VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #0969/01 0981333
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 081333Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2609
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000969 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: IZ ECON PGOV PREL EAID
SUBJECT: IMPROVING COORDINATION: SCIENTIAL GLOBAL STUDY ON 
IRAQI MINISTERIAL CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT 
 
¶1.  Summary: The recently completed assessment of U.S. 
capacity development (CD) programs in Iraq by the independent 
consultant Scientia Global, Inc. calls for stronger 
coordination among the ministerial advisors, a comprehensive 
strategic framework, metrics for measuring progress, support 
for sustainment and transition plans, and reinforcement of 
Iraqi buy-in.  We have been implementing many of the changes 
recommended in this post-initiated study for some time and 
have begun work on others.  Among them is improving 
coordination and planning by organizing ministerial working 
groups, preparing work plans to guide their efforts, and 
ensuring their work supports the Joint Campaign Plan (JCP) 
and the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA). One of the 
report's main recommendations we do not go along with is the 
proposal to develop an overarching CD strategic plan and a 
new management structure to carry it out.  While such an 
approach may have had merit when we were pursuing a variety 
of CD programs, it has less to commend itself now that many 
of these programs are phasing out and the remaining ones are 
implemented almost entirely through USAID.  In our view, 
stronger coordination using our existing frameworks offers a 
better way forward.  Our internal working groups to support 
implementation of the Strategic Framework Agreement will 
support these efforts.  We believe the approach outlined here 
offers a feasible and effective way to assist efforts aimed 
at building the capacity of Iraq's ministries to manage 
projects, execute budgets, and deliver services to the Iraqi 
people.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------ 
Assessing Capacity Development 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2. In a report issued January 30, 2007, the Special Inspector 
General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) concluded there was a 
need for more effective support for capacity development 
(CD).  In response to these concerns and our ongoing efforts 
to improve coordination among our wide-ranging CD program, 
post commissioned Scientia Global, Inc. to carry out a 
five-month Iraq Ministerial Capacity Development Assessment. 
Starting its work in September, Scientia looked at various CD 
programs aimed at improving both public administration 
(training, mentoring) and technical support (operations and 
maintenance).  It assessed more than 125 CD programs and 
projects in ten targeted ministries.  It determined that over 
$600 million had been spent on these activities since 2004. 
Scientia conducted a comprehensive survey soliciting USG and 
Iraqi opinions. 
 
------------------------ 
Coordination and Metrics 
------------------------ 
 
¶3.  Scientia noted overall improvement in operations of 
various ministries between 2006-2008, including increased 
power generation output at power plants supported by USG O&M 
and improvements in budget execution.  It also recognized 
that while USG CD programs have been well received and 
valued, it is beyond our means to satisfy all CD needs of the 
Iraqi government.  Communication and coordination among USG 
agencies were cited as "primary concern" and "overriding 
theme" of the assessment.  It criticized the lack of impact 
indicator metrics at the overall program level and concluded 
that metrics for advisor activities were poorly documented. 
Scientia called for a unified set of metrics, including 
baselines, tied to a single interagency CD strategy 
independent of project metrics.  For example, it commended 
the efforts of USAID's Tatweer program in its use of metrics 
at the output and outcome levels, but noted that these 
Qat the output and outcome levels, but noted that these 
metrics did not capture all USG CD efforts.  While 
acknowledging that coordinating bodies do exist, Scientia 
concluded that the USG CD efforts lack an entity with the 
requisite authority to direct the efforts of multiple USG 
agencies. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Single Interagency Strategy Needed 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  A key conclusion in Scientia's report is that CD programs 
need clear strategic CD goals. It did not believe that the 
mission's Joint Campaign Plan or the bilateral Strategic 
Framework Agreement adequately defines those goals.  While 
noting that the JCP includes metrics for measuring success 
and identifying targets, it determined that it does not link 
these metrics to agency-specific strategies. It argued 
instead for a single strategic planning framework to direct 
all CD activities. 
 
¶5.  Scientia also urged putting in place a stronger 
coordination process.  It saw the Embassy's Ministerial 
Engagement Coordination Committee (MECC) as a valuable forum 
 
for general inter-ministerial information sharing, but argued 
for a more formal mechanism to manage intra-ministerial 
coordination.  It noted that the MECC establishes indices and 
baseline data, but does not tie them to tasks required to 
support a broader CD strategy.  Scientia called for 
restructuring the MECC to direct policy, strategic direction, 
and management of all CD programs. 
 
