VZCZCXRO2338
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHUNV #0093/01 0651450
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 061450Z MAR 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9087
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 UNVIE VIENNA 000093 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP AORC IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN:  BOARD URGES TEHRAN TO COOPERATE 
 
------------------- 
Summary and Comment 
------------------- 
 
¶1.   (SBU)  A joint six-country (P5 1) statement on Iran, the 
first of its kind at an IAEA Board of Governors meeting, had 
a salutary effect on the tenor of the March 3 Board 
deliberations on Iran.   This statement of unity took Board 
members and Iran by surprise and the majority of the Board 
welcomed the renewed diplomatic engagement, with four Members 
explicitly noting it in their national statements.  The Six 
also captured international press headlines.  A national 
statement by China, the only one from among the Six, tracked 
with the joint statement and did not distract from the focus 
on P5 1 unity.  Ambassador Schulte's opening statement to the 
Board under an earlier agenda item the previous day touched 
on Iran and expressed a renewed U.S. commitment to diplomatic 
engagement and support for the IAEA and multilateralism. 
Based on comments from other missions, the statement had a 
positive and palpable impact on Board members and set the 
stage for the Iran discussion.  Overall, the tone of the 
Board statements on Iran was stronger than in previous 
Boards, with more Member States calling on Iran to cooperate 
and more states noting serious concern about Iran's lack of 
cooperation on key technical issues like the possible 
military dimensions (PMD) of Iran's program and refusal to 
implement Code 3.1 Modified of its Safeguards Agreement. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  The Director General's (DG) opening remarks to the 
Board on March 2 highlighted Iran's lack of progress and 
failure to meet UNSC and Board requirements and called on 
Iran to "unblock" the situation.  ElBaradei was encouraged by 
the "apparent fresh approach" to dialogue (on the part of the 
U.S.), which could give new impetus to resolve this 
longstanding issue. Thirty of the thirty-five Board Members 
spoke or were spoken for by the EU or NAM, and five non-Board 
members spoke under Rule 50.  The majority of statements 
noted Iran's failure to comply with UNSC and Board 
requirements, Iran's failure to cooperate or implement 
additional transparency measures, such as the Additional 
Protocol (AP), and Iran's blockage of the IAEA's 
investigation into the PMD.     In addition to the EU and 
other like-minded States, Argentina, Switzerland, and South 
Africa delivered strong statements critical of Iran. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Not everyone was affected by the constructive tone 
of the overture from the Six. The NAM statement again largely 
reiterated the Tehran Ministerial declaration and the NAM 
troika continued to play by the old playbook, with Egypt and 
Cuba taking a decidedly unconstructive stance.  Other NAM 
members (Philippines and Iraq) delivered stronger statements 
calling for Iranian cooperation.  Statements from South 
Africa, Argentina, and Switzerland stood out as unusually 
constructive. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  The focus of Iran's statement seems to have 
shifted somewhat.  Rather than largely targeting the U.S.(and 
the West generally , Iran more strongly criticized the IAEA 
Secretariat.  Iran argued that the IAEA is not acting in 
accordance with its Statute, predominantly because it should 
be focused on expanding peaceful uses of nuclear energy at 
least as strongly as it verifies nonproliferation. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  As requested by France, the Legal Office presented 
its view regarding Iran's continued refusal to implement Code 
3.1 Modified and Iran's denial of IAEA access to the Heavy 
Water IR-40 Reactor.  The Legal Advisor declared that these 
refusals are "inconsistent with Iran's obligations under the 
Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement," while 
also making obvious efforts to downplay the immediate 
"noncompliance" implications.  Ambassador Schulte reiterated 
from a previous Board statement that "this is an apparent 
breach of Safeguards and Iran's claim that it will not adhere 
to early declaration/Code 3.1 Modified shows a willingness to 
commit future breaches."    The conventional call for public 
release of the Iran report by consensus was successful, but 
spurred a request (from opponents holding their fire on the 
specific case) for an agenda item at the June Board on the 
issue of "de-restricting" documents prepared confidentially 
for the Board. 
 
