VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0091/01 0651336
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 061336Z MAR 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9075
RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0801
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0853
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 0295
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0651
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1513

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000091 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
EAP FOR BOSWORTH AND KIM, ISN FOR GROMOLL AND MAHAFFEY, IO 
FOR GOLDSTEIN, EAP FOR KELLY AND JOHNSON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC IAEA KN KNNP
SUBJECT: IAEA/DPRK: SUPPORT FOR SIX-PARTY PROCESS AND 
IAEA'S INVOLVEMENT CONTINUES 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (SBU) North Korea has been on the agenda of every IAEA 
Board of Governors meeting since inspectors were kicked out 
of the country in December 2002.  For the March 2009 Board 
meeting no written report was issued by the Secretariat on 
this item, and the Director General's introductory remarks 
were notably short; he stated only that the Agency continues 
to monitor and verify the shutdown status of Yongbyon nuclear 
facilities and that fuel discharged from the reactor remains 
under IAEA surveillance.  Fewer Board members spoke on this 
item than in previous Boards, due probably to the lack of 
detail provided by the DG and the lack of progress within the 
Six-Party framework in securing a verification mechanism or 
completing "Phase II" actions as agreed among the six 
parties.  As in previous Board meetings, members delivered 
statements strongly supporting the Six-Party process and 
looked forward to the denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula and North Korea's return to the NPT and IAEA 
safeguards.  Most members also reiterated the importance of 
the IAEA's participation in verification work in North Korea. 
 End Summary. 
 
---------------------------------- 
DG Confirms Shutdown of Facilities 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The Director General has reported on the status of 
the implementation of safeguards in the DPRK, as requested by 
the Board of Governors, since inspectors were kicked out of 
Yongbyon in December 2002 (GOV/2003/14).  Inspectors returned 
to North Korea in July 2007, as requested by the Six Parties 
under the February 13, 2007, Initial Actions Agreement, to 
monitor and verify the shutdown of facilities at Yongbyon and 
Taechon.  The IAEA's mandate remains unchanged, although they 
have unofficial observer status in the U.S.-led disablement 
work, now comprised of the defueling of the 5-MW(e) reactor 
at Yongbyon. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) In his introductory remarks, the DG confirmed the 
shutdown status of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities, and noted 
that fuel discharged from the Yongbyon reactor remains under 
Agency containment and surveillance, but did not comment 
further on the DPRK.  The DG has generally provided 
additional comments during his introductory remarks, 
including expressing his desire for North Korea to return to 
IAEA Safeguards at an early date.  He has noted in the past 
that the IAEA has no role in disablement other than to 
document and observe the activities.  He also did not repeat 
his call for clarification as to whether or not the IAEA 
should consider the DPRK an NPT member.  (Note:  The DPRK's 
NPT status has implications for how the IAEA implements its 
treaty/safeguards obligations in the DPRK, even if the DPRK 
is considered to have withdrawn from the Treaty.) 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Nine statements were delivered by Board members: 
China, Japan, Canada, the U.S., Russia, Australia, the 
Philippines, New Zealand, and the EU (representing nine Board 
members, including associated state Albania).  (U.S. 
Statement in para 12).  In addition, South Korea spoke under 
Rule 50. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Six Party Members Express Support 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) China spoke first, noting the important progress 
made by the Six-Party talks towards the eventual 
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.  China expressed 
its interest in achieving the targets set in the Joint 
Statement of September 19, 2005 by the Six-Party members. 
China committed to working with other parties to complete 
Phase II actions without delay.  Russia noted it stands by 
the Six-Party commitments and the 2005 Joint Statement. 
Russia called on all parties to abide by agreements and 
expressed its hope that disablement will be completed soon. 
Russia also expressed the "need" to make active use of the 
IAEA in DPRK. 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Japan focused on the importance of establishing a 
robust framework of verification, recalling that such a 
framework was not achieved during the December 2008 Head of 
Delegation meeting of the Six-Party talks.  Japan reaffirmed 
its commitment to "continue to work together with other 
partners at the Six-Party Talks towards the full 
implementation of the Joint Statement as a whole."  Japan 
also noted that the IAEA should play an important role in 
North Korea, in order to make utmost use of its knowledge and 
experience. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) South Korea, not currently on the Board, spoke 
under Rule 50.  ROK noted the importance of the multilateral 
approach to effectively dealing with this issue, and 
recognized that progress has been made.  South Korea 
expressed concern about North Korea's provocative statements 
aimed at the South and at the North's preparations for a 
missile launch.  South Korea asked DPRK to not take actions 
that would undermine the Six-Party Talks. 
 
