VZCZCXRO7786
PP RUEHAST RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0055/01 0711443
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121443Z MAR 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6263
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0714
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1269
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1209

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 USOSCE 000055 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, 
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI 
JCS FOR J-5 
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) 
NSC FOR HAYES 
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL 
EUCOM FOR J-5 
CENTCOM FOR J-5 
UNVIE FOR AC 
GENEVA FOR CD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG
SUBJECT: FSC MARCH 11: UNSCR 1540 ROUNDTABLE HIGHLIGHTS 
U.S. PROPOSALS 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  The March 11 Forum for Security 
Cooperation roundtable on UNSCR 1540 endorsed further work at 
the OSCE to implement the mandatory measures to prevent the 
proliferation of WMD to non-state actors.  The speakers, 
including the director of counter-proliferation policy from 
the UK Foreign Office, endorsed a U.S. strategy paper that 
calls for completion of a Best Practice Guide, an information 
exchange among participating States, and identification of 
available technical assistance for participating States 
implementing the provisions of 1540.  Speakers also endorsed 
including OSCE field missions and other intergovernmental 
organizations in Vienna like the IAEA in OSCE implementation 
efforts.  Russia was grudging with its support, warning that 
it and other delegations lacked technical expertise and of 
the risks of duplication. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The U.S. recommended greater use of Chapter X, 
Vienna Document 1999 voluntary regional measures in light of 
an OSCE monitors' report of a live-fire exercise by Russian 
forces near a Georgian village.  Russia found the idea 
interesting.  Delegations are still analyzing the latest 
revision of the draft decision on an update to the Code of 
Conduct questionnaire.  The decision to extend the deadline 
to June 15 for submitting responses to the Code of Conduct 
questionnaire was adopted.  End summary. 
 
UNSCR 1540 Roundtable: Call to Arms 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) A roundtable on implementation of UNSCR 1540 agreed 
that there remained much work to be done that the OSCE could 
support.  Paul Arkwright, director of counter-proliferation 
in the UK Foreign Office, extolled a Food-for-Thought (FFT) 
paper (FSC.DEL/25/09/Corr.1) recently circulated by Italy, 
the UK, and the U.S., that outlined next steps to be taken at 
the OSCE.  The paper, based on a U.S. strategy document, 
recommends participating States: 
 
- Exchange data on all reports provided to the 1540 Committee 
at the UN in New York; 
 
- provide each other information on their ability to provide 
technical assistance to other countries; 
 
- complete work on the Best Practice Guide; 
 
- continue to report on their implementation to the 1540 
Committee 
 
Arkwright also suggested updating the OSCE principles on 
nonproliferation to bring them into line with the demands of 
¶1540. 
 
Both Sides of the Danube 
------------------------ 
 
¶4. (SBU) Arkwright noted that the 1540 Committee is 
constrained by the language of the resolution and political 
considerations, unlike other relevant actors such as the OSCE 
and its participating States who have greater latitude to 
move the resolution forward.  He noted that Vienna has 
several intergovernmental organizations which could work 
together to further implementation.  By leveraging capacity 
 
USOSCE 00000055  002 OF 004 
 
 
on "both sides of the Danube" the OSCE could help to make 
Vienna a "regional center of excellence" in 1540 
implementation. 
 
Nukes and the "Masculine Strut" 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Rebecca Johnson of the Acronym Institute for 
Disarmament Diplomacy said 1540 implementation could be part 
of a larger effort at nuclear weapons disarmament.  Although, 
she claimed, many states were still suspicious of 1540 as it 
arose during the "toxic period" immediately after 9/11 when 
the U.S. was implementing "coercive" counter-proliferation 
measures like the Proliferation Security Initiative, the 
preamble to 1540 tied it to broader efforts to rid the world 
of WMD.  Johnson said that states had to deglamorize" 
nuclear weapons, claiming that some states sought them 
because the weapons enabld a "masculine strut." 
 
¶6. (SBU) Johnson acknowledged many obstacles to full 
implementation of 1540 including "reporting fatigue," lack of 
understanding of the threats posed by proliferation to 
non-state actors, inadequate resources, and "reactive" 
assisance.  She called for greater involvement by civil 
society and more normative regimes to restrict possession and 
use of WMD.  She suggested that one possible first step would 
be the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. 
 
EU Efforts to Implement 1540------------------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) Ian Anthony of SIPRI detailed EU programs that 
furthered 1540 goals, among them introducing a "security 
dimension" to EU export controls; refinement of dual use 
goods lists; policies and practice for critical 
infrastructure protection, including chemical and biomedical 
facilities, in light of CBRN threats; and over 1.5 million 
euros in dedicated research funding.  Anthony said SIPRI had 
identified continuing security and proliferation problems 
with some common-chemical production facilities, biomedical 
research institutes, and HEU supplies for research reactors. 
 Anthony recommended an OSCE-EU meeting in late 2009 or early 
2010 to compare and coordinate 1540 implementation efforts. 
 
