VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0092/01 0651413
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 061413Z MAR 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9079
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0145
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1517

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000092 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA FOR FELTMAN AND SHAPIRO, ISN/RA FOR NEPHEW AND DANIEL, 
IO/T FOR GOLDSTEIN, NEA FOR MONZ, CIA FOR HORIO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PARM SY KN IAEA KNNP
SUBJECT: IAEA/SYRIA: SYRIA OFFERS NO FURTHER COOPERATION TO 
IAEA BOARD 
 
REF: A. 08 UNVIE 00635 
     ¶B. UNVIE 00071 
     ¶C. UNVIE 00084 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) The March 4 IAEA Board of Governors deliberations on 
Syria broke down along similar lines as past Board discussion 
of this issue.  Although the Director General and a majority 
of Board members (21 of 33 Board members) called for 
cooperation by Syria, NAM standard bearers Egypt, Cuba and 
Malaysia, abetted by Iran and Syria, sought to shift the 
focus back to Israel, though without success.  By contrast, 
DG ElBaradei's introductory statement to the Board reflected 
his written report, with a focus on uranium findings and the 
need for Syrian cooperation and transparency in providing 
access to information, locations and debris, themes echoed in 
strong statements on the part of the EU, U.S., Canada, 
Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Argentina, Albania, 
Switzerland, Ghana and the ROK.  Many of the like-minded 
questioned the correctness and completeness of Syria's 
declarations under its safeguards agreement, and called on 
Syria to implement the Additional Protocol.  As is the case 
on Iran, the NAM troika shielded Syria from calls for greater 
transparency with a legalistic view of the cooperation 
required by Syria's safeguards agreement, as did Russia. 
China and Russia both had short statements lending lukewarm 
support to the IAEA investigation but generally downplaying 
the issue. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Unlike his previous pronouncements on the subject, 
ElBaradei made no mention of Israel's destruction of the 
Al-Kibar (or Dair Alzour, as referred to by the Agency) site. 
 Lacking any substantive arguments, most of the NAM (with the 
notable exception of Ghana) and Arab group resorted, as in 
past meetings, to criticizing Israel for the bombing and on 
Israel and "others," (the United States) for the late 
provision of information to the Agency.  NAM and the Arabs 
charged that late provision of information hampered the IAEA 
investigation, and made well-worn charges asserting a double 
standard regarding Israel's non-NPT status.  Iran took this 
issue one step further by calling again for an IAEA General 
Conference resolution condemning Israel's bombing of the 
facility, which would be an implicit admission that the site 
was nuclear-related.  For its part, Israel expressed 
"astonishment following statements accusing my country of 
attacking a Syrian facility" and called for good faith 
cooperation by Syria.  As a further distraction, the NAM also 
highlighted the issue of safeguards confidentiality and 
leakage of information to the press, using this as a pretext 
to block public dissemination of the Director General's 
report so as to not "politicize" the issue.  Canada, 
Australia, the U.S. and EU argued for transparency but 
stopped short of calling for a vote that would exacerbate 
divisions on the Board. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Speaking last, Syria underlined its willingness to 
cooperate with the Agency pursuant to the routine provisions 
of its Safeguards Agreement, but made clear that the June 
2008 inspectors' visit to Al-Kibar was a one-time occurrence. 
 Syria stuck to its claim that the site was and is a military 
installation unrelated to nuclear activities.  Syria also 
took the Secretariat to task for not informing it of further 
analysis of environmental samples from Al-Kibar and repeated 
its spurious claim that Israeli munitions were the source of 
any uranium found at the site.  In addition, he offered up a 
refinement of his explanation on how the uranium came to be 
at the site, claiming that perhaps Israeli missiles were 
contaminated with uranium (rather than made of uranium), an 
obvious attempt to rebut the Agency's "low probability" 
assessment that the Israeli munitions were the source.  In 
addition to arguing that the report should not be released, 
Syria hoped that the issue would not be on the June Board 
agenda.  In short, Syria persisted in its effort to sweep the 
IAEA investigation under the rug -- but did not succeed.  End 
Summary. 
 
