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RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 000627 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/W, INR/AA 
BAGHDAD FOR DMCCULLOUGH 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KIRF NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: A FULLER PICTURE OF THE FEBRUARY 2009 
BAUCHI SECTARIAN VIOLENCE 
 
REF: ABUJA 332 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  Poloff, PolAssist and a delegation from 
the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 
(USCIRF) traveled to Bauchi March 30 to April 1 to gain a 
better understanding of the February 21-22 sectarian violence 
in the state.  The team met with State government officials, 
religious leaders, and non-governmental organizations.  While 
the spark that ignited the Bauchi violence appears to have 
been a parking dispute, large numbers of unemployed, violent 
youth took advantage of the spark to loot and burn.  By the 
end of the two-day crisis, as many as 12 people were killed 
and approximately 150 homes and businesses burned, with an 
estimated 85% of these belonging to Christians.  Many with 
whom we met believed the crisis in Bauchi could have been 
stopped earlier; however, in response to the negative outcry 
following the Jos orders to "shoot on sight," the Bauchi 
governor initially ordered the police and security services 
not to fire their guns, thereby hamstringing efforts to bring 
the situation under control.  It appears most of the violence 
was driven by youth gangs called "Sara Suka."  These young, 
Hausa-Fulani gangs are at times employed by politicians 
(although there is no evidence that the February violence was 
directed by politicians) and are often under the influence of 
drugs and/or alcohol.  The limiting factor in the February 
violence appears to have been personal relationships 
previously established with members of the other faith.  Such 
relationships, however, are the exception rather than the 
norm, with even the interfaith NGOs we met never having 
actually met with each other previously.  The key to 
preventing future conflicts is in grassroots efforts focused 
on building such personal relationships through interfaith 
councils and dialogue programs.  Unfortunately, with poverty 
and unemployment fueling religious tensions, the crisis was 
not the first in Bauchi and almost certainly will not be the 
last.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) PolOff and PolAssist traveled with a USCIRF staff 
delegation to Bauchi State in northern Nigeria from March 30 
- April 1 to discuss the February 21-22 sectarian violence in 
Bauchi (reftel), and get some sense of its root causes.  The 
team met with representatives of the Bauchi State government, 
State Committee on Conflict Resolution and Community 
Reconciliation, State Shari'a Commission, Nigerian Red Cross, 
Roman Catholic Diocese of Bauchi, Bauchi State chapter of the 
Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), Evangelical Church of 
West Africa, and nongovernmental organizations working in 
interfaith dialogue and conflict resolution, as well as with 
several victims of the crisis and the Bauchi Chief Imam. 
Sectarian crises are not new to Bauchi -- as many as 52 
churches were burned in Tafawa Balewa in 2002 according to 
the Catholic Diocese and six churches were destroyed in 2008 
in Ningi following the rescue of two Christian women 
reportedly kidnapped for forced marriage to Muslim grooms. 
While opinions differed on some details of the February 2009 
violence, a clearer picture emerged of the events leading up 
to and during the crisis and of the underlying causes of 
conflict in the state.  Common themes included the role of 
poverty and unemployment in local ethnic and sectarian 
conflict and the lack of engagement by the State government 
in significant efforts to prevent future violence. 
 
DETAILS OF THE FEB CRISIS - CHAIN OF EVENTS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶3. (SBU) Piecing together information from all these 
meetings, the following picture emerged.  On February 13, 
security at the Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN) church in 
"Railway" Local Government Area (LGA) blocked Muslim 
worshippers from the mosque down the street from parking in 
the church's parking lot.  An argument ensued.  The Catholic 
Diocese reported that the police and State Security Service 
(SSS) were called in and the situation calmed down. 
Reportedly, leaders from the COCIN church, the mosque, CAN, 
the police and SSS met two times that next week to discuss 
the parking dispute and believed they had resolved the 
situation.  (Note: We were told by the Catholic Diocese that 
 
ABUJA 00000627  002 OF 004 
 
 
Imam Fantami Isa, who preached at the mosque, had been 
previously thrown out of Abubakar Tafawa Balewa University 
and of a Gombe mosque for preaching inflammatory rhetoric. 
End Note.)  Also on February 13, a church burned in the 
Kafadumi local government area (LGA), apparently caused by 
electrical problems.  Three nights later (February 16), a 
mosque reportedly caught fire.  (Note: We never heard any 
explanations of the reason for the mosque fire.) 
 
¶4. (SBU) On Friday, February 20, when attendees returned to 
the mosque for prayers, the parking problem recurred.  At 
that point, most with whom we spoke seemed to agree that 
gangs of young (generally 17-19 years old), unemployed Hausa 
men known locally as "Sara Suka" joined in and escalated the 
argument to violence.  (Note: The name is Hausa for "slash 
and stab."  While the Sara Suka gangs are mostly Hausa-Fulani 
Muslims, they are generally not regular attendees at mosque, 
nor are they believed to be organized for religious purposes. 
Several observers commented that many of them are drug 
addicts or use alcohol.  End note.)  The COCIN church was 
burned and police again came into the area to restore order. 
That night, the mosque was burned as well.  During the day on 
Saturday, February 21, violence continued throughout the 
Railway LGA area. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Most with whom we spoke said the police and security 
services could have stopped the violence at this stage if 
they had acted.  We were told by the Bauchi State government 
Special Advisor on Peace and Conflict Resolution, however, 
that, following the outcry over the "shoot on sight" order 
given in Jos in November, Bauchi Governor Yuguda had given 
explicit instructions to the police and security services not 
to fire their weapons.  As a result, no action was taken to 
stop the violence until late on February 20 when the Governor 
reversed this order.  In all, the worst part of the violence 
appears to have lasted only a few hours.  In this time, 11-12 
people were killed (we heard both numbers repeatedly) and 
approximately 150 homes and businesses were burned.  The Red 
Cross estimated 85% of the damage was to Christian homes and 
businesses.  The Red Cross reported as many as 7,000 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) immediately following the 
crisis.  That number had dropped to just over 300 by late 
March.  (Note: Some of those still in the IDP camps include 
members of the Sayawa tribe who were displaced in the 2008 
violence in Tafawa Balewa.) 
 