 ¶6.  (SBU)  Comment:  Although Egypt's statements have become 
more obstructionist, statements by formerly middle-ground 
countries like Switzerland and South Africa were very strong 
and helped to contribute to the overall pressure on Iran in 
the Board room.  The stronger overall tone may be due in part 
to the DG's report being at least the third  in a row that 
shows no Iranian cooperation. Member States may also feel 
less conflicted about pressuring Iran so long as it supports 
the strengthened diplomatic efforts they see reflected in 
U.S. and P5 1 statements.  Some states may now be less 
concerned that efforts to increase pressure in the IAEA may 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000093  002 OF 008 
 
 
provoke precipitous military or other strong action they are 
not ready to support.  Several Member States in their 
statements welcomed new positive "signals," and the 
Philippines directly welcomed the U.S. statement on 
engagement under agenda item two (septel).  The DG's 
straightforward approach in his opening statement and Iranian 
Ambassador Soltanieh's aggressive line in the Board and the 
previous week's technical briefing, may also have contributed 
to the overall change in tone. End Comment. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
DG Sets the Stage for the Iran Discussion 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  ( SBU)  The Director General (DG) in his opening 
statement to the Board on March 2, set the tone for the 
discussion on Iran by highlighting Iran's lack of cooperation 
and failure to meet UNSC and Board requirements.  He 
encouraged the "apparent fresh approach" to dialogue on the 
part of the United States for giving new impetus to resolve 
this longstanding issue.  He noted that contrary to the 
requests of the Board and the UNSC, Iran has not suspended 
its uranium enrichment- and heavy water-related activities, 
nor has it implemented the Additional Protocol (AP) or the 
modified text of Code 3.1 of its Subsidiary Arrangements on 
the early provision of design information.  The DG also said 
that it was regrettable that no progress had been made with 
concerns about possible military dimensions (PMD) because of 
the lack of Iranian cooperation.  He explained that unless 
Iran implements transparency measures and the AP, the IAEA 
will not be in a position to provide credible assurances 
about the absence of undeclar 
ed nuclear material or activities in Iran.   He called on 
Iran to provide substantive information and access to 
documentation, locations, and individuals in connection with 
all of the outstanding issues, and urged the Member States 
which have provided information to the IAEA to agree to the 
IAEA's sharing of the information with Iran. 
 
--------------------------------- 
The Group of Six and China, Again 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  France delivered a statement (text below) on 
behalf of China, France, Germany, Russia, the U.K., and the 
U.S., marking the first time that a jointly-agreed statement 
by this sextet was delivered in the Board on Iran.  No one, 
including like-minded Board members, expected such a 
statement of unity, which took all, including Iran, by 
surprise.  The focus on diplomatic engagement was universally 
welcomed and most of the Board also echoed the sextet's call 
on Iran to comply with UNSC and Board resolutions and 
cooperate with the Agency on issues related to possible 
military dimensions. 
 
¶9.  (U)  Begin text of statement: 
 
We thank the Director General for his report on the 
"Implementation on NPT Safeguards and relevant provisions of 
UN Security Council Resolution s 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1835 
in the Islamic Republic of Iran." 
 
We reaffirm our unity of purpose and strong support for the 
Agency.  We applaud the Secretariat for the professionalism 
and impartiality with which it has pursued its verification 
mission and reaffirm that the IAEA plays an essential role in 
establishing confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of 
Iran's nuclear program. 
 
We call upon Iran to meet without delay the requirements of 
the IAEA Board of Governors and to implement the resolutions 
of the UN Security Council. 
 
We note the serious concern expressed in the Director 
General's report and in his introductory statement to this 
Board about the continued lack of progress in connection with 
remaining issues which give rise to concerns about possible 
military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program.  In this 
regard, we call on Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA by 
providing the Agency such access and information that it 
requests to resolve these issues. 
 
We further call upon Iran to implement and ratify promptly 
the Additional Protocol and to implement all measures 
required by the Agency in order to build confidence in the 
exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. 
 
