VZCZCXRO1963
PP RUEHAST RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0049/01 0651022
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 061022Z MAR 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6246
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0701
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1256
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1196

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 USOSCE 000049 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, 
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI 
JCS FOR J-5 
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) 
NSC FOR HAYES 
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL 
EUCOM FOR J-5 
CENTCOM FOR J-5 
UNVIE FOR AC 
GENEVA FOR CD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG
SUBJECT: AIAM MARCH 3-4: LIVELIER IF NOT UNFAMILIAR: RUSSIA 
CALLS FOR NEW CSBMS (PART 1) 
 
¶1. (U) Note:  This is the first of two cables reporting the 
March 3-4 OSCE Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting.  End 
note. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Summary:  While the 2009 Annual Implementation 
Assessment Meeting (AIAM) was livelier than 2008, national 
positions remained largely unchanged.  Russia continued to 
insist that the Vienna Document 1999 and other OSCE 
political-military agreements were obsolete or dying.  Russia 
circulated a detailed critique of the Vienna Document and a 
revision of an earlier proposal for naval CSBMs.  Russia also 
called again for an embargo of offensive arms transfers to 
Georgia.  Russia and Georgia agreed that risk reduction and 
crisis stabilization measures could not work without 
political will. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The U.S. urged greater emphasis on implementation of 
the existing documents and doubted the wisdom of reopening 
CSBMs when Russia had suspended implementation of CFE.  The 
U.S. also doubted the utility or necessity of naval CSBMs, 
noting the lack of any security issue involving naval forces 
that Russia's CSBM would address. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Norway proposed to increase the number of evaluation 
quotas while Denmark suggested increasing the numbers on 
inspections and evaluation teams.  Turkey plans to make a 
proposal for more liberal rules for use of digital cameras 
and GPS equipment.  Germany confirmed it will propose 
standards for military commanders' briefings.  The UK and 
Russia circulated a draft Best Practice Guide for Chapter IV 
contacts.  Finland, Germany, Switzerland and others called 
for aligning OSCE SALW work with the UN Program of Action. 
Switzerland and Finland want to ensure that technical 
consultations among heads of verification are available to 
future AIAMs.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Working Session 1: Vienna Document 1999 
--------------------------------------- 
 
Annual Exchange of Military Information 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Ukraine urged states to provide more than just the 
minimum information required by the Vienna Document 1999 
(VD99).  Norway noted that its own forces were shrinking and 
moving away from a brigade-based structure, so the amount of 
information provided was also diminished.  In these 
circumstances, more clarity was needed in defining the 
equipment that was subject to reporting.  Russia claimed that 
the information provided under the AEMI was irrelevant to 
actual post-Cold War conditions.  Turkey urged states to 
comply with reporting deadlines and suggested that failure to 
do so was due to lack of political will.  Turkey and Finland 
urged states to comply with the electronic filing 
requirements of FSC.DEC/17/07. 
 
Defense Planning 
---------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Switzerland, Germany, and Sweden supported the 
Russian proposal to establish a single deadline for 
submission of defense planning information.  The U.S. 
 
USOSCE 00000049  002 OF 006 
 
 
(Neighbour) replied that a single deadline is impractical, 
because of varying legislative calendars, and unnecessary, as 
there was no evidence that a single deadline would increase 
the number of submissions, 30 in 2008.  The U.S. did support 
further exploration of the Swiss suggestion to make experts 
available to states who requested assistance in preparing 
their submissions. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Turkey, Italy, and Norway supported the U.S. 
position that the proposal did nothing to remedy the problem 
of non-compliance.  Italy and Norway similarly recommended 
further efforts at mutual support.  Azerbaijan also opposed 
the proposal, adding there was no need for additional 
decisions that only increase the burden of compliance. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Russia replied that if the U.S. had a budget problem 
that prevented timely submission, there was nothing in the 
proposal to prevent this.  The U.S. would merely need to 
explain the reason for the delay and estimate when the 
information would be available.  Establishing an 
"administrative" deadline would allow the Conflict Prevention 
Center to send reminders to delinquent states. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Ireland suggested that treating defense planning 
separately from defense budgets might address the timeliness 
issue, as the former was usually a multi-year effort while 
budgets were annual 
requirements. 
 
