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Viewing cable 09BEIJING1125, MEDIA REACTION: NORTH KOREA, IRAN, U.S. POLICY, DALAI

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BEIJING1125 2009-04-27 08:58 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Beijing
VZCZCXRO9564
RR RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #1125 1170858
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 270858Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3673
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RHMFIUU/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
UNCLAS BEIJING 001125 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/CM, EAP/PA, EAP/PD, C 
HQ PACOM FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR (J007) 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR CH PREL ECON
 
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: NORTH KOREA, IRAN, U.S. POLICY, DALAI 
 
-------------------- 
  Editorial Quotes 
-------------------- 
 
1. NORTH KOREA 
 
"Three doubts in North Korean issue" 
 
The official Communist Party international news publication Global 
Times (Huanqiu Shibao)(04/27): "There are three questions concerning 
North Korea's development of nuclear weapons. First, is it a goal or 
a method?  Second, concerning the nuclear crisis in North Korea, are 
we aimed at a non-nuclear peninsula or regional peace?  Third, is 
the objective of the Six Party Talks to promote regional peace or is 
it to press for a non-nuclear peninsula? ... In fact the Six-Party 
Talks process aims at realizing security at the price of North Korea 
giving up its nuclear programs. We don't know North Korea's real 
strategy. What's more, their strategy varies. Because nuclear 
weapons are important to North Korea's national security, in the 
future the country will not sincerely give up their nuclear 
programs. Second, India has developed nuclear weapons, and the U.S. 
has progressed from taking sanctions, to canceling these sanctions 
and then, finally supporting India's development of a civilian 
nuclear program. So, what is the role of nuclear non-proliferation 
in national security? Third, the Six-Party Talks process has a rough 
future. The manageable goal of the Talks is for North Korea to give 
up their nuclear program, but the larger goal should be regional 
peace." 
 
2. IRAN 
 
"Cutting nuclear weapons talks is a "test move"" 
 
The official intellectual publication Guangming Daily (Guangming 
Ribao)(04/27): "U.S. Assistant Secretary of State [Gottemoeller] and 
Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry Director [Antonov] conducted a 
meeting in Italy concerning the newly drafted treaty suggesting a 
decrease in U.S. strategic nuclear weapons.  The negotiation is very 
complex.  The U.S and Russia are unlikely to reach an agreement on 
decreasing their nuclear weapons and deploying an anti-missile 
system.  The U.S. and Russia will be sure to maintain a nuclear 
strength balance.  This will be the foundation for each country's 
bargaining position. Can Obama bring the U.S.-Russia relationship 
into a new era? This negotiation concerning limiting nuclear weapons 
surely will be a "test move"." 
 
3. U.S. POLICY 
 
"Are Obama's first 100 days a change or a gamble?" 
 
The official popular newspaper Beijing Youth Daily (Beijing 
Qingnianbao)04/27): "Supporters think that Obama has the strength to 
create change diplomatically through soft power.  Those who oppose 
Obama believe that he has traded national interests for his 
political gain.  Modesty is Obama's largest political "game piece." 
U.S. -China relations have trended positively since Obama took 
office. A major change in Obama's China policy is ceasing the 
criticism that China is an "exchange rate manipulator." Both the 
U.S. and China have sincerely agreed to work towards solutions to 
their divergent policies. The new balance of power has influenced 
the bilateral relationship. Because of the rise of China's strength, 
the U.S. can no longer conduct the relationship from a one-sided 
perspective. Within the first 100 days, Obama's support rate reached 
69%. However, his changing diplomacy has aroused some doubts. He has 
been criticized for trading national interests for other interests. 
Chinese experts have expressed support for his smart power 
diplomacy, but have also indicated the ambiguity in his Iraq policy, 
as well as the Afghanistan and North Korea issues." 
 
4. DALAI 
 
"Dalai wants to meet Obama in October" 
 
The official Xinhua News Agency international news publication 
International Herald Leader (Guoji Xianqu Daobao) (04/27): "Since 
the beginning of 2009, the Dalai's clique has stepped-up their 
global separatist activities.  On April 23, the Dalai arrived in the 
U.S.  While in the U.S., the Dalai hopes to attract the attention of 
President Obama.  Obama will be unwilling to condone actions 
unhelpful to the U.S.-China relationship because the U.S. needs 
China's cooperation and help a lot more than before. However, Obama 
will not do anything that is unbeneficial for the U.S. The U.S. 
Congress is likely to pressure Obama on this issue.  Therefore, it 
is possible that Obama may meet the Dalai in October amid 
pressure." 
 
PICCUTA