We remain firmly committed to a comprehensive diplomatic 
solution, including through direct dialogue, and urge Iran to 
take this opportunity for engagement with us and thereby 
maximize opportunities for a negotiated way forward. 
 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000093  003 OF 008 
 
 
End text. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Despite the efforts and suggestions by the 
remaining five to refrain from national statements and let 
the joint statement speak for itself, China, under 
instructions from Beijing, delivered a separate statement, 
which was stronger than past statements.  Associating itself 
with the joint statement from the six, China noted with 
concern that Iran still had not implemented the relevant UNSC 
resolutions and not cooperated with the IAEA in solving the 
remaining issues.  China advocated a negotiated solution to 
the Iranian nuclear issue while recognizing Iran's right to 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy as long as it fulfilled its 
international obligations.  China encouraged Iran to 
implement Board and UNSC resolutions, strengthen cooperation 
with the IAEA, and implement the AP. 
 
-------------------------- 
EU and Like-Minded Deliver 
Very Strong Statements 
-------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  As EU President, the Czech Republic presented a 
very strong EU statement that noted the situation with Iran 
had worsened since the November 2008 Board and encouraged 
Iran to seize the current window of opportunity of the 
announced U.S. engagement with Iran.  The EU explained that 
it was "deeply disappointed" with Iran's continued refusal to 
cooperate with the IAEA and failure to comply with UNSC 
requirements.  The statement noted with "great concern" and 
"alarm" that Iran has not permitted the IAEA to perform a DIV 
at the IR-40 reactor at Arak and continues to unilaterally 
suspend Code 3.1, which is not consistent with Iran's 
obligations under its safeguards agreement.  The EU "deeply 
regretted" Iran's lack of cooperation on PMD and urged Tehran 
to implement the AP and provide all requested information and 
access to documentation, locations, and individuals, so that 
the IAEA can clarify the character of its nuclear program. 
The statement also underlined its "grave concerns" that Iran 
is the only country in the world to build and possibly 
operate a nuclear power plant without being party to the 
relevant and important nuclear safety and security 
conventions. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  Australia, Canada, Japan, and New Zealand all 
delivered strong statements that noted it was essential for 
Iran to promptly and substantively respond to the IAEA's 
questions regarding PMD projects and meet all Board and UNSC 
obligations, including suspension, implementing the AP, and 
Code 3.1.  Australia emphasized the DG's February report was 
the fourth that indicated a lack of substantive progress and 
that the Board should "not lose sight of the fact that these 
possible military dimensions remain matters of serious 
concern." Australia also encouraged Iran to take full 
advantage of the "new opportunities for engagement."  Canada 
noted with "great concern" and "alarm" that Iran's actions 
move in the opposite direction of the UNSC and Board 
resolutions, as it continues to conduct enrichment-related 
activities, including on the new generation IR-4 centrifuge. 
Canada explained Iran's cooperation is long overdue.  Japan 
also stated that it was "deeply regrettable" that Iran 
continues to expand enrichment-related activities, especially 
mentioning the work on new generation centrifuges, and urged 
Iran to return to the negotiation process based on the 
comprehensive package proposed by the P5 1 without further 
delay.  New Zealand noted its concerns about the true nature 
of Iran's nuclear program and said it was essential for Iran 
to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities in 
order to allay the serious concerns of the international 
community. 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  Albania, fully associating itself with the EU 
statement, delivered a strong statement highlighting that no 
real progress on outstanding issues had been made and that 
the Board, the IAEA, and Iran were locked in a "vicious 
circle" because of Tehran's refusal to cooperate.  Albania 
indicated that it was up to Iran to convince the world of the 
"peaceful nature" of its nuclear program.  The Swiss 
statement, which was more constructive than in the past, 
noted how similar the DG's February report was to the 
previous two reports that Iran had not cooperated with the 
IAEA on PMD and that it, Switzerland, feared this trend would 
continue.  Switzerland explained that the DG's report brings 
forth new concerns, such as Iran's amount of low enriched 
uranium (LEU) equaling one "significant quantity" if it were 
further enriched to highly enriched uranium (HEU); the 
continued refusal to allow a DIV at the IR-40 reactor; Iran's 
production of fuel rods for the IR-40 reactor; and the 
continued enrichment-related activities, including the work 
on the new generation centrifuge.  The Swiss said they were 
encouraged by the "new approach" on dialogue, and called on 
Iran to cooperate on the "alleged studies" as well as Member 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000093  004 OF 008 
 
 
States to issue the documentation, as best as it is 
advisable. 
 