Model Workplans from VERTIC 
--------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Rocio Escauriaza Leal of VERTIC detailed elements of 
legislative and regulatory action plans for implementing the 
provisions of 1540 for each of the major WMD types: 
biological, chemical, and nuclear.  She noted VERTIC is able 
to respond to requests for technical assistance in 
implementation, including institutional and legal audits and 
action plans. 
 
Endorsements 
------------ 
 
¶9. (SBU) The Czech Republic (Reinohlova), on behalf of the 
EU, announced its continuing support for 1540 and combating 
the proliferation of WMD.  The EU supports continued OSCE 
work on 1540.  Finland (Kangaste) supported the Italy-UK-U.S. 
FFT on further 1540 work at the OSCE.  Turkey (Begec) said it 
 
USOSCE 00000055  003 OF 004 
 
 
wanted to see more 1540 work on the OSCE agenda and praised 
the FFT, particularly the idea of cooperation between the FSC 
and the Permanent Council's Security Committee.  On the 
margins, Spain and Belgium indicated their interest in 
supporting the FFT. 
 
U.S. Calls for Action 
--------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) noted its role in the creation 
of 1540 and the wide OSCE support for UNSCR 1810 extending 
the mandate of 1540 as reflected in the number of 
participating States who were co-sponsors of that resolution. 
 Neighbour recalled that the most recent 1540 Program of Work 
included elements that were reflected in the FFT: assistance, 
cooperation with international organizations, and national 
implementation and monitoring.  Neighbour echoed Arkwright's 
call to take advantage of other intergovernmental 
organizations like the IAEA and UNODC.  He repeated the point 
made in the FFT that the OSCE could widen the scope of work 
beyond the FSC to the Security Committee and Secretariat 
units it oversees: the Action against Terrorism Unit and the 
Border Management Group. 
 
Russia Has Doubts 
----------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) recalled that it, too, was among 
the original sponsors of 1540 at the UN.  While gratified 
that the OSCE was making a contribution, Ulyanov doubted it 
had the technical expertise to absorb the volume of complex 
information provided by states in fulfilling their 1540 
reporting obligations.  It would be important for the OSCE to 
create realistic goals for itself, he added. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Turning to the FFT, Ulyanov said he would need 
guidance from Moscow, but as a preliminary observation he 
thought much of the paper only duplicated the requirements of 
1540 itself.  On the other hand, the suggestion to include 
the field missions in 1540 work had potential, although it 
might require additional resources including staff.  Russia 
will participate in any informal consultations on the FFT. 
 
OSCE Field Missions and 1540 
---------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Arkwright, from the UK FO, in response to a U.S. 
question about a potential role for OSCE field missions, said 
it would not be necessary to increase their staffing as long 
as their function as a conduit for communication on 1540 
issues to a host government was not duplicated by other 
states, intergovernmental organizations, or NGOs.  SIPRI's 
Anthony disagreed, arguing that field missions needed the 
resources and that duplication was more of a concern at a 
higher level among states and IOs. 
 
Regional CSBM in South Caucasus 
------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour), noting a March 9 OSCE 
Military Monitoring Officers report of a Russian or South 
Ossetian live-fire exercise near the Georgia village of 
Bershueti (SEC.FR/182/09), suggested a Chapter X, Vienna 
 
USOSCE 00000055  004 OF 004 
 
 
Document 1999 voluntary measure to report such exercises in 
advance to avoid alarm and possible destabilization in area 
where tensions continue to run high. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) responded with interest, asking if 
the proposal would lead to a "dangerous" reopening of the 
Vienna Document and whether notifications of such exercises 
would be required in the entire OSCE area.  Neighbour assured 
that the measure would be voluntary and not require reopening 
the Vienna Document and was meant to respond only to another 
Bershueti-type incident and would perhaps be applicable along 
the administrative boundary. 
 
Code of Conduct Questionnaire 
----------------------------- 
 
¶16. (SBU) The decision to extend the deadline for responses 
to the Code of Conduct questionnaire in 2009 to June 15 was 
adopted (FSC.DEC/1/09). 
 
¶17. (SBU) In the working group, several delegations reported 
they needed more time to study the latest version of the 
draft decision to update the Code questionnaire 
(FSC.DEL/14/08/Rev.1).  The FSC Code coordinator (Eischer, 
Austria) explained his use of "constructive ambiguity" in the 
revision of the preamble paragraphs in the draft decision, 
retaining both the paragraph referring to the UN Charter and 
"race, sex, language or religion" and a paragraph combining 
reference to the Helsinki Final Act and the "indivisibility 
of security." 
 
¶18. (SBU) Russia still would prefer additional language in 
operative paragraph 2 allowing response to either the 
existing or updated questionnaire in 2009.  Finland and 
Sweden, among the Nordic authors of the UN Charter paragraph, 
can support the latest version of the draft decision.  The 
chair (France, Simonet) urged all to support his effort to 
reach consensus on a decision before the end of the winter 
session on April 1. 
 
Next Meeting 
------------ 
 
¶19. (SBU) The FSC will hold a cyber security workshop on 
March 17-18.  The next FSC plenary and working groups will be 
on March 25 and will include, at Russia's request, a Security 
Dialogue discussion on reopening the Vienna Document 1999. 
SCOTT