VZCZCXRO2255
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0959/01 0980746
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 080746Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2587
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0058
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0148
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0083
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0776

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000959 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/I, OES/ENRC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EAID SOCI SENV EWWT KGHG IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI MARSHES STRUGGLING TO MAKE A COMEBACK (PART 
1 OF 2) 
 
REF: 07 BAGHDAD 3796 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) Iraq's marshes have been in trouble for a long time. 
 Considering the marshes to be a waste of land and a breeding 
ground for mosquitoes, early British plans called for the 
near complete drying out of the marshes.  By 1990, the marsh 
area had already been reduced by 50%.  Saddam greatly 
accelerated the process following the First Gulf War, 
ultimately drying out 90% of the marshes.  Iraq has only one 
water sharing agreement with its neighbors and major upstream 
projects continue to erode its share of the Tigris' and 
Euphrates' flow.  Iraq has a widely vetted plan to restore 
the marshes to 75% of their 1972 area.  Despite the marshes 
impressive natural capacity to regenerate, however, limited 
water resources and poor economic follow-up threaten the 
plan's ultimate success.  This cable is the first of a 
two-part series on the Iraqi marshes.  End summary. 
 
------------------------------- 
Why Are the Marshes in Trouble? 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The southern marsh region of Iraq had three distinct 
but interconnected marshes until late in the 20th century: 
the Hawizeh Marsh on the Iranian border, fed by the Tigris 
from Iraq and several smaller rivers from Iran; the Hammar 
Marsh stretching along the southern Euphrates before it 
empties into the Shatt Al-Arab; and the Central Marsh, a 
60-kilometer wide shallow sheet of water flowing south from 
the Tigris to the Euphrates.  In the 1970s, approximately 
400,000 Madan, or Marsh Arabs, lived in the three marshes 
which altogether covered over 8,000 square kilometers. 
Considering the marshes to be a waste of land and a breeding 
ground for mosquitoes, the British introduced ambitious plans 
for land reclamation and water management in 1951, which were 
further refined by more detailed Russian plans in 1982. 
These early plans, which still largely guide the development 
of Iraq's major water management infrastructure projects, 
called for the near complete drying out of the marshes. 
There have been variations from the original plan, including 
numerous projects launched for tactical reasons in the 
Iran-Iraq War, and others to facilitate oil exploration and 
extraction.  However, none was more environmentally damaging 
or internationally controversial than the 1991-94 "Glory 
River" project implemented to dry out the Central Marsh. 
 
--------------- 
Saddam's Damage 
--------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Iraqi marshes began drying out long before 1991. 
 While Saddam greatly accelerated the process following the 
First Gulf War, comparison of satellite imagery from 1972 and 
1990 shows that each of the three marshes had already 
decreased by about 50% before the Gulf War began.  Then, 
under Saddam's rushed and environmentally thuggish "Glory 
River" project, the GOI built a 100 km-long, 2 km-wide canal 
that channeled the Tigris River around the Central Marsh.  As 
a result, by 1994, the Central and Hammar Marshes were almost 
completely dry.  By 2003, the Hawizeh Marsh had been reduced 
to a quarter of its original size, leaving a total marsh area 
of only 750 square kilometers, down over 90% from 1972. 
(Note: Since the Hawizeh marsh never completely dried out, it 
makes a convenient seedbed from which flora and fauna can be 
transplanted into the dried Central and Hammar marshes.  The 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) identified this 
possibility immediately in 2003 and took steps to ensure 
Qpossibility immediately in 2003 and took steps to ensure 
water continued to flow into the Hawizeh marsh.  End note.) 
 
----------------- 
Less Water Inflow 
----------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Water projects in the marsh area are only part of 
the reason for the demise of the marshes.  A second 
significant problem is that today, Iraq just doesn't receive 
as much water as it used to.  While droughts in recent years 
have captured headlines, the lack of water is a more profound 
political and structural issue.  Most of Iraq's surface water 
comes from upstream sources in Turkey and Syria, with a small 
amount from Iran's Karkeh River, which has recently been 
 