------------------------ 
Turkey Trying to Balance 
------------------------ 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  Turkey's statement again was balanced, though 
slightly better than at the last Board, but it did not 
specifically make calls on Iran to act.  Rather, it made 
general statements on what should be done.  Turkey began by 
attaching importance to the effectiveness of the IAEA's 
safeguards system and noted with satisfaction that the IAEA 
has been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of 
declared nuclear material in Iran, but also noted that the 
IAEA was not yet in a position to provide assurances about 
the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in 
Iran.  Turkey considered it important that the outstanding 
issues related to Iran's nuclear program be addressed in a 
constructive and transparent way without further delay and 
that the alleviation of the ongoing crisis of confidence with 
regard to the scope and nature of Iran's program be resolved 
through peaceful means.  Turkey noted that it hoped once the 
confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's 
nuclear program is restored, the IAEA will be able to devote 
more time, energy, and resources to its other statutory 
functions. 
 
------------------------------- 
GRULAC, Except Venezuela, Calls 
for Cooperation 
------------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (SBU)  Among the GRULAC Board members, Argentina's 
statement was so strong that it compared favorably to those 
of the like-minded.  Argentina regretted the lack of 
substantive progress since November and hit all the major 
issues:  violation of UNSC and Board requirements for 
suspension; emphasis on the failure to implement Code 3.1 
Modified and allow DIV inspections at Arak; the need for Iran 
to provide substantive information and transparency on issues 
related to PMD; and an appeal for Iran to undertake all 
measures to build confidence in the peaceful nature of its 
nuclear program, echoing the sextet statement.  Argentina 
did, however, call for member states to allow the provision 
of documents to Iran. 
 
¶16.  (SBU)  Mexico made a similarly strong intervention 
calling on Iran to cooperate effectively and without delay 
and underlined the obligatory nature of UNSC resolutions. 
Mexico focused on Iran's refusal to provide access to Arak, 
failure to respond to the IAEA's repeated requests on PMD 
issues, and the need for additional transparency.  In a terse 
statement, Brazil noted that the current DG's report was no 
different from the last and hoped that the DG could soon 
report progress to allow the Board no doubts as to the 
peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program.  Brazil urged the 
Secretariat to find a way to break the deadlock but made no 
call for Iran's cooperation or implementation of UNSC 
resolutions, and ended with a call for direct engagement. 
NAM member Ecuador's statement was weaker than its past 
interventions and did not include a call for Iran to 
cooperate or implement UNSC resolutions.  Ecuador regretted 
the deadlock on Iran that could undermine the credibility of 
safeguards but noted information sharing by Member States as 
an important step to unblock the issue. 
 
¶17.  (SBU)  Chile and Venezuela both spoke under Rule 50.  In 
a forward looking statement delivered by the former Board 
Chair, Chile hoped for constructive engagement by all parties 
and stressed the unimpeachable legitimacy of UNSC and Board 
resolutions.   Chile also noted that the report made "crystal 
clear" the need for cooperation and transparency.  While 
Chile acknowledged the NAM statement, "this was not the whole 
story."  Chile cited the concerns in the DG reports, 
including the need for the AP, and called for Iran to 
alleviate doubts as to its nuclear program.  Venezuela, 
predictably unhelpful, focused on Iran's "fulfillment" of its 
legal obligations under its safeguards agreement and the 
completion of the work plan.  Venezuela singled out a small 
group of countries for failure to provide documents to Iran, 
and noted six years of unproven allegations. 
 
