VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0121/01 0830726
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 240726Z MAR 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9193
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEANFA/NRC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000121 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA, ISN/NESS, ISN/RA, CA/VO 
NA-243-GOOREVICH 
NRC FOR OIP - HENDERSON, SCHWARTZMAN 
OSD FOR TAYLOR 
COMMERCE FOR SHEPPARD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC KNNP IAEA ENRG TRGY CVIS
SUBJECT: IAEA: DISCUSSION WITH IAEA ON IMPLEMENTATION OF U.S. 
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Officials of the United States Government and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) met in Vienna on March 3, 
2009, to discuss matters related to the implementation of the 
U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol.  IAEA officials confirmed that the 
Agency was prepared for the United States to purchase equipment to 
be used during complementary access visits, as well as to work with 
U.S. officials on equipment management procedures (authentication, 
storage, delivery to/from sites, preventive maintenance, replacement 
of defective equipment, etc.). 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The Agency agreed to provide electronically an up-to-date 
list of Agency inspectors designated to the United States, and to 
make arrangements with the Office of External Relations to try to 
ensure that regular updates are provided, also electronically, to 
the U.S. Mission.  Additionally, the IAEA agreed to clarify if the 
IAEA Additional Protocol Reporter software could include a mechanism 
for reporting mines as "suspended", and to share its experience with 
the United States on performing complementary access at mines.  In 
response to questions by the U.S. Delegation, the IAEA agreed to 
investigate and inform the United States:  (1) if information on the 
export of nuclear grade graphite for non-nuclear end-use was 
required; and (ii) if there was any difference between the 
information provided under the VRS and that required under the AP. 
Under Article 2.a.(ix), the Agency may request information on 
imports of items enumerated in Annex II of the AP by the United 
States.  IAEA officials indicated that complementary access visits 
to importing locations might be useful in confirming NNWS quarterly 
export declarations.  The United States committed to propose Agenda 
items for the bilateral consultations in April and to make 
arrangements for site visits requested by the IAEA.  Funding for 
IAEA safeguards activities in the United States would also be 
addressed in the April bilateral meeting.  Also at the April 
meeting, the U.S. team agreed to clarify communications channels. 
Comment: UNVIE is prepared to host a computer in the secure area to 
ensure that the U.S. Mission remains in the loop on all 
communications.  End comment and summary. 
 
--------------------- 
Introductory Comments 
--------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) IAEA Safeguards Department Operations B Director Herman 
Nackaerts welcomed this first round of discussions on the 
implementation of the U.S. Additional Protocol (AP), something he 
had been requesting for some time.  He stated the IAEA is interested 
in learning the tools/procedures for use under the U.S Additional 
Protocol, the delegation of responsibilities within the U.S. 
Government on matters related to the Additional Protocol, 
communication channels, and any constraints that the United States 
might have on IAEA activities under the Additional Protocol.  IAEA 
Principal Legal Officer Laura Rockwood underscored that the text of 
the U.S. AP is identical to the APs undertaken by the non-nuclear 
weapon state parties to the NPT. She noted that it is important, in 
this regard, that the U.S. not adopt an interpretation of its 
obligations regarding its civil nuclear fuel cycle that would be at 
odds with how the same provisions were applied to the civil fuel 
cycle of NPT non-nuclear weapon states parties. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Selection of the Louisiana Enrichment Services Centrifuge Facility 
for the Application of IAEA Safeguards 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Nackaerts stated that the IAEA was nearing a decision on 
the selection of the Louisiana Enrichment Services (LES) Centrifuge 
Facility for the application of IAEA safeguards under the U.S.-IAEA 
Safeguards Agreement, although no final decision has been made. 
Nackaerts said the preliminary thinking is to explore ways to use 
LES for developing novel/alternative safeguards approaches as 
alternatives to traditional safeguards approaches, for possible 
eventual use in NNWS.  He indicated that selection of LES for the 
application of IAEA safeguards would depend upon what constraints 
the U.S. might seek to impose at the facility.  As an aside, 
Nackaerts recalled that the Director General (DG) had determined 
that the IAEA did not have a legal obligation under the Hexapartite 
Safeguards Project to apply safeguards on this facility.  (Comment: 
The IAEA seemed be motivated to select LES over the Lead Cascade at 
Portsmouth, based on the fact that LES employed URENCO technology, 
 
