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Viewing cable 09TOKYO668, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 03/25/09

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09TOKYO668 2009-03-25 08:39 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO9105
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #0668/01 0840839
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 250839Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1756
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/USFJ //J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 5493
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 3153
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 6945
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 0891
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 3693
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8431
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4456
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4327
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 12 TOKYO 000668 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 03/25/09 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Japan lags behind in competition over FTA; South Korea reaches 
tentative accord with EU (Asahi) 
 
(2) Greenhouse gas emissions cut: Government to propose five options 
for mid-term goal: Final decision is to be reached in June (Nikkei) 
 
 
(3) Government to purchase 40 million tons of carbon emissions 
credit from Czech Republic (Nikkei) 
 
(4) Should Ozawa continue to head the DPJ? (Nikkei) 
 
(5) Ichiro Ozawa's cloister government plan and overall picture of 
his connections to general contractors (Part B) (Shukan Gendai) 
 
(6) Ichiro Ozawa's cloister government plan and overall picture of 
his connections to general contractors (Part C) (Shukan Gendai) 
 
(7) Ichiro Ozawa's cloister government plan and overall picture of 
his connections to general contractors (Part D) -- Conclusion 
(Shukan Gendai) 
 
(8) Ishigaki mayor sends letter to U.S. president, expressing 
opposition to planned port call of U.S. warships (Ryukyu Shimpo) 
 
(9) TOP HEADLINES 
 
(10) EDITORIALS 
 
(11) Prime Minister's schedule, March 24 (Nikkei) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Japan lags behind in competition over FTA; South Korea reaches 
tentative accord with EU 
 
ASAHI (Page 3) (Full) 
March 25, 2009 
 
South Korea has reached a tentative agreement with the European 
Union (EU) on concluding a free trade agreement (FTA). Once the 
accord comes into effect, South Korea will become able to export 
automobiles, home appliances, and other products duty-free to the 
giant market of Europe that is larger than the U.S. market. In 
contrast to South Korea's gathering momentum for FTAs, Japan's slow 
moves are noticeable. Many in the Japanese government and industrial 
circles are filled with alarm. 
 
Export industries also being alarmed 
 
A senior South Korean government official emphasized the importance 
of the FTA with the EU, saying: "Under the FTA, each other's markets 
will be unprecedentedly widely opened up, so there must be a major 
impact. We naturally expect (South Korean firms to have) a 
competitive edge over Japanese firms." 
 
For South Korea, the EU is the second largest trade partner, 
following China. The total value of its trade surplus with the EU in 
2008 was 18.4 billion dollars (about 1.8 trillion yen). This figure 
is larger than the 14.5 billion dollars in its trade surplus with 
 
TOKYO 00000668  002 OF 012 
 
 
China. 
 
The EU has imposed tariffs of more than 10 PERCENT  on autos, TV 
sets, and other imports. But these tariffs will be totally removed 
within five years under the FTA. Seoul expects that the accord will 
give more advantages to South Korean manufacturers than Japanese 
makers have, and surely add momentum to increasing their exports. 
The Korea Institute for International Economic Policy estimated in 
2006 that an FTA with the EU would add to the nation's gross 
domestic product (GDP) by about 3 PERCENT  over the long run. 
 
An executive of a leading Japanese electric machinery company said: 
"We will be at a disadvantage in competing with South Korean firms." 
He fears that Japanese firms may suffer a serious blow as a result 
of significantly losing price competitiveness regarding such home 
appliances as slim TV sets, which are directly exported to the 
European market. Meanwhile, Sony Corp., which assembles in Europe TV 
panels procured from Samsung Electronics, has taken the South 
Korea-EU accord calmly, an executive remarking: "We will not sustain 
a serious disadvantage." 
 
