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Viewing cable 09ABUDHABI378, Fraud Summary - Abu Dhabi

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ABUDHABI378 2009-04-14 12:28 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Abu Dhabi
VZCZCXRO9244
RR RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR
DE RUEHAD #0378/01 1041228
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 141228Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2361
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 2954
INFO RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 8235
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1575
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0509
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0136
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 ABU DHABI 000378 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP; CAIRO FOR RCO; POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION UNITS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC AE
SUBJECT:  Fraud Summary - Abu Dhabi 
 
REF:  08 State 74840 
 
ABU DHABI 00000378  001.2 OF 006 
 
 
1.  Country Conditions 
 
Note:  Many aspects of this report should be viewed in tandem with 
the Fraud Summary from Consulate General Dubai. While the two posts 
in the UAE see somewhat different applicant pools (Notably, Dubai is 
the primary NIV processing post for persons in Iran, while Abu Dhabi 
handles all IV processing in country.), many of the lessons learned 
from one post can be applied at the other. 
 
Fraud in Abu Dhabi is low. Concern about visa fraud in the UAE is 
generally limited to visa applications from Third Country Nationals 
(TCNs) living in or visiting the UAE. UAE citizens ("Emiratis") are 
a minority in their own country, comprising less than 20 percent of 
the population. South Asians, mainly Indians and Pakistanis, make up 
50 percent of the population. The next largest expatriate ethnic 
groups are Filipinos (19.6 percent), Arabs from other parts of the 
Middle East (13 percent) and Iranians (2.5 percent.) 
 
Expatriate workers (many from high fraud countries) are the most 
likely to perpetrate general NIV fraud. Organized fraud efforts, 
such as document vendors or visa "touts," are uncommon in the UAE. 
Most IV applicants are Iranian and fraud is at times evident in 
fianc (K), and employment (E) visa applications. Post faces the 
challenging task of verifying information provided by Iranian 
applicants in visa interviews. For example, family relationships are 
evidenced by documents Post views as susceptible to fraud. Post has 
no viable means to regularly verify the authenticity of documents 
and information presented by Iranians and relies heavily on the 
personal interview - and staff's knowledge of Iranian culture and 
procedures - to determine application validity. 
 
The UAE is a major regional and global transportation hub, and with 
this comes the potential to become a transit point for alien 
smuggling (particularly to Europe), travel of imposters, production 
of false documents, and other classic types of travel/immigration 
fraud. 
 
Airline and immigration officials note a number of male fide 
passengers routinely attempting to transit the UAE, but report very 
few passengers carrying fraudulent U.S. documents. This may change 
as the UAE's two major airlines (Dubai-based Emirates and Abu 
Dhabi-based Etihad) expand their direct service to the U.S.  Both 
airlines, along with several U.S. carriers also offer daily direct 
service between the UAE and USA. There are plans for greater 
aviation links in the future. 
 
Both Posts in the UAE (Embassy Abu Dhabi and Consulate General 
Dubai) adjudicate a significant number of Iranian applicants. 
Approximately 50% of the total NIV workload in Dubai and 80% of the 
total IV workload in Abu Dhabi is Iranian. Consulate General Dubai 
is the primary global NIV application point for Iranians resident in 
Iran. Embassy Abu Dhabi is the second largest post for processing of 
Iranian immigration cases. General discontent with the Iranian 
political regime and continued increase in unemployment rates and 
inflation continues to drive desire for Iranians to migrate.  Post 
anticipates a continued increase in both immigrant and nonimmigrant 
Iranian visa applications, with a concurrent potential for increased 
fraud. 
 
 
 
2.  NIV Fraud - Abu Dhabi 
 
There is generally little fraud associated with applications from 
UAE citizens. Among the expatriate community that applies for visas, 
detected fraud efforts are generally unsophisticated and include 
questionable bank statements, letters of employment, etc. Post does 
not rely on such documents and does not 221-g applicants 
specifically for them. If an applicant cannot clearly establish 
entitlement to the visa, post makes use of Section 214(b). 
Photo-substituted documents are very rare. In general, detecting 
Iranian visa fraud in the few NIV cases Abu Dhabi sees remains 
complicated by the lack of direct knowledge of Iranian documents and 
systems. Concern about security and technology transfer issues add 
to our overall vigilance. 
 