which was utilized around the world, whereas the Lead Cascade 
employed U.S. technology, which had not been proliferated.  End 
Comment.) 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Nackaerts also expressed interest in learning more about 
the SILEX enrichment facility.  U.S. participant Steve Adams 
(ISN/MNSA) noted that this facility had not been placed on the 
eligible facilities list.  Nackaerts requested that this facility be 
discussed during the April bilateral consultations in the United 
States. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
U.S. Actions Related to the Additional Protocol 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
- 
¶6.  (SBU) Adams briefly reviewed the U.S. national security 
exclusion and highlighted actions taken by the U.S. Executive and 
Legislative Branches necessary to bring the AP into force.  Adams 
stated that the responsibility for U.S. implementation of the AP was 
shared among the U.S. interagency community, as follows:  (1) the 
Department of Defense (DOD) was responsible for activities that take 
place on DOD-owned, operated or leased locations; (2) the Department 
of Energy (DOE) was responsible for activities that take place on 
DOE-owned, operated or leased locations; (3) the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) was responsible for activities that take place at 
NRC-licensed locations, except at DOE and DOD locations; and (4) the 
Department of Commerce (DOC) was responsible for activities that 
take place at locations not covered by DOE or NRC.  Department of 
Defense installations, however, will neither be declared nor are 
subject to inspection by the IAEA. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Adams stated that DOE had promulgated all required 
internal rule making as well as manuals and handbooks on the AP in 
the DOE complex.  DOE had submitted its draft declaration to DOC. 
DOC had collected and processed industry submissions, and aggregated 
all agency information collected from declarations into a U.S. 
national declaration for transmission to the IAEA.  DOC promulgated 
its final rule on October 31, 2008.  DOC was working jointly with 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on a data collection system.  The 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was responsible for activities 
that take place at NRC-licensed locations, except at DOE and DOD 
locations.  NRC revised its regulations to incorporate U.S. IAEA 
Additional Protocol requirements (December 23, 2008).  NRC had 
provided pertinent information to NRC licensees at several 
industry-related meetings. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Adams confirmed that the United States would submit its 
first quarterly export report on May 30, 2009.  By late April, the 
U.S., in order to meet its domestic legal requirements, will submit 
its initial declaration under the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol to 
Congress for a 60-day review process.   The approved declaration 
will be transmitted to the IAEA by July 2, 2009, in order to meet 
the 180-day requirement for such declarations under the U.S.-IAEA 
Additional Protocol. 
 
------------------------ 
Frequency of Inspections 
------------------------ 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Adams requested that the Agency provide the U.S. with 
informal views regarding the likely frequency of inspections in the 
U.S.  In this regard, the U.S. is interested in learning from the 
Agency whether it had conducted any complementary access visits in 
France or the United Kingdom.  He asked how soon the U.S. could 
expect its first complementary access visit after submission of the 
initial declaration by the United States.  Nackaerts responded that 
the U.S. could expect to see a modest inspection effort, i.e., no 
more than five complementary access visits per year during the first 
two years.  These accesses would undoubtedly be sought in connection 
with activities that the United States had with non-nuclear weapon 
states Party to the NPT or in an effort to better understand the 
U.S. declaration. 
 