BAGHDAD 00000959  002 OF 004 
 
 
diverted.  Despite this reliance on water whose source is in 
other countries, Iraq currently only has one water sharing 
agreement, that with Syria regarding shared usage of the 
Euphrates River.  Iraq has actively pursued dialogue with its 
neighboring countries over the past three years on water 
sharing, but has made little tangible progress.  The Iraqi 
Minister of Water Resources, Dr. Abdul Latif Rashid, made a 
visit to Turkey in June 2008, where he requested and received 
a small amount of additional flow in 2008.  However, this 
will not have a significant impact on the marshes' revival. 
The Tripartite Technical Commission for Water Resources, 
established between Turkey and Iraq in 1980 and joined by 
Syria in 1983, met for the first time in over 20 years in 
February.  Results, however, were little more than symbolic. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The annual volume of water flowing from the Tigris 
and Euphrates into the marsh region dropped by almost 40% 
between 1970 and 2000 due to the large number of water 
management projects built upstream.  Equally detrimental to 
the health and extent of the marshes was the loss of the 
yearly "pulse" of flood water caused by the spring melt in 
northern Iraq and Turkey.  With Turkey and Iraq continuing to 
build large dams, further reduction in annual flow volume to 
the marshes is inevitable unless (a) additional regional 
water sharing agreements are established; (b) Iraq improves 
its water usage efficiency; or (c) Iraq decisively alters its 
water allocation among agriculture, drinking water, and 
environmental demands like the marshes. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Wide Agreement on Iraq's Technical Plans... 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) EmbOffs and Dhi Qar PRT met on 12 November 2008 with 
MoWR Provincial DG Abdul Al-Kazim, the NGO Nature Iraq's 
in-country Director Dr. Jasim Al-Asadi, and Dhi Qar 
University's Marsh Research Center Manager Dr. Talib Hussein. 
 They described in detail the integrated plan for water 
management in the marsh region:  A main inlet regulator to be 
built on the north end of the Central Marsh (vicinity PV 88 
86) will allow up to 270 cubic meters per second (m3/s) of 
Tigris water to flow into the marsh.  Another main regulator 
for the Hammar Marsh (vicinity PV 66 24) will allow inlet 
flow up to 320 m3/s.  The system contains 11 other regulators 
of varying capacity as well as more than 50 control gates. 
The system's design is based not only on managing flow 
volume, but also water quality by balancing the amount of 
irrigation drain water and clean water ("sweet water") 
released into the marsh.  The system is also designed to try 
to mimic the spring pulse of melt water. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Of greatest interest, Kazim, Al-Asadi, and Hussein 
-- who represent two different GOI ministries and an NGO -- 
were in complete agreement on the system's design and on the 
GOI's marsh restoration goals.  When asked directly, Kazim 
said, "You can talk to anyone who has been working on marsh 
issues and you will see that we agree with this general 
plan."  Most of the marsh areas that will not be re-flooded 
are either now populated with small towns, as is the case 
along the entire north side of the Central Marsh, or reserved 
for oil exploration and recovery, including the West Qurna 1 
and 2 oil fields, he said.  "When drying out the Central 
Marsh, Saddam dictated where many people would be relocated 
QMarsh, Saddam dictated where many people would be relocated 
by restricting their ration card access," said Al-Asadi. 
"But you should also note that many people just moved in with 
relatives in Baghdad, especially Sadr City, or fled to Iran." 
 (Note:  Al-Kazim, Al-Asadi, and Hussein did not know how 
many of the approximately 150,000 people that have returned 
to the marshes since 2003 were from Sadr City or Iran.  End 
note.) 
 
¶8. (SBU) The Ministry of Water Resources Director General of 
the Center for the Restoration of the Iraqi Marshes (CRIM), 
Abdul Kadhem Lahmood, corroborated these remarks in his 
meeting with EmbOffs on March 18 in Baghdad, and added that 
such widespread agreement "had been achieved because of 
science and engineering, not negotiation."  "We considered a 
range of plans, all the way from getting rid of the marshes 
entirely, to 25% restoration, 50% restoration, or even 75% -- 
engineering tells us there is adequate water resources to 
restore 75% of the marsh area," he said; "5,592 square 
kilometers," including restoring sheet flow in the southern 
part of the Central marsh.  Construction began in December 
2008 on many of the regulators and gates and the MoWR plans 
to finish construction of the entire system in 2010.  MoWR 
 
