VZCZCXRO2387
PP RUEHAST RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0050/01 0651102
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 061102Z MAR 09 ZDK
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6252
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0707
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1262
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1202

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 USOSCE 000050 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, 
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI 
JCS FOR J-5 
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) 
NSC FOR HAYES 
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL 
EUCOM FOR J-5 
CENTCOM FOR J-5 
UNVIE FOR AC 
GENEVA FOR CD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG
SUBJECT: AIAM MARCH 3-4: LIVELIER IF NOT UNFAMILIAR: RUSSIA 
CALLS FOR NEW CSBMS (PART 2) 
 
REF: A. USOSCE 0049 
     ¶B. USOSCE 0046 
 
USOSCE 00000050  001.6 OF 007 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Note: This is the second part of a two-part cable 
reporting the March 3-4 OSCE Annual Implementation Assessment 
Meeting.  See reftel A for the first part.  End note. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Working Session 2: Other Documents 
---------------------------------- 
 
Conventional Arms Transfers 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Russia complained that states supplying Georgia, 
"among the most militarized states on the planet," with large 
numbers of arms and military equipment were violating the 
Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers.  Arms 
supplied to Georgia continued to threaten peace and regional 
stability and had made possible the targeting of civilians 
and domestic repression.  Ulyanov urged states to reconsider 
the earlier Russian proposal for an embargo of, at least, 
offensive arms to Georgia (FSC.DEL/155/08/Rev.1). 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Czech Republic, on behalf of the EU, reported 
that the earlier EU position (FSC.DEL/170/08) had not 
changed:  EU states complied with all relevant requirements, 
including OSCE principles, in their arms transfer practices. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Georgia replied that its arms acquisitions were 
transparent and in compliance with OSCE principles and other 
international norms.  Georgia had been inspected many times, 
by Russia among others, under CFE and VD99.  Meanwhile Russia 
had supplied separatists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia with 
heavy arms, including armor, aircraft, and artillery.  How 
did this jibe with the OSCE principles? 
 
¶5. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) remarked that delegations had 
heard this debate before.  He contested Russia's description 
of Georgia as "heavily militarized:" if so, why had Russia 
been able to easily defeat Georgia in the August 2008 
conflict?  The U.S. had armed and trained Georgian forces in 
response, in part, to Russian concerns over Chechen 
terrorists based in the Pankisi Gorge.  U.S. assistance had 
been reciprocated by Georgia's participation in coalition 
operations in Iraq.  Could Russia explain how Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia obtained their weapons?  For the immediate 
future, the U.S. supported robust EU and OSCE observer 
missions in Georgia and the occupied territories and full 
compliance with all provisions of the ceasefire. 
 
Non-Proliferation 
----------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Italy, Belarus, and the UK (Gare) agreed that 
non-proliferation should remain on the agenda of the FSC, 
Italy calling it "the heart" of work in the Forum.  Gare 
urged states to continue their efforts to implement UNSC 
Resolution 1540 on preventing the proliferation of WMD to 
non-state actors, noting that the recent UNSC Resolution 1810 
extended the mandate of 1540 until 2011 and placed added 
emphasis on the role of regional organizations like the OSCE. 
 
 
USOSCE 00000050  002.4 OF 007 
 
 
Stabilizing Measures 
-------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Georgia reprised earlier remarks that such measures 
were next to useless in South Caucasus without Russia's 
political will to reach a peaceful solution. 
 
Code of Conduct 
--------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Switzerland confirmed it will sponsor another 
regional seminar on the Code of Conduct; it hosted a Code 
seminar in Almaty in 2008 for Central Asian states.  Sweden 
and Finland supported a German suggestion for a permanent 
mechanism outside the AIAM to review implementation of the 
Code.  Georgia complained that "one participating State" 
violated several provisions of the Code during the August 
2008 conflict.  The FSC Code coordinator (Eischer, Austria) 
reported delegations appeared close to consensus on a draft 
decision to update the Code questionnaire. 
 