--------------------------- 
DG Makes Compelling Case 
For Continued Investigation 
--------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The IAEA Board of Governors addressed the Director 
General's report on implementation of the NPT safeguards 
agreement (GOV/2009/9) in the Syrian Arab Republic for the 
second time as a specific agenda item (see Ref A for Board 
discussion of Syria in November, Ref B on the DG report, and 
Ref C on the  Secretariat's technical briefing to member 
states ).  The Director General's introductory remarks on 
Syria at the March Board provided a compelling case for 
continued investigations in Syria.  His remarks were in line 
with his recent report.  He noted that additional uranium not 
of a type in Syria's declared inventory of material had been 
found in samples taken from the site.  He also repeated the 
"low probability" assessment that  Israeli munitions were the 
source of the uranium, noted that Syrian responses have been 
inadequate, and repeated a request for additional information 
and access from Syria.  The DG also urged "Israel and other 
States" to provide relevant information to the Agency and to 
agree that the information be shared with Syria. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Comment: DG ElBaradei did not repeat his remarks 
from November that the unilateral force and late provision of 
information "severely hampered" the Agency in its assessment 
of the site.  While repeating an appeal for states to provide 
information, including imagery, he also did not directly 
mention the lack of commercial satellite imagery immediately 
following the bombing, a circumstance he described in 
November as "baffling."  This did not stop Syria's allies 
from focusing on Israel's actions in their statements.  End 
comment. 
 
--------------------- 
Calls for Cooperation 
--------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Of the Board's 35 members, all but three (Mexico, 
Uruguay and Brazil) spoke on this item in a national capacity 
or as part of group.  Six statements were made under "Rule 
50" by Member States not currently on the Board, South Korea, 
Libya, Israel, Venezuela, Iran, and Syria.  This was Israel's 
first time to speak on Syria at the Board. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Twenty-one board members called on Syria to 
cooperate with the Agency's investigation by responding to 
questions, requests for information, and access to additional 
sites and debris.  Switzerland made a strong statement noting 
that Syria "needs to cooperate totally" with the Agency 
without delay. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Cooperation, But With Restrictions 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Some states, however, were not as categorical in 
their call for Syria to cooperate.  Algeria, Egypt, South 
Africa, Libya and Venezuela praised Syria for its cooperation 
to date.  NAM members Egypt, Algeria, and Malaysia called on 
Syria to cooperate, but only within the limits of its 
obligations pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement with the 
Agency.  (Note: Access to sites not on Syria's list of 
declared facilities, including the Al Kibar site, is beyond 
Syria's routine safeguards obligations.  End note.) 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Japan, in an otherwise strong statement, noted that 
Syria had provided a "certain level of cooperation." 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Syria, during its intervention at the conclusion 
of the agenda item, stated its intent to "continue 
cooperating with the Agency within its obligations under its 
comprehensive safeguards agreement."  Unlike Iran, Syrian rep 
Othman was careful not to question the motives or competence 
of the Secretariat. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Echoing the DG's call for member states with 
relevant information to provide it to the Agency, many 
members called on others to cooperate with the Agency's 
investigation as well, including Argentina, Australia, China, 
Ghana, India, Iraq, Malaysia (making specific reference to 
Israel), South Africa, and Turkey. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Concern Over Possible Undeclared Activities 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Like-minded countries (Canada, Czech Republic on 
behalf of the EU, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Albania, 
Switzerland ), as well as Argentina, Ghana, South Korea, and 
Israel joined the U.S. in expressing concern over the 
possibility of undeclared nuclear activities in Syria. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) The EU was particularly strong in recalling the 
obligation "of each and every IAEA Member State party to the 
NPT to declare all of its nuclear installations and according 
to the modified code 3.1 of the subsidiary arrangements to 
report also the planning and construction of any nuclear 
facility to the Agency before the decision on its 
construction is taken."  (Note: Syria has accepted the 
modified code 3.1., as does each Member State with 
comprehensive safeguards agreements other than Iran. End 
note.) 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Member States expressed concern in particular over 
the Agency's finding of additional anthropogenic (or 
chemically-processed) uranium particles during its June 2008 
visit to Al-Kibar, uranium that was "of a type not included 
in Syria's declared inventory of nuclear material," per the 
Director General's report (ref B).  Canada said that Syria 
has not satisfactorily addressed the presence of uranium at 
the Al-Kibar site.  New Zealand noted the discrepancies 
between Syria's response and the Agency's findings, which 
need to be clarified.  Although Turkey did not specifically 
express concern, it said the uranium findings need to be 
understood. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Canada and the Czechs/EU, recalled the November 
2008 DG report which stated that the features of the 
destroyed building, along with connectivity of the site to 
adequate pumping capacity of cooling water, are similar to 
what may be found in connection with a reactor site. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Ghana was the only NAM member to express concern 
about the Agency's findings in Syria.  In addition to noting 
the additional uranium, Ghana asked Syria to provide "all 
requested information" and access to the sites.  The 
statement noted the Agency's finding of uranium at the site 
and asked for Syria to provide access that is beyond its 
safeguards obligations.  (Comment: Ghana's statement at the 
March Board was stronger than its statement at the November 
board, following an "outreach" lunch Ambassador held with the 
Ghanaian Board Governor the day prior to the Board 
deliberation. End Comment.) 
 
