VZCZCXRO8390
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHBK #0862/01 0930455
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 030455Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6626
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 6403
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000862 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON PGOV ELAB SCUL TH
 
SUBJECT:  REGIONAL ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES HELP EXPLAIN 
THAILAND'S RED-YELLOW DIVIDE 
 
BANGKOK 00000862  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  The economic and social climates in the 
Northeastern and upper South regions in Thailand differ in important 
ways that may help explain their opposing political loyalties. 
Villages in the Northeast tend to struggle economically, export 
large numbers of working-age adults, and welcome government populist 
programs for the promise they bring to strengthen the economy. 
Villagers in the upper South, by contrast, have invested 
successfully in labor-intensive palm oil and rubber plantations. 
Local working-age adults tend to stay in the area, moving up to 
small handicraft and tourism sector jobs, while workers from the 
Northeast and Burma are brought in to provide the more menial 
agricultural labor.  Operating successfully without much 
intervention from Bangkok, villagers in the upper South have less 
enthusiasm for the government's populist programs.  Regional culture 
in the upper South, especially among large pockets of 
well-integrated Muslim communities, tends to prefer the status quo, 
while the Northeast is anxious for something better.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Comment:   Even a cursory look at Thailand's political map 
reveals that the "red vs. yellow" divide is not simply an urban 
(Bangkok)-rural split, though the dividing line does tend to run 
between those who are relatively better-off under the status quo, 
and those who are not.  The political division does become 
strikingly geographical at voting time because migrant workers, who 
are predominantly from the Northeast and are spread around the 
country, can generally only vote in their home villages.  While 
social and economic differences explain political loyalties in these 
regions to some extent, emotional and long standing provincial ties 
to different political factions are somewhat impervious to even the 
best efforts at government policy-making.  End comment. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) In recent trips to three provinces in Thailand's Northeast 
region and three others in the upper South, Econoff visited rural 
villages and government offices to gauge the impact of government 
programs on life beyond Bangkok.  Villages in Thailand vary greatly, 
from those where the elected village headman does not wear shoes to 
those where the village council welcomed Econoff to a Power Point 
presentation in the newly- constructed village hall.  The economic 
and cultural differences between the regions seem striking, and may 
help explain why the Northeast is predominantly "red" and continues 
to support ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatr, while the upper 
South favors the Democrat Party now in power and provided many 
"yellow" foot soldiers in the 2008 protests. 
 
Making a Living 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Northeast Thailand is Thailand's most highly populated 
region and also the most difficult economically.  Even with the 
relatively high agricultural prices during the past year, much of 
the wealth landed in the hands of the millers and brokers; not 
enough stayed in the villages to keep village families on the farm, 
Econoff was told.  During the March to May hot, dry season in 
particular, the land becomes parched, and working-age adults head to 
Bangkok and beyond in search of work.  Over the years, many have 
continued to reside in their newfound places of work, returning home 
only during the annual April New Year water festival.  The extended 
families who traditionally joined to work the rice paddies have 
given way to contract labor and mechanized planting, as many 
villages seem "hollowed out," inhabited mainly by children and the 
elderly. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The upper South, by contrast, has expanded palm oil and 
rubber plantations far beyond what locally-available labor could 
take care of and is a net importer of workers, mainly from the 
Northeast, but also from Burma.  The climate is different in the 
South, which has a second monsoon.  Palm oil and rubber plantations 
have complementary harvesting seasons, so there is year-round 
production.  The region also benefits from increased tourism.  Not 
only world-famous Phuket, but Samui Island and now Krabi boast 
direct air flights to Europe.  Unlike the Northeast which craves 
development, the Upper South, while not rich, is more satisfied 
economically.  A proposal for a Southern Seaboard industrialized 
land bridge to link the Gulf of Thailand with the Andaman Sea has 
languished on the drawing boards for decades.   Locals told Econoff 
that while it would boost GDP, it could also disrupt the landscape 
and the growth of eco-based tourism. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) While migrant labor moves freely between all regions in 
Thailand, the upper South tends to keep its talent home.  Villagers 
and officials told Econoff that menial labor, especially in 
agriculture, is increasingly turned over to Northeastern and Burmese 
workers and the locals have moved on to develop advanced year-round 
farming techniques for exotic fruits, such as the mangosteen, for 
international markets, OTOP village handicraft programs, and the 
tourist sector.  The Northeast, by contrast, sends away much of the 
working talent it would need to capitalize fully on development 
opportunities, making government assistance from Bangkok for those 
who remain in the villages all the more attractive. 
 