------------------------------- 
Others Express Support and Urge 
And Increase Role for the IAEA 
------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Canada, the EU, Australia, the Philippines, and New 
Zealand expressed support to the Six-Party Talks and the 
IAEA's role in monitoring the shutdown of facilities.  The EU 
members expressed the hope that a legal framework based on a 
safeguards agreement with the Agency will be implemented soon 
and highlighted that the IAEA has a central role to play in 
verification.  The EU urged DPRK to provide a "complete and 
correct" declaration of nuclear facilities and materials to 
the IAEA and promptly allow for its verification.  All 
members stressed the central role of the Agency in the 
verification process. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Australia noted its concern at the slow pace of 
disablement activities.  New Zealand expressed its concern on 
the lack of progress in the Six-Party Talks, saying that the 
current situation has taken a step back from the positive 
signs of a year ago. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Japan, South Korea, Canada, and the EU joined us 
in recalling UNSCR 1718 and South Korea and the EU also noted 
UNSCR 1695.  The EU in particular used the opportunity to 
call on DPRK to refrain from any further related (missile and 
nuclear) activities as noted in the Security Council 
resolution.  The EU expressed its deep concern regarding the 
ballistic missile and nuclear activities of the DPRK, as well 
as the proliferation activities of the DPRK in both these 
areas, 
 
------------------------------ 
Overshadowed, and Just as Well 
------------------------------ 
 
¶11. (SBU) Comment:  The Board's treatment of the DPRK issue 
at this meeting was brief and business-like, acknowledging 
that action on this matter and the IAEA's role in it must 
flow from the Six-Party process.  The safeguards verification 
items on Iran and Syria, reported septels, commanded more of 
the Board's attention and were contentious.  Those two 
countries figured prominently in discussions throughout the 
four-day Board meeting, both inside the Board Room and out. 
Interestingly, the only reference to the DPRK file outside 
this formal agenda item was during the joint appearance of 
the two candidates to succeed Director General ElBaradei, 
when Japanese IAEA Governor Amano referred to resolving 
"diverse" safeguards issues such as Iran and DPRK as one of 
the Agency's highest priorities.  Challenged by the Iranian 
ambassador on whether the two cases were somehow similar, 
Amano clarified that they were not, but reiterated they were 
both challenges of great importance.  End Comment. 
 
-------------- 
U.S. Statement 
-------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Madame Chairwoman, 
 
Secretary Clinton, during her recent trip to Asia and her 
first overseas trip as Secretary of State, stated that the 
"most acute challenge to stability and security in Northeast 
Asia" comes from North Korea and its nuclear program.  At 
that time, the Secretary reaffirmed that President Obama and 
she are committed to working through the Six-Party Talks to 
achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula in a peaceful manner.  Noting the U.S. belief that 
we have an opportunity to move forward with denuclearization, 
Secretary Clinton recalled that the DPRK committed in the 
September 2005 Joint Statement to abandoning all its nuclear 
weapons and returning at an early date to the 
Nonproliferation Treaty.  The DPRK also committed to return 
to IAEA safeguards.  On February 26, Secretary Clinton 
announced the role of Ambassador Stephen Bosworth as Special 
Representative for North Korean Policy and Ambassador Sung 
Kim as Special Envoy for Six-Party Talks.  Ambassadors 
Bosworth and Kim are traveling to the region this week to 
consult with our Six-Party allies and partners on the problem 
of North Korea's nuclear and missile threats to the region. 
 