------------------------------ 
NAM: Some Support Iran, Others 
Call for Cooperation 
------------------------------ 
 
¶18.  (SBU)  Speaking first under the Iran agenda item, Cuba 
delivered a characteristically one-sided NAM statement 
beginning with a verbatim recitation of the July 2008 NAM 
Tehran Ministerial statement on Iran's nuclear program.  The 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000093  005 OF 008 
 
 
NAM statement went on to highlight the usual "positive" 
aspects of the DG's report on Iran related to the 
non-diversion of declared nuclear material, noted that the 
PIV results were consistent with Iran's declarations, and 
expressed satisfaction at 21 unannounced inspections at 
Natanz since last year.  There was no call for Iranian 
cooperation, but the NAM still supported the DG's request for 
Member States to provide "alleged studies" documents to Iran 
as not doing so was an "obstacle" to verification.   Finally, 
taking into account the "completion of" the work plan, the 
NAM statement looked forward to implementation of safeguards 
in Iran in a routine manner.  The statement concluded with a 
usual call for diplomacy and dialogue. 
 
¶19.  (SBU)  Among the NAM, Egypt and Cuba took the most 
unconstructive stances, continuing to play by the old 
playbook.  Egypt cited the resolution of most outstanding 
issues and cooperation by Iran within the scope of its legal 
safeguards obligations while noting the "pitfalls and limits" 
of asking for additional transparency.  Egypt entirely 
discounted the "alleged studies" as lacking in neutrality and 
unverified information.  The Egyptian statement also linked 
denuclearization in the Middle East with "parallel" efforts 
by Iran.  Cuba's national statement was typically negative 
and could have been written by Iran.  Cuba began by 
questioning why the issue continued to be on the Board's 
agenda after the completion of the work plan, declared 
safeguards should be routinized, and criticized UNSC 
involvement as illegal.  In addition to assailing the 
"alleged studies" and the failure to provide documents to 
Iran, Cuba suggested that the Board "legislate" on this 
issue, i.e. pass a resolution requiring states (the U.S.) to 
allow the IAEA to share all information with Iran.  Cuba did, 
however, welcome any endeavor toward dialogue, on the basis 
of equality.  In contrast to Egypt and Cuba, Malaysia, also 
part of the NAM troika, was forward looking.  Malaysia 
encouraged cooperation by all parties, diplomacy and 
dialogue, and welcomed the fresh initiatives of the Obama 
administration while also calling for a Middle East NWFZ. 
 
¶20.  (SBU)  South Africa, though associating itself with the 
NAM statement, was even stronger than the last Board and was 
the toughest of the NAM members that delivered national 
statements.  At the beginning of the statement, South Africa 
noted Iran's provision of access to declared facilities, and 
urged Iran to "continue" cooperation, but then listed a 
number of concerns highlighted by the DG's report.  South 
Africa noted that the Secretariat was unable to conclude the 
nature of Iran's program and whether there were undeclared 
activities underway, that Iran had failed to abide by Code 
3.1 and the AP, that questions about PMD were still 
unanswered, and encouraged Iran to provide information and 
access to help clarify those issues.  South Africa also 
called on Iran to take the "mandatory" steps required under 
UNSC resolutions and called for Member States to provide 
copies of documents to Iran. 
 
¶21.  (SBU)  Most of the other NAM statements were a mixed 
bag.  The Philippines noted non-diversion, welcomed Iranian 
cooperation and unhelpfully linked the lack of substantive 
progress on PMD with the failure to provide Iran with 
documentation, as did Ghana.  However, the Philippines called 
on Iran to implement the AP and Board and UNSC resolutions 
and welcomed the fresh approach by the U.S. and direct 
diplomacy.  Ghana also called on Iran to implement the AP and 
for "all parties" to cooperate.  In a short statement, India 
called on "all concerned" and "trusted" that Iran would 
cooperate.  India made its usual reference to the "supply 
side" of nonproliferation in its usual jab at Pakistan. 
 