Small Arms and Light Weapons 
---------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Finland asserted good decisions were taken last 
year.  Future work should build on 2008 work in the FSC on 
brokering, air transport of SALW, and MANPADS and support the 
UN Program of Action on SALW (UNPOA).  The upcoming review of 
the OSCE Document on SALW should follow the agenda of the 
recent Third UNPOA Biennial Meeting of States (BMS).  Future 
emphases should include brokering, marking and tracing, end 
use certificates, illicit transportation, transparency, and 
information exchanges.  Sweden concurred, adding that project 
work should remain a priority.  The session coordinator 
(Schweizer, Germany) suggested the OSCE might host a regional 
conference on the UNPOA before the Fourth BMS in 2010. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Switzerland supported Finland's recommendations. 
Over the last ten years the OSCE has developed a core 
competence in SALW, but better ties with the UNPOA are still 
needed.  Future efforts should focus on improved 
implementation, perhaps by strengthening experts in the field. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Belarus (Pavlov) said it supported OSCE work on 
SALW, noting its recent destruction of 15 MANPADS and 
successful stockpile management program.  Review of the 
document should consider all other SALW-related decisions, 
such as FSC.DEC/15/02 on expert advice on implementation. 
 
¶12. (SBU) The UK recommended three guiding principles while 
conducting the review of the OSCE Document on SALW: 
implementation; consistency with the UNPOA; and no new 
burdens on states already in compliance. 
 
Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Switzerland observed that in the field, work on 
SALW and stockpiles of conventional ammunition (SCA) is done 
together.  Review of the SALW document should include SCA. 
They are linked.  Experts should participate in the review. 
More outreach is needed; this could include translation of 
the Best Practice Guides into non-OSCE languages.  Finland 
 
USOSCE 00000050  003.4 OF 007 
 
 
supported the Swiss recommendations, noting its recent 
contribution of a guide on melange rocket fuel oxidizer 
disposition would be of interest to many states.  Germany and 
Switzerland supported the coordinator's suggestion of a 
workshop on project implementation, including indicators of 
surplus. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Russia (Geyvandov) asked for the status of 
negotiations between the OSCE and Ukraine over privileges and 
immunities, including questions of legal liability, for OSCE 
personnel working on the melange project in Ukraine.  Ukraine 
(Leschenko) reported that the MOU defining these immunities 
was pending approval before the upper house of the national 
parliament.  The CPC (Geertsen) added that resolution of the 
issue will also depend on the methods employed by the firms 
awarded the contract for elimination. 
 
MANPADS Export Controls 
----------------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) Finland said there was a need for greater outreach 
on the OSCE Principles for Export Controls of MANPADS, 
including assistance to individual states.  The U.S. reported 
an outreach seminar in Vienna with the OSCE Mediterranean 
Partners in October 2008 that addressed stockpile management 
and export controls and led to further bilateral assistance. 
 
End-User Certificates 
--------------------- 
 
¶16. (SBU) Switzerland recommended thorough analysis of the 
results of the information exchange on end-user certificates 
and related verification procedures in order to derive best 
practices.  Finland agreed, noting there is a lack of clear 
binding commitment to these standard elements among the 56 
participating States. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Working Session 3: CSBM Improvements 
------------------------------------ 
 
Russian Orthodoxy 
----------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) took the floor first, striking a 
familiar cord in lamenting the alleged stagnation of CSBMs 
since 1999.  He argued the need to adapt the document to 
changing conditions and supported his position by noting that 
the Russian Food-for-Thought on VD99  implementation 
estimates that more than half of the provisions no longer 
function.  Ulyanov conceded that two years ago Russia had 
abandoned the idea of seeking a comprehensive change to the 
document.  But, noting that "half-measures have not worked," 
Ulyanov said that lack of progress on Russian proposals, 
including that on rapid reaction forces, had led them back to 
their original concept of a full update of the document. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Ulyanov complained that no matter how many times 
Russia consults with its OSCE partners, they still 
misunderstand Russia's intent.  Ulyanov repeated that Russia 
does not want to "abandon, freeze, or undermine" the current 
document.  Rather, Russia wants to identify shortcomings, 
develop appropriate updates for those shortcomings, and open 
 
USOSCE 00000050  004.4 OF 007 
 
 
the document to codify those changes.  Ulyanov compared the 
OSCE to other international organizations, such as the 
Wassenaar Arrangement, where the most important documents are 
reviewed and revised.  Why then, he asked, does the idea of 
change bring panic in the OSCE, even though it updated VD99 
four times during its first decade. 
 