South Korea, where domestic demand is limited, has been actively 
moving to launch negotiations to conclude FTAs. The nation concluded 
FTA negotiations with the U.S. in 2007, but no prospects are in 
sight for the FTA to come into effect because lawmakers on both 
sides have yet to approve it. Even so, South Korea has completed 
negotiations with India, which have received large volumes of 
exports and investments from South Korean firms. Seoul also agreed 
with Australia and New Zealand this month to start negotiations. It 
has announced it would accelerate FTA talks with all Asian 
countries. 
 
A government official in charge of trade affairs has a strong sense 
of alarm. Japan remains unable to even agree to launch governmental 
negotiations with the EU and to explore effective measures. In 2007 
and 2008, both sides' economic circles promoted joint research, but 
their opinion paper just noted the tariff issue, the most important 
issue in negotiations, "We have different views," underscoring a 
wide gap existing between Japan and the EU. 
 
Japan's tariffs on industrial products are already at a low level. 
In addition, Japan is unlikely to significantly open up its 
agricultural market. Given these factors, the EU cannot expect much 
even if it concludes an FTA with Japan. A senior Foreign Ministry 
official said: "The EU remains unresponsive" to Japan's approach. 
 
Japan has already put in effect economic partnership agreements 
(EPA) with nine countries and regions, including Southeast Asia. An 
EPA includes services and other sectors to an FTA. Japan has also 
signed EPAs with Vietnam and Switzerland. But regarding negotiations 
with the U.S., Europe, and India, South Korea has leapt ahead of 
Japan. 
 
Unable to promote bilateral negotiations, Japan has placed high 
expectations on the new round of World Trade Organization (WTO) 
global trade talks (Doha Round), according to a senior Foreign 
Ministry official. But with the U.S. and emerging countries 
remaining at loggerheads, it seems difficult to conclude 
negotiations this year. 
 
(2) Greenhouse gas emissions cut: Government to propose five options 
for mid-term goal: Final decision is to be reached in June 
 
TOKYO 00000668  003 OF 012 
 
 
 
NIKKEI (Page 5) (Almost Full) 
March 25, 2009 
 
Proposals for a mid-term goal of cutting greenhouse gas emissions, 
which the government is now looking into, have been revealed. The 
government has proposed five options ranging from a 4 PERCENT 
increase to a 25 PERCENT  cut as of 2020, compared with the base 
year of 1990. Each proposal incorporates possible impacts of such a 
reduction on gross domestic products (GDP) and unemployment rates. 
GDP would be pushed down by between 0 PERCENT -0.5 PERCENT  or by up 
to 5.6 PERCENT  in annualized terms. GDP would be pushed down by up 
to 5.6 PERCENT  in terms of the amount accumulated by 2020. The 
unemployment rate would rise by up to 1.3 PERCENT . The government 
intends to set Japan's mid-term goal by June, while taking into 
account those economic burdens and effects to prevent global 
warming. 
 
Final decision is to be made in June 
 
The government will present on March 27 the five proposals at a 
meeting of the Mid-Term Goal Review Committee chaired by former Bank 
of Japan (BOJ) Governor Toshihiko Fukui reporting to the prime 
minister, an informal round-table to discuss the global warming 
issue. 
 
The government will explain the importance of global warming 
preventive measures and burdens entailed through town-hall meetings 
between politicians and citizens. It will adopt a mid-term goal, 
after hearing the views of the public. 
 
The five proposals include a 4 PERCENT  increase case (in comparison 
with the 1990 level), premised on the continuation of the present 
level of efforts to cut emissions, and a 7 PERCENT  increase case 
(in comparison with the 1990 level), premised on companies and 
households in general purchasing state-of-the-art equipment, when 
they replace existing ones. Another proposal is that the government 
obligates companies and households to purchase state-of-the-art 
energy-saving equipment. A 25 PERCENT  reduction proposal would 
achieve the largest amount of emissions cuts. The five options also 
include a proposal for replacing almost all existing equipment with 
state-of-the-art equipment. Under this proposal companies would be 
asked to adjust production activities. 
 