---------------- 
China and Russia 
---------------- 
 
¶17.  (SBU) China and Russia maintained a low profile in their 
statements, supporting the Agency's investigation but not 
expressing concern regarding the Agency's findings thus far. 
China encouraged Syria and others to strengthen cooperation, 
Russia called on active cooperation with the Agency and 
regretted the destruction of the facility, which led to 
complications in verification.  Notably, China backed off 
from its statement in November that it supports the 
investigation in accordance with Syria's safeguards 
responsibilities. 
 
--------------------- 
Israel Defends Itself 
--------------------- 
 
¶18.  (SBU) Israel's ambassador spoke on the Syria issue for 
the first time in a Board meeting, expressing "astonishment 
following statements accusing my country of attacking a 
Syrian facility."  Israel said that Syria's few friends 
"stated that the facility was indeed a nuclear facility, 
without even waiting for the IAEA investigation and 
conclusions."  Israel urged Syria's cooperation with the 
Agency in order to close the file and noted that the Board 
should consider "grave consequences" for any "total lack of 
cooperation on the part of Syria."  Israeli Ambassador 
clarified after the Board that Syria's few friends want 
international community to deal with Israel as if it bombed a 
nuclear facility.  Israel questioned the logic of referring 
to the issue as non-nuclear regarding Syria and as nuclear 
regarding Israel.  (Comment: This is probably a reference to 
Iran's implication that Israel violated the IAEA statue by 
bombing a nuclear facility.  After the Board adjourned, Iran 
handed out copies of the Resolution 533 from October 1990 on 
the prohibition of armed attacks against nuclear 
institutions.  That resolution resulted from Iraq's bombing 
of the Bushehr reactor a few year's earlier during the 
Iran-Iraq war.  Although other NAM countries stated that 
Israel's destruction of the facility reactor was a violation 
of the UN Charter, no state other than Iran specifically 
 
mentioned the IAEA resolution prohibiting the use of force or 
threatened use of force against a nuclear facility.  End 
comment.) 
 
------------------- 
Additional Protocol 
------------------- 
 
¶19.  (SBU) The EU, Australia, Japan and Albania called for 
Syria to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol, with Japan 
calling this "very important."  Cuba noted with concern the 
trend of certain countries  seeking to impose the AP, calling 
this "unacceptable," and saying that the AP cannot be turned 
into a legal obligation. 
 
----------------------------------- 
NAM States Remain Strong Supporters 
Of Syria 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶20.  (SBU) Syria received support from the same group of NAM 
countries that spoke on its behalf at the November 2008 Board 
meeting.  NAM standard bearers Egypt, Cuba and Malaysia, 
abetted by South Africa, Algeria, Iraq, Venezuela, and Iran, 
sought unsuccessfully to shift the focus back to Israel. 
Iran took this issue one step further by calling again for an 
IAEA General Conference resolution against Israel.  Iraq, 
Libya, and Venezuela raised the issue of double standards as 
regards to Israel's non-NPT status. 
 
¶21.  (SBU) These same member states commended Syria for its 
continued cooperation.  Previewing Syria's remarks that its 
cooperation be limited to its legal obligations, Malaysia 
noted that measures that go beyond the comprehensive 
safeguards agreement are purely voluntary.  Cuba complained 
that some states are pushing for cooperation which would make 
Syria go beyond its obligations and divulge sensitive 
information (Note: a reference to Al-Kibar being a military 
site).  Venezuela said that the investigation should be dealt 
with in the framework of Syria's legal obligations.  Malaysia 
further supported Syria's posture by noting that it was the 
sovereign right of any state to restrict access to military 
facilities. 
 