Risk Reduction 
-------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) noted that, based on personal 
experience of service at the UN Security council, the Chapter 
III risk reduction mechanism seemed designed to increase 
rather than abate tensions. The procedures were cumbersome 
and culminated only in convening the entire FSC: not 
necessarily the best way to defuse a crisis.  Perhaps it was 
no accident the chapter had only been invoked a few times, 
most recently in May 2008 (the Georgia UAV shoot down). 
Ulyanov archly suggested that perhaps the mechanism was 
effective as it allowed states to pursue their own agendas, 
citing "the grievous problems in Georgia and South Ossetia 
that culminated in war."  He said that the new European 
Security Treaty Russia had offered would encourage the 
construction of an effective crisis resolution mechanism. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Georgia (Giorgadze) agreed that perhaps Chapter III 
was not ideal, but in the end what mattered was the political 
will of a state to abide by international norms and 
commitments.  Giorgadze asserted that the "UN and most 
states" believe Russia violated its international commitments 
when its aircraft shot down a Georgian UAV in 2008. 
 
¶12. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) also agreed Chapter III was 
not perfect, but recalled that it did lead to useful dialogue 
over the UAV incident.  The war in August 2008 was not the 
fault of VD99 but rather, as Georgia had remarked, a matter 
of political will.  If one country is determined to go to 
war, then a risk reduction mechanism cannot stop it. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Russia retorted that Georgia had long planned to 
attack Abkhazia but had been deterred by Russia.  Georgia 
 
USOSCE 00000049  003 OF 006 
 
 
then attacked South Ossetia instead.  Russia did not accept 
the verdict of the experts who concluded it had shot down 
Georgia's UAV.  Russia still has not been allowed to examine 
the evidence the experts relied on. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Greece (Sourani) suggested the mechanism could also 
be discussed at the Annual Security Review Conference in June. 
 
Prior Notification and Observation 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) The Czech Republic (Reinohlova) and Sweden 
(Ekengren) supported voluntary notification of sub-threshold 
military activities.  The Czechs had begun reporting these in 
2006 after the related FSC decision in 2005; Reinohlova 
reported another exercise, "Collective Shield 2009," which 
would prepare a Czech component for the Euro battle group. 
Turkey, noting some of its own voluntary notifications, 
expressed disappointment with the number of sub-threshold 
notices. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Belarus (Pavlov) and Russia called for mandatory 
sub-threshold notifications.  Russia claimed Chapters V, VI, 
VII, and VIII, involving prior notification and observation 
of military activities and annual calendars, were 
"practically dead letters, unlikely to ever function."  Given 
the disappointing level of notifications, the only options 
were to eliminate the requirement or lower the reporting 
threshold.  The Netherlands (Kleinjan) and the UK (Gare) 
opposed, in effect, lowering the thresholds for notification 
agreed to in VD99.  Azerbaijan needed to review the 
requirement in light of "real world" conditions, noting that 
"infringements" of VD99 requirements pertaining to weapons 
and equipment should not be tolerated. 
 
Contacts 
-------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) The UK and Russia circulated a draft BPG for 
implementation of Chapter IV on Contacts (FSC.AIAM/8/09). 
Sweden, Denmark, Armenia, the Netherlands, and Finland voiced 
support for the guide.  Sweden suggested that a participating 
States should participate in a Contact visit before trying to 
organize one.  Norway proposed, with support from Sweden and 
Luxembourg, that the observer States should produce a formal 
report of the contact visit. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Many delegations announced their plans to host 
contact visits to  airbases and/or military facilities and/or 
weapon demonstrations.  In 2009, nine participating States 
will host visits: Turkey (May), Hungary (May), the 
Netherlands (May), Spain (May), Albania (June), Ireland 
(September), Kazakhstan (September), the Czech Republic 
(October), and Germany (October).  In 2010, two participating 
States will host contact visits: Switzerland (April), and 
Belgium (TBD). 
 
