VZCZCXYZ0010
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0283/01 0781321
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 191321Z MAR 09
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6119
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 0263
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 1422
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI PRIORITY 0319
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 3598

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000283 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL UNSC
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RICE'S INTRODUCTORY MEETING WITH 
FRANCES DENG, UN SPECIAL ADVISER FOR THE PREVENTION OF 
GENOCIDE 
 
¶1. Summary:  Ambassador Rice met with Francis Deng, the UN's 
Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide on March 16 to 
discuss current activities of his office and priorities for 
the future.  Deng explained his efforts to engage three 
important constituencies on the work of his office in order 
to build support for genocide prevention: member states, 
colleagues in the United Nations, and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs).  He stressed the need for stronger ties 
with the Security Council in order to boost the effectiveness 
of his office despite reluctance on the part of the Russians 
and Chinese.  He remarked that sovereignty can no longer be 
seen as a protection against outside interference, but as a 
responsibility of the state towards the welfare of its own 
citizens. On the question of peace versus justice, Deng's 
position has shifted to favor the need for accountability for 
those who commit egregious crimes. Ambassador Rice expressed 
her disappointment in the leaders of Africa who too often 
pursue their own interests rather than protecting the welfare 
of Africans. She pressed Deng to publicly acknowledge that 
the government of Sudan's decision to expel humanitarian NGOs 
amounts to genocide by other means.  End summary. 
 
¶2. Deng opened the meeting by stating that his mandate as the 
Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide (SAPG) is 
impossible, but must be made possible.  He views the work of 
his office as the catalyst for a larger process within the UN 
to prevent genocide from occurring. In his role as the SAPG, 
Deng must engage three main constituencies: a) governments of 
member states, b) colleagues within the UN system, and c) 
NGOs.  Many member states see the concept of genocide 
prevention and the related framework of the Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P) as tools for the world's great powers to 
interfere in internal matters of weaker states.  Deng must 
allay their fears to generate support for the work of his 
office.  The UN system must be convinced that a number of its 
constituent parts have a role to play in early warning and 
prevention of genocide.  NGOs push Deng's office to adopt a 
strategy of "name and shame" and have doubts about the 
effectiveness of his mandate due to weak linkages with the 
Security Council. 
 
¶3. As a priority for his office, Deng seeks greater 
interaction with the Security Council.  He does not want to 
push himself on the Council as he knows that his mandate 
remains sensitive to some members including Russia and China. 
 Some Council members and many member states remain wary of 
the principle of sovereignty as responsibility that Deng 
promotes.  They prefer to view sovereignty as protection from 
outside domination or interference while Deng promotes the 
vision that sovereignty implies a responsibility to safeguard 
the welfare of a country's citizens. 
 
¶4. Deng told Ambassador Rice that he seeks P-5 support to 
allow his mandate to become more effective through a stronger 
connection with the Security Council.  At the moment, he does 
not push to be allowed to brief the Council unless he knows 
that he will get a positive response.  He worries that his 
office will be weakened if he asks to be able to report to 
the Council and is rejected.  If the US and other Council 
members make a habit of requesting briefings from the office 
of the SAPG, he believes that he will have more credibility 
within the UN system and beyond. 
 
¶5. On the topic of peace versus justice, Deng started out 
firmly in the camp that believes that peace must take 
precedence over justice for the victims of atrocities, 
especially given the African cultural preference for peace 
and reconciliation.  However, Deng's views have shifted and 
he now asserts that justice must be given priority.  Leaders 
who are responsible for crimes against their own people must 
be held accountable. 
 
¶6. On Sudan, Deng expressed dismay at the violence that has 
wracked his country for decades.  He lamented the 
confrontational approach adopted by the government of Sudan 
in response to the ICC arrest warrant for President Bashir 
when the country would have been better off cooperating with 
the international community to cement the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) and find a political solution to the conflict 
in Darfur. 
 
¶7. Ambassador Rice challenged Deng on the dismal response of 
African leaders to the crisis in Sudan.  She described many 
African leaders as being more interested in their narrow 
self-interests rather than the good of the people of Sudan. 
She noted that the SPLM had not played a constructive role in 
seeking security and justice for the people of Darfur, and 
 
 
 
that the SPLM remained conspicuously silent when the 
government of Sudan announced the expulsion of international 
humanitarian NGOs from the country. Deng replied that the 
weak African response sprang from a feeling that the ICC 
targets African nations.  Ambassador Rice reminded Deng that 
African nations helped to create the ICC and that Uganda and 
the DRC had initiated ICC proceedings in their own countries. 
 The Security Council became involved in Africa only in the 
case of Sudan. 
 
¶8. Deng remarked that he had drafted a mild statement in 
response to the Sudanese government's action to expel aid 
agencies, but that it was stuck in the office of the 
Secretary General where a quiet, low-key approach is favored 
when dealing with this matter.  Ambassador Rice noted that 
she had gone on record as labeling the Sudanese expulsion of 
humanitarian agencies and the resulting closure of aid 
programs "genocide by other means".  She expressed the hope 
that Deng or the UN could make a similarly strong statement. 
 
¶9. On Sri Lanka, Deng spoke of conversations that he had with 
that country's permanent representative to the United 
Nations.  The Sri Lankan perm rep told Deng that his 
country's actions in mounting an offensive against the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elan (LTTE) in the north of Sri 
Lanka were known to its friends the United States and India. 
The Sri Lankan representative left the impression that his 
government's measures against the LTTE are supported by the 
US and India.  A visit to Sri Lanka left Deng impressed with 
the great cleavages between the Sinhalese and Tamils that 
would not be solved by the government's victory on the 
battlefield. 
 
¶10. Deng touched briefly on R2P and noted that the Secretary 
General wants close cooperation between the office of the 
SAPG and Ed Luck who is heading up the UN approach on R2P. 
The mechanism for cooperation remains to be determined, but 
Deng expects to operate out of joint offices with Luck. 
Rice