¶22.  (SBU) As a further distraction, the NAM also highlighted 
the issue of safeguards confidentiality and leakage of 
information to the press, using this as a pretext to block 
public dissemination of the Director General's report so as 
to not "politicize" the issue. 
 
¶23.  (SBU) Egypt specifically said that Board reports should 
not contain "unverifiable information," a likely reference to 
the Agency's policy of pursuing leads contained in credible 
all-source information, including intelligence. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Syria Responds to Concerns by Board 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶24.  (SBU) Syria, following Iran's example, spoke last under 
Rule 50.  The statement was delivered by Ibrahim Othman, the 
Director General of the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission. 
Othman thanked the Agency for its professionalism and noted 
the importance of the Agency's decisions to remain 
"independent" and not become political.  Othman reaffirmed 
Syria will continue (sic) to cooperate with the Agency within 
its obligations under its comprehensive safeguards agreement. 
 
 
¶25.  (SBU) Othman took on the issues that concerned board 
members and offered an explanation.  On the issue of 
providing the IAEA additional visits to Syrian sites, Othman 
said that the "memo of understanding" between the Agency and 
Syria agreed to in May 2008 allowed for only one visit to 
Al-Kibar.  The visit would allow visual and environmental 
sampling.  Othman declared the visit successful, adding that 
the Agency team had full freedom at Al-Kibar and surrounding 
buildings. 
 
¶26.  (SBU) On the issue of partial and repetitive responses 
as noted in the DG report, Othman said that Syria had 
answered all the questions asked by the Secretariat.  Those 
questions not answered fall outside of the scope of Syria's 
safeguards obligations.  As for the point in the DG's report 
on repetitiveness, Othman said that the responses provided in 
the February letter were provided to the Agency for the first 
time in writing, and were therefore not repetitive. 
 
¶27.  (SBU) Othman reaffirmed that Al-Kibar was a military 
site and had "nothing to do" with nuclear activities. 
Syria's response has been within its security requirements 
and beyond its obligations under the CSA.  He asked why Syria 
should be expected to "indict itself" in response to baseless 
accusations. 
 
¶28.  (SBU) Focusing on the leaks to the media, Othman said 
the leaks were not accurate (presence of graphite leaked by 
Secretariat) and harmful to the issue.  He asked the 
Secretariat to be cautious with its information, recalling 
that the presence of uranium particles was leaked prior to 
the issuance of the November 2008 Board report notifying 
member states of the finding.  Othman said that leaking could 
be interpreted as steps to politicize the issue. 
 
¶29.  (SBU) Turning to Israel, Othman said that Israel's 
response to the Agency (regarding Syria's claim that the 
uranium found in samples came from Israeli missiles) was 
"cynical and insulting."  He also called the response no 
surprise to the international community, adding that Israel 
"killed and injured thousands of women and children last 
month" (Gaza).  Othman said that the Agency needs to 
investigate further and verify Israel's response.  In 
addition, he offered up a refinement of his explanation on 
how the uranium came to be at the site, claiming that perhaps 
Israeli missiles were contaminated with uranium (rather than 
made of uranium).  (Comment: An obvious attempt to rebut the 
Agency's "low probability" assessment that the Israeli 
munitions were the source.) 
 
¶30.  (SBU) Othman complained that Syria was unaware the 
Agency would continue testing the samples taken from 
Al-Kibar, adding that it considered the results included in 
the November report as "final."  Syria was not informed of 
the additional results until the March 2009 DG report was 
issued. 
 
¶31.  (SBU) Othman said that the Agency must act within the 
memorandum of understanding signed in May 2008 and that the 
Agency should not disclose any information to the public 
while the investigation is ongoing. 
 
¶32.  (SBU) Othman dismissed the point in the DG's report that 
the uranium found at the site was "of a type not included in 
Syria's declared inventory of nuclear material."  He said 
that the nuclear material in Syria is under Agency control 
and has been periodically inspected since 1992.  He claimed 
all inspection results since 1992 have been satisfactory, and 
again reaffirmed that the contamination came from Israel. 
 
¶33.  (SBU) Othman closed by objecting to the public release 
of the Syria report, saying it would lead to 
misinterpretations and complicate the issue.  Othman was the 
only speaker to say that Syria should not be on the Agenda at 
the next session of the Board of Governors. 
 