H-1B (Temporary Skilled Worker) and L-1 (Intercompany Transfers of 
Executives/ Managements) visa fraud remain areas of concern. Some 
cases have been returned to DHS with recommendations for revocation. 
In the recent past the majority of cases sent for revocation 
involved Indian nationals who have grossly exaggerated their work 
experience when filing for H-1B petitions through friends or family 
 
ABU DHABI 00000378  002.2 OF 006 
 
 
in the United States. The Embassy occasionally works with the 
anti-fraud units in Chennai and Mumbai to verify educational 
documents, upon which labor petitions are partially based. While no 
organized fraud efforts have been detected, Post remain conscious of 
the fact that South Asian nationals may apply in the UAE to evade 
well-established anti-fraud units in India and Pakistan. 
 
Although Abu Dhabi has had no specific reports of domestic servant 
abuse or trafficking in the A3 (Domestic Servants of Diplomats), G5 
(Domestic Servant of Government Official) or B1 (Temporary Visitor 
for Business) categories, we remain vigilant to potential abuse of 
these visa categories. 
 
3.  IV Fraud - Abu Dhabi 
 
Immigrant visa fraud is not prevalent but is at times found in K 
(fianc) petitions, E (employment-based) applications, and F 
(family-based) petitions. In fianc petitions, proof of a true 
relationship is often difficult to ascertain. Some of these cases 
involve Iranian fiancs who speak only Farsi engaged to Americans 
who speak only English. There are often significant discrepancies in 
age between the applicant and the petitioner, even as much as 20 to 
30 years. Applicants often provide generic "couples photos", usually 
taken outside of Iran, to provide evidence of a relationship. 
Legitimate fianc cases nearly always include numerous photos from 
the engagement party, which is held in Iran and includes extended 
family. The majority of Iranian K-1 petitioners obtained U.S. status 
through marriage to an American. Frequently, those marriages lasted 
only the time needed to obtain LPR status. Petitioners have also 
often been married numerous times and sometimes have already 
petitioned for one or two previous fiancs (or spouses) from Iran. 
Post continues to see numerous Internet relationships, first-cousin 
relationships and relationships with large age differences. 
 
Post has seen a number of fianc visa cases involving Iranians which 
raised concerns about "marriages of convenience," perhaps involving 
exchange of money, entered into for the sole purpose of immigration. 
In these cases, consular officers discovered during interviews with 
the Iranian fianc that a close American citizen relative - often an 
uncle or aunt residing in the same U.S. city as the petitioner - was 
responsible for introducing an American (who is most often not 
Iranian-American) to his/her relative in Iran and suggesting 
marriage. This appears to be well outside the practice of a simple 
"arranged marriage", which Post accepts as a norm within Iranian 
culture and frequently legitimate, particularly when the petitioner 
is Iranian-American. The Iranian-American matchmaking relative is 
also yabwQ8ing enters the U.S. on a K-1 visa causing several other siblings 
to subsequently find their "soul mates" in the U.S., usually through 
the family of the original sibling's petitioning fianc or through 
personal profiles posted on the Internet and in Internet chat rooms. 
 
 
Post occasionally receives e-mails from disgruntled K-1 petitioners, 
relaying stories of their fianc arriving in the U.S. and shortly 
thereafter either leaving them or meeting and marrying someone else. 
Often these e-mails from USC K-1 petitioners request the Embassy to 
take action against their fiancs who were issued visas. 
 
In addition, every year Post returns several K-1 (fianc) petitions 
to DHS for review after determining that the couple had already 
married. This issue is particularly prevalent with Iranian 
applicants. Iranian couples engage in religious ceremonies in Iran 
(which are legal marriages in that country) and then apply for 
fianc visas. Determining if a couple is already married is very 
difficult. Interviewing officers depend on the personal interview, 
but we realize that some applicants may be successfully concealing 
these marriages. These already married K-1 petitioners often claim 
that their U.S. lawyers advised them to petition as a fianc because 
"the process is quicker." The existence of "temporary marriage 
contracts" in Iran is also problematic as they are treated as a 
legitimate marriage just as a "normal" marriage. 
 
