VZCZCXRO0995
OO RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTH #0683/01 1181426
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 281427Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0119
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 000683 
 
SIPDIS 
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA 
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG 
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA 
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/04/28 
TAGS: PTER ASEC ABLD PREL KCRM GR
SUBJECT: GREEK LAW ENFORCEMENT FACES BIG HURDLES IN MEETING TERRORIST 
CHALLENGE 
 
REF: ATHENS 214; ATHENS 114 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel V. Speckhard, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
Summary 
------- 

¶1. (C) As domestic terrorist groups and violent anarchist gangs 
continue the heightened level of activity that they initiated 
following the December 2008 riots, Greek law enforcement is looking 
for help.  At the request of the Greek Ministry of Interior, 
Scotland Yard recently conducted an assessment that identified 
weaknesses ranging from the strategic (the lack of a Greek 
interagency counterterrorism plan) to the logistical (poor sharing 
of investigative resources between units) to the tactical 
(inadequate use of surveillance cameras).   Many of these 
shortcomings can be explained by Greek legislation, which severely 
constrains law enforcement, and by a political context in which 
leaders have an ingrained reluctance to support tougher law 
enforcement.  While we have found Greek law enforcement officials 
to be good partners in many cases, it is likely that their 
weaknesses in capacity and coordination increase the security 
threat faced by Embassy Athens and Americans in Greece.  End 
Summary. 
 
Reaching Out, Getting Tough Messages Back 
----------------------------------------- 

¶2. (C) As post laid out in ref B in January, Greek law enforcement 
faces severe constraints in its ability to deal with the security 
challenges it faces from domestic terrorist organizations, 
increasingly violent anarchist gangs, and the huge and increasing 
influx of illegal aliens who use Greece as an entry point into the 
European Union.  In our own work with Greek law enforcement 
officers on specific cases, we have found them open to cooperation 
and eager to adopt advanced international practices where they can. 
There have been some success stories, most notably in the run-up to 
the 2004 Olympics, when the USG and others supported a significant 
training program that did increase the professional level of law 
enforcement.  But the riots late last year, which followed the 
accidental police shooting of a teenage protester and which law 
enforcement officers were unable (or not permitted) to contain, 
demonstrated the continued gulf between the size of the threat and 
the capacity of Greek law enforcement.  Since January, the news has 
not gotten any better.  As post has reported, terrorist groups both 
old and new have struck with increasing regularity, and 
anarchist-aligned gangs have become bolder in carrying out 
firebombings, daylight crowbar rampages in posh neighborhoods, 
arson, and other violence.  Banks, other businesses, and government 
facilities are the most common targets, but the attacks have 
recently branched out to include a number of churches in Athens and 
Thessaloniki April 9.  Law enforcement agencies, meanwhile, have 
been subjected to one public embarrassment after another, including 
leaked documents, prison escapes, and the February 4 shooting of a 
contract security guard outside the U.S. Ambassador's residence by 
an apparently deranged police officer. 
 
¶3. (C) In response to growing concern over the level of violence, 
Constantinos Bitsios was brought into the position of Secretary 
General of the Ministry of Interior.  Previously the diplomatic 
advisor to Prime Minister Karamanlis, Bitsios is well-connected 
both within the government and with the international community, 
and he appears to have a mandate to improve the conduct of Greek 
law enforcement.  Bitsios has reached out to a number of Embassies 
for recommendations and assistance.  The most prominent response 
thus far has been from the British, who brought in Scotland Yard 
experts to conduct an assessment of Greece's counterterrorism 
posture.  The resulting report, shared with Bitsios and separately 
with us in late March, identifies weaknesses at a variety of 
levels.  It concludes that Greece lacks a "coordinated government 
CT strategy" and in particular lacks a media campaign to deliver 
key messages.  It notes that Greek legislation places far more 
constraints on investigations than is typical for European law 
enforcement agencies, including in the use of technical 
surveillance, access to financial and communications data, and 
biometric data.  It also identifies the existence of three 
different departments within the Greek police, who deal 
individually with international terrorism, domestic terrorism, and 
anarchist groups, without a plan for sharing of resources or 
information, as a key weakness in terms of operational activity. 
 
¶4. (C) In briefing us on the report, British Embassy law 
enforcement liaison Kevin O'Shea said that although the British 
wanted to help Greek law enforcement where they could, they did not 
foresee Scotland Yard launching a long-term project as Greek press 
reports had suggested.  O'Shea said this was partly because of 
British budgetary constraints, but also because in his view most of 
the fundamental weaknesses in Greek law enforcement were grounded 
in legislation and unlikely to change in the short term.  Of the 
areas assessed, O'Shea predicted the British were most likely to 
end up working with the Greeks on an overall counterterrorism 
strategy.  The British have also stayed in close touch with us, the 
Dutch, and other countries the Greeks have approached, making 
practical suggestions such as encouraging the Dutch to look into 
supporting public prosecutor training. 
 
Lessons from the Past; Implications for the Future 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 

¶5. (SBU)  We have a relatively good working relationship with Greek 
law enforcement officials, and have found them open to new concepts 
and to working with us on specific cases in which there are U.S. 
interests.  We have provided different kinds of training at 
different times, although in many cases that training is now 
getting old.  The training before the 2004 Olympics, especially the 
1,450 Greek officers trained by DS/ATA from 2002 to 2004, had a 
significant impact, contributing to a substantial improvement in 
public views of law enforcement.  Even today, despite the ongoing 
difficulties, most Greeks would admit (even if grudgingly) that 
today's police force is better than that of a generation or two 
ago.  While we have not conducted police training on that scale 
since the Olympics, Embassy LEGAT has provided training to nearly 
200 police officers and 50 military personnel over the past 18 
months, most of them specifically in counterterrorism-related 
topics.  In the last year, DHS/ICE trained 120 Greek police, 
immigration, and customs officials in the areas of human 
trafficking, counterfeit document detection, and cyber crime. 
Since September 2008, DEA has trained about 300 Greek police, Coast 
Guard, and Special Control Service officials on undercover 
operations and related topics. 
 
¶6. (C) Nevertheless, Greek law enforcement officials face legal, 
political, and organizational challenges that limit their ability 
to disrupt and roll up terrorist organizations.  For example, they 
have made no arrests of members of Revolutionary Struggle (RS), the 
group that launched the RPG at the Embassy in January 2007, and RS 
has been one of the leading participants in the latest round of 
violence.  These limitations have a number of consequences, 
including one of special concern to us: an increased security risk 
to the Mission.  We have not been targeted in recent violence, 
although some American companies (most notably Citibank) have been. 
Given the deep-seated anti-Americanism of the Greek far left, and 
these groups' past targeting of the U.S., the danger that they will 
turn their sights to us is very real.  The current generation of 
Greek terrorists has thus far managed to avoid any significant 
arrests; they may believe they can act with impunity.  Unless Greek 
law enforcement is able to break up some of these groups at this 
stage, we and other potential targets in Greece will face a 
continuously more skilled and extensive terrorist threat. 
 
¶7. (SBU) As outlined in ref A, post recommends re-starting a DS/ATA 
program, as was done prior to the 2004 Olympics, to strengthen the 
capacity of Greek law enforcement bodies to deal with the 
significant threats they faces and which also threaten U.S. 
interests.  It would begin with an assessment of Greece's 
counterterrorism needs, and subsequent training would focus on such 
areas as SWAT, explosive ordnance demolition (EOD), political 
violence, hostage negotiations, and major case management. 
 
 
  
SPECKHARD