--------------------- 
Board Chair's Summary 
--------------------- 
 
¶34.  (SBU) The Board Chair's summary accurately recounted the 
Board deliberations on Syria, but included Syria's request 
for the Agency to verify whether the munitions used to 
destroy the facility were uranium based or contaminated by 
anthropogenic uranium.  (Comment:  Non-Board member 
statements under Rule 50 are not normally included in Chair 
summaries.  Iran's statements, also made under Rule 50, were 
similarly reflected in the Chair's summary for the first time 
at this Board.)  The Chair noted that "several members 
emphasized that the Secretariat should refrain from 
requesting Member States to provide information or take 
measures that go beyond the States' safeguards obligations, 
particularly those involving national security," an attempt 
to undercut the next Board report. 
 
---------------------------- 
Syria DG Report Not Released 
---------------------------- 
 
¶35.  (SBU) Canada requested the public release of the Syria 
report, which was supported by Australia and the U.S.  Egypt 
spoke immediately after Canada and objected to the report's 
release.  Cuba and Syria also objected.  After an 
 
unsuccessful attempt by the Board chair to unilaterally 
decide to not release the report, which drew an objection by 
Canada, the Board Chair deferred the decision to the next 
day.  After consultations the following morning, the Chair 
announced that she was unable to reach consensus on the 
release since "a large number of states including the EU were 
for the release and a large number of NAM states were 
opposed."  She expressed regret over the "split" Board, but 
the report, therefore, was not released due to lack of 
consensus.  The Chair also noted in her written summary that 
the Board had agreed to place on the agenda for its June 
meeting an agenda item entitled "De-restriction of documents 
of the Board of Governors."  Adding this item to the agenda 
for the June meeting was initially proposed by Cuba during 
the discussion on releasing the Iran report (septel).  Cuba, 
Egypt, and Iran reiterated their objection to releasing the 
Syria report. The Ambassador expressed regret at the lack of 
consensus and reiterated the U.S. belief that, in light of 
the apparent safeguards violation, the report should be 
released to the public.  Noting that Syria had gone to great 
lengths to conceal the nature of the facility at Al-Kibar and 
to sanitize the site after the reactor was destroyed, he said 
that Syria should not be allowed to continue its cover up 
effort by preventing the release of the Director General's 
reports.  He took exception to some member states' 
mischaracterization of the report as biased and politicized, 
and noted the importance to let the report speak for itself. 
The Ambassador, joined by France and Germany, also made it 
clear that we do not accept the outcome of this Board as a 
precedent and will revisit the issue of publishing the report 
in June. 
 
¶36. (SBU)  Note: In a short meeting in her office before 
Board proceedings opened on March 2, Ambassador lobbied Board 
Chair Ferouki on the appropriateness of public release of 
both the Iran and Syria reports.  Ferouki advised against any 
vote on the matter.  Ambassador Schulte noted that were Syria 
to open Board statements by declaring that it would now agree 
to provide the access and information the IAEA had requested, 
the U.S. would welcome that statement and he would seek 
instructions allowing him not to call for public release of 
the report.  Ferouki later informed the Ambassador that she 
had informed Syrian AEC head Othman, but he told her that he 
had no instructions to agree to the IAEA requests. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶37.  (SBU) Syria has decided on its story line and is 
sticking to it.  While Mission will continue to engage 
closely with the Secretariat and other Board members in 
support of rigorous IAEA pursuit of its Syrian investigation, 
it seems clear that further meaningful Syrian cooperation 
with the IAEA will not be forthcoming short of significant 
new developments.  Mission will send septel its thoughts on 
how best to optimize the chances for increasing pressure via 
the IAEA investigation in support of the broader diplomatic 
effort to prompt a new cost/benefit analysis in Damascus. 
 
-------------- 
U.S. Statement 
-------------- 
 
¶38.  (SBU) Madame Chair, 
 
      Syria's continuing refusal to cooperate with the IAEA 
should be of serious concern to all members of this Board 
and, indeed, to all supporters of the international 
nonproliferation regime.  We thank the Director General for 
his latest report, which reflects the serious and sustained 
attention the Agency pays to this important issue.  We 
applaud the Secretariat's professionalism in pursuing the 
investigation of this pressing matter and hope that future 
reports will reflect a decision by Syria to fully cooperate 
and provide a full accounting of its clandestine nuclear 
activities, both past and present. 
 