¶6.  Other recommendations in Scientia's report included 
preparing a transition plan for "sunset organizations" and a 
common definition for CD; formalizing Iraqi ownership and 
involvement; developing sustainment plans, including details 
on training follow-up; nurturing professional ties with Iraqi 
ministries; encouraging Iraqi engagement of international 
consulting firms or establishment of joint ventures; and 
compiling an inventory of ministerial engagement projects. 
Finally, Scientia urged that sufficient resources be made 
available to implement its recommendations. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Capacity Development: Next Steps 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  We concur with many of Scientia's recommendations and are 
already implementing many of them.  We are developing 
transition plans for "sunset programs."  We are working to 
reinforce Iraqi buy-in and consolidate strong professional 
relationships with Iraqi ministries.  We are supporting 
efforts to hire international legal and consulting services 
for Iraqi ministries (e.g., by retaining on the Ministry of 
Electricity's behalf the services of a leading international 
law firm to negotiate a variety of rehabilitation 
transactions and provide legal mentoring).  We will continue 
our efforts on these fronts and aim to implement best 
practices across all ministries. 
 
¶8.  We also agree on the need to avoid stove piping and to 
clearly link CD programs to broader goals of the mission. 
However, rather than attempting to devise a single, 
overarching strategic framework with difficult-to-define 
metrics, we believe a better approach lies in improving 
planning and coordination among our teams of advisors in 
individual ministries and ensuring their work supports the 
strategy defined in the JCP and SFA.  We want to avoid a 
laborious effort to design and impose a new bureaucratic 
structure and instead focus on ensuring that work plans are 
cross-referenced and support our broader strategies. 
 
¶9.  Another concern we have with Scientia's proposal for a 
new centrally directed planning and management framework is 
that it is not needed.  In the past, our CD efforts consisted 
of many different programs implemented by various agencies 
represented within the mission.  USAID handled Tatweer, the 
largest of them, but also was responsible for others.  The 
Iraq Transition Assistance Office (ITAO) implemented the 
Ministry of Electricity's Operations, Maintenance and 
Sustainability (OMS) program and had many advisors providing 
technical assistance in various ministries.  DOD's Task Force 
on Business Stability Operations runs the Procurement 
Assistance Program.  Until recently, six 3161 advisors were 
attached to the Economic Section. 
 
¶10.  But this situation is changing.  ITAO's OMS program has 
already been transferred to the Ministry of Electricity. 
With the exception of USAID's programs, the rest are due to 
be phased out or transformed into Iraqi-led efforts within 
the next year or two.  We are seeking funding to continue 
substantial support for CD programs, at least through fiscal 
year 2010.  For the most part, implementation will be in the 
hands of USAID, which already has effective procedures in 
Qhands of USAID, which already has effective procedures in 
place for planning, metrics, and management control. 
 
¶11. Still, we believe we need to improve our planning and 
coordination of our existing CD programs, but that a less 
centrally directed and more collaborative approach is 
warranted.  To achieve this, we are moving to implement a 
three-track approach.  First, we are following through on a 
new initiative to improve coordination among the advisors 
working with the individual ministries.  Under the direction 
of the Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq, we are 
convening advisors within each ministry to discuss strategic 
goals and develop work plans.  The Embassy's Agriculture 
Working Group and Public Finance Management Action Group 
(PFMAG) are already in place.  Advisors working on oil issues 
have expanded their existing weekly meeting to coordinate 
their work.  The advisors to the Ministry of Electricity are 
now meeting regularly.  Initial meetings have taken place 
bringing advisors together working with the Ministry of 
Planning and the National Investment Commission.  In the 
future, the agenda of the PFMAG will be expanded to include 
coordination on issues involving advisors to the planning 
ministry. 
 
 
¶12.  Second, we will continue to use the larger MECC forum to 
facilitate inter-ministerial coordination.  The MECC will 
continue to play an important role in exchanging information 
and sharing lessons learned and best practices on 
cross-cutting issues.  The MECC can also be used to identify 
programmatic gaps and duplications. 
 
¶13.  Third, a small group of MECC principals will meet 
regularly as needed. Participants will be the section heads 
responsible for CD programs (USAID, ITAO, Treasury, etc). 
They will oversee the coordination of the individual 
ministerial teams, ensure consistency in plans prepared by 
their program units, and provide overall guidance. 
 
¶14.  Our new internal SFA working groups under the Joint 
Coordinating Committees for Economics and Energy and for 
Essential Services and IT will support our CD efforts.  Work 
plans for these groups will encourage coordination and 
information-sharing among the advisors in individual 
ministries.  The plans will outline deliverables, assign 
roles and responsibilities for advisors, provide for more 
effective communication with Iraqi counterparts, and ensure 
consistency with the JCP and SFA. 
 
¶15.  CD encompasses broad issues of technical training, 
mentoring, and institution-building; it is the means and not 
the ends to achieving our goals. By implementing this 
three-track approach and using the structure of the SFA to 
strengthen internal coordination, we will improve delivery of 
CD assistance, thus enabling Iraq's ministries more 
effectively to manage and sustain their programs. 
BUTENIS