 8805
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 2083
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 7390
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 3471
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 8129
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 001334 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2019 
TAGS: MARR PREL MOPS PGOV MCAP KTIA PTER CO
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA DCA TALKS MOVE AHEAD DESPITE OBSTACLES 

REF: A. BOGOTA 0438 
     ¶B. BOGOTA 0955 

Classified By: Ambassador William R. Brownfield 
Reasons 1.4 (b and d) 

SUMMARY 
-------- 
¶1. (C) U.S. and Colombian delegations reached tentative 
agreement on more than half of the draft text during round 
three of the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) negotiations 
in Bogota on April 14-16.  Still, key provisions remain 
unresolved, with the GOC insisting it cannot meet some U.S. 
requests without violating Colombian law.  The GOC conceded 
that these legal issues could be overcome if Colombia's 
congress were to ratify the agreement, but stressed the Uribe 
administration was unwilling to seek congressional approval 
because of political sensitivities.  The GOC considers 
conclusion of the DCA to be conditioned on U.S. agreement to 
address GOC requests for access to U.S. supplies in the event 
of a national emergency and consideration of other 
security-related assistance.  The two delegations agreed to 
meet again on May 19-21 to continue the DCA talks.  End 
summary. 

DCA ROUND THREE 
--------------- 
¶2. (C) U.S. and Colombian delegations convened in Bogota on 
April 14-16 for the third round of negotiations on the DCA.
Deputy Foreign Minister ClemenciaForero, Deputy Defense 
Minister Juan Pinzon, and Deputy Defense Minister Sergio 
Jaramillo led the Colombian delegation.  PM Senior Advisor 
Ambassador Jackson McDonald headed the U.S. delegation 
consisting of State and DOD representatives.  The delegations 
made slow but steady progress, reaching agreement on 
approximately half of the proposed 27 articles in the draft 
DCA agreement.

KEY STICKING POINTS REMAIN 
-------------------------- 
¶3. (C) Still, several key provisions remain unresolved, 
including issues related to jurisdiction, exemptions from 
fees and inspection, the right to carry weapons, and waivers 
of claims.  Pinzon said that while he understood such terms 
were critical from the U.S. perspective, the GOC could not 
cede on these issues without risking a violation of Colombian 
law.  He conceded that these legal concerns could be overcome 
if the agreement were to be submitted and approved by 
Colombia's Congress, but stressed that President Uribe wanted 
to avoid such a public debate due to domestic political 
sensitivities.  Pinzon acknowledged that with respect to some 
of the contentious provisions, such as the right of U.S. 
personnel to carry weapons, current practice (which allows 
personnel to carry weapons) was working well.  He cautioned, 
however, that the GOC could not codify these practices in the 
DCA because of legal and political constraints.

¶4. (C) Jaramillo told us after the negotiations concluded 
that the U.S. was pressing for terms that the GOC simply 
could not deliver.  Insistence on these provisions could 
scuttle a deal, and jeopardize existing arrangements 
governing U.S. military personnel in Colombia.  Colombian 
Ambassador to the United States Carolina Barco told us 
submitting the deal to Congress in the run-up to Presidential 
and Congressional elections in 2010 could delay any agreement 
and turn relatively non-controversial current cooperation 
efforts into a political football. 

DCA DEBATED IN THE PRESS 
------------------------ 
¶5. (U) An April 17 editorial in Colombian daily "El 
Espectador" titled "The Mysterious Transfer of the Manta 
Base" argued that the DCA issues should be debated publicly 
and not in secrecy.  The editorial discounted statements by 
Foreign Minister Jaime Bermudez that the DCA were simply 
accords aimed at increasing long-standing bilateral 
counter-narcotics cooperation, arguing that "A U.S. base on 
Colombian soil and the transfer of war equipment designed to 
intimidate and exert pressure is no small matter."  Leading 
weekly "Semana" magazine carried an article on April 14 
titled "Gringo Military Bases in Colombia?" quoting 

ex-minister of Defense Rafael Pardo that it would be a 
diplomatic error to permit U.S. bases in Colombia, since such 
a move would compromise relations with Colombia's neighbors 
and, possibly, the region. 

GOC INSISTS ON QUID PRO QUO 
--------------------------- 
¶6. (C) Pinzon said his instructions were to proceed as 
quickly as possible on the DCA, but that progress on the DCA 
was ultimately linked to additional agreements on security 
assistance, such as GOC access to U.S. supplies and equipment 
in the event of a national emergency.  He noted such 
assistance would be needed to help the GOC sell the DCA to 
the Colombian public.  Pinzon indicated that the GOC would 
likely delay signing a DCA--if a final agreement on the text 
is reached--pending resolution of the new GOC requests (the 
so-called "Track II" issues.)  Jaramillo told us on April 16 
that the GOC's request for additional security commitments 
comes from President Uribe. 

NEXT STEPS 
---------- 
¶7. (C) Despite the obstacles, talks have progressed more 
rapidly than is normal for this type of agreement, and the 
delegations agreed to meet for a fourth round of DCA 
negotiations in Colombia on May 19-21.  The two sides also 
agreed to continue exchanging proposals on remaining 
bracketed text in the interim.  Ambassador Brownfield and 
Foreign Minister Jaime Bermudez discussed the status of the 
talks on April 14, along with the possibility of putting 
talks temporarily on hold (as current engagement continues) 
in the event we are unable to overcome remaining differences 
on "must have" provisions. 

¶8. (U) This cable was reviewed by Ambassador McDonald. 
BROWNFIELD 

=======================CABLE ENDS============================