VZCZCXRO1045
PP RUEHAST RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0071/01 0851526
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 261526Z MAR 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6297
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0718
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1273
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1213

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 USOSCE 000071 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, 
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI 
JCS FOR J-5 
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) 
NSC FOR HAYES 
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL 
EUCOM FOR J-5 
CENTCOM FOR J-5 
UNVIE FOR AC 
GENEVA FOR CD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG
SUBJECT: FSC MARCH 25: RUSSIA CALLS FOR LIMITED REVISION OF 
VIENNA DOCUMENT 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Russian arms control delegation head 
Ulyanov told the March 25 Forum for Security Cooperation that 
half of the Vienna Document, last revised in 1999, was a 
"dead letter" and even its provisions for information 
exchange, inspections/evaluations, and contact visits were no 
longer robust and in danger of decaying into irrelevance. 
Reprising a theme he has argued for the last three years, 
Ulyanov asserted the only way the Vienna Document 1999 (VD99) 
could avoid "the fate of the CFE Treaty" would be immediate 
and rapid revision of some of its key portions, similar to 
what was done several times in the 1990s.   Revision could be 
limited by an FSC decision that would reopen only certain 
paragraphs of VD99, set a fixed time limit, and underline 
that VD99 would remain in effect until revision was complete. 
 Greece cautioned that reopening VD99 could jeopardize all 
its provisions as the European security climate had changed 
since the early 1990s when it was first negotiated.  The U.S. 
noted Russia itself had, despite its gloomy report, actively 
implemented Vienna Document verification provisions in 2008 
and 2009. 
 
¶2. (SBU) French MFA security policy DAS Audibert explained 
Paris' views for next steps on European security.  Audibert 
minimized the significance of the recent French decision to 
rejoin the NATO military structure and insisted France had 
always been "Atlanticist," although some believed it had 
championed the European Security and Defense Policy to 
compete with NATO.  European defense strategy will require 
continuing reliance on the "twin pillars" of NATO and the EU 
even though many European nations need to invest more in 
defense.  Although France saw a major role for the OSCE in 
any new European security arrangement, considerable 
imagination and flexibility would be needed to surmount 
frozen conflicts and restore the political-military acquis, 
including CFE.  End Summary. 
 
Who's Afraid of the Vienna Document? 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (SBU) Russian arms control delegation head Mikhail Ulyanov 
said participating States responded warily, if not in 
outright panic, to his standing question why had the Vienna 
Document not been changed since 1999 when it had been amended 
four times in the first ten years of its existence.  Ulyanov 
doubted the explanation proffered by the UK that the European 
political climate had changed since the document was first 
written.  He recalled the Helsinki Final Act was created in 
the mid-1970s when the "common purpose" was presumably no 
greater.  The Stockholm document on CSBMs was adopted in 
¶1986.  More recently, the adapted CFE Treaty was negotiated 
despite tense NATO-Russia relations in the wake of the 
Yugoslavia conflicts.  The actual explanation, Ulyanov 
concluded, was a lack of political will compounded by 
diminishing interest in CSBMs.  Many states, he said, are 
comfortable with the present document and allergic to 
anything that would limit their latitude for military action. 
 
"A Dead Letter" 
--------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) These attitudes, Ulyanov warned, are at odds with 
current reality.  Not all states are comfortable with the 
position that the Vienna Document performs well enough. 
 
USOSCE 00000071  002 OF 005 
 
 
Referring to an earlier Russian Food-for-Thought paper that 
reviewed each of the document's chapters (FSC.AIAM/2/09), 
Ulyanov asserted that at least half of the provisions were 
not functioning, "a dead letter," as exemplified by Georgia's 
recent refusal of a Russian inspection request.  He added 
that pS submission under VD99 vary widely in the degree of 
detail, itself an "abnormal state of affairs."  Atrophy of 
VD99 was part of a larger stalemate over the last decade in 
the core mandate of the FSC.  Innovation is viewed by some as 
taboo even though change is acknowledged elsewhere as needed, 
as in discussions of European security architecture.  "Yet 
while every howitzer was counted, naval forces were not even 
considered."  Not only the Vienna Document, but the OSCE 
Document on SALW, Principles of Non-Proliferation, and Code 
of Conduct also are in need of serious review.  If nothing 
were done, the document would completely cease to function 
within ten years. 
 