BAGHDAD 00000959  003 OF 004 
 
 
will pay the approximately 120 billion ID (approximately 100 
million USD) for the system, he said. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
...But Little Agreement on Economic Plans for the Marsh 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) In contrast to Iraq's success thus far in water 
management planning for the marsh region, there is far less 
evidence of cooperative planning for economic development. 
While CRIM's interest in the marshes extends far beyond water 
resource issues, their expertise unfortunately does not. 
Noting that GOI priorities for the marsh region are, first, 
restoration, and second, employment, Kadhem said, "Anyone 
seeking marsh restoration should help us prepare the land 
adjacent to the marshes with housing and agricultural 
development."  He cited two particular marsh region housing 
projects under consideration:  One, funded by the Dutch and 
Swedish Governments in the Hawizeh marsh, which, he admits, 
is still in the discussion phase.  The second is a plan for 
5,000 "special marsh homes," phase one of which would consist 
of 1,000 homes to be built in the south region of the Central 
marsh.  The design is complete and construction has begun, 
based on grants arranged through the Marsh Restoration 
Committee, he said.  When asked, Kadhem claimed that he did 
not know who was funding the project. (Note:  This is perhaps 
a pilot project for the NGO Nature Iraq's (NI) "Eden Again" 
plan to build eco-friendly villages for returning Marsh Arabs 
in the vicinity of the village of Chubayish (septel).  NI has 
been searching for donors for this project for several years, 
but the Embassy is not aware of any having stepped forward. 
End note.) 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Water Supply--The Long Pole in the Tent 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) While there is noteworthy agreement on the water 
management system design, the actual water available to the 
marshes is a more controversial topic.  Nature Iraq's Alwash 
is not fully convinced of MoWR's will to provide sufficient 
water resources.  "I will take whatever water they can give 
us--drainage water, salty water, even brackish water," he 
said.  Alwash also claims there is more than enough water for 
all of Iraq's needs if MoWR properly utilizes its water 
resources.  (Note: Reftel, approximately 90% of Iraq's water 
usage goes to irrigation.  End note.)  When asked, CRIM DG 
Kadhem claimed that the ministry's water supply calculations 
in support of the 75% restoration goal are based on 
conditions of normal rainfall and took into account projected 
upstream water consumption in Iraq, Turkey, and Syria. 
"While we of course seek improved water sharing arrangements 
with our neighbors, our present plan, assuming normal 
rainfall, will provide enough water to achieve our goal of 
75% marsh restoration," he said.  "The Hawizeh marsh is a 
RAMSAR site, so there should be some regional or 
international obligation to help protect it."  (Note:  The 
Hawizeh Marsh was declared a RAMSAR Convention on Wetlands 
site in February 2008.  Embassy water experts agree that 
there will be insufficient water supply to achieve the 75% 
restoration goal and that the GOI will likely use the marshes 
and their investment in  marsh water management structures as 
a bargaining tool to apply international pressure to Syria 
and Turkey to expand Iraq's share of the Tigris and Euphrates 
Qand Turkey to expand Iraq's share of the Tigris and Euphrates 
flow.  End note.) 
 
--------------- 
Drought Effects 
--------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) According to both CRIM and Nature Iraq, Iraq's 
present drought has reduced the marsh area to approximately 
40% of its 1970 size, a significant reduction from the United 
Nations Environment Program's pre-drought estimate of 58% 
restoration in December 2006.  Alwash told EmbOff that NI met 
with MoWR officials in February and presented detailed plans 
for temporary structures on the Euphrates to prevent further 
drought damage to the Hammar and Central marshes.  Recent 
international media reports are also creating pressure on the 
MoWR for near-term remediation of the drought's effects. 
Kadhem said the drought, while unfortunate, "is the way life 
has always been in the marshes."  When the water level in the 
marsh changes, people move their homes, he said.  "Some are 
using this unfortunate situation to push their own agenda," 
he lamented. 
 
BAGHDAD 00000959  004 OF 004 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Part Two:  Who's Who in Marshland Restoration 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Despite Iraq's lack of coordination between the 
central and provincial governments, well over 100,000 Iraqis 
have returned to the marsh area, and it is possible many more 
will follow if an adequate system of social services is 
established.  The second of this two-cable series will review 
the various GOI, international, and USG efforts to help 
restore the Iraqi marshes.  Embassy believes that the South 
Florida Water Management District (SFWMD--lead agency for 
Everglades restoration) can make a unique contribution to 
Iraq's efforts, based on the Iraqi marshland's striking 
resemblance to the experience of the Florida Everglades. 
BUTENIS