R 020623Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4274
INFO AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
CJTF HOA
USMISSION USNATO 
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

UNCLAS ADDIS ABABA 000754 
 
 
STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AND PM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MOPS MARR SO UG BU
SUBJECT: USAU: STATUS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL PROJECT FOR 
AFRICAN UNION 
 
REF: 08 ADDIS ABABA 1718 
 
¶1. Summary: USAU held a C3IS workshop on Feb. 25-27 to revive 
the U.S. commitment to the African Union (AU) for a 
communications package for the African continent's African 
Standby Force (ASF) program.  The meeting brought together 
civilian and military communication experts from the AU, UN, 
U.S. and the EU, as well as members from the AU's Peace and 
Security Commission and Infrastructure and Communications 
divisions.  Among the key recommendations from the workshop 
are to provide immediate relief for the current 
communications challenge faced by the AU's mission in 
Somalia, and to begin to create a 24-hour operation center 
for the AU's Peace and Security Operations Division.  End 
Summary. 
 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶2. As a result of a September 2005 G-8 meeting at the AU, the 
USG and the AU entered into an historical agreement to 
substantially upgrade the integration and communications 
capacity of the AU in executing the AU's "Roadmap for the 
Establishment of the African Standby Force."  From this, the 
U.S. Department of State agreed to support a Command, 
Control, and Communication Information System to provide a 
High Frequency (HF) radio voice network, with a follow-on 
Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) capability, to facilitate 
interoperability and information sharing between the AU, the 
three Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and two Regional 
Mechanisms (RMs) and the ASF Brigade headquarters.  This 
system would link, via voice, data, and fax: (i) the AU 
headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; (ii) the five 
headquarters of the regional ASF brigades; (iii) their 
subordinate units; and (iv) the proposed depot facility.  The 
backdrop of this program was to support regional peacekeeping 
and counter-narcotics efforts through Global Peace Operations 
Initiative (GPOI) funding. 
 
¶3. The AU C3IS project, originally envisioned as critical to 
support the ASF, has languished for four years.  As a result, 
the AU still does not have the C3IS architecture in place. 
Between contract award in 2005 and 2008 there have been many 
missteps, miscalculations, misunderstandings, and a general 
lack of effective communication between and among the USG, 
its contractors and the AU.  The workshop was held to review 
the status of the existing project as well as the U.S. 
commitment to the project. 
 
Current Situation and Proposed Look Forward 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. Currently the AU does not have equipment to monitor data 
and control access to sensitive data.  It cannot communicate 
in real time with deployed forces or effectively with 
regional ASF headquarters.  AU Peace and Security Operations 
Division (PSOD)/ASF is not able to guarantee reliable 
communications among ASF commanders during crisis situations. 
 An example of this is the recent Vehicle-born Improvised 
Explosive Device in February 2009 at the AMISOM Burundi base 
in Mogadishu which left 11 soldiers dead.  The PSOD head was 
not able to get real time information from his commander on 
the ground due to lack of communications.  Currently, 
PSOD/ASF forces in Mogadishu use the open web and calling 
cards on cell phones when coverage is available to 
communicate.  This allows anyone, including the enemy, to 
obtain information about battlefield activity.  Lastly, there 
is no dedicated maintenance and support for any 
communications gear. 
 
¶5. The workshop's findings were as follows:  First, C3IS 
should be refocused to the PSOD.  In crisis situations, PSOD 
cannot compete with other entities for access to scarce 
network resources.  A dedicated network for operations 
support is required.  Second, PSOD needs a robust system with 
increased availability, security, and quality of service. 
PSOD must be able to trust, and rely on, system performance 
during operational missions.  Third, PSOD should have 
ownership and discretionary access control of the network and 
data.  This is to ensure control over sensitive data 
involving operations and to prevent others access to 
information they do not need to know.  Fourth, C3IS Node 
locations should be at the PSOD level, which includes the ASF 
headquarters and Continental Logistics Base; the three RECs 
(including ECOWAS, ECCAS, and SADC), and the two RMs 
(including NARC and EASBRICOM), along with their regional 
planning elements and logistics depot in each of the five 
regions mentioned; and brigade level headquarters and field 
mission headquarters for civilian, police, and military. 
 
¶6. In addition to the longer term recommendations outlined in 
para 5, participants made the following recommendations for 
immediate relief for the current communication challenges: 
First, complete the current VSAT installation in Mogadishu. 
VSAT is designed to create a direct, reliable, and secure 
connection, through satellite links, between personnel in the 
field and the AU's 24-hour situation room.  It is capable of 
linking field officers to AU staff both by e-mail and Voice 
Over Internet Protocol, expanding and increasing the speed of 
real-time communication, coordination, and reporting. 
Second, establish a basic PSOD operations center which could 
be as simple as a dedicated small office or container with 
electrical, internet, phone, and fax capability.  Third, 
utilize the computers and associated non-ITAR restricted 
equipment from the already provided C3IS equipment that was 
procured from the initial program.  Fourth, leverage existing 
AU capabilities for RECs, RMs, and AMISOM.  Fifth, acquire at 
least one satellite phone so that the PSOD can have some 
reliable communications going forward with the AMISOM 
commander. 
 
¶7. Finally, it was agreed that the way forward includes: 
Presenting the recommendations to the USAU Ambassador and the 
AU hierarchy for understanding and agreement;  revising the 
MOU between the U.S. and the AU; developing a network policy 
for PSOD/ASF system; obtaining dedicated resources, including 
personnel for operations, maintenance, and training; 
establishing a dedicated PSOD Network Operations Center with 
basic initial capability and enhancing it to full capability 
(i.e. secure voice, internet, fax); establishing a PSOD C3I 
Network Operations Center with full capability; extending the 
capability of the PSOD C3IS to the RECs and the RMs. 
 
 
YAMAMOTO