      Regrettably, as noted in the Director General's latest 
report, Syria has not yet demonstrated the level of 
cooperation and transparency needed by the IAEA to complete 
its investigation.  This is the second consecutive Board at 
which the Director General has submitted a report noting the 
lack of cooperation by Syria.  The last report, submitted to 
the November Board, stated that "Syria has not yet provided 
the requested documentation in support of its declarations E 
concerning the nature or function of the destroyed building, 
nor agreed to a visit to the three other locations which the 
Agency has requested to visit" as part of the investigation 
into undeclared nuclear activities.  Even more troubling, the 
Director General reported that Syria denied the IAEA access 
to sites and took immediate steps to sanitize the three 
suspected nuclear-related sites upon receiving the IAEA's 
request for access.  Unfortunately, Syria has yet to address 
any of these serious concerns or allowed the IAEA access to 
the additional sites. 
 
      We note with regret that Syria's most recent response 
to the IAEA's questions and concerns - included in a February 
17 letter, according to the Director General's report - only 
provided partial answers and did not address most of the 
questions raised by the Agency.  Syria has not yet provided 
information about the past use and nature of the Dair Alzour 
site.  Syria has also thus far refused to allow the IAEA 
access to additional suspected nuclear-related sites or 
access to the debris and equipment removed from Dair Alzour. 
As stated in the Director General's report, these measures 
are "essential" for the Agency to complete its assessment. 
 
      This report contributes to the growing evidence of 
clandestine nuclear activities in Syria, including the 
revelation that additional anthropogenic (or chemically 
processed) uranium particles "of a type not included in 
Syria's declared inventory of nuclear material" were detected 
in environmental samples taken at Dair Alzour.  I note that 
at the February 24 Technical Briefing on Syria, the 
Secretariat reported that it had found still more uranium 
particles in samples taken from Syria in addition to the 
"significant" quantity of uranium particles reported to the 
November Board.  We must understand why such material - 
material that was not previously declared to the IAEA - 
existed in Syria, and this can only happen if Syria provides 
the cooperation requested of it by the Director General.  In 
particular, as DDG Heinonen reiterated at the Technical 
Briefing, it is essential that Syria provide inspectors with 
access to the debris from the bombed facility.  Importantly, 
the Agency also notes in the report the "low probability" 
that the processed uranium present in soil samples from Dair 
Alzour could have come from the munitions used to destroy the 
facility, as alleged by Syria. 
 
Madam Chair, 
 
      I note with concern the statements Syria made last week 
at the Agency's technical briefing on this issue.  At the 
meeting, instead of explaining why uranium was detected at 
the Dair Alzour site, the Syrian representative claimed that 
it would not "accept" any future evidence gained from 
environmental samples.  This comes on the heels of Syria's 
earlier statements that it would not cooperate further with 
the IAEA until it received the sampling results.  We, as a 
Board, must not allow Syria, or any state, to politicize the 
objective work of the Agency's technical inspectors by 
attempting to selectively discredit their scientific 
findings. 
 
      Syria's continued efforts to hinder and discredit the 
work of the Agency begs the question:  What does Syria have 
to hide about its nuclear activities? 
 
      By failing to declare the Dair Alzour site to the IAEA 
and provide the required design information, Syria violated 
its safeguards agreement.  More importantly, however, Syria 
undermined the very role IAEA safeguards play in the 
international nonproliferation regime - to provide the 
international community with the necessary assurance that the 
reactor was part of a peaceful program.  This is all the more 
worrying as the configuration and location of the destroyed 
reactor suggests that it was not intended for peaceful 
purposes. 
 
      Given the gravity of this issue and Syria's refusal to 
allow the IAEA to complete its verification activities, the 
United States asks that all Board members join us in 
demanding that Syria fully cooperate with the IAEA 
investigation without delay by granting the IAEA access to 
any information, debris and sites needed to complete its 
investigation.  Such cooperation will go a long way in 
providing assurance to the international community of Syria's 
peaceful intentions. 
 
Madam Chair, 
 
      In order to maintain the high level of transparency for 
which the Agency and Board are known, and to ensure that all 
members of the international community are aware of the 
Agency's work on this important issue, we call for the 
Director General's reports on the Implementation of NPT 
Safeguards in the Syria Arab Republic to be made available to 
the public. 
 
Thank you. 
SCHULTE