Employment-based IV petitions are also watched closely for fraud. 
Post is receiving a steady stream of E-3, "specialized skill" visa 
applications. It is often difficult to verify that the Iranian 
applicants possess the claimed work experience. Frequently the 
applicants are "self-employed" and thus can state that their 
experience matches the experience required in the employment 
 
ABU DHABI 00000378  003.2 OF 006 
 
 
petition. Contacting previous employers in Iran is time-consuming 
and ineffective. In many cases, the businesses have closed or the 
current manager has no record of the applicant's employment. At 
times, the petitioner is either a family member or a close friend of 
the petitioner. Post has also seen cases of the U.S. business 
misrepresenting the services it offers in the petition to justify 
the need for hiring the Iranian employee. The personal interview is 
of great importance in these cases. 
 
 
At times, falsified Iranian documents have been submitted to support 
an application. The applicants had different birthdates listed on 
their original petition and in their birth certificates (Shenas 
Namehs). Of particular note is that the Shenas Namehs provided were 
new (duplicate), and were not the original document provided at 
birth. The birth date on the original document made the individual 
over 21 years of age whereas the new birth date made the age of the 
applicant under 21. The birthdates were intentionally changed so 
that the applicant would qualify for the visa. Post is not clear 
what Iranian identity authorities require to issue a duplicate 
Shenas Namehs. Post notes that "unmarried" sons and daughters of 
LPRs/AmCits have also submitted duplicate Shenas Namehs. Post 
suspects that in many of these cases, the applicant is married and 
has obtained a duplicate Shenas Nameh to conceal their marriage data 
so that they qualify for a particular visa class. Post has 
discovered that the applicants were in fact married.  Post later 
sees petitions from American Citizens, who immigrated to the U.S. as 
"unmarried sons or daughters," for a spouse and children from that 
same period of time. 
 
4.  DV Fraud - Abu Dhabi 
 
All DV applicants in the UAE are TCNs - often from high-fraud 
countries including Bangladesh, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. Conoffs 
and LES have worked with fraud officers in Dhaka, Lagos, and other 
posts to authenticate documents, particularly birth certificates and 
education credentials. The most common reason for a DV application 
to be disqualified is failure to include names of all family members 
at the time of the original application. 
 
5.  ACS and Passport Fraud - Abu Dhabi 
 
The American Citizen Services unit does not generally encounter U.S. 
passport fraud. Post is vigilant about possible false citizenship 
claims and forwards all CRBA applications of children born in Iran 
to U.S. Embassy Bern for adjudication. 
 
Individuals regularly appear at Embassy Abu Dhabi requesting 
authentication of educational documents from diploma mills and 
unaccredited institutions located both inside and outside the United 
States.  Often the unaccredited certificates or degrees have been 
duly accredited at the state level and bear the authentication seal 
of the U.S. Secretary of State.  We continue to receive educational 
documents that were accredited by the District of Columbia even 
though the college or university is not located there.  Educational 
documents accredited in a state different than the state of issue is 
a useful fraud indicator because this often implies that the 
document was rejected in the state listed on the diploma (i.e., 
Florida), so the individual submitted the document to DC for 
accreditation. 
 
Third country nationals often submit these documents as UAE labor 
and immigration law requires them to provide evidence of their 
expertise and education in a particular field.   The authentication 
process only certifies "the genuineness of the signature and seal or 
the position of a foreign official" and does not verify the validity 
of the document.  However, the UAE government and local companies 
often presume that the Embassy seal is a verification of the 
document's content and the subject's qualifications. 
 
CA/OCS/PRI has confirmed that the Embassy is under no obligation to 
authenticate these documents bearing the seal of the Department of 
State.  Post uses U.S. Department of Education and Council for 
Higher Education databases to verify accreditation of educational 
institutions.  Post refuses to authenticate documents from 
non-accredited institutions. 
 
6.  Adoption Fraud - Abu Dhabi 
 
Post adjudicates very few local adoption cases. Adoption per se does 
not exist under Sharia law in Islamic countries, including the UAE. 
A court may only grant guardianship. The Department has advised that 
guardianship does not carry the same status as adoption for purposes 
of U.S. immigration, and thus Posts may only issue IR-4 visas for 
 
ABU DHABI 00000378  004.2 OF 006 
 
 
children whose adoption will be finalized in the US. 
 
