VZCZCXRO8316
OO RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTH #0657/01 1141239
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 241240Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0104
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0016
RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE 0001
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ATHENS 000657 
 
SIPDIS 
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA 
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG 
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA 
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/04/24 
TAGS: PREL GR PGOV NATO AF KNNP MK UN OSCE
SUBJECT: Re-Shaping the U.S.-Greece Relationship 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Lesley Acs, POL OMS, State Department, Political 
Section; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  The overwhelming positive attitudes of the Greek 
public toward the new Administration offers an opportunity to 
reshape U.S.-Greece bilateral relations, moving Greece from a 
reluctant to reliable and proactive partner.  To achieve this, we 
need to move the focus of our relationship from the more parochial 
regional problems to the broader common strategic interests and 
challenges.  We propose a two-stage approach combined with 
ambitious senior-level engagement.  Stage one will focus on 
resolving -- quickly -- bilateral issues that are high visibility 
and high value for both sides, including Greek inclusion in the 
Visa Waiver Program and increased Greek contributions in 
Afghanistan.  In stage two, we will work cooperatively on strategic 
interests, such as support for Turkey's EU course, counterterrorism 
and non-proliferation, and Balkan stability.  The Macedonia name 
issue, Aegean tensions, and the Cyprus problem will remain 
significant, as will the New Democracy government's razor- thin 
majority (bringing the prospect of early elections).  But these 
hurdles should not block us from achieving our goal of re-defining 
the bilateral relationship on a more positive and strategic 
direction.  We recommend immediate and visible re-engagement by 
U.S. policy makers, building on the Secretary's meeting with FM 
Bakoyiannis in February and the President's meeting with PM 
Karamanlis in April.  Our recommendations follow in paragraph 7. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
OUR GOALS 
 
¶2.  (C)  The change of administration -- and the historic shift in 
European public attitudes toward the U.S. -- offers us an 
opportunity to dramatically reshape the U.S.-Greece relationship. 
Our goals are: 
 
-- To solidify these new attitudes toward the President and 
translate them into positive engagement with the United States; 
-- To move Greece from a quiet and reluctant ally to a strong, 
reliable, and pro-active partner; 
-- To discourage comparisons with the level of U.S.-Turkish 
engagement; 
-- To focus on strategic challenges we have in common 
(counter-terrorism, Afghanistan, Turkey's EU membership, energy 
security, economic recovery); and 
-- To move away from a relationship centered on Aegean disputes, 
Cyprus, Macedonia - while continuing strong, sustained support for 
resolution of these issues. 
 
A TWO-STAGE APPROACH 
 
¶3.  (C)  To achieve these goals, we propose a two-stage approach, 
combined with an ambitious schedule of senior-level engagement to 
maintain and build on the new momentum.  In stage one, we will push 
for quick resolution of bilateral issues that are high-visibility 
and high-value and highlight the benefits to both sides of a 
renewed partnership.  These are: 
 
-- Visa Waiver Program:  We are in the final stages, with a Greek 
team coming to Washington in early May.  The Secretary has 
expressed her interest in seeing this done expeditiously and the 
DHS Assistant Secretary supports the goal of concluding by 
mid-summer.  Removing this visa requirement would have a far- 
reaching impact on Greeks and public attitudes toward the U.S. 
-- U.S.-EU Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements:  We 
are close to resolving minor inconsistencies in interpretations of 
Treaty language and should be in a position to move this through 
Parliament by early summer.  This would send a strong signal of 
Greece's willingness to improve cooperation and remove an 
impediment to EU ratification prior to the next US-EU Summit. 
-- Afghanistan Contributions:  Greek MOD officials have committed 
to increasing contributions to Alliance efforts in Afghanistan and 
Hellenic Aid has made it their second-highest priority.   This is a 
tangible and significant turn-around, given the generally weak 
public support for NATO operations. 
 
¶4.  (C)  In stage two, we should look to other important areas 
where Greece can be a productive partner.  These include the 
following priorities: 
 
-- Support for Turkey's EU perspective:  Turkey's EU perspective is 
 
ATHENS 00000657  002 OF 003 
 
 
key to both regional stability and our outreach to the Muslim 
world.  Greece is a major supporter of Turkey's EU accession 
aspirations.  We need to work closely with Greece to keep the EU 
door open. 
-- Counterterrorism and non-proliferation:  Greece is being 
buffeted by a resurgence of domestic terrorism and is the leading 
entry point into the EU for migrants from the Middle East, 
Afghanistan, and Pakistan - raising its role in combating 
international terrorism.  With one-sixth of the world's merchant 
shipping Greek-owned, and Greek military ships involved in EU and 
NATO operations, Greece can also play an important role in 
countering proliferation.  We should increase our counter-terrorism 
assistance cooperation and make a new push on getting Greek ship 
owners to support the Proliferation Security Initiative. 
-- Support for Balkans stability:  Greece is one of the largest 
investors in the Balkans and it is vital that they continue their 
engagement to ensure that the economic downturn does not jeopardize 
stability.  With its Orthodox ties, Greece also can be helpful in 
keeping Serbia on the right track, as well as encouraging stability 
in Kosovo and Bosnia's minorities. 
-- Effective OSCE:  Greece holds the OSCE Chairmanship this year. 
This gives us an opportunity to ensure that the Georgia mission is 
re-established, Russia's security architecture proposal is handled 
appropriately, and OSCE continues to support the election process 
in Afghanistan. 
 