---------- 
Arab Group 
---------- 
 
¶22.  (SBU)  In addition to Egypt, Iraq also spoke, while 
Board Members Algeria and Saudi Arabia were silent. (Libya 
and Syria addressed the Board under Rule 50.)  All associated 
with the NAM and predictably called for a NWFZ in the Middle 
East.  Iraq began its statement by applauding Iran's 
scientific achievement at Bushehr as a model for the region 
and reiterated a balanced approach to the issue.  Iraq called 
for Iran's adherence to the AP, encouraged suspension until 
confidence is restored, and urged that Iran address the 
recommendations and concerns in the DG's report.  In addition 
to calling for Iran to provide substantive information on PMD 
issues, Iraq also called for provision of documents. 
 
¶23.  (SBU)  Syria indicated that there was no evidence to 
date that Iran had violated its Comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreement and that it was regrettable that certain countries 
have double standards when it comes to identifying and 
supporting international obligations. Libya called on Iran to 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000093  006 OF 008 
 
 
increase cooperation so that the IAEA can understand the 
nature of its program, but also called on the international 
community to deal with all issues on equal footing (i.e, 
Israel). 
 
------------------------------- 
Iran Aims Criticism at the IAEA 
------------------------------- 
 
¶24.  (SBU)  As usual, Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh delivered 
an impassioned statement, but he departed somewhat from past 
practice by focusing more criticism on the IAEA, rather than 
the West and U.S. in particular.  He argued that the Agency 
is not acting in accordance with its Statute, predominantly 
because it should be focused on expanding peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy as least as strongly as on nonproliferation. 
Taking a different spin on his familiar argument that the 
Board has become politicized, Soltanieh attempted to sow 
discord by characterizing the Board as a battlefield between 
"haves" and "have nots," rights and obligations, nuclear 
suppliers and nuclear recipients, and aggressors and victims, 
and could be summed up as a battle between "justice and 
injustice."  He noted that a few Member States are trying to 
keep Iran on the agenda despite the completion of the work 
plan and complained that the latest DG's report did not 
reflect Iran's views on some of the issues or add in 
information that Iran deemed critical, such as the fact that 
the IAEA has found no evidence of nuclear material being 
associated with the "alleged studies," citing these as 
examples of how the Agency's credibility is compromised.  He 
also gave a new argument on Iran's failure to abide by Code 
3.1 Modified, stating that Iran had implemented the modified 
form only voluntarily starting in 2003, and thus when the 
Majles prohibited voluntary cooperation with the IAEA, Iran 
was forced to return to the original version from its 
Safeguards Agreement.  Soltanieh called for the DG to 
immediately abide by the last paragraph of the work plan and 
return Iran's file to "routine" status.  Only then would Iran 
return to its voluntary cooperation with the Agency to 
resolve ambiguities, "if any."  Iran also passed out a copy 
of its March 2 letter to the DG (emailed to IO/T and ISN/RA) 
which argued many of these points in detail. 
 
¶25.  (SBU)  In the second section of Soltanieh's remarks, 
which he notes as separate from his prepared statement  and 
usually lambastes the U.S., EU, and like-minded for their 
remarks, Soltanieh focused only on France's legal questions 
posed to the Secretariat about how it defined violations of 
Code 3.1 and Iran's DIV obligations.  In a significant 
departure from previous Boards, Soltanieh made no directed 
statements against the U.S.  (Comment:  It is unclear if the 
absence of vitriol against the U.S. was meant to be a signal 
or a response to the first U.S. statement at the meeting 
(septel) and/or the joint P5 1 statement on Iran which noted 
opportunities for engagement.  The fact that the U.S. did not 
give a national statement may also have denied Soltanieh an 
opening he might otherwise have taken.  Nevertheless, the 
departure from past statements was notable and seems to 
mirror at least one recent IRNA article which reported 
positively on the P5 1 statement.  End Comment.) 
 