Selective Pruning 
----------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Anticipating the objection that reopening the Vienna 
Document would threaten the existing CSBM regime, Ulyanov 
assured that only selected sections need be considered, and 
this could be done without jeopardizing the rest of the 
document.  Just a few new provisions were needed to update 
the document, including Russia's earlier proposals for 
information exchanges and notifications on naval forces and 
(with Belarus) multinational rapid reaction forces.  Also, in 
Chapter IX on verification, a definition of "force majeure" 
was needed.  The recent proposals by Norway on inspection 
quotas (FSC.AIAM/5/09) and Denmark on the size of inspection 
teams (FSC.AIAM/6/08) should also be considered, he said. 
Chapters V through VIII could be left intact, except that the 
definition of "major military activities" needed to be 
updated. 
 
Immediate and Urgent Revision Needed 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (SBU) Ulyanov assured that pS could agree in advance which 
provisions to reopen, and that protracted negotiations would 
be in no one's interest.  He proposed a date certain by which 
any changes would have to be approved, e.g., before the 
Athens Ministerial (in December).  Review of the document 
should then occur every four or five years, as is done with 
core documents at the UN, the EU, and NATO.  Ulyanov urged pS 
to begin revision immediately: it should become the main work 
of the FSC for the next two or three months if the document 
is to avoid "the fate of the CFE Treaty."  Ulyanov asked that 
his presentation be considered as a Food-for-Thought and part 
of dialogue to ensure European security. 
 
Allies and Others Resist 
------------------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) While Belarus gave a blanket endorsement of the 
Russian position, Switzerland demurred that only the Vienna 
Document provisions on conflict resolution were moribund, 
largely for political reasons.  Austria complained that it 
had attempted a review of the Code of Conduct in 2006 but 
lacked any support to go forward.  The UK reminded that it 
had recently co-sponsored with Russia a draft Best Practices 
 
USOSCE 00000071  003 OF 005 
 
 
Guide on contact visits, hardly an example of inactivity. 
Latvia suggested the problem was lack of will, not an 
inadequate instrument. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Germany (Kantorczyk) expressed general satisfaction 
with the Vienna Document, but conceded the Russian point that 
the document had not been revised since 1999, attributing 
this to the absence of the consensus present in the 1990s. 
Kantorczyk noted the document lacks a mechanism for regular 
review but revision should be undertaken when needed. Germany 
would be making its own proposal for improving the document 
soon.  Germany did not share Ulyanov's pessimism about OSCE 
political-military documents generally: the Forum had 
recently agreed to undertake a review of the SALW document. 
 
U.S.: VD99 Seems to Work for Russia 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) countered that the discussion 
should not be whether to reopen the document but allow Russia 
to explain what issues it had with the document beyond some 
of the issues it had already raised that were discounted by 
other pS, e.g., its proposals on naval and rapid reaction 
forces.  Neighbour said it was hard to understand Russia's 
assertion that VD99 was not working considering its own very 
heavy implementation of the document in 2008 and 2009. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Greece (Sourani) repeated the common apprehension 
that revising any part of the document would entail reopening 
all of it.  She asked delegations to recall their substantial 
revision efforts in 1995-1999, which led only to a chapter on 
regional measures.  Responding to Ulyanov's claim that there 
were fewer notifications, she said the document was a victim 
of its own success in reducing tensions and building 
stability. 
 
Allons Enfants 
-------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) French MFA DAS for security policy Jacques Audibert 
discussed European security on the eve of the NATO Summit. 
Audibert minimized the magnitude of the change represented by 
France's return to NATO's integrated military structure, 
asserting it had always been committed to the trans-Atlantic 
partnership and France never intended EU defense institutions 
to compete with NATO as events continue to prove that Europe 
needs the U.S. and vice versa.  For the future, France will 
work to strengthen "the twin pillars" of European security, 
NATO and the EU, including the latter's European Security and 
Defense Policy. 
 