----------------------- 
Reliable Communications 
----------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Adams noted that, as the U.S. had stated in previous 
bilateral consultations, it plans to use the United States Nuclear 
Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) as the means through which it will 
receive and respond to IAEA notifications requesting complementary 
access, as well as for other related communications requiring rapid 
 
turn-around.  Adams noted that the U.S. would ask that the IAEA, at 
a minimum, to include the following information in its notifications 
of complementary access:  (1) the identification of the location, 
site or facility for which complementary access was sought; (2) the 
purpose for the complementary access; (3) the basis for the 
selection of the facility, site, or other location for which the 
complementary access sought; (4) the activities that will be carried 
out during the complementary access; (5) the time and date that the 
complementary access was expected to begin, and the anticipated 
period covered by the complementary access; and (6)the names and 
titles of the inspectors. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) At the April meeting, Adams stated that the U.S. would 
like to discuss and agree with the IAEA on the format for inspection 
notifications, the technical specifications of the electronic 
communications system linking NRRC and IAEA, and logistical 
arrangements for setting it up.  In the meantime, he noted that 
representatives from the NRRC who will be in Vienna in mid-March 
would like to review technical specifications of the electronic 
communication systems linking the NRRC and IAEA.  Nackaerts 
questioned the value of a dedicated computer system for what might 
amount to very little activity in the U.S., but did not object to an 
eventual installation at the IAEA, assuming all technical 
arrangements could be worked out.  Nackaerts asked that the April 
discussion clarify points of contact and communication channels. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Mission Comment and Recommendation:  While Ambassador 
supports making use of the NRRC for communications, we note it will 
be important to ensure that the U.S. Mission remains involved in all 
communications between the USG and the IAEA.  We suggest that a 
computer terminal also be installed in the secure area at UNVIE (in 
addition to the computer that would be installed at the IAEA), to 
ensure that we receive copies of all relevant communications.  End 
comment and recommendation. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Through the AP, Article by Article 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Nackaerts stated that the IAEA had began discussing U.S. 
obligations under each article of the AP, beginning with Article 2, 
and hoped to use this discussion to identify questions and possible 
gaps in knowledge.  Rockwood noted that the U.S.-IAEA AP was 
identical to APs adopted by non-nuclear weapon states parties to the 
NPT, with the exception of the exclusion of instances where its 
application would result in access by the Agency to activities with 
direct national security significance to the U.S. or to locations or 
information associated with such activities, and emphasized that, 
except where that exclusion was relevant, the provisions of the 
U.S.-IAEA AP would be interpreted in the same way as would other 
APs, using the same formulation for those provisions. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Rockwood stated that Article 2.a.(i) was designed to 
complement information in INFCIRC 153-type agreements in order to 
give a complete picture of the nuclear fuel cycle-related activities 
in the state.   Specifically, the state was required to report on 
all government or government-sponsored research and development in 
the nuclear fuel cycle.  IAEA confirmed that, if it sought 
complementary access to a location declared pursuant to this 
article, it would require the IAEA to identify a question or 
ambiguity with the U.S. declaration, therefore, giving more than a 
24 hour notice of IAEA interest in the location. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Adams noted that such research and development in the 
United States was usually carried out at the bequest of the 
Department of Energy.  NNSA/NA-243 official Joanna Sellen stated 
that the U.S. would provide the IAEA with information it could, 
focusing mainly on the joint work that the U.S. carries out with 
other states, especially NPT non-nuclear weapon state parties.  She 
indicated DOE had done a thorough job of scrubbing its declaration, 
and was prepared, if necessary, to provide the IAEA access to the 
relevant principle investigators if access to the location itself 
was not possible. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Rockwood noted that the Agency would only seek access to 
Article 2(a)(i) locations based on a question or inconsistency; as 
such, discussions of the matter would normally be required.  USDOC's 
Jill Shepherd stated that the Department of Commerce was responsible 
for research and development at private companies and universities. 
DOC was principally concerned with the protection of confidential 
business information at such locations.  As such, DOC was 
responsible for developing managed access plans to protect such 
 
information from inadvertent release. 
 