Post does see several IR-4 visa applications originating from Iran 
each year and expects to see more Iranian-based adoption requests in 
the future. Adjudicating such cases is relatively difficult since 
U.S. legal requirements for completing an adoption and Iranian legal 
proceedings and documentation for guardianship do not easily 
collaborate.  Post again stresses the challenge of authenticating 
Iranian documents, especially provincial documents which are often 
more local in nature and vary from the standard documents normally 
submitted for visa adjudications or for adoption cases in other 
countries. The potential for fraud exists. Post is working with 
other posts, such as Ankara, to ensure consistent adoption 
processing. 
 
7.  Use of DNA Testing - Abu Dhabi 
 
Post has rarely had to request this for determinations of 
relationship in IV cases or for CRBA/passport determinations. 
 
8.  Asylum and Other DHS Benefit Fraud - Abu Dhabi 
 
Post processes Visa 92 (asylum) cases, which are not usually found 
to be fraudulent from the perspective of the consular officer's 
responsibility to determine the family relationship. However, based 
on interviews with the applicants, it appears that in many cases the 
underlying basis for the original asylum claim was likely to have 
been false. For example, Post receives following-to-join visa 
requests based on successful asylum claims by Iranians who had 
reportedly converted from Islam to Christianity, claiming 
persecution in Iran. Interviews with following-to-join family 
members often result in disclosures that the "conversions" were not 
real. Often the interview reveals that the applicant has very little 
knowledge of the conversion and answers frequently appear to be 
coached. Post advised the Department and DHS/VSU about such concerns 
and continues to complete Visas 92 processing per Department 
guidance. DHS/VSU has advised that they have reported our concerns 
to appropriate DHS offices and established an internal dialogue 
about the phenomenon. 
 
9.  Alien Smuggling, Trafficking, Organized Crime, Terrorist Travel 
- Abu Dhabi 
 
As Dubai and Abu Dhabi emerge as major airline transportation hubs 
between Europe, the U.S., Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and 
East Asia - and with growing networks of direct flights to many 
locations in those regions - there is and will continue to be an 
expected increase in the level of fraudulent travel through the 
country. Over 80 percent of the UAE population is composed of TCNs 
and there are direct air links to almost every corner of the world, 
including service to at least seven U.S. cities. 
 
While there are no known major networks in the UAE itself, both Abu 
Dhabi and Dubai are popular transit points for fraudulent travelers 
(most frequently transiting to Europe.) It is unlikely that UAE 
nationals will become involved in the fraud industry; rather, this 
will more likely arise from within the TCN communities that see 
opportunities to assist persons entering the UAE illicitly or 
transiting to other parts of the world. 
 
10.  DS Criminal Fraud Investigations - Abu Dhabi 
 
Post does not have an A/RSO-I for investigations. However, there is 
a strong relationship between the consular section, RSO, and the DHS 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Visa Security Unit(DHS/ICE/VSU). 
All offices at the Embassy mutually support one another in 
maintaining the integrity of the passport and visa processes. 
 
11.  Host Country Passport, Identity Documents, and Civil Registry - 
Abu Dhabi 
 
UAE immigration authorities knowingly issue passports to UAE 
nationals born outside the UAE that incorrectly show their place of 
birth to be in one of the country's seven emirates.  The UAE 
Government instituted this practice to combat discrimination in 
administering the UAE law against dual nationality.  The decision to 
allow this practice is usually attributed to the former President 
and father of the nation, Sheikh Zayed. In 2002, Post consulted with 
the Department, which determined that these passports are not valid 
travel documents under U.S. law and can therefore not be used to 
travel to the United States.  Generally, bearers of such passports 
are qualified visa applicants with legitimate travel plans to the 
United States.  As well-intended as this UAE government policy may 
be, it nonetheless complicates Post's efforts to identify UAE 
 
ABU DHABI 00000378  005.2 OF 006 
 
 
nationals who are potential security threats to the United States or 
have other visa ineligibilities. 
 
The UAE otherwise has modern, professional and secure nationality 
and identity documents and well-established procedures for obtaining 
and maintaining vital civil records, at least for those born within 
the last 30 years. Given that the modern state of the UAE only came 
into existence in 1971, it is more difficult to rely on any 
documents created before that date. However, almost all records on 
individuals and their families are now updated and established. UAE 
passports are ICAO compliant, and since they are valid for 5 years, 
Post has no particular problems with older versions of the UAE 
passport. 
 