Since Japan is calling for changing the base year used for the 
comparison of emissions cuts from the current 1990 as set under the 
Kyoto Protocol, it also indicated figures compared with the 2005 
level. Reduction levels in the five proposals range between a 4 
PERCENT  cut and a 30 PERCENT  cut. 
 
The possible impact of proposed mid-term goals is indicated in the 
total amount accumulated between 2009 and 2020. The government 
estimates that provided the future growth of GDP is between 1.3 
PERCENT -1.6 PERCENT  in annualized terms, the growth rate would be 
pushed down by between 0 PERCENT  and up to 5.6 PERCENT . This is 
because companies would have to shoulder the costs. There would also 
be an impact of production adjustment. These elements will work as 
factors for putting dent in growth rates by between 0 PERCENT -0.5 
PERCENT  in annualized terms. In a case of achieving a 25 PERCENT 
cut in 2020, compared with the 1990 level, power rates is estimated 
to double. In a case of a 7 PERCENT  cut, too, such rates are 
estimated to rise by over 20 PERCENT . 
 
TOKYO 00000668  004 OF 012 
 
 
 
Before it reaches a final decision on a mid-term goal, the 
government is now looking into a reduction level to be adopted with 
focus on between 5 PERCENT -15 PERCENT  cuts, compared with the 1990 
level. In this case, Japan's GDP will be pushed down by between 0.1 
PERCENT -0.2 PERCENT  in annualized terms. As a result, an 
employment rate as of 2020 would rise to between 0.2 PERCENT -0.5 
PERCENT . 
 
Options for goal of cutting greenhouse gas emissions 
(Unit:  PERCENT , as of 2020) 
 
 Goal of cutting greenhouse gas emissions Scope of GDP to be pushed 
down Scope of unemployment rate to be pushed up 
 In comparison with the 1990 level. Figures in the parentheses 
indicate comparison with the 2005 level. Accumulated total between 
2009 and 2020 As of 2020 
(1) Present effort to cut emissions is to be continued 
 4 (-4) 0 0 
(2) All industrialized countries cut emissions by 25 PERCENT . Each 
country is to shoulder costs equally 
 1   -   -3 
(-6  -  -11) No estimation No estimation 
(3) Companies and households purchase state-of-the-art energy-saving 
equipment. (no government obligation) 
 -7 (-14) -0.5   -   -0.6 0.2 
(4) The government partially obligates introduction of 
state-of-the-art energy saving equipment. Part of existing equipment 
is to be replaced with such types. 
 -15 (-21)  -1.3   -   -2.1 0.5 
(5) Almost all equipment is to be replaced with energy-saving 
types. 
 -25 (-30) -2.8   -   -5.6 1.3 
 
(N.B.) Impacts on GDP and unemployment rates are calculated, based 
on the case (1). 
 
(3) Government to purchase 40 million tons of carbon emissions 
credit from Czech Republic 
 
NIKKEI (Page 4) (Full) 
March 25, 2009 
 
The government has undergone final coordination with the possibility 
of purchasing 40 million tons of greenhouse gas emissions credits 
from the government of the Czech Republic. If realized, it will have 
achieved the goal of such purchases -- 100 million tons -- in order 
to meet the mandated emissions cuts set under the Kyoto Protocol, 
when combined with the amount set to be purchased from Ukraine. The 
government has determined that since the prices of emissions credits 
have significantly fallen due to the economic and financial crisis, 
it would be possible to constrain the cost of such a purchase. It 
intends to purchase a large amount of emissions credits, by speeding 
up the plan. 
 
The amount is largest ever as an emissions credit the Japanese 
government purchases in a lump. An agreement will likely be reached 
before the end of March. The government will unlikely reveal the 
price of such a purchase. However, in view of market prices, it is 
estimated to be around 50 billion yen. Japan will receive an 
emissions quota over several years. 
 
