VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0413/01 0970943
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 070943Z APR 09
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1317
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9095
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0531

UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000413 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
 
¶1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused April 7 
news coverage on the fraud scandals involving several high-ranking 
Taiwan military officials; on the year-end city mayors' and country 
magistrates' elections; on a Taiwan fishing boat which was hijacked 
by Somali pirates in the Indian Ocean Monday; and on the powerful 
earthquake that rocked Italy Monday. 
 
¶2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, several editorial pieces 
centered on the recently-concluded G-20 summit in London and its 
connection to U.S.-China-Taiwan relations.  An editorial in the 
pro-independence "Liberty Times" said that China has seized the 
opportunity of the G-20 to demanding that other countries give 
political payback by offering their confirmation of China's stance 
on the Taiwan and Tibetan issues.  An editorial in the 
pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" said that a 
worrying development for Taiwan was "Washington's move toward the 
creation of a 'G2' with China, an exclusive US-China relationship 
that would go well beyond cooperation on economic matters and enter 
the strategic sphere."  A separate "Taipei Times" op-ed piece, 
written by a U.S. professor of strategy at the Naval War College in 
Rhode Island, discussed the recent standoff between U.S. survey 
ships and Chinese vessels in the South China Sea.  The article urged 
the United States to "renew its political commitment to Asia while 
bolstering its naval posture."  An editorial in the 
pro-independence, English-language "Taiwan News" discussed the 
meeting between U.S. President Barack Obama and his Chinese 
counterpart Hu Jintao on the margins of the G-20 meeting.  The 
article concluded that "the Obama administration should constantly 
keep in mind the importance of upholding Taiwan's democratic process 
in cross-strait relations and should ... remind international 
society that the effective promotion of democracy and human rights 
in China itself must remain essential elements in any 'positive, 
cooperative and comprehensive' relations with an authoritarian and 
expansionist PRC."  End summary. 
 
¶3. U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations 
 
A) "How Can the [Taiwan] People Sit back and Watch the Ma 
Administration Push Taiwan's Future into the Graveyard?" 
 
The pro-independence "Liberty Times" [circulation: 700,000] 
editorialized (4/7): 
 
"The G-20 summit in London ended last week, but its impact and 
implications on Taiwan have just started to show.  China seized a 
tough moment when the financial tsunami that has broken out in the 
United States is causing economic recession in the world, and it 
attempted with all it has to manage the 'rise of its position' [in 
the international community] following its economic rise.  [China's 
attempt] was reflected in Hu Jintao's strong need to establish his 
achievements in history -- namely, to assure that [he] will push 
forward 'unification' [with Taiwan,] which has never been easy to 
achieve by any [Chinese] leader since the founding of the Chinese 
Communist government.  The issue regarding Taiwan's sovereignty, as 
a result, has borne the first brunt and become a target that [China] 
stares at maliciously and covetously. ... 
 
"On the surface, the G-20 meeting concluded with various economic 
stimulus plans of international cooperation as its major 
accomplishment to save the global crisis.  But behind it, China 
conveniently took advantage of such a group meeting among big 
nations to demand political payback from other countries in a 
high-profile manner.  In his meeting with Hu, [U.S. President 
Barack] Obama, a 'freshman' in the international community, directly 
encountered the 'confirmation' of [China's stance on] the Taiwan and 
Tibetan issues. ...  Such signals, which maliciously encroach on the 
sovereignty of Taiwan or the Republic of China, were sent many days 
ago.  Yet our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as if in a completely 
vegetative state, was totally unprepared and presented zero 
contingency planning when faced with consistently severe 
interpellation from both ruling party and opposition legislators 
yesterday. ... The fact that the [Ma] regime is at its wit's end 
toward the drifting state of Taiwan as a nation is in reality akin 
to murdering the 'Republic of China'.  It does not matter much if Ma 
Ying-jeou were "wiped out' by Hu Jintao, but how can numerous Taiwan 
people sit back and watch Ma's incapability to command [the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs], thereby sending our nation's future into the 
graveyard?" 
 
B) "Can Taiwan Survive Historical Forces?" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] editorialized (4/7): 
 
"... Another worrying development - again something that is well 
beyond the ability of Taiwanese to control - is Washington's move 
toward the creation of a 'G2' with China, an exclusive US-China 
relationship that would go well beyond cooperation on economic 
matters and enter the strategic sphere. Should this come into being, 
 
the forces of history could very well engulf Taiwan.  Already, major 
allies of the US in the Asia-Pacific region, such as Japan and 
India, have voiced concern at the emergence of a "G2," which they 
perceive as a plot by Beijing to undermine their influence in the 
region. Western observers, including Dennis Wilder, a visiting 
fellow at the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings 
Institution, have been receptive to those fears and highlighted the 
downsides. 
 