The UAE has also launched a mandatory national identity card program 
for all residents of the UAE. Several hundred thousand Emiratis, 
starting with those in the armed forces and the police, now have 
such cards. The identity card is scheduled to be mandatory for all 
residents - Emirati and TCN alike - by 2010. The ID cards carry all 
biometric data and fingerprints on an electronic chip and are 
intended to eventually be used as driver's licenses, for banking 
purposes, for residency status verification, and more. More 
information on the UAE national ID card can be found at the Emirates 
Identity Authority's website at 
http://www.emiratesid.ae/mainenglish.html. 
 
In 2003, the UAE began implementation of iris scanning at its 
airports for certain nationals. Individuals who are deported from 
the UAE, or are the subject of travel bans, are enrolled into the 
iris-scan lookout system prior to their removal/departure from the 
UAE. At time of entry into the UAE, travelers of certain 
nationalities are required to undergo iris scanning, and over 30,000 
persons have been intercepted using the new technology. Iris 
scanning is also being deployed at land border crossings, and is 
currently active on the Omani border. 
 
 
12.  Cooperation with Host Government Authorities - Abu Dhabi 
 
Generally, Post has a good working relationship with the host 
government including cooperation on fraud issues as they arise. The 
UAEG, however, remains unresponsive to the serious passport place of 
birth concerns described above in paragraph 11. 
 
13.  Areas of Particular Concern - Abu Dhabi 
 
Post again highlights the known inadequacy of the UAE passport in 
regards to true place of birth for UAE nationals born outside the 
UAE. (See paragraph 11.) 
 
Post's primary concern in IV work remains our limited ability to 
verify Iranian documents and information provided in interviews. 
Post relies on "Shenas Namehs" to confirm names, birthdates, 
marriages, divorces, and other data. Post has seen several cases in 
which duplicate Shenas Namehs are submitted to verify identity. In 
many cases, Post has found that the duplicate document does not 
retain the same data as the original and that opportunities exist 
for altering data. 
 
With no USG presence in Iran it is difficult to conduct research to 
verify suspicious information or documents. Post is concerned about 
fraud in Iranian cases and sees the potential for abuse (with 
possible security ramifications) of the U.S. immigration process. 
Post is working on improving our knowledge of Iranian documents. We 
are working with the Swiss Embassy in Tehran, our counterparts from 
other missions with presence in Iran, and with colleagues from other 
U.S. Missions that handle Iranian visa work to gather Iranian 
legitimate documents and analyze valid trends. Despite efforts made 
approximately 4 years ago to gather Iranian documents, Post have not 
had a set on documents against which to verify Iranian claims. 
Efforts are being made through the Swiss and the British Embassies 
to gather valid and current Iranian documents. 
 
Post suspects that the Iranian community has caught on that working 
for the Government of Iran often results in a delay of visa 
issuance.  Additionally, Post suspects local Iranian travel agencies 
(which facilitate Iranians visiting the UAE, including 
accommodations in Dubai and transportation to Abu Dhabi) informally 
brief applicants on what to expect and say during visa interviews. 
Most recently, Post is working with CA/VO/L/C (the State group 
responsible for clearing Security Advisory Opinions) to clarify 
guidelines for the use of Security Advisory Opinions for Iranians 
with previous government and/ or military experience. 
 
 
ABU DHABI 00000378  006.2 OF 006 
 
 
 
 
14.  Staffing and Training - Abu Dhabi 
 
Abu Dhabi does not have any dedicated fraud prevention staff.  Visa 
team members - LES and officer alike - look for fraud on a 
case-by-case basis.  When the possibility of fraud is suspected, 
Post works to investigate that case.  With an Iranian- American IV 
Chief and 3 Iranian LES staff, much IV fraud work can be done in 
native language and by investigating original sources in Iran.  The 
DHS Visa Security Unit provides excellent assistance on fraud 
prevention matters and provides training to our consular staff, UAE 
immigration, and others for the detection of fraudulent documents, 
travel, imposters, DHS database reviews, and the whole range of 
fraud issues. 
 
Olson