WHO PERPETRATED THE VIOLENCE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶6. (SBU) Numerous contacts told us that the violence was 
almost exclusively perpetrated by the Sara Suka gangs.  The 
Red Cross and the Catholic Diocese both told us these gangs 
are often hired by politicians to follow the politicians' 
cars, singing praises or causing trouble to those who get in 
the way.  The Red Cross told us that several of these boys 
were arrested following the violence; however, the 
politicians demanded the release of "their boys" and over a 
short period of time virtually all of them were released. 
Despite the clear ties to politicians, we heard no 
allegations that the politicians had incited or in any way 
called for the February violence.  As well, many with whom we 
spoke recognized that the Sara Suka members were neither 
controlled by the Muslim nor the Christian communities. 
While it is likely the violence was mainly carried out by 
Sara Suka members, there appears to have been some collusion 
or support from local community members in the burning of 
homes and businesses as someone from the local area would 
have been needed to point out which homes were Christian and 
which were Muslim. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The team noted several stories of heroes who reached 
out and sheltered or defended their neighbors of different 
faith.  We heard of a church that was not burned because the 
Imam from the  mosque across the street came to stand and 
defend it, and we heard of Christians and Muslims who 
sheltered neighbors and even strangers.  Several of the 
interfaith NGO representatives noted that thousands sought 
 
ABUJA 00000627  003 OF 004 
 
 
refuge in the military barracks during the crisis, including 
Muslims and Christians, men, women and children.  All these 
people were there together, but there were no incidents of 
violence among them at the Barracks.  The NGOs also noted the 
example of Zongo LGA, an LGA bordering Railway with 
approximately equal numbers of Christians and Muslims.  The 
LGA Chairman in Zongo set up neighborhood committees to 
resolve conflicts, foster a sense of community and protect 
community interests.  When the violence threatened to spread 
to Zongo, community members (Muslim and Christian) reportedly 
blocked the road and would not allow the rioting mob to enter 
the area. 
 
ROOT CAUSES AND STATE RESPONSE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶8. (SBU) While the initial spark for the violence appears to 
have been a parking dispute, the size of the reaction to this 
initial event clearly reflected a pre-existing tense 
situation.  Religious differences and, in particular, a sense 
of majority rule which seems to leave minority Christians 
feeling unrepresented and outside the system, seem to have 
certainly played a role.  As well, high unemployment, lack of 
development, public corruption, lack of training and skills 
among the police and security services, and lack of a strong 
state government response all played a significant role. 
Cellular phones allowed word of the violence to spread 
quickly, as news of the violence and calls for retribution 
were sent out by text message.  Even the weather seemed to 
play its part -- in the hot, dry weather before the beginning 
of the rainy season, tempers are often short, and many in the 
largely agrarian society are idle.  It was clear from the 
positive stories of local heroes that what made the 
difference in limiting the spread of violence in many cases 
was the personal relationships previously established with 
members of the other faith.  It was equally clear, however, 
that such relationships are the exception rather than the 
rule; forexample, the "interfaith" mediation NGOs with whom 
we met had never actually met with each other.  There was 
continuous debate in almost every meeting we had on whether 
the root cause of the violence was religious, political or 
ethnic.  While some were adamant that it was purely one or 
another, most believed that it was a murky combination of the 
three that was impossible for them to parse out. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Salisu Shehu, Bauchi State Special Advisor on 
Education and Societal Reorientation and Liman Babayo, 
Special Assistant on Peace and Conflict Resolution, told the 
team that the State Elders Committee, and the Committee on 
Conflict Resolution and Community Reconciliation are working 
to prevent future violence.  The Committee on Conflict 
Resolution maintained it has been "highly successful," noting 
that Muslim and Christian committee members sit next to each 
other.  Shehu outlined the Bauchi State government's efforts 
to mediate tension and prevent violence, including 
establishing 20 peace centers around the state, placing 45 
"peace agents" in local communities to gather information and 
report to the security services, and delivering peace 
lectures in primary and secondary schools. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
¶10. (SBU) Without significant improvements to the economy and 
development in Bauchi, there will continue to be a risk of 
future periodic outbreaks of violence in the area.  Given 
Nigeria's declining oil revenues (the source of virtually all 
government funds) and the resultant decreases in the state's 
budget, the Bauchi State government's ability to deliver 
basic services and promote employment and development among 
its people will continue to be limited, at least in the near 
term.  We encountered a strong sense from the Christian 
community that this was a "war" and that the time had come to 
"stand up and defend ourselves" which also does not bode well 
for peace.  The key to preventing future crises is more 
likely to be at grassroots level rather than at broader 
policy levels.  Expansion of interfaith councils and dialogue 
programs from the national to the state and local levels 
 
ABUJA 00000627  004 OF 004 
 
 
would allow an avenue for building such relationships.  End 
comment. 
 
¶11. (U) This cable was coordinated with Consulate Lagos. 
SANDERS