"'We [the US] have far more in common with our allies and the 
region's democracies than with China,' Wilder wrote in the 
Washington Post last week.  And yet, not once did Wilder, a former 
senior director for East Asian affairs at the National Security 
Council, mention Taiwan. This is a telling omission. If giants like 
Japan and India risk being undermined by a US-China 'G2,' one can 
only wonder what the arrangement entails for the future of this 
country.  As the saying goes, when elephants fight, it's the grass 
that suffers. In a time when the giants of this world have their 
eyes fixed on the global economy and increasingly see China as an 
indispensable ally, small states are likely to be pushed around - 
and perhaps sacrificed. Unless Taiwan starts making noise now, it 
could very well become the first 'inevitable' democratic casualty of 
the force of history that is the global financial crisis." 
 
C) "The PLA Navy Sails the South China Sea" 
 
James Holmes, associate professor of strategy at the Naval War 
College, Newport, Rhode Island, opined in the pro-independence, 
English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 30,000] (4/7): 
 
"US leaders should not be surprised at China's vehemence toward US 
maritime operations in the South China Sea. Nor is this merely a 
passing phase in China's rise. As the Chinese economy grows more and 
more dependent on seaborne commerce passing through the Strait of 
Malacca and as the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy extends its 
seaward reach, Beijing will take an increasingly forceful approach 
to Southeast Asian affairs.  By no means is armed conflict 
inevitable, but Washington should expect Beijing to mount a 
persistent challenge. It may even try to recast the US-led maritime 
order in Asia to suit Chinese preferences. Stronger powers tend to 
push for legal interpretations favorable to themselves, and they 
tend to get their way. Redefining its offshore "exclusive economic 
zone," or EEZ, as sovereign waters would let China forbid many 
foreign naval activities in maritime Southeast Asia. 
 
"Beijing's ambitions are no secret. Chinese law claims virtually the 
whole South China Sea as territorial waters. Recent harassment by 
Chinese vessels of two US survey ships operating in international 
waters - but within China's EEZ, south of Hainan Province - is 
probably just the start of Sino-US wrangling over maritime law. If 
Beijing's view wins out, the South China Sea will in effect become a 
Chinese lake, especially as the PLA Navy increases its capacity to 
put steel behind China's maritime territorial claims. ...  The US 
must renew its political commitment to Asia while bolstering its 
naval posture. Otherwise, Washington will abdicate its maritime 
leadership." 
 
D) "What Obama-Hu Meet Means for Taiwan" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taiwan News" [circulation: 
20,000] editorialized (4/7): 
 
"The first meeting between United States President Barack Obama and 
People's Republic of China State Chairman and ruling Chinese 
Communist Party General Secretary Hu Jintao on the sidelines of the 
'Group of 20 countries' summit held in London last week sent a 
worrying message to Taiwan and other regional U.S. allies. ... 
After all, U.S. allies in Asia are deeply concerned that 
Washington's search for a solution to its worst postwar economic 
downturn may induce the Obama administration to go beyond expanded 
strategic economic and political dialogues with the PRC and develop 
a full-blown strategic partnership and could cause a 'China first' 
policy to outweigh the US's long-term 'Asian policy.'  While the 
result may be short of the feared 'G2,' the Obama administration 
does seem to have elevated the economy into the main axis of its 
'multi-track' foreign policy.  Naturally, our main concern is the 
implications of these trends for Taiwan. The Obama administration 
has been supportive of the cross-strait "reconciliation" pursued by 
the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) administration of 
President Ma Ying-jeou during the past 10 months, which seem to 
accord with Washington's primary concerns with 'peace and 
stability.' ... 
 
The U.S. may choose not to interfere with the efforts of the Ma 
administration to promote 'reconciliation' under a 'one-China 
framework' supposedly based on the so-called 'Consensus of 1992,' so 
long as the process is 'peaceful.' However, it remains uncertain how 
Obama and his Democratic administration would react if such a 
'reconciliation' process was 'undemocratic' and turned into a 
 
 
'gradual unification' arranged under the table through the secretive 
KMT-CCP dialogue, beyond the reach of Taiwan's democratic 
mechanisms.  Moreover, Hu's remarks on Taiwan undermined the 
theoretical underpinning of Ma's policy by effectively refuting the 
KMT administration's claim that Beijing was flexible on its 'one 
China principle,' which insists that Taiwan is part of the PRC. ... 
 
"Moreover, the fact that the PRC has made no concessions or 
reductions of its military threat to Taiwan despite Ma's olive 
branches suggests that uncertainties and possible danger of conflict 
are still embedded in cross-strait relations.  Hence, the Obama 
administration should constantly keep in mind the importance of 
upholding Taiwan's democratic process in cross-strait relations and 
should itself remind international society that the effective 
promotion of democracy and human rights in China itself must remain 
essential elements in any 'positive, cooperative and comprehensive' 
relations with an authoritarian and expansionist PRC." 
 
YOUNG