 
TOKYO 00000668  005 OF 012 
 
 
The Kyoto Protocol mandates Japan to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 
6 PERCENT , in comparison with the 1990 level, over five years 
between 2008 and 2012. The government plans to achieve 0.6 PERCENT 
of that goal with self-help efforts, such as energy-saving efforts 
by companies, and 3.8 PERCENT  with absorption by forests and 1.6 
PERCENT  through purchases of emissions credits from abroad. 
 
(4) Should Ozawa continue to head the DPJ? 
 
NIKKEI (Page 1) (Full) 
March 25, 2009 
 
By Mutsumi Nishida, editorial writer 
 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) President Ichiro Ozawa announced 
yesterday at a press conference that he would remain in his 
position. Earlier in the day, his first state-funded secretary was 
indicted for receiving illegal donations from Nishimatsu 
Construction Co. Ozawa said with tears in his eyes: "Bringing about 
politics that will stand on the side of people by achieving a change 
in government is my final task as politician." 
 
Although the political impact of the arrest of Ozawa's secretary is 
incalculable, both the investigations by the special investigation 
squad of the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office and Ozawa's 
explanations raise questions. 
 
Money from Nishimatsu's dummy political organizations has gone not 
only to Ozawa's fund-management organization Rikuzankai but also to 
politicians of other ruling and opposition parties. The money was 
provided either as contributions or as payments for purchases of 
fundraising-party tickets. 
 
There is no way to predict how the investigation will turn out in 
the future. If the special investigation squad indicts only Ozawa's 
secretary alone, we can't help feeling that it was simply taking a 
potshot at the DPJ. Even some former prosecutors have contended that 
the investigation this time around is unprecedented. 
 
There are many questionable points in Ozawa's explanation of the 
donation scandal. Ozawa's secretary was indicted for falsely 
reporting 35 million yen donated by the dummy political groups 
during the period between 2003 and 2006. It has been discovered that 
the Nishimatsu company donated a total of approximately 300 million 
yen in a year or so, including a portion that became invalid. 
 
It is hard to believe that the state-paid secretary and Ozawa did 
not know about the names of the donors who had offered such huge 
amounts of money. 
 
Explaining that the purpose of the Political Funds Control Law is to 
report the name of a political group that contributed money to his 
fund-management body, Ozawa underscored differences between his and 
the prosecutors' perceptions. Such an explanation lacks persuasion. 
 
 
Ozawa has allegedly been involved in the rigging of bids for public 
works projects in the Tohoku region, contracts for which Nishimatsu 
received. A series of press reports have shed light on part of 
Ozawa's method of collecting political funds, which has seriously 
tarnished his image. The donation scandal reminds the public of the 
old method that has continued since the days of Prime Minister 
 
TOKYO 00000668  006 OF 012 
 
 
Kakuei Tanaka, who collected money by taking advantage of his 
influence over public works projects. Voters might be feeling strong 
discomfort on learning this. 
 
The question is how much the DPJ will be able to gain public support 
in the next Lower House election under Ozawa's leadership. Unless 
the largest opposition party sweeps away the "politics and money" 
scandal, it won't be able to prevent a backlash in the general 
election. The DPJ appears to have taken a bet in which it does not 
have much hope of success. 
 
At the press conference yesterday, Ozawa said: "Once we take the 
reins of government, I will have no regrets about assuming the posts 
of party leader and then, prime minister." He added: "I cannot judge 
whether remaining in the party leader post is a plus or minus. That 
depends on how the public gauges it." 
 
Nevertheless, he has decided to continue serving as party leader. It 
is extremely difficult for voters to know his real intention. The 
question is whether the DPJ will give priority to changing the party 
leadership or place important on assuming the political helm. In the 
case of the former, Ozawa would have made a different decision. The 
DPJ has accepted Ozawa's bid to continue serving as party leader, 
giving priority to internal unity. In executive meetings last night, 
former President Seiji Maehara and other executives raised 
objections. Therefore, the DPJ is not necessarily united. Dark 
clouds are already looming over Ozawa, despite his campaigning 
skills. The DPJ's handling of the issue of politics and money will 
be harshly questioned by the electorate. 
 
