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DE RUCNDT #0229/01 0690030
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 100030Z MAR 09
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6030
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0265
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000229 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC PREL EFIN KTFN PTER UNSC
SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS OF 1267 MONITORING TEAM'S ANNUAL REPORT 
 
¶1. (U) SUMMARY: The 1267 Monitoring Team, a UN-mandated group 
charged with documenting and reporting on the implementation 
of the UN sanctions on Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, has issued 
its ninth annual report containing recommendations to improve 
the efficacy and fairness of this sanctions regime. The 
report lauds new procedures adopted in UNSCR 1822 to increase 
fairness and transparency that, along with improvements to 
the Consolidated List and increased commitment from Member 
States, is critical to ensuring these sanctions have the 
greatest impact on the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.  The Team 
presents a series of procedural recommendations to further 
enhance fairness in listing, reviewing names and de-listing 
names.  It also proposes measures to ensure the "dynamism" of 
the Consolidated List (e.g., through de-listing individuals 
who lack sufficient identifiers or are reported to be dead) 
and improve implementation of the asset freeze, travel ban, 
and arms embargo.  The Team proposes reforming the current 
system for granting humanitarian exemptions.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On February 28, 2009, the Analytical Support and 
Sanctions Monitoring Team ("Monitoring Team") presented to 
the 1267 al-Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions Committee its ninth 
annual report containing recommendations to improve the 
efficacy and fairness of this sanctions regime.  In the 
report, the Team concludes that the threat from al-Qaeda 
continues, with the focus firmly on South Asia, and that the 
Taliban (both in Afghanistan and Pakistan) is in no danger of 
defeat.  The Team states that the al-Qaeda threat today is 
geographically restricted to the Afghanistan/Pakistan border 
area and the organization is weakened by its failure to mount 
the attacks that it has threatened. The report indicates by 
comparison that the Afghan Taliban has gained ground from 
opium cultivation and will likely continue to dominate the 
countryside for the foreseeable future, highlighting the 
urgent need for effective counter-terrorism measures in South 
Asia. 
 
CHALLENGES TO SANCTIONS IMPLEMENTATION 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) The report assesses the major factors that have 
undermined the effective implementation of the 1267 UN 
sanctions regime, namely that some states lack the capacity 
to introduce and enforce the measures, regard the targets to 
be of marginal national relevance, grant sanctions a low 
priority because they believe them to be ineffective, or 
question the legitimacy of sanctions. The courts, in 
particular, the report observes, have asserted their 
authority to examine the legality of actions taken by States 
to carry out obligations under relevant Security Council 
sanctions resolutions. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Referring to recent litigation in Europe challenging 
sanctions implementation, the Team notes that Courts have 
decided that individuals and entities placed on the List must 
have certain protections of their rights, in particular their 
right to know the case against them, to be heard and to 
challenge the decision before an independent body. These 
court decisions, the report concludes, could cause real 
difficulties for Member State implementation of sanctions 
measures. Referring to new safeguards introduced in UNSCR 
1822 (adopted June 2008), the Monitoring Team assesses that 
"the procedures now in place make future (legal) challenges 
less likely and less likely to be successful.8 
 
IMPROVING FAIR PROCEDURES 
------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) To respond to criticisms of unfairness -- and stave 
off new litigation -- the report recommends improvements in 
three particular areas: listing, reviewing names and 
de-listing.  With respect to listing procedures, the report 
recommends that the Committee should view any submission for 
listing as an invitation to its fifteen members to add, if 
they can, substantive further reasons for listing or 
identifying information, rather than just agree or disagree 
with the listing (as is current practice).  The Monitoring 
Team believes that if the entries on the List are well 
founded and persuasive, they are less likely to be challenged 
in national courts. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The report notes that the Security Council is 
unlikely to create an "independent review mechanism" to 
review designations (as some countries have proposed), but 
suggests instead that the recent litigation actually means 
that "(the courts) will in effect offer an independent review 
of listing decisions by the Committee when these are 
challenged before them."  The Team also proposes that they 
should have the opportunity to gather relevant information 
from all parties concerned when designating states and states 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000229  002 OF 003 
 
 
of residence disagree on the continued appropriateness of a 
listing or when the information provided is vague. 
 
¶6. (SBU) To improve the delisting procedures, the Team 
recommends the Committee: 1) provide the petitioner a 
specific response when it rejects a petition, 2) consider 
ways to gather the maximum information possible about the 
activities of individuals and entities that apply for 
de-listing, 3) direct the Team, or another expert body, to 
collect further information from states or clarify aspects of 
the petition with the individuals or entities that have 
submitted it.  The Team further notes that delisting should 
not be a precondition for a listed Taliban to participate in 
reconciliation talks, but that the Committee should develop 
specific requirements for delisting Taliban that would make 
the process more predictable and consistent. 
 