OSCE a Keystone 
--------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Acknowledging the problems at the OSCE with 
continuing impasse over frozen conflicts and an "erosion of 
commitment" to the political-military acquis, he said France 
viewed the OSCE as a keystone of the European security 
structure, which should be based on the trans-Atlantic link; 
preservation of extant institutions including NATO, the EU, 
and the OSCE; a comprehensive, multi-dimensional concept of 
security including human rights; and renewed commitment to 
the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 Charter 
 
USOSCE 00000071  004 OF 005 
 
 
of Paris. 
 
European Defense Deficits 
------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) While noting that the NATO-EU partnership still 
needed work, Audibert said Europe's own defense efforts were 
still insufficient, noting perennial equipment and other 
shortfalls resulting from declining or static defense 
budgets.  There was, he said, something wrong when two 
European countries had 75 percent of the airlift capacity of 
the EU.  Nevertheless, he said the EU had proven its worth, 
citing its observer mission in Georgia, naval response to 
Horn of Africa piracy, and rule of law mission in Kosovo. 
 
U.S. Needs Time 
--------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) Audibert added that any future European security 
arrangement would need to address new and emerging threats 
such as global warming, proliferation of WMD, energy 
security, terrorism, and cyber attacks.  States would 
reaffirm their adherence to the principles of avoidance of 
force and the right to elect security arrangements.  Regional 
conflicts had to be addressed and the CFE Treaty, although 
"not in crisis," should be restored to its central position 
in the European security architecture through adaptation and 
subsequent "modernization."  To do this will require all 
parties to show imagination and flexibility.  He cautioned 
that many states, particularly the U.S. with the change in 
administration, need time to take stock before committing to 
an OSCE summit. 
 
SALW 
---- 
 
¶15. (SBU) In the working group , the FSC chairman of the 
Informal Group of Friends of SALW (Schweizer, Germany) 
reported many delegations share a common understanding of the 
way ahead in fulfilling the 2008 ministerial decision to 
review the OSCE Document on SALW.  At an informal meeting on 
March 19, most delegations agreed on a general approach 
instead of a "line-by-line" review of the document. 
Schweizer will circulate a notional work plan shortly that 
will draw from proposals made by delegations, including: 
descriptions of current OSCE norms and programs; support of 
related international organization and NGO efforts; and a 
major meeting by September.  Schweizer described an emerging 
consensus for future work on brokering, end-use certificates, 
marking and tracing, and stockpile management. 
 
Code of Conduct 
--------------- 
 
¶16. (SBU) Responding to the latest revision of the draft 
decision for an update to the Code of Conduct questionnaire 
(FSC.DD/14/08/Rev.2), Belarus said it still preferred a 
"direct reference" to the "indivisibility of security" in 
preamble paragraph 3, despite a U.S.-suggested edit to the 
paragraph that quotes from Code paragraph 3 that "security is 
indivisible."  In any case Belarus is still waiting for 
instructions. 
 
 
USOSCE 00000071  005 OF 005 
 
 
¶17. (SBU) Germany proposed editorial changes to questions 
II.4.1. and 4.3 and II.1.3., substituting "how does your 
state" for "how do you."  Germany can accept the draft with 
just these changes, although it also repeated a 
recommendation that preamble paragraph 5 recalling the 
earlier technical update of the questionnaire (FSC.DEC/4/03) 
be deleted as superfluous. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Turkey requested the word "any" be deleted from 
question I.1.4 soliciting information on "additional efforts" 
to combat terrorism.  Russia immediately counter-proposed 
"possible" in place of "any."  (Note: Turkey has consistently 
sought strengthening the obligation to provide this 
information, while Russia just as consistently has sought to 
dilute it. End Note.)  The FSC Code coordinator (Eischer, 
Austria) may prepare another revision after consulting with 
delegations.  If consensus appears likely, the chair will 
call a working group meeting before the plenary on April 1. 
 
 
ASRC 
---- 
 
¶19. (SBU) The chair (Lebedel, France) announced that Loic 
Simonet (France) would be the FSC chef de file for the Annual 
Security Review Conference (June 23-24).  Lebedel also 
invited comment on his perception paper on the terms of 
reference for the chef de file (FSC.DEL/62/09).  There was no 
further discussion of the paper. 
 
Next Meeting 
------------ 
 
¶20. (SBU) The next and last FSC meeting under the French 
chairmanship will be on April 1. 
SCOTT