(5) Ichiro Ozawa's cloister government plan and overall picture of 
his connections to general contractors (Part B) 
 
SHUKAN GENDAI (Pp.20-23) (Excerpts) 
April 4, 2009 
 
By Kenya Matsuda, journalist 
 
"Donations as protection money to yakuza" 
 
There are many similarities between Ichiro Ozawa and (the late) 
Kakuei Tanaka (prime minister in the early 1970s). Cozy ties to 
general contractors are one of them. 
 
General contractors have detailed large numbers of personnel to help 
Ozawa's election campaigning and gubernatorial elections. The major 
general contractor Kajima Corp. has served as the coordinator of 
"general contractor elections" in Iwate Prefecture. Looking back, a 
former Kajima executive said: 
 
"With the approach of an election, representatives of general 
contractors used to stay at hotels to classify constituencies. 
Groups of three employees then visited the assigned electoral 
districts. Their job was to show up at subcontractors responsible 
for equipment, electric work, materials, and urge them to present 
lists. Their visits alone were enough to apply pressure on the 
subcontractors. The general contractors footed the bills for such 
activities. Mr. Ozawa effectively took control of 80-90 PERCENT  of 
the construction, civil engineering and transport companies." 
 
Another Kajima executive serving as a go-between with the political 
community admitted that his company's former Tohoku branch chief had 
 
TOKYO 00000668  007 OF 012 
 
 
been questioned by (prosecutors). "It's strange that I haven't been 
questioned," the executive said smiling wryly. He added: 
 
"In the Tohoku region, bids have been rigged by general contractors 
under coordination by Kajima and by regional construction companies 
under coordination by Fukuda Corp. for which Ozawa's father-in-law 
used to serve as honorary chairman." 
 
"Construction companies have kept making donations to Ozawa to 
prevent him from obstructing biddings rather than to expect him to 
use his good offices. It was similar to vendors' protection money to 
yakuza during a festival. It was an insurance premium for biddings, 
so to speak" 
 
A representative of an Iwate construction company used to say: 
"Disobeying Ichiro Ozawa means you get no orders." 
 
Above all, Ozawa reportedly exercised tremendous influence regarding 
the Isawa Dam projects (Oshu City, Iwate Prefecture), ordered by the 
Land, Infrastructure, Transport Ministry Regional Development 
Bureau. 
 
I heard the following comment from a representative of an Iwate 
construction company: 
 
"The Isawa Dam project was made possible by Mr. Ozawa. Anyone who 
wants to win a contract must visit Mr. Ozawa's office with a 'gift.' 
Without a visit to his office, it's impossible to join the 
project." 
 
The Isawa Dam is one of the country's largest rock-fill dams costing 
240 billion yen. 
 
In 2004, Kajima Corp. won a contract for the levees -- the dam's 
heart -- for 20.349 billion yen, and in 2005, Taisei Corp won dam 
materials collection work for 15.97 billion yen. Nishimatsu 
Construction Co. won a flood-control project for 10.027 billion yen 
in 2006. 
 
Between 2002 and 2007, a total of 68 companies won contracts related 
to the Isawa Dam. Of them, 16 companies made donations to the DPJ 
Iwate Constituency No.4 headquarters headed by Ozawa. 
 
Their donations totaled 26.25 million yen, and the orders they won 
came to 4.78 billion yen. Furthermore, 11 Kajima or Nishimatsu 
subcontractors also made donations to the Constituency No. 4 
headquarters. The Nishimatsu scandal is merely the tip of the 
iceberg. 
 
To begin with, corporate donations were collected through 
Rikuzan-kai, Ozawa's fund-management organization. Following the 
amendment in 2000 to the Political Funds Control Law, donations were 
funneled to the Constituency No. 4 branch instead of Rikuzan-kai, as 
was discussed above. 
 