¶17.  (SBU) Adams noted that it went without saying that the U.S. 
would follow the terms of the subsidiary arrangement that had been 
negotiated with the IAEA.  IAEA officials asked if the U.S. was 
requesting a new subsidiary arrangement.  Adams stated that, while 
he did not preclude possibly seeking a subsidiary arrangement on 
other subjects, he did not expect there was a need for another 
subsidiary arrangement on managed access.  When it was clear the 
IAEA side was unaware of the extant subsidiary arrangement, Adams 
provided the IAEA with a copy of the signed original document. 
Adams noted that subsidiary arrangement contained illustrative 
managed access techniques that were based largely upon standard 
managed access techniques used in other international treaty 
regimes, e.g., the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
 
¶18.  (SBU) Rockwood stated that Article 2(a)(ii) was a catch-all 
provision, allowing the parties to agree upon measures that provide 
for the provision of additional information on operational 
activities that could enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of 
safeguards at facilities or locations outside of facilities where 
nuclear material was customarily used.  Adams stated that the U.S. 
saw no need at this time to pursue measures under this provision. 
 
¶19.  (SBU) Rockwood raised Article 2(a)(iii), noting that this 
provision required the United States to provide general descriptions 
of each building on each site, including its use.  Rockwood quoted 
the definition for a "site" in the AP.  She stated that this 
provision basically required the United States to provide an 
annotated map identifying the location of all installations 
co-located at the facility.  She added that that this provision 
directly addressed one of the shortfalls of the IAEA safeguards 
regime identified in the post-Gulf War era. 
 
¶20.  (SBU) IAEA Operations B Section Head Chris Charlier encouraged 
the U.S. to indicate managed access requirements in its Article 
2.a.(iii) declarations.  All necessary efforts have to be made on 
both sides so that the objectives/purposes of the complementary 
access are not compromised due to managed access.  The Agency 
provided the U.S. with a copy of the standardized text for AP 
Subsidiary Arrangements. 
 
¶21.  (SBU) Adams responded that he believed that the U.S. position 
remained that it would declare such information only for sites on 
the facilities that the IAEA had selected for safeguards and for 
which it had provided design information.  Adams added that he would 
research the historical U.S. position on this issue and would be 
prepared to speak authoritatively on it during the April bilateral 
meetings.  Rockwood stated that the United States should be 
cautious, given the possibility that others (such as Iran) could use 
the U.S. position to justify a new interpretation of this provision 
that would, for example, allow it to avoid declaring information for 
facilities that it had not provided the IAEA with design 
information, such as the new Iranian reactor planned for Darkhovin. 
Rockwood added that it was important that the U. S. not exaggerate 
what was required under Article 2(a)(iii) - a map of the site would 
suffice 
 
¶22.  (SBU) Rockwood raised Article 2(a)(iv), noting that this 
provision required the U.S. to provide the IAEA information on the 
scale of operations for each location identified in Annex I. 
Rockwood stated that this provision was designed to give the IAEA 
key information about choke points in the State's nuclear fuel 
cycle.  The IAEA, however, could only seek access to such a site 
after raising a question or inconsistency with the State's 
declaration; therefore, access could not be expected to occur in 
less than 24 hours, and would only be during working hours.  Adams 
agreed with this interpretation, noting that it was hard to see why 
the IAEA would seek access in the U.S. under this provision, unless 
it was for the purpose of learning information about an NPT 
non-nuclear weapon state's fuel cycle.  Rockwood stated that the 
principal reason for safeguards in the nuclear weapon states was to 
demonstrate that the AP did not place the non-nuclear weapon states 
at a commercial disadvantage. 
 
¶23.  (SBU) Regarding Article 2(a)(v), Rockwood stated that the IAEA 
expected declarations regarding the status of the uranium mines and 
uranium and thorium concentration plants.  Adams informed the Agency 
that DoC would be responsible for hard rock mines, while the NRC 
would be responsible for in situ solution mines and concentration 
plants.  Specifically, the IAEA expected to be informed whether the 
location was "operating", "closed down" or "abandoned.  Shepherd 
 
stated that, in the U.S., mines could be operational, closed down, 
suspended or decommissioned, whereas the AP Reporter software did 
not provide a field for reporting "suspended" (operational but not 
operating) mines.  The IAEA agreed to clarify whether the Protocol 
Reporter software could include a mechanism for reporting mines as 
"suspended", and to share its experience with the United States on 
performing complementary access at mines. 
 