---------------------------- 
Legal Opinion on DIV and 3.1 
---------------------------- 
 
¶26.  (SBU)  At a technical briefing the week before the 
Board, Director of the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) Johan 
Rautenbach refused to respond to France's query on the legal 
implications of Iran's non-implementation of Code 3.1 
Modified, the refusal to allow the IAEA to perform a DIV at 
the IR-40 reactor, and the refusal to provide design 
information for the nuclear power plant to be built at 
Darkhovin. In the Board meeting, the French Ambassador 
requested the Secretariat provide the Board with a formal 
response.  As agreed in follow-up discussions with the U.S. 
and France, Rautenbach responded, in a prepared text, that 
Iran's non-implementation of Code 3.1 Modified-which covers 
the updated design information for the IR-40 reactor and the 
submission of design information for the Darkhovin power 
plant-is "inconsistent with Iran's obligations under the 
Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement." 
Rautenbach, however, sought to downplay the "noncompliance" 
implications of his opinion by noting that "it is difficult 
to conclude that providing information in accordance with the 
earlier formulation in itself constitutes non-compliance 
with, or a breach of, the Safeguards Agreement," based on a 
comparison between States with Small Quantity Protocols 
(SQP). 
 
¶27.  (SBU)  Ambassador Schulte asked for clarification, in 
which Rautenbach confirmed that Iran is the only state with a 
comprehensive safeguards agreement that is not/not 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000093  007 OF 008 
 
 
implementing Code 3.1 Modified.  Ambassador Schulte also 
reiterated from a previous Board statement that "this is an 
apparent breach of Safeguards and Iran's claim that it will 
not adhere to early declaration/Code 3.1 Modified shows a 
willingness to commit future breaches."  (Comment:  It is 
widely assumed among missions and Secretariat officials that 
Rautenbach's comments soft-pedaling the "noncompliance" 
implications were directed by ElBaradei.) 
 
¶28.  (SBU)  Regarding Iran's refusal to provide the IAEA 
access to the IR-40 reactor, Rautenbach replied that the 
refusal "is inconsistent with its obligations under its 
Safeguards Agreement," and the IAEA has a continuous right to 
verify the design information which has already been provided 
to it by Iran regarding the IR-40 reactor.  He said that the 
normal frequency of the DIV depends on safeguards 
requirements, but in the case of Iran, both the Board and the 
UNSC have requested suspension of heavy water-related 
activities, therefore, the IAEA needs continued access. 
Rautenbach also noted that it was up to the Board to consider 
and determine if any action by a State that is inconsistent 
with its Safeguards Agreement rises to a level where the IAEA 
cannot verify that there is no diversion, in which case the 
Board has the option to take the actions set out in Article 
XII.C.  (Comment:  Mission rep overheard a subsequent 
conversation on the margins of the Board room in which 
Soltanieh complained about the IAEA legal analysis.  OLA 
officials attempted to persuade him that Iran should at least 
allow access to the IR-40 for design verification given that 
that obligation flows from the fact that Iran has already 
declared the facility and provided design information.) 
 
 
--------------- 
Chair's Summary 
--------------- 
 
¶29.  (SBU)  In her summary, the Chair (Algerian Ambassador 
Feroukhi) noted that several Member States expressed serious 
concern that the Agency has yet to confirm the exclusively 
peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program, that there remain 
a number of outstanding issues, and with Iran's failure to 
comply with UNSC and Board obligations. In addition, several 
Member States noted their concern about the absence of 
Iranian cooperation and progress on PMD and the need for Iran 
to implement the AP.   The summary stated that several 
members expressed regret that Iran has not provided 
substantive responses to the outstanding issues, and urged 
Iran to provide more information and access to the relevant 
information, documentation, locations, and individuals in 
order to enable the IAEA to clarify the nature of Iran's 
nuclear program. 
 
¶30.  (SBU)  The Chairwoman took note that several Member 
States expressed concern that no progress has been made on 
the IAEA's request to Iran to reconsider its decision to 
unilaterally suspend Code 3.1 Modified and deplored Iran's 
objection to the DIV at the IR-40 reactor, which they 
stressed was not consistent with Iran's safeguards 
obligations. 
 