Inspection and Evaluation 
------------------------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) Norway, supported by Denmark, introduced a paper on 
"Inspection and Evaluation Visit Quotas," (FSC.AIAM/5/09). 
The paper concludes there is a need for more evaluation 
 
USOSCE 00000049  004 OF 006 
 
 
visits and proposed to adjust the quota calculation system, 
on a voluntary basis, in order to double the number of 
passive evaluation quotas. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Denmark also offered a paper, supported by Norway, 
on the "Size of Inspection and Evaluation Teams" 
(FSC.AIAM/6/09), which proposes an increase in the number of 
inspection team members , from four to five, and an increase 
in evaluation team members from three to four.  Denmark 
believed that an increase in the number of implementers would 
improve multilateral cooperation and transparency, increase 
participation by pS, and thereby reduce the number of 
inspections  conducted in place of evaluation quotas. 
 
¶21. (SBU) Canada, the Czech Republic, and Greece offered 
support for the  Norway/Denmark papers on quotas and team 
size.  Austria, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden welcomed 
the two papers and offered their willingness to engage in its 
discussion.  The Netherlands was not satisfied with the 
current situation where passive quotas are exhausted on low 
level military activities and are not available for use later 
when there were significant military activities.  The 
Netherlands proposed a gentlemen's agreement to not misuse 
the inspection regime.  It does not support raising the 
number of quotas, spreading quotas, or lowering military 
threshold as this would lead to more inspections/evaluations. 
 
¶22. (SBU) Belgium emphasized the right of each pS to 
determine when to request an inspection.  It agreed with the 
analysis calling for an increase in the number of evaluation 
quotas.  Though Belgium expressed doubt as to whether an 
increase in evaluations/inspections would improve the quality 
of the inspections, it offered support for more quotas. 
Hungary also agreed on the need for more quotas, but on a 
voluntary basis. 
 
¶23. (SBU) Greece, Kazakhstan, and Slovakia cautioned that any 
proposal should take into account the additional financial 
costs as the world is in the middle of a financial crisis. 
Denmark and Norway countered that their proposals would 
reduce the overall cost of implementation since it would lead 
to a decrease in the number of inspections which are more 
costly to conduct than evaluations. 
 
¶24. (SBU) Sweden said that an important by-product of 
inspections and evaluations is confidence-building 
established during military contacts.  The 109 inspections in 
2008 had led to interactions among more than 1000 arms 
control personnel.  Italy disagreed, asserting that 
maintaining good relations is not the purpose of inspection. 
 
¶25. (SBU) Turkey said it intends to submit a paper on the use 
of digital camera and GPS equipment during inspections.  The 
paper will propose that inspection teams be allowed to use 
digital cameras without advance permission from the receiving 
state; if an inspection team's request is denied, the 
receiving state will provide a GPS device to the inspection 
team.  Denmark supported this proposal. 
 
¶26. (SBU) Germany informed that it will submit a proposal for 
a best practice guide (BPG) on briefing guidelines for 
military commanders during a VD99 evaluations and 
inspections. 
 
USOSCE 00000049  005 OF 006 
 
 
 
¶27. (SBU) Russia introduced its Food-for-Thought paper on 
"Analysis of the Implementation of the Vienna Document 1999" 
(FSC.AIAM/2/09).  Russia remarked that the observations and 
recommendations in its paper are well known to delegations; 
Russia will return to these recommendations at the March 25 
FSC.  Austria responded that VD99 is one of the still 
functioning security mechanisms and argued that it should be 
fixed or changed before it is considered irremediably broken. 
 Denmark thought the paper could be a basis for future 
discussion.  Turkey supported some of Russia's conclusions in 
the paper. 
 
¶28. (SBU) Belarus pointed out the lack of consistency in the 
conduct of evaluation teams.  States conduct evaluations 
using widely varying methods.  Belarus called for the 
development of a common rule on the conduct of an evaluation. 
 
¶29. (SBU) Switzerland revealed that it was denied the use of 
an interpreter during an inspection.  It called for 
discussion on the definition of auxiliary personnel. 
Switzerland also called for a common definition on "force 
majeure." 
 