¶24.  (SBU) Rockwood noted that, in accordance with Article 2.a.(vi), 
the U.S. was required to report inventories and exports to NNWS and 
alleged non-nuclear purposes of pre 34(c) [INFCIRC/153] material. 
Adams stated that the NRC was responsible for collecting information 
to be provided under this provision; however, the U.S. did not 
anticipate that many locations would have to be declared. 
 
¶25.  (SBU) Regarding Article 2.a. (vii), Rockwood and Adams agreed 
that no nuclear material had been exempted from safeguards under the 
U.S. VOA.  The U.S. declaration under this provision would simply be 
"nothing to declare."  Similarly, there was no intermediate or 
high-level waste containing plutonium, high-enriched uranium or 
U-233 on which safeguards had been terminated under the U.S. VOA; 
therefore, the U.S. declaration under this provision likewise would 
be "nothing to declare." 
 
¶26.  (SBU) Rockwood stated that Complementary Access might be useful 
in confirming NNWS declarations about exports.  Adams stated that 
the NRC and Commerce would be responsible for collecting information 
on exports of specified equipment and non-nuclear material listed in 
Annex II, as required by Article 2.a.(ix).  The NRC will provide 
information on exports of nuclear grade graphite for use in 
reactors.  Shepherd asked whether information on exports of nuclear 
grade graphite for non-nuclear end-use was required.  Adams asked 
whether exports of spare parts (e.g., parts for pumps reported 
already) was also required. The Agency agreed to research these 
issues and respond in April.  UNVIE SciAtt Hilliard requested the 
Secretariat to clarify the differences between what the U.S. is 
currently reporting under the Voluntary Reporting Scheme (VRS) and 
what is expected under the AP. 
- 
¶27.  (SBU) In regard to Article 2.a. (x), Sellen stated that the 
Department of Energy would provide the Department of Commerce with 
information on general plans for the succeeding ten-year period, in 
particular on facilities that may be included in the list of 
eligible facilities. Sellen noted it is understood that enrichment 
and reprocessing plants may be included under this article.  This 
information would be included in the U.S. declaration. 
 
¶28.  (SBU) Adams asked the extent to which information provided 
under the Voluntary Reporting Scheme (VRS) coincided with that 
required under the U.S.-IAEA AP, and, if it was the same 
information, whether any action on the part of the U.S. would be 
necessary before the United States ceased reporting under the VRS. 
The Agency explained that, if the U.S. were to decide to stop 
reporting under the VRS, it would be advisable for the U.S. to 
inform the Agency officially.  The Agency requested that information 
on exports be provided based on actual dates of exports and not 
based on the dates the export licenses were granted. 
 
¶29.  (SBU) Rockwood stated that, in accordance with Article 2.b.(i), 
if the U.S. had knowledge of any nuclear fuel cycle-related R&D not 
involving nuclear material information, it was required to make 
"best efforts" to declare it to the IAEA.  Shepherd noted that the 
Department of Commerce regulations addressed this obligation, and 
are published in the Federal Register.  It was anticipated that 
there may be a number of U.S. locations that could have such R&D. 
Rockwood explained that access to such locations could only be 
triggered by a question or an inconsistency, which would require 
prior consultation with the U.S. 
 
¶30.  (SBU) Rockwood noted that, in accordance with Article 2.b. 
(ii), the U.S. was required to make every reasonable effort to 
provide information to the Agency for locations outside a site which 
the Agency considers might be functionally related to the activities 
of the site.  She explained that it was, in the first instance, the 
State's prerogative to delineate site boundaries, this provision 
permitted the Agency to follow up with the State if it had reason to 
believe that the State had not included those buildings which are 
required under the AP to be included within the site.  Given the 
U.S. exception for activities with direct national security 
significance, Rockwood acknowledged that this provision was not 
likely to be relevant. 
 
¶31. (SBU) In accordance with Article 2.c, Rockwood stated that the 
U.S. was required to provide amplifications or clarifications of any 
information as requested by the Agency in so far as relevant for the 
purposes of safeguards.  Nackaerts asked how such requests should be 
made to the U.S.  Adams required that official Agency communications 
should be sent through the Permanent Mission of the United States to 
the IAEA in Vienna. 
 
