VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHWR #0298/01 0791445
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201445Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8029
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 000298 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRIED 
NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR SHERWOOD-RANDALL 
OSD FOR U/S FLOURNOY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2019 
TAGS: PREL PM PL
SUBJECT: POLAND: ARE WE SINCERE? 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ashe by reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY.  Polish political leaders have largely 
recovered from initial misgivings about recent U.S. overtures 
to Russia.  The President's public clarification of his 
letter to President Medvedev, as well as the meeting between 
FM Sikorski and Secretary Clinton, have set aside for now 
Polish concerns that the U.S. will seek a grand bargain with 
Russia at the expense of the U.S.-Poland strategic 
relationship.  Of continuing and perhaps increasing concern, 
however, is the slow pace of consultations between our two 
governments, especially at the heads level.  There is a 
growing fear among Polish government elites that Poland has 
become an afterthought, or even a nuisance, in Washington 
circles, and this is hard to swallow for a country that 
considers itself a loyal ally and important contributor to 
U.S. strategic interests in greater Europe and Afghanistan. 
Much of this unease would dissipate with movement forward on 
Prime Minister Tusk's request to meet with the President in 
Washington in April. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C)  President Obama's clarifying remarks on the "secret 
letters" to Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev struck a 
welcome chord with Polish leaders.  FM Radoslaw Sikorski came 
away from his February 25 meeting with Secretary Clinton 
favorably impressed by her perspective on Russia, telling the 
press and us in private that the Secretary has "great 
geo-political instincts."  Concerns over the U.S.-Russian 
dialogue are by no means dead, however.  President Lech 
Kaczynski recently told Polish media that any U.S. decision 
to withdraw from missile defense (MD) to assuage Russia would 
"be an unfriendly gesture towards Poland."  The DCM was 
grilled by Presidential Deputy Chief of Staff about whether 
the US could, in essence, keep from being out maneuvered by 
the Russians.  Deputy Defense Minister Stanislaw Komorowski 
told acting U/S Mull in Washington in early March that "it is 
important to be 100 percent sure that Russia has no influence 
on sovereign decisions ... that would be a disaster for both 
of us." 
 
¶3.  (C)  The GOP is anxious to engage the new administration 
at a high political level.  Prime Minister Tusk was extremely 
pleased with his Munich meeting with the Vice President, and 
Foreign Minister Sikorski greatly appreciated his meeting 
with the Secretary.  However, the GoP would like very much to 
hear back on its request for PM Tusk's visit to the White 
House.  Privately, MFA officials have told us the Prime 
Minister will lose credibility if he does not get a 
Washington visit by the end of April.  The Poles are aware of 
the President's intentions to meet with his hosts on the 
margins of the Informal US-EU Summit -- the Czech Republic -- 
where MD will clearly be on the agenda. 
 
¶4. (C)  We have also given Warsaw numerous assurances that 
the U.S. intends to move forward with our strategic 
relationship and will consult on MD, but Poles are keenly 
aware of the lack of actual consultations  -- either on the 
Administration's thinking on MD or dialogue as envisioned in 
the August 2008 Declaration on Strategic Cooperation.  They 
are being studiously patient as we sort through our policy 
options and put in place key personnel, but the Poles are 
increasingly frustrated about the absence of regular, 
expected contacts. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Promised consultations are not inconsiderable. The 
consultative mechanisms established in the August 2008 
Declaration of Strategic Cooperation are: a Strategic 
Dialogue (SD), Strategic Cooperation Consultative Group 
(SCCG), and High Level Defense Dialogue (HLDG).  From the 
Polish perspective, it is more important that these bodies 
actually begin to meet (or least makes plans to do so) than 
to wait until logistical and protocol arrangements are 
determined, such as the rank of respective delegation 
leaders, frequency of meetings, or portfolio 
responsibilities. Indeed, the Poles now agree with us that 
these issues are more likely to be resolved during the 
meetings themselves than through formal exchanges beforehand. 
 
¶6.  (C)  COMMENT.  Although Polish leaders are thus far 
reassured that there will be no secret U.S.-Russian deal 
reached over Poland's head, they are increasingly nervous 
about their perceived lack of access to U.S. leaders, and 
worry that they are hearing about significant U.S. 
initiatives that concern Poland (like on Missile Defense) in 
the press and not from us directly.  Our sense is that they 
are beginning to doubt our sincerity, and that is no doubt a 
confusing situation for a country that has consistently and 
strongly supported the U.S. END COMMENT. 
 
ASHE