VZCZCXYZ0021
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHVEN #0059/01 0821532
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231532Z MAR 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6269
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0082
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS USOSCE 000059 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PHUM PTER AF OSCE
SUBJECT: OSCE SUPPORT FOR AFGHAN ELECTIONS 
 
¶1. (U) This is an action request.  Please see paragraph 11. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Summary and Action Request:  USOSCE has encouraged 
the OSCE's Office of Democratic and Human Rights (ODIHR) to 
respond positively to Afghanistan's request for OSCE 
assistance to its August 20 presidential and provincial 
council elections by sending an election assessment team. 
The evaluation by ODIHR, universally respected for its 
election expertise, could lend legitimacy to these elections, 
help Afghanistan prepare for next year's parliamentary 
elections, and solidify OSCE's partnership with Afghanistan, 
a bordering OSCE Partner state that has a considerable impact 
on security in the OSCE region.  ODIHR, the OSCE 
Chairmanship, and the majority of OSCE participating States 
stand ready to assist Afghanistan, but require firm assurance 
that adequate funding and security for an assessment team 
would be forthcoming before taking the necessary political 
decision on the matter.  Previous ODIHR missions to 
Afghanistan have cost approximately one million Euros, 
including security costs.  Action Request: please provide 
assurances re level of funding US would be ready to 
contribute to this effort, as well as security aspects the 
OSCE would be expected to provide for an ODIHR team in 
Afghanistan (and conversely security that the international 
community will be providing in support of the election 
effort).  End Summary. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Afghan Foreign Minister Spanta in a February 22 
letter to the Greek Foreign Minister and 
Chairperson-in-Office Dora Bakoyannis requested the OSCE's 
Office of Democracy and Human Rights (ODIHR) assist in the 
preparation and planning of the August 20 Presidential and 
Provincial Council Election.  Spanta had earlier invited the 
ODIHR in his speech to the OSCE-Partners for Cooperation 
Conference, held in Kabul last November, expressing 
appreciation for ODIHR's key role in assisting the 2004 
Presidential and 2005 Parliamentary elections.  The Afghan 
Mission to the OSCE followed up on March 17 by providing the 
OSCE Secretary General with the Afghan Independent Election 
Commission's wish-list of training and equipment needs 
(distributed to EUR/RPM and SCA/A). 
 
¶4. (SBU) ODIHR is well placed to assist the Afghan elections 
given its expertise in election administration and its 
experience in Afghanistan.  ODIHR's assistance to 
Afghanistan's first-ever Presidential elections in 2004 and 
in the parliamentary election of 2005 was applauded by the 
Afghan Government and the international community.  For the 
2004 and 2005 election, ODIHR sent expert election support 
teams who analyzed key elements of the election environment, 
including the electoral system, campaign and legislation, the 
electoral administration, voter registration, counting and 
vote tabulation, and the complaints and appeals process.  The 
resulting recommendations from ODIHR have since been used in 
preparing for the 2009 election.  ODIHR invited Afghanistan's 
Independent Election Commission (IEC) to ODIHR's offices in 
Warsaw on March 10-11 to review the recommendations.  ODIHR's 
assessment report from the 2009 Presidential election would 
be extremely valuable in preparing for next year's 
parliamentary elections in Afghanistan. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Given the EU and UN's technical assistance, ODIHR is 
not expected to play as prominent a role in this election as 
it did in 2004 and 2005.  ODIHR Director Lenarcic reported to 
the March 19 Permanent Council meeting that ODIHR was ready 
and willing to help.  At our urging, Lenarcic and his team 
have been in contact with the UN, EU, and governmental and 
non-governmental actors in Afghanistan to identify ongoing 
technical assistance activities and identify where ODIHR 
expertise could be most useful to avoid unnecessary 
duplication and add value.  The Greek OSCE Chairmanship has 
joined us in encouraging ODIHR to formulate a robust 
technical assistance package. 
 
¶6. (SBU) An ODIHR mission to Afghanistan will require a 
consensus-based, political decision of the OSCE Permanent 
Council.  The OSCE Chairmanship will distribute a draft 
decision the week of March 23 -- based largely on our input 
-- authorizing ODIHR to provide assistance in the election. 
The decision should be brought to the Permanent Council in 
the next month in order for ODIHR to have adequate time to 
prepare and deploy its experts. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Stumbling Blocks: Funding and Security 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) The majority of the OSCE participating States 
believe that ODIHR's expertise and professionalism should be 
made available to Afghanistan, whose fate greatly matters to 
security in the OSCE area.  To achieve consensus on a 
decision in the Permanent Council, however, we will need to 
address the concerns of some of the participating States 
regarding security provisions for the ODIHR experts and 
adequate funding for the mission. 
 
¶8. (SBU) ODIHR Director Lenarcic has estimated that a mission 
could cost a million Euros or more.  The 2004 and 2005 
election support teams, which were much more robust, cost 
more than one million Euros.  Participating States want 
assurances from us and other probable donors -- including 
Finland and Sweden -- that funding would be forthcoming. 
(Note:  the OSCE already has 303,500 Euros in available 
U.S.-sourced funding left over from the previous Afghan 
election projects.  This funding can immediately be made 
available for the 2009 Afghan elections.  End note.) 
 
¶9. (SBU) While the precise security parameters of the 
assessment mission cannot be specified at this point (ODIHR 
can only determine what specific role it can play after the 
EU concludes its needs assessment mission in April), the 
overall mission is expected to include at least 10-15 experts 
based in Kabul for up to six weeks leading up to the 
election.  ODIHR would prefer to be co-located with the EU 
mission so that it can tap into the EU observer reports.  The 
ODIHR experts would conduct meetings in Kabul with election 
stakeholders (political parties, election officials, NGO's, 
media representatives, etc.) and would require secure 
transport to and from the meeting venues. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Incorporating ODIHR experts under an existing 
security umbrella -- such as the possible ISAF security to be 
provided for the EU observers -- would be the ideal solution. 
 NATO/ISAF's ability to provide security for the ODIHR team 
would calm fears about sending ODIHR experts into a 
potentially dangerous situation. 
 
¶11. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: USOSCE requests firm assurances 
that can be conveyed to OSCE participating States that 
funding resources to support an ODIHR team will be available 
and what steps, if any, the U.S. might be ready to arrange or 
provide for the security of the ODIHR team on the ground 
during their entire stay in Afghanistan. 
SCOTT