The No. 4 branch's political funding reports list scores of 
construction companies. Some 100 companies, mostly those in the 
Tohoku region, made donations annually. In a four-year period 
between 2004 and 2007, they donated over 200 million yen in total. 
 
In addition, Ozawa is said to have used party tickets to collect 
money from general contractors. 
 
TOKYO 00000668  008 OF 012 
 
 
 
(To be continued) 
 
(6) Ichiro Ozawa's cloister government plan and overall picture of 
his connections to general contractors (Part C) 
 
SHUKAN GENDAI (Pp.20-23) (Excerpts) 
April 4, 2009 
 
By Kenya Matsuda, journalist 
 
Money came and went in the same room 
 
Ichiro Ozawa has his own political group that he calls Seikei 
Kenkyu-kai (Ichiro Ozawa Politics and Economics Study Group). Seikei 
Kenkyu-kai held three or four political fund-raising parties 
annually between 2004 and 2007 in the name of Ichiro Ozawa Keisei 
forums. Sales of the tickets, sold for 20,000 yen apiece, netted 
373.52 million yen in the four-year period. 
 
It is clear from those organizations' expenditure columns that large 
parts of their incomes were "donated" to one political organization: 
Rikuzan-kai. 
 
As was discussed earlier, Rikuzan-kai is Ozawa's fund-management 
organization, to which corporate donations have been banned since 
ΒΆ2000. 
 
It appears that the money collected by the No. 4 branch and Seikei 
Kenkyu-kai was directly funneled to Rikuzan-kai. 
 
Hiroshi Kamiwaki, a professor of constitutional issues at Kobe 
Gakuin University who also heads an ombudsman group examining 
political funds, takes this view: 
 
"The money flow tells us that Rikuzan-kai received donations from 
construction companies via the No. 4 branch and the income from 
selling party tickets via Seikei Kenkyu-kai. The system was designed 
to funnel corporate donations to Rikuzan-kai via two 
organizations." 
 
Corporate donations to the No. 4 branch totaled 1.48 million yen in 
1998 and 1.55 million yen in 1999. The amount jumped to 174.6 
million yen in 2000 and 90.32 million yen in 2001. Rikuzan-kai also 
began receiving "donations" in 2001. "Donations" to Rikuzan-kai 
totaled 380 million yen between 2004 and 2007. 
 
Seikei Kenkyu-kai also donated huge amounts of money to Rikuzan-kai. 
Between 2004 and 2007, the total came to 220 million yen. The money 
collected, including that of the No. 4 branch, topped 600 million 
yen. 
 
The Kenkyu-kai and Rikuzan-kai offices share the same condominium in 
Tokyo's Akasaka district. Takanori Okubo, Ozawa's secretary who is 
under arrest, has been responsible for accounting at Rikuzan-kai and 
heads Kenkyu-kai. 
 
That was not all. Kenkyu-kai made donations to Ozawa's supporter 
association in Tokyo, as well, that also shares the same 
condominium. The Tokyo supporter association and Rikuzan-kai donated 
money to each other between 2004 and 2006. Okubo is also the 
representative of the Tokyo supporter association. 
 
TOKYO 00000668  009.2 OF 012 
 
 
 
Money always ended up at Rikuzan-kai after going back and forth in 
the same condominium. Why did Ozawa have to raise that much money 
for Rikuzan-kai? 
 
In 1994, Ozawa began buying condominiums in Tokyo and other areas 
with Rikuzan-kai's political funds. According to its fiscal 2007 
political funding report, Rikuzan-kai possessed real estate worth 1 
billion yen. Although those assets were purchased with Rikuzan-kai 
"office expenses," they were all in Ozawa's name. 
 
In buying those assets, Ozawa borrowed money from banks with them as 
collateral. Ozawa repeated the odd practice of loaning the money 
from the banks to Rikuzan-kai. 
 