------------ 
DoD Concerns 
------------ 
 
¶32.  (SBU) Nackaerts asked the United States to identify possible 
constraints in the implementation of the AP in the United States. 
He noted the discussions the previous week with a DOD team that had 
agreed to provide written procedures to facilitate the IAEA's 
understanding.  OSD's Marc Taylor provided the background that the 
Department of Defense had concerns regarding the equipment to be 
used during complementary access visits, and that DoD facilities are 
located throughout the United States.  He said the equipment 
procedures were designed to ensure that the IAEA equipment 
functioned as designed and was not capable of collecting information 
outside the scope of the Additional Protocol, and said a member of 
the Department of Defense would be part of the host team for 
complementary access visits.  The sides agreed to discuss procedures 
for use of the equipment during the next meeting. 
 
¶33.  (SBU) Nackaerts confirmed that complementary access (CA) would 
be sought during normal working hours, and that activities conducted 
during such access would be in accordance with Article 6.  Nackaerts 
stressed the importance of the inspectors having access to the data 
collected during CAs, including transporting or transmitting data 
back to Vienna, in order to draw independent conclusions from its 
complementary access. Extra time may be required during 
complementary access to compile data from Agency equipment on site. 
Rockwood suggested the U.S. provide as much information beforehand 
on how it intended to manage inspector access. 
 
-------------------- 
Inspection Equipment 
-------------------- 
 
¶34.  (SBU) Adams recalled that the U.S. and IAEA had discussed in 
the past and agreed upon a concept for technical equipment 
inspection, and that a further informal discussion had taken place 
the week before on the equipment to be purchased.  Nackaerts stated 
that Safeguards DDG Heinonen had confirmed the arrangement, e.g., 
that the United States would purchase such complementary equipment 
kits, which would be placed under Agency seal, and the U.S. would 
have them available for use by IAEA inspectors during complementary 
access visits.  Nackaerts confirmed that the Agency would implement 
this measure, but identified a number of practical issues that had 
to be worked out to the satisfaction of both sides.  The Agency will 
authenticate each instrument in the kit before use.  Adams stated 
that the United States would discuss its planned equipment 
management procedure (authentication, storage, delivery to/from 
sites, preventive maintenance, replacement of defective equipment, 
etc.) during the bilateral meeting in April.  Nackaerts stated that 
it was important for the IAEA to be assured that it could remove 
notes and data, e.g., radiation measurements, from the location and 
return them to Vienna for analysis.  He observed it might be 
necessary to build in additional time to conduct complementary 
access in the U.S., and also noted the need to redefine a bit the 
rationale for CA in the U.S., but agreed to try to walk through what 
a CA might entail at the April meetings. 
- 
¶35.  (SBU) Taylor of OSD elaborated on the U.S. concern that the 
IAEA could tamper with the equipment and make it more sensitive than 
it was designed, or give it features that were inconsistent with the 
purpose of the IAEA's access.  Rockwood warned that these procedures 
could set a bad precedent for complementary access within NPT 
non-nuclear weapon states, particularly those states where the IAEA 
has serious concerns about nuclear activities, and stressed the 
importance of the IAEA being equipped to do its job.  In Rockwood's 
view, it was important to tie these measures to the national 
security exclusion. 
 
---------------------- 
Environmental Sampling 
---------------------- 
 
¶36.  (SBU) Taylor stated that the U.S. would check each site for 
 
information of direct national security significance to the U.S. 
before sampling would be allowed, and noted the President had to 
approve such sampling.  Nackaerts responded that it sounded like a 
five-year process, if not longer.  Rockwood stated that she had deep 
concerns about what the U.S. was proposing.  She recognized that the 
U.S. could exclude information or activities of direct national 
security significance to the U.S., but expressed her concern about 
the interpretation of what constituted direct national security 
significance to the U.S.  She questioned what would happen if other 
countries had such concerns and sought to use Article 7 managed 
access to exclude the Agency from doing its job.  Rockwood stated 
that she understood that the U.S. was trying to protect signatures 
from its nuclear weapons program. 
 