MAKING THE CONSOLIDATED LIST: RELEVANT, DYNAMIC 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Beyond the litigation and fairness critiques, the 
Team assesses that the greater challenge is "maintaining the 
preventative and forward-looking nature of the sanctions 
regime."  To accomplish this, the Team believes the Committee 
must simultaneously continue those al-Qaeda/Taliban targets 
that pose the greatest current threat and remove listings 
that are peripheral to the current threat.  The Team says 
that it believes there is "no obvious advantage in the List 
becoming longer, but (there is) great advantage in it 
becoming more dynamic.8 
 
¶8. (SBU) To help clean up the list, the Monitoring Team notes 
the requirement in UNSCR 1822 that the 1267 Committee conduct 
a comprehensive review by June 30, 2010, to "ensure the 
Consolidated List is as updated and accurate as possible and 
to confirm that listing remains appropriate" by June 30, 
¶2010.  The Team recommends that the Committee regard this 
review as a priority, especially given the adverse effect 
that entries with insufficient identifiers have on the 
overall credibility of the List. In cases where a name lacks 
sufficient identifiers, the Team recommends that the 
Committee encourage the designating State either to provide 
at a minimum the full name, date and place of birth and 
nationality, or to submit a de-listing request. The Team also 
recommends improvements in how the Consolidated List is 
distributed to states. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The report recommends that when the Committee 
conducts its review of listed individuals reported to be dead 
(at least 24 individuals, possibly as many as 39), it should 
grant any pending de-listing request if nothing has been 
heard to contradict an official report of the death within 
twelve months.  If no pending de-listing request exists, the 
Team recommends that the Committee chair submit a de-listing 
request for the individual concerned. In cases where the 
death has been widely reported but for which there is no 
official confirmation, the Team recommends that the Committee 
consult with the relevant States and encourage them to submit 
a de-listing request if two years have passed without further 
information. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: ASSET FREEZE, TRAVEL BAN, ARMS EMBARGO 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) To enhance implementation of the asset freeze, the 
Team recommends that the Committee direct the Team, in 
conjunction with relevant States, the United Nations 
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to identify key figures 
that make payments to the Taliban and are vulnerable, by 
virtue of the visibility of their assets, to action under the 
sanctions measures. The report notes that evidence of 
terrorist financing, so far as it is available, suggests that 
Al-Qaeda and the Taliban rely on two main sources of income: 
donations and the proceeds of crime, including trafficking 
narcotics. It therefore concludes that the best targets of 
the assets freeze measure are the donors. The Team would like 
for States to follow the example of the United Arab Emirates, 
where hawala brokers must register with the Central Bank and 
submit all transactions for official scrutiny. 
 
¶11. (SBU) The Team proposes the Committee grant it additional 
authority on a case-by-case basis to investigate details 
surrounding possible violations of the travel ban.  The Team 
notes that violations of the travel ban may occur in 
reconciliation talks between the Afghan government and the 
Taliban.  In such cases, the Team recommends that the 
Committee make clear to Afghanistan that such talks must 
respect the sanctions regime, but that the Afghan government 
may apply for exemptions to the travel ban. 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000229  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶12. (U) With respect to the arms embargo on designated 
individuals and entities, the report notes that states find 
it difficult to prevent the indirect supply, sale, or 
transfer of arms and related material to individuals who are 
members of listed entities but are not listed. Several listed 
entities, the Team reports, have ceased to function or 
morphed into new, unlisted group.  As an example, the Team 
notes the case of the Somali group Al-Shabaab which, although 
not currently listed, carries out armed operations on behalf 
of and in support of Al-Qaeda. 
 
REFORM OF HUMANITARIAN EXEMPTIONS 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) The team notes that few States appear to abide by 
UNSCR 1452 (2002), which sets out the procedures for 
humanitarian exemptions from the asset freeze, and that the 
Committee should review this resolution.  The Team proposes 
that a system whereby states are still obliged to seek 
agreement from the Committee before allowing an exemption for 
extraordinary expenses (as is current practice), but would 
have the discretion to grant exemptions for basic exemptions 
based on their own national standards and then informing the 
Committee of their decisions after the fact. 
 
NEXT STEPS 
---------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) The 1267 Committee will have a first discussion 
about the Monitoring Team's report on March 9.  The 
Committee, however, will return to these recommendations 
throughout the course of the year leading up to the renewal 
of the 1267 sanctions regime in December 2009. 
Rice