BANGKOK 00000862  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
Impact of Populist Programs 
 
¶7.  (SBU) When villagers in the Northeast explained to Econoff why 
Thaksin remains popular, despite allegations of the former Prime 
Minister's large-scale corruption, they typically said that Thai 
politicians have always been corrupt, but that Thaksin "gave some 
back" in the populist programs he initiated during his years in 
power.  The popularity of these programs--the 30 baht universal 
health care program, a revolving village entrepreneurship fund, 
bonus payments for teachers, agricultural price supports--is 
unquestioned; each government after Thaksin has continued and 
expanded them.  But in the Northeastern villages Econoff visited, at 
least, Thaksin continues to get all the credit for them. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The success of the programs varies.  In some villages, the 
USD 30,000 revolving fund appears well-managed, Econoff observed. 
Government rules stipulate that borrowers must repay loans with 
interest within a year and village committees vet loan applications 
and ensure repayment.  In other villages, the elders told Econoff it 
is too difficult to make decisions and so they divide up the fund 
among all families equally.  Some village leaders admit that some 
recipients have squandered the money on cell phones or motorcycles, 
and have had to take out higher interest loans from loan sharks to 
cover themselves, increasing their debt burden.  Some borrowers 
reportedly believed that the money was a gift from Thaksin and 
claimed they did not know it had to be re-paid.  In most all cases, 
particularly in the Northeast, village headmen and committees said 
they believe the fund is a good thing.  At the very least it 
develops management capacity among village leaders. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) In the upper South, enthusiasm for the village fund is not 
as high, but villagers there appreciate money from the government as 
much as people elsewhere.  One village head told Econoff, "We were 
suspicious at first, of course, because we knew the money came from 
Thaksin."  In explaining the village's political leanings, he told a 
local joke that they would vote for a telephone pole to represent 
them in Parliament so long as it was a member of the Democrat Party. 
 The Democrat Party's roots in the upper South go back decades.  One 
developer in Krabi attributed the province's prosperity in recent 
years to the opening of the international airport in the late 1990s, 
which he said was made possible by the efforts of former Democrat 
Party leader Chuan Leekpai (Prime Minister from 1992-95 and 
1997-2001) to pull together the necessary land parcels. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Views on the merits of the health care program are 
generally positive in both regions, Econoff found.  However, some 
villagers in the Upper South believe that the old program, under 
which people could buy a 500 baht (14 dollar) card and get medical 
care for a year, was better because lines were not so long back 
then.   Villagers everywhere complain about the long waiting lines 
under the new program (which Thaksin's successor governments have 
reduced to zero payment for all citizens not covered by other 
government health plans).  One villager said that the last time he 
went to the hospital he arrived at 6:00 a.m., but there were already 
200 people there and he did not get seen that day.  He had to sleep 
over in the waiting room to be seen the following day.  Local 
hospital figures show that patient visits are up 50 percent since 
medical care has been provided free of charge. 
 
Cultural and Religious Differences 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Northeast Thailand is solidly Buddhist.  Some villages 
have their own Buddhist temples and resident monks.  A key priority 
for all village leaders is to arrange for access to monks for the 
villagers for instruction, opportunities for merit-making, and 
performance of rituals.  Monks joined Econoff's discussion with a 
village head in Mahasarakham province.  They spoke at length, 
however, about the challenges of promoting religious observance when 
traditional mores are breaking down.  Young women are willing to 
sleep with men to get money to buy cell phones.  Some villages have 
serious drug abuse problems.  There is a debate going on as to 
whether the monkhood should continue to sponsor highly popular 
festivals at the temples, knowing that on those occasions in 
particular alcohol consumption will soar, or whether they should 
"return to the basics" and stress asceticism and devotion, knowing 
that approach would make the religion less popular.  Facing these 
challenges, government programs that offer the possibility of 
strengthening village life and the local economy are much 
appreciated. 
 
¶12.   (SBU) The upper South, particularly in provinces along the 
Andaman coast, is perhaps half Muslim.  Unlike their cousins in the 
deep South, these Muslims do not speak Malay and are well- 
integrated into Thai society.  (Note: Separately, we have heard that 
numbers of Muslim Malay families have been moving to the upper South 
from the deep South to escape the poor security situation there.) 
Econoff was told that many children in Muslim villages attend 
 
BANGKOK 00000862  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
evening classes to learn about their faith, but they attend regular 
Thai schools and consider themselves fully Thai.  In his interaction 
with them, Econoff found that had not some of the women worn 
head-scarves, there would have been nothing to indicate that these 
Muslim Thai were any different from Buddhist Thai elsewhere.  Among 
the Buddhists in the area, the Muslims have a reputation as good 
business people, if small-scale.  One Muslim village in Krabi 
province is expanding its home-stay business, where mainly Western 
tourists have made reservations on-line and can choose between 
eco-tour days spent harvesting rubber or going out on fishing boats. 
 Provincial economic planners working on the Southern Land Bridge 
told Econoff, however, that Muslim villages are not interested in 
relocating or taking in new industry that would threaten their 
family-based local culture.  Buddhist villages are more willing to 
uproot and consider taking jobs in the industrial sector, "if that 
would be good for the development of the country." 
 
JOHN