VZCZCXYZ0010
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAH #0542 1190904
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 290904Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2734
INFO RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC 0090

UNCLAS ASHGABAT 000542 
 
STATE FOR S/CT BATJER JOHNSON, SCHULTZ 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PGOV ASEC KVPR KHLS TX
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON TURKMENISTAN'S INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING 
AND SHARING PRACTICES 
 
REF: (A) 07 ASHGABAT 1059, (B) STATE 032287 
 
¶1.  (U) Post presents the following updates to the survey on 
Turkmenistan's immigration control and watchlist systems for 
terrorist screening.  Responses are keyed to lettered subheadings in 
ref B. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) A: Immigration Databases and Traveler Information 
Collection:  No updates to report. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) B: Watchlisting:  No substantive updates.  The State 
Migration Service (SMS) has replaced the Agency for Registration of 
Foreign Citizens. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) C: Biometrics:  No updates to report. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) D: Border Control and Screening:  The Government of 
Turkmenistan uses computer software to screen all travelers.  In 
order to obtain a visa, foreigners must first obtain a letter of 
invitation from the State Migration Service, which gives ample 
opportunity to prescreen incoming visitors and deny permission to 
any the government deems undesirable.  If someone of interest did 
make it to the airport or a border crossing, the Immigration 
Service, Ministry of Internal Affairs or the Ministry of National 
Security would take the charge in questioning, depending on the 
issue. 
 
There is no general law enforcement database, and information 
sharing within the Government of Turkmenistan is unreliable at best. 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU) E: Passports:  Turkmenistan began issuing new passports 
with an embedded data-carrying chip in July, 2008.  The passports 
were designed by a German company and feature more advanced security 
features.  The chip includes fingerprint scans of the bearer's index 
fingers as well as the photograph and signature.  It is unknown if 
the government shares the key to read the biometric information with 
any other governments. 
 
Replacement passports are generally identical to regular passports: 
they are issued for the full validity of 10 years and do not have a 
specific series.  Post is unaware of specific methods of dealing 
with "habitual" passport losers, beyond the onerous documentation 
requirements to receive a passport in the first place, which must be 
completely replicated in order to receive a replacement.  Post has 
not seen an increase in suspiciously "clean" passports, as many visa 
applicants still have their old passport (which functions as an 
internal identification document). 
 
¶7.  (SBU) F: Fraud Detection:  No updates to report. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) G: Privacy and Data Security:  Turkmenistan remains a 
tightly-controlled, autocratic, secretive government.  Post believes 
that all information collected during the lengthy letter of 
invitation process (to obtain a visa) and any case files developed 
would be considered state secrets.  The government is not 
specifically concerned about the privacy of personal information, 
either of its own citizens or foreigners, but rather protecting 
these "state secrets."  There seem to be no laws permitting an 
individual to petition for access to data that security agencies 
hold on them. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) H: Identifying Appropriate Partners:  Turkmenistan 
continues to be an unlikely partner for data sharing. 
 
 
 
MILES