"What Has Changed?" 
------------------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) Ulyanov characterized the silence that followed his 
question, "What has changed since the 1990s?" as symptomatic 
of a group used to ten years of stagnation.  Ulyanov claimed 
that the only change was the erosion of political will.  He 
repeated that he intended to discuss reopening the document 
again in the FSC on March 25.  Ulyanov responded to a 
question on the value of the VD99 information exchange to 
introduce what he characterized as a newly revised proposal 
for naval CSBMs (FSC.DEL/120/08.Rev.1). 
 
U.S. Cautions Against Reopening VD99 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶20. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) acknowledged a recurring theme 
at the 2009 AIAM: that VD99 is not a perfect document.  But, 
said Neighbour, the document is working and it is important 
for all pS to live up to their obligations as they are 
currently written.  Neighbour cautioned that reopening VD99 
would be an uncertain and very long road that could call into 
question the successful provisions of the current document. 
 
¶21. (SBU) Neighbour asserted that much of the document is 
fine, but agreed with Ulyanov that political will is lacking. 
 Chapter III on Risk Reduction, for example, is fine as 
written.  Making changes to Chapter III would not have 
changed the outcome in August.  The CiO went to extraordinary 
lengths to avert a crisis, but what was lacking was the 
political will to find a peaceful resolution. 
 
¶22. (SBU) Neighbour also asked pS to look at Russia's 
analysis from a broader perspective: to consider aspects 
outside the OSCE. Neighbour reasoned that when one delegation 
has suspended its implementation of the biggest CSBM of all, 
that is CFE, it hardly seems the right time to reopen VD99. 
Neighbour added that Russia cannot substitute VD99 for CFE. 
 
U.S. Opposes Naval CSBMs 
------------------------ 
 
¶23. (SBU) Neighbour also recalled that Russia's naval CSBM 
was earlier discussed in the FSC and noted that some 20 pS, 
Allies and others, questioned the merit of Russia's proposal. 
 Neighbour remarked that: 
 
- Russia did not identify any security concern that the naval 
CSBMs would address.  In essence, there is no "problem" to 
solve via a CSBM. 
 
- In the absence of any security concern to be addressed and 
any substantive modification to the proposed measures, it 
would not be productive for the FSC to spend time discussing 
measures that will not provide any collective benefit to OSCE 
states. 
 
USOSCE 00000050  005.4 OF 007 
 
 
 
- NATO Allies are open to engagement on a variety of naval 
issues, in appropriate fora.  For example, in the NATO-Russia 
context, cooperation on maritime search and rescue has been 
promoted by NATO Allies. 
 
Neighbour concluded by stating that the U.S. is willing to 
engage, in consultation with Allies and friends, on 
substantive concerns to improve existing CSBMs based on 
reciprocity, military significance, and verifiability. 
 
Irish Support 
------------- 
 
¶24. (SBU) On the margins, Ireland (Donagh) approached USDel 
and noted its satisfaction with the U.S. intervention. 
Donagh said he thought he was talking for a number of smaller 
non-NATO pS when he said that the tone and timing of the 
intervention was very effective and much appreciated. 
Similar sentiments were subsequently heard from Finland, 
Switzerland, and some Allies. 
 
How Significant Are Units in the Urals? 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶25. (SBU) Ulyanov replied that, if anything, naval forces 
were certainly as "militarily significant" as Russian 
artillery units stationed near the Urals.  He noted that over 
the last ten years there have been two major military 
operations, the first in the Balkans and the second in Iraq, 
and both of these operations relied heavily on naval forces. 
Ulyanov said verifiability is a topic for negotiation and he 
questioned concept of reciprocity, asking how reciprocity can 
be achieved between, for instance,  Russia and San Marino or 
the Holy See. 
 
¶26. (SBU) Ulyanov conceded that VD99 cannot replace CFE since 
each has its own purpose.  CFE sets limits on conventional 
forces, which are verified through a strict inspection 
regime.  The verification of information exchanged on 
conventional forces in VD99 is intended to build confidence, 
not verify limits. 
 
¶27. (SBU) Belarus thanked the U.S. and Russia for starting 
the discussion and noted that while Belarus did not want to 
go back two years, there are proposals on the table 
(presumably the Russia/Belarus proposal on RRF) for which 
they are looking for feedback. 
 