¶31.  (SBU)  The summary also reflected that several Member 
States noted that he IAEA has reported the non-diversion of 
declared nuclear material in Iran, although the absence of 
undeclared material and activities in Iran was an ongoing and 
time-consuming process.  The Chairwoman also recalled that 
several members requested that Member States which provided 
the IAEA with documentation related to the "alleged studies" 
should authorize the IAEA to share them with Iran, as it was 
a matter that could impede the verification process.  The 
summary stated that several members expressed the view, 
taking into account the implementation of the August 2007 
work plan, that safeguards implementation in Iran be 
conducted in a routine manner.  Also, the issue of leakage of 
confidential safeguards information provided to the IAEA was 
raised as a matter of serious concern. 
 
¶32.  (SBU)  Comment:  In a notable departure from previous 
Chair's summaries, Feroukhi entertained Iran's request to 
have its comments reflected in the summary.  The Secretariat 
claimed that there was precedent for observers' views to be 
reflected in the summary, but others disputed that this was 
the case.   The two citations of Iran's views in the Chair's 
summary were a reference to the report not adequately 
reflecting Iran's cooperation and an egregious and gratuitous 
citation of Iran's argument that the UNSC was illegally 
seized of the Iran issue.  This effort by Iran to interject 
its views may only be the beginning; Syria's comments were 
subsequently reflected in the Chair's summary on the Syrian 
agenda item.  There is concern that the NAM troika's ultimate 
objective in opposing public release of DG reports is to 
strike a deal in which the target state would have its views 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000093  008 OF 008 
 
 
reflected in the Director General's report as is the practice 
in other UN agencies (where the views of the country 
concerned appear in a separate addendum).    This would 
seriously detract from the Director General's report. 
Furthermore, Iran regularly circulates Information Circular 
documents reflecting its views so there is no need to do so 
in the report.  End Comment. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Public Release of the Report Up for Discussion 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶33.  (SBU)  After reading her summary and prompted by 
Ambassador Schulte, Chairwoman Feroukhi stated that since no 
objection had been expressed to the proposal (from Canada and 
others) for the public release of the Iran report, it would 
be released.  Brazil stepped up and noted that while it did 
not object to the release of this report, the Board should 
consider this matter further sometime in the future, since 
the DG's reports are written in confidence.  Malaysia, Cuba, 
Egypt, and Saudi Arabia all joined support for Brazil's 
comments.  Cuba requested a discussion on the public release 
of reports at the next Board meeting, Egypt rejected the 
"politicization" of the DG's reports, and Saudi Arabia noted 
that public release undermined the confidential nature of the 
IAEA's work.  On the contrary, Iran asked that all/all 
records of Board deliberations (such as a "recording") be 
released, since there had been so many misunderstandings 
about its responsibilities and cooperation with the IAEA. 
 
¶34.  (SBU)  Canada responded and reiterated its request for 
the reports to be made public, as it was a matter of 
principle and transparency.  Feroukhi concluded by repeating 
that there had been no "official objection," so the report 
would be released and referred the Board to past discussions 
(1996) about the release of such reports. 
 
------- 
Comment 
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¶35.  (SBU) The joint P5 1 statement had the desired effect on 
Board dynamics on the Iran issue.  Our decision to keep the 
focus on the P5 1 and issue no national statements will mean 
increased attention/scrutiny to the next U.S. national 
statement, presumably at the June Board meeting, when there 
will be much higher expectation that the U.S. policy review 
will be complete and that the U.S. statement will reflect its 
conclusions.  Mission notes that June will be ill-timed, from 
the perspective of some like-minded states, for a Board 
review of policy releasing DG reports on Iran (and Syria). 
The June Board each year discusses the IAEA's annual 
Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR), and the U.S. each 
year argues for its public release.  Some of our friends, 
Germany and Japan, for example, argue against release of the 
SIR document.  Septel will offer our recommendations for 
negotiating this June debate. 
SCHULTE