Russian Visa Procedures 
----------------------- 
 
¶30. (SBU) Recalling the recent announcement by Russia on its 
plane-side visa policy, the U.S. (Grimley) asked Russia for 
clarification on its new visa procedures.  The U.S. said it 
wanted to know how the new procedures would influence 
inspections done by multi-national inspection teams: whether 
the new procedures were temporary or permanent; and whether 
the new visa procedures would be coupled with POE diversion, 
resulting in obstruction of the VD99 regime.  The UK and 
Denmark supported the U.S. intervention and also voiced 
concern.  Russia (Ulyanov) assured that the new procedures 
were fully consistent with VD99 and requested the questions 
in writing so that it could fully respond.  Ulyanov added 
that these issues were another reason example why VD99 should 
be updated as it lacks provisions for visas. 
 
Force Majeure 
------------- 
 
¶31. (SBU) Citing a gap in VD99 Chapter IX concerning the lack 
of a definition of force majeure, Belarus called for future 
discussion on this topic.  Belarus recalled that in 2001 the 
UK had proposed a paper on force majeure and offered to take 
the lead on this topic.  Russia, backing Belarus, cited the 
misuse of force majeure by Georgia in refusing Russia's 
recent request for an inspection. Russia offers a definition 
of force majeure in its VD99 Food-for-Thought.  Responding to 
Russia, Georgia asserted it had rightfully declared force 
majeure as Russia's invasion and occupation of Georgia were 
clearly acts outside its control. 
 
¶32. (SBU) Switzerland, also in support of Belarus, recalled 
that Tajikistan had inappropriately declared force majeure in 
2007 due to "bad weather and an energy crisis" to deny an 
inspection by Switzerland and Italy.  Switzerland emphasized 
that force majeure should only be used in cases where there 
is a direct threat to the health and security of team 
 
USOSCE 00000049  006 OF 006 
 
 
members.  Canada agreed that force majeure needs to be 
defined and said that it was still preparing a paper on force 
majeure. 
 
Other Implementation Issues 
--------------------------- 
 
¶33. (SBU) Moldova announced that access had been denied to an 
inspection team into a region (Transnistria) of its territory 
that was under the control of a separatist movement and 
Russia.  This inspection conducted by the UK was turned away 
by the Transnistrian "border guards" who claimed that the 
area was a security zone.  The UK confirmed the incident. 
Russia replied that the situation is nothing new and wondered 
why pS insisted on inspecting an area where a conflict is 
ongoing.  Russia suggested that pushing for an inspection 
simply made the situation worse. 
 
¶34. (SBU) Switzerland reminded that a German/Swiss team was 
also denied, without explanation, its inspection request by 
Uzbekistan in 2008.  Switzerland asked when this refusal 
would be resolved. 
 
Regional Measures 
----------------- 
 
¶35. (SBU) Turkey announced continued support for regional 
CSBMs as they promote transparency, confidence, and security. 
 Turkey called attention to the benefits of the Black Sea 
CSBM and proposed adopting it for use in the Baltic region. 
 
¶36. (SBU) Hungary cited the details of various multiple 
bilateral CSBMs and agreements it had with Ukraine, Serbia, 
Moldova, Montenegro, Cyprus and Kazakhstan.  Hungry noted the 
positive results of each agreement. 
 
¶37. (SBU) Ukraine announced VD99 Chapter X multilateral 
cooperation on its border with Belarus, Poland, Hungary, and 
Slovakia.  Ukraine would also like to cooperate on its 
maritime borders with other pS. 
 
¶38. (SBU) Kazakhstan announced that it had hosted three 
training events at its regional training center in 2008 and 
planned to do the same in 2009.  Belarus informed that it 
invited observers to an autumn 2008 exercise to contribute to 
transparency in the region. 
 
OSCE Communications Network 
--------------------------- 
 
¶39. (SBU) The Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) reported that 
the OSCE Communications Network is functioning as designed 
and required.  Some pS are still not connected and occasional 
problems have occurred as a result of power failures and 
internet connection disruption.  The CPC stands ready to 
assist all pS as necessary.  Armenia urged all pS to take 
necessary action to connect to the OSCE network.  (End part 
1.) 
NEIGHBOUR