¶37.  (SBU) Adams read Sections 252 and 253 of the "U.S. AP 
Implementation Act" of 2006.  Under these provisions, the U.S. may 
not permit any wide-area or location-specific environmental sampling 
in the U.S., respectively, unless the President had determined and 
reported to Congress, among other things, that: 
 
-- the proposed use of environmental sampling was necessary to 
increase the IAEA's capability to detect undeclared nuclear 
activities in a non-nuclear weapons state; and 
- 
-- the proposed use of environmental sampling will not result in 
access by the IAEA to locations, activities or information of direct 
national security significance. 
 
¶38.  (SBU) Rockwood stated that the U.S. policy on environmental 
sampling must not go beyond the national security exclusion, i.e., 
information or activities of direct national security significance 
to the United States. 
 
------------------------- 
Visas for IAEA Inspectors 
------------------------- 
 
¶39.  (SBU) Nackaerts underscored the need for the U.S. to provide 
one-year multiple entry visas to IAEA inspectors designated to the 
U.S.  Adams stated that the U.S. would provide one-year 
multiple-entry visas to designated Agency inspectors.  Hilliard 
noted that the U.S. did not get timely electronic notification of 
the full list of inspectors designated to the U.S.  In order to 
expedite the visa issuing process and to facilitate quick access at 
the declared sites, Hilliard suggested that the Agency provide an 
up-to-date list of designated inspectors electronically to the U.S. 
on a regular basis. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Draft Agenda for April Bilateral Consultations 
--------------------------------------------- - 
- 
¶40.  (SBU) Both sides agreed that a follow-up meeting will be held 
in Washington, DC, during the week of 20 April 2009, and that the 
implementation of AP and the VOA will be the focus of this meeting. 
Time permitting; the safeguards approach for the MOX facility will 
be discussed.  On the implementation of the AP, discussion topics 
will include:  provision of information, including communication 
channels; implementation of CA and managed access; equipment for 
inspection/CA; resolution of questions and inconsistencies; 
protection and handling of confidential information; delineation of 
site boundaries; agency regulations implementing the AP; and 
environmental sampling.  On the implementation of safeguards under 
the VOA, topics of discussion will include updated eligible 
facilities list; SQP amendments; de-selection of facilities; Y-12 
status and future plans; U.S. plans for the MOX facility (Savannah 
River); U.S. plans for uranium enrichment; and U.S. plan for placing 
additional Pu under safeguards at KAMS.  The United States also 
requested that the Agency give a presentation on its information 
security arrangements/measures and on safeguards measures at gas 
centrifuge enrichment facilities. 
 
¶41.  (SBU) Additionally, the sides agreed to discuss the budget for 
the implementation of safeguards in the United States at the April 
bilateral consultations. The U.S. stated that it might provide a 
briefing on the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). 
Nackaerts requested that the U.S. provide the IAEA delegation with a 
tour of the National Enrichment Facility in New Mexico.  During that 
site visit, the IAEA would be prepared to begin discussing a 
possible safeguards approach, including development of alternative 
safeguards measures and novel technologies.  The U.S. agreed to 
propose the agenda for the meeting in April. 
 
¶42.  (U) U.S. delegation members have cleared this cable.  U.S. 
Delegation:  Mr. Stephen Adams, DOS; Ms. Lisa Hilliard, UNVIE; Ms. 
Karen Henderson, NRC; Ms. Jill Shepherd, DOC; Ms. Joanna Sellen, 
DOE; Mr. Marc Taylor, OSD; Mr. Kurt Kessler, UNVIE. 
 
IAEA personnel participating included: Mr H. Nackaerts, DIR-SGOB; Mr 
¶C. Charlier, SH-OB3; Ms L. Rockwood, SH-NPPM, OLA; Mr W.S. Park, 
A/SH-OBC; Mr T. Bayou Temesgen, SIS-OB3; Mr T. Shigeto, CO-USA; Ms 
¶S. Wilson, OBC. 
 
SCHULTE