¶5.  (C)   There are also other areas where we can increase our 
cooperation.  Military cooperation, if done quietly, has always 
been met by positive attitudes in the Greek military.  Good 
relations with Russia make Greece a useful partner as we 
re-calibrate that relationship.  Greece's contacts in the Middle 
East can reinforce our messages to Syria and Iran.  And Greece 
already recognizes our emphasis on global issues -- energy, the 
environment, anti-trafficking initiatives -- that affect it most 
directly. 
 
THE CHALLENGES 
 
¶6.  (C)  As we move forward, we will face several major challenges: 
 
-- We must continue to press the GOG to engage in the UN-led 
process to resolve the Macedonia name issue, realizing that it may 
not be possible to resolve in the near term.  We should encourage 
them not to use the name issue to slow progress in other areas of 
cooperation. 
-- We will also need to work with Greece to keep Aegean tensions 
with Turkey in check and encourage practical measures to reduce the 
number and magnitude of incidents. 
-- On Cyprus, we need to encourage Greek support for a resolution, 
while ensuring the U.S. does not get pulled into the center of this 
long-standing dispute. 
-- The New Democracy government of Karamanlis has a razor-thin 
majority of one vote in the parliament.  We do not expect elections 
before next spring, at the earliest.  We should assume the current 
government is our partner for this strategy, while keeping strong 
links to the opposition party led by George Papandreou. 
 
HIGH-LEVEL ENGAGEMENT 
 
¶7.  (C)  Achieving these goals and re-setting our relationship 
requires immediate and visible re-engagement by policy-makers.  FM 
Bakoyiannis met with the Secretary in February, and President Obama 
met with PM Karamanlis in April.  We need to build on these early 
contacts and use meetings with U.S. officials to achieve progress 
on specific issues.  For that reason, we recommend the following 
engagement strategy: 
 
-- Prime Minister Karamanlis:  A Karamanlis visit to Washington any 
time this calendar year will result in an excellent boost to 
U.S.-Greek relations.  The key to keeping the political benefit 
from this month's invitation is to make it real by setting a date. 
Good timing would be this fall in advance of the EU Summit in 
December, where Turkey's EU prospects will be discussed. 
-- POTUS:  Following Karamanlis's invitation in Strasbourg, a POTUS 
visit to Greece next spring would be a powerful signal that -- 
having broken the tradition of tying visits to Greece to visits to 
Turkey -- Greece is an important partner in its own right in 
 
ATHENS 00000657  003 OF 003 
 
 
pursuit of our highest objectives. 
-- Vice President:  A visit to Greece at any point would be a great 
boost to U.S.-Greek relations, with the Vice President viewed very 
favorably by Greeks.  A visit, however, would need to be managed in 
such a way as to not be perceived as a substitute for a 
Presidential visit at some point, drawing comparisons to the 
treatment given to Turkey. 
-- Secretary of State:  FM Bakoyiannis has proposed an informal 
OSCE ministerial to discuss Russia's security architecture 
initiative.  She has suggested dates at the end of June.  Ideally, 
VWP negotiations would be completed and an announcement made in the 
run-up to the visit. 
-- Secretary of Defense:  SecDef will meet with MoD Meimarakis on 
April 27.  The meeting is essential for discussion of Afghanistan 
contributions, Greece's expected large defense procurement, 
non-proliferation issues, and other cooperation. 
-- Assistant Secretary Designee Gordon:  If confirmed by the 
Senate, an early visit to Athens in May or June (preferably before 
he stops in Ankara) would be an important opportunity to confirm 
Mr. Gordon's interest in relations with Greece, and could be used 
to prepare the ground for the Secretary's participation in the OSCE 
informal ministerial. 
-- Special Envoy Mitchell:  A stopover in Athens on a trip to the 
Middle East would send an important signal to Greece of our 
willingness to engage them on issues beyond traditional, parochial 
ones.  Greece is generally viewed positively by Palestinians and 
Israelis; FM Bakoyiannis has been a strong supporter of programs 
for youth and women in the region and is the host for on-going 
Track Two discussions. 
-- Foreign Minister:  We should suggest a visit by FM Bakoyiannis 
to Afghanistan, in her role as OSCE CIO, in the context of the 
August elections.  We could consider coordinating a visit by her 
with a visit by U.S. officials (such as Special Envoy Holbrooke or 
the CENTCOM Commander). 
-- Working Groups:  In her February meeting with Foreign Minister 
Bakoyiannis, the Secretary talked about working groups as a way to 
reinvigorate the relationship.  We should upgrade existing groups 
by raising attendance to a higher level and adding a strategic 
focus to the discussion (HLCC chaired by Defense and CCC chaired by 
State), as well as adding a new group to engage on the foreign 
political and external relations component to our agenda. 
 
¶8.  (C) CONCLUSION:  The opportunity to reshape fundamentally the 
U.S.-Greek relationship should not be missed.  The Greek government 
has already shown in the first few months of the new Administration 
its desire for a more substantive partnership --  providing needed 
assistance in Afghanistan, pushing forward previously delayed 
agreements, and toning down the volume on the Greek-Russian 
relationship.  The U.S. has a strategic interest in cultivating 
this new attitude and building an enduring alliance on our mutual 
interests, shared challenges, and common values. 
 
 
  
SPECKHARD