CiO Greece: VD99 a Safety Net 
----------------------------- 
 
¶28. (SBU) Greece (Sourani), the current OSCE 
Chairmanship-in-Office, recalled Camille Grande's use of the 
term "benign neglect" in his presentation at the FSC on 
European security (reftel B).  Sourani contended that VD 1999 
is a victim of its own success and cautioned pS not to 
underestimate the value of the current measures for 
confidence-building through contacts.  She suggested that, in 
a period where CFE was not being implemented, VD 1999 became 
a sort of safety net.  She asked pS to consider what would 
happen if VD 1999 became inoperable.  Sourani empathized with 
Russia's frustration at the lack of interest in their 
 
USOSCE 00000050  006.3 OF 007 
 
 
proposals but noted the proposals tabled in previous 
sessions, commenting that the FSC would have some concrete 
proposals to work on.  She cautioned that the lengthy 
discussions on the update to the Code of Conduct 
questionnaire underscore how difficult it can be to gain 
consensus at 56. 
 
UK: Those Were the Days 
----------------------- 
 
¶29. (SBU) The UK (Gare) thanked Russia for circulating their 
paper and for the U.S. intervention which presented the other 
side of the coin.  Gare took exception to one point made by 
Greece and noted that only one pS had suspended 
implementation of the CFE treaty and that all other States 
Parties were continuing to implement CFE.  Gare said the 
level of trust and confidence during the 1990s was much 
higher, with all pS sharing a common vision.  Since 2000, 
however, the level of trust and confidence has eroded and now 
it is more difficult to find consensus.  In these conditions, 
it is important to find areas of common agreement. 
 
¶30. (SBU) Turkey asked whether it was really necessary to 
destroy the existing architecture in order to reestablish a 
common direction.  Turkey argued that pS should look for ways 
to improve the current system rather than attempting to 
rebuild the architecture from scratch. 
 
Ulyanov: We're Gaining on You 
----------------------------- 
 
¶31. (SBU) Russia conceded that we do not know where we would 
end up when we opened VD 1999 and that it would be a long 
road.  But he said Russia does not see continued use of the 
current document as a problem in the mean time.  He also 
agreed with the UK, that pS are now pulling in different 
directions.  However, he noted with satisfaction, the number 
of pS calling for changes to VD 1999 increased from two last 
year to five this year. 
 
¶32. (SBU) The coordinator (von Arx, Switzerland) asked 
whether it was possible to create a theoretical "box" in 
which pS could freely discuss the concept of updating VD 1999 
without impacting the implementation of the current document. 
 He asked whether pS could work inside such a framework.  He 
also asked whether a CSBM could be developed for reacting to 
crises under "bad weather" conditions and how regional CSBMs 
can help. 
 
¶33. (SBU) Referring to regional measures, Ulyanov recalled 
Russia's proposal to extend the Black Sea CSBM to the Baltic 
Sea.  He said that Russia was thinking in terms of a modest 
measure that would not require additional financing or 
significant increase in work. 
 
U.S. on All-Weather CSBMs 
------------------------- 
 
¶34. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) said CSBMs were meant to be 
"all-weather" measures.  He noted that pS, including the 
U.S., had implemented provisions under both CFE and VD 1999, 
including inspections and evaluations, during operations in 
the Balkans and in Kosovo. 
 
USOSCE 00000050  007.3 OF 007 
 
 
 
¶35. (SBU) Armenia commented that it considered regional CSBMs 
of value and called on their more coordinated use.  Armenia 
noted, however, as conditions change so must the CSBMs and 
therefore there should be a discussion on whether VD 1999 
needs to be updated. 
Azerbaijan noted that while the idea of regional CSBMs makes 
sense, particularities of regional security concerns makes it 
difficult for outsiders to assist in creating such measures. 
Too often the result is erosion of confidence.  Too many 
CSBMs are not being fully implemented or are seen as 
win-lose, when they should be developed an implemented on a 
win-win consensus. 
 
¶36. (SBU) Switzerland agreed with the coordinator's point on 
creating boxes.  Switzerland noted that one such box should 
be the AIAM, and that another box should be the Heads of 
Verification.  Switzerland said it would make a proposal in 
the FSC to hold the HOV permanently in December or January so 
that the results of the discussions could be forwarded to the 
AIAM in March for consideration. 
 
¶37. (SBU) On the margins, Finland (Kangaste) indicated that 
Nordic states might support this effort.  Canada also 
commented favorably on the idea of allowing HOV's to meet 
separately on technical maters, but at a time that allowed 
for the results to feed into the AIAM as appropriate. 
NEIGHBOUR