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Viewing cable 09AITTAIPEI507, MEDIA REACTION: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09AITTAIPEI507 2009-04-29 09:56 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0018
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0507/01 1190956
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 290956Z APR 09
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1463
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9138
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0576
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000507 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN 
RELATIONS 
 
1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused April 
29 news coverage on the swine flu outbreak and the Taiwan 
government's anti-epidemic plan; and on the developments in 
cross-Strait relations.  Several papers also carried reports from 
the "Defense News" saying that the United States is expected to sell 
60 UH60M Black Hawk Utility helicopters to Taiwan in the third 
quarter of 2009.  In terms of editorials and commentaries, a column 
in the centrist, KMT-leaning "China Times" discussed the new 
"Obamaism" and the resurgence of U.S. Republican neo-conservatism. 
The article said the comeback of neo-conservatism will undoubtedly 
pose new challenges to the Obama administration, which is trying to 
redress the mistakes made by the previous U.S. administration and 
make new achievements in terms of the U.S. diplomatic tactics.  An 
op-ed in the pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times," 
written by John Tkacik, a retired U.S. foreign service officer, 
discussed the Obama administration's Asia policy and the possibility 
of a "Taiwan Policy Review."  The article said "democratic Asia 
needs U.S. leadership if it is to balance China, and the test of the 
Obama administration's Asia policy will be to provide that 
leadership."  End summary. 
 
2. U.S. Foreign Policy 
 
"U.S. Republican Neo-conservatism Resurges" 
 
The "International Lookout" column in the centrist, KMT-leaning 
"China Times" [circulation: 150,000] wrote (4/29): 
 
"The 'Obamaism' upheld by U.S. President Barack Obama in terms of 
U.S. foreign policy is in reality still based on the principle of 
'the U.S. leading [the world],' except for the fact that he is a 
realist.  Being pragmatic is not a bad thing; it can help to look 
closely and tell what should be done and what should not.  For those 
tasks of which the United States is competent and capable, it can 
handle; while for those it cannot, it can seek cooperation [from 
other countries].  That is why Obama said during the Summit of the 
Americas: 'The United States cannot act alone but must achieve its 
leadership by setting examples.'  Not to act alone means that [it] 
will seek cooperation, and setting examples indicates that it must 
first try what it can. Such is the difference between obstinacy and 
pragmatism.  Both [directions] are meant to maintain the hegemony of 
the United States, except that the former is to act recklessly, 
while the latter is to act smartly. ... 
 
"[Former U.S. President George W.] Bush stepped down in the wake of 
the failure of the war in Iraq, giving neo-conservatism a major 
setback.  But it was not long before these people staged a comeback 
... and formed the 'Foreign Policy Initiative.'  The neo-cons 
believe that the 21st century will be dictated by a struggle between 
the democratic powers led by the United States and the dictatorships 
headed by China and Russia. ... When Obama redressed the foreign 
policy mistakes made by Bush and seeks to make new achievements in 
terms of the diplomatic tactics, the neo-conservatism undoubtedly 
has created challenges to the Obamaism. 
 
3. U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations 
 
"An Obama TPR: Too Little, Too Late?" 
 
John Tkacik, a retired chief of China intelligence at the State 
Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the first 
Clinton Administration, opined in the pro-independence, 
English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 30,000] (4/29): 
 
"While reports of an imminent Taiwan Policy Review (TPR) are 
premature, it would be a useful exercise as part of a global 
strategic review of China's emerging pre-eminence. ...  There is no 
wisdom in confronting China head-on in Asia, and a TPR by the 
administration of US President Barack Obama must take this into 
account. But if the US is to balance China's looming rise with a 
coalition of Asian democracies, Taiwan must be a key policy element. 
... 
Unfortunately, 'geostrategic considerations,' when it comes to 
Taiwan (or China, for that matter) have long been absent in 
Washington policy circles. ... 
 
"Taiwan's significance in Asia is eclipsed in this China fantasy. 
Taiwanese now feel they have nowhere left to go but China. The rest 
of Asia watches US-Taiwan trends to see if the US might draw some 
line with China. All Asian governments understand Taiwan's strategic 
importance to the US. I say this despite the comments of my good 
friend and former Chinese-language classmate, American Institute in 
Taiwan Chairman Ray Burghardt, who said on March 19 that 'a 
geostrategic character to American policy toward Taiwan ... isn't 
really there.'  Taiwan's strategic value was not discussed in the 
Condoleezza Rice State Department or in the Bush White House. 
However, Taiwan's significance to US security is not dismissed by 
defense and intelligence officials who observe China's expanding 
RELATIONS 
 
military power: They must plan for weapons systems 20 years into the 
future and China's military, naval, missile and cyberspace 
modernization keeps them awake. Taiwan's geographic location in Asia 
and its geopolitical disposition are essential to monitoring these 
developments. ... 
 
"More important, Taiwan is the US' poster-child for democracy in 
Asia; the US' 10th-largest export market; and the world's 
fourth-largest foreign exchange reserves holder. Taiwan's GDP is 
bigger than any in Southeast Asia. Taiwan's population is bigger 
than Australia's. In short, US equanimity at the prospect of 
democratic Taiwan's absorption by communist China is a clear signal 
to the rest of Asia that the US has bought on to the 'Beijing 
Consensus' - Asia may as well go along, too.  Sooner or later there 
will be an Obama 'Taiwan Policy Review.' But it won't amount to 
much. An Obama TPR will judge that the powerful momentum in 
cross-strait dynamics is pushing Taiwan rapidly into full economic 
dependence on China. It will conclude that Taiwan's inextricable 
economic dependence on China - absent counterbalancing action - will 
quickly drive the country beyond its 'tipping point' toward 
political and, ultimately, security dependence on Beijing. At that 
point, Obama can dust off his hands and say: 'Oh well, I really 
wanted to help Taiwan, but it was too late.' Some will say, 'It's 
not so bad, look at Hong Kong.' Others will say, 'Oh well, it was 
Bush's fault.' ... 
 
"Obama is unlikely to be confrontational with China or anyone else. 
But democratic Asia needs US leadership if it is to balance China, 
and the test of the Obama administration's Asia policy will be to 
provide that leadership. A Taiwan Policy Review will only be a small 
subset of that calculation. Now that Campbell has been nominated, 
Obama has an outline of an 'Asia Team' that can begin to reassess 
the US' erosion in the Western Pacific. If Campbell can't stop the 
collapse of the US' Asian interests in Taiwan, it's hard to see 
where he can do it." 
 
YOUNG