President Obama has called for a strengthening of the 
international institutions dedicated to finding common 
solutions to common problems.  In this connection, we feel 
strongly that the IAEA should play an important role in the 
DPRK's denuclearization, including in the verification of the 
DPRK's initial declaration and in future dismantlement 
activities. We believe such a role for the Agency is in the 
best interest of all parties, including the DPRK.  We look 
forward to further cooperation with the IAEA as we move 
toward our goal of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. 
 
Madame Chairwoman, 
 
The United States appreciates and commends the IAEA's ongoing 
work to implement the Agency's "ad hoc monitoring and 
verification arrangement" in the DPRK related to the shutdown 
and sealing of the five nuclear installations at Yongbyon and 
Taechon.  U.S.-led teams maintain constant coordination with 
IAEA personnel working on the ground in the DPRK, which will 
serve as a model for the future, deeper cooperation that we 
seek. Our teams continue to make progress in disabling the 
three primary nuclear facilities at Yongbyon.  Eight out of 
11 agreed disablement actions at the three facilities have 
been completed, including the removal of more than 6,200 (or 
about 75%) of the approximately 8,000 fuel rods from the 
five-megawatt reactor.  The United States urges the DPRK to 
complete the remaining disablement activities expeditiously 
in order to advance the denuclearization process and move 
toward full implementation of the Joint Statement. 
 
The United States continues to seek a Six-Party agreement on 
verification.  In October 2008, U.S. officials and their DPRK 
counterparts conducted negotiations in Pyongyang and reached 
agreement on measures to begin verification of the DPRK's 
nuclear programs. The DPRK submitted an initial declaration 
of its programs to the Chinese government on June 26, 2008. 
The declaration package includes information about North 
Korea's plutonium program, which has produced fissile 
material for its nuclear weapons, and notes U.S. concerns 
regarding North Korea's proliferation and any uranium 
enrichment activities.   Based upon the October discussions, 
U.S. and North Korean negotiators agreed on a number of 
important verification measures.  All of these measures are 
consistent with the July 12 statement issued by China, as 
Chair of the Six-Party Talks. 
 
The parties sought to reach a Six-Party agreement on a 
verification text during the December 2008 Heads of 
Delegation meeting, but the DPRK refused to formalize any 
verification protocol in a Six-Party text.  The United States 
remains committed to achieving a Six-Party agreement on 
verification, and we plan to work closely with our partners 
in the Six-Party process to wrap up Phase II activities, 
including disablement, in order to move quickly into Phase 
III, during which the DPRK is to verifiably abandon its 
nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs. 
 
The DPRK's verifiable denuclearization and fulfillment of all 
its other commitments relating to the Joint Statement will 
make possible the realization of the full range of benefits 
 
envisioned in the Joint Statement.  As Secretary Clinton 
stated last month in Seoul, "If North Korea is genuinely 
prepared to completely and verifiably eliminate their nuclear 
weapons program, the Obama Administration will be willing to 
normalize bilateral relations, replace the peninsula's 
longstanding armistice agreement with a permanent peace 
treaty, and assist in meeting the energy and other economic 
and humanitarian needs of the Korean people." 
 
The United States reiterates that UN Security Council 
Resolution 1718 remains in effect.  All Member States should 
continue to abide by the requirements of this Chapter VII 
resolution.  The DPRK should avoid any provocative actions 
that might aggravate tensions in the region and undermine 
progress in the Six-Party process. 
 
Madame Chairwoman, 
 
The role of the IAEA, and full DPRK cooperation with the 
IAEA, will be important as we move forward.  We expect to 
continue our close collaboration as we work toward the DPRK's 
verifiable abandonment of all nuclear weapons and existing 
nuclear programs. 
 
Thank you, Madame Chairwoman. 
SCHULTE