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Viewing cable 09WELLINGTON65, NEW ZEALAND "ACCEPTS" COMMONWEALTH DECISION ON FIJI

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09WELLINGTON65 2009-03-06 04:06 2011-04-28 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Wellington
VZCZCXRO1487
PP RUEHPB
DE RUEHWL #0065 0650406
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 060406Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5786
INFO RUEHSV/AMEMBASSY SUVA PRIORITY 0854
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 5466
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0223
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY 0839
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0152
C O N F I D E N T I A L WELLINGTON 000065 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2024 
TAGS: PGOV PREL FJ NZ
SUBJECT: NEW ZEALAND "ACCEPTS" COMMONWEALTH DECISION ON FIJI 
 
Classified By: Embassy Wellington CDA David J. Keegan. Reasons E.O. 129 
58, 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Charge met with March 5 with Chris Seed, Deputy 
Secretary in the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (MFAT) March 5, 2009 who reviewed NZ's assessment of 
Fiji developments. 
 
2. (C) Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) meeting 
in London decided not to suspend Fiji as NZ had sought. GNZ 
and Foreign Minister Murray McCully had argued that Fiji had 
given no indication that it would accede to the CMAG 
requirements that it move toward elections. The Commonwealth 
had set an expectation that countries that had been removed 
from the group's governing councils for two years would be 
expelled. This recent action allowed Fiji to breach that 
requirement. 
 
3. (C) The CMAG had decided to take the approach that PNG had 
recommended. They had decided to let the PIF take the lead at 
the May meeting of its Ministerial Contact Group. If Fiji had 
still failed to make progress, the PIF could then move to 
suspend. GNZ had realized that this was a likely compromise 
position and did not challenge it. The CMAG is expected to 
meet in six months and could then move to suspend/expel Fiji 
if there has been no progress. 
 
4. (C) GNZ is concerned that Frank Bainimarama will present 
the Commonwealth meeting as a victory for him because they 
chose not to expel him. There are already reports that FB is 
seeking to convene a special meeting of the Melanesian 
spearhead group, claiming that it is Fiji's turn in rotation 
to serve as the chair. He apparently hopes this will be a 
meeting more friendly to him than the PIF, with Australia, 
New Zealand, and Polynesian critics like Samoa and Tonga 
excluded. It is not yet clear whether the MSG will actually 
be prepared to meet a FB's request, but he is trying to win 
over allies one by one. 
 
5. (C) Like Foreign Minister McCully, Seed said he sees no 
prospect of progress with Fiji in the near term. FB has shown 
no willingness to listen to advice, either domestic or 
foreign, about how to move forward. Anyone who questions his 
approach is ignored. As FB settles in, the economic situation 
in Fiji is becoming increasingly dire. Tourist visits is down 
far more steeply than Fiji government numbers suggest. 
Government and forex balance sheets are quickly going bad. 
KEEGAN