(To be continued) 
 
(7) Ichiro Ozawa's cloister government plan and overall picture of 
his connections to general contractors (Part D) -- Conclusion 
 
SHUKAN GENDAI (Pp.20-23) (Excerpts) 
April 4, 2009 
 
By Kenya Matsuda, journalist 
 
Ozawa's continued betrayal of the public 
 
Interest payments to Ichiro Ozawa, who heads Rikuzan-kai, occupy a 
large portion of the organization's "political activity expenses." 
In 2004, Ozawa loaned 400 million yen to Rikuzan-kai. The 
organization repaid it in two years. This suggests that Ozawa has 
ample funds. 
 
Nobuyoshi Tanabe, a former Supreme Public Prosecutors' Office 
prosecutor, said: 
 
"The special investigation team is reportedly aiming to build a 
graft case (assen-ritoku) against the Ozawa side. Receiving 
donations from Nishimatsu via dummy organizations would constitute 
graft. Mr. Ozawa also has real estate bought with political funds. 
If the team can prove that Mr. Ozawa acquired his personal assets 
with political funds, that, too, would be graft." 
 
In the wake of many money scandals, including Sagawa trucking 
company's 500-million-yen contribution in 1992 to former Liberal 
Democratic Party Vice President Shin Kanemaru and a 1993 corruption 
case involving general contractors, Ozawa led the political reform 
drive to introduce a political party subsidy system, while pulling 
the strings of the Hosokawa coalition administration in 1993. 
 
Back then, Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa replied: "We are going 
to ban corporate and organizational donations by introducing a 
political party subsidy system." 
 
Needless to say, Rikuzan-kai's political funds come partly from 
taxes. It is not an exaggeration to say that in order to amass his 
own assets, Ozawa has continued betraying the general public by 
raking in taxpayer money via Rikuzan-kai and corporate donations at 
the same time. 
 
Furthermore, the DPJ vowed in its 2004 and 2005 manifestos that it 
would totally ban political donations from corporations that have 
 
TOKYO 00000668  010.2 OF 012 
 
 
won orders for public works projects. 
 
In other words, Ozawa himself has broken the DPJ's campaign pledges. 
It is quite absurd that he should shamelessly call for a total ban 
on corporate donations. It can be said that Ozawa committed triple 
betrayal against the general public. Ozawa envisions establishing a 
cloister government as a kingmaker, which would be a nightmare. 
 
(8) Ishigaki mayor sends letter to U.S. president, expressing 
opposition to planned port call of U.S. warships 
 
RYUKYU SHIMPO (Page 26) (Full) 
March 25, 2009 
 
(Ishigaki) 
 
In a press conference yesterday, Ishigaki Mayor Nagateru Ohama 
expressed opposition to the planned port call by the U.S. Navy's two 
minesweepers at Ishigaki Port on April 3-5, saying: "I cannot 
approve (of the port call), from the viewpoint of defending our 
citizens' security." He also revealed that he had mailed a letter 
under his signature as mayor to U.S. President Barack Obama, in 
which he noted: "We would like you to understand that Ishigaki City 
cannot welcome the port entry of any U.S. warships, and we ask you 
to make a wise decision." 
 
The U.S. Navy notified the Ishigaki Maritime Coast Guard Office on 
March 17 of a plan to have its warships enter Ishigaki Port for the 
purposes of the crewmembers' relaxation and promoting friendly 
relations with citizens at 8:00 a.m. on April 3 and leave the port 
at noon on April 5. It has been reported that 128 crewmembers are 
scheduled to land at the port. 
 
Mayor Ohama asserted: 
 
"Ishigaki Port is overcrowded, so there is no room for a warship to 
enter. In addition, it is a private port and is not designed to 
accommodate warships. Since there is fear of an accident occurring, 
we cannot allow warships to come into port, in view of port 
administration. ... Recently, accidents and incidents involving U.S. 
military personnel have been frequently reported. We cannot cope 
with the landing of so many U.S. military personnel at the port." 
 
The U.S. Navy had initially indicated a plan for a port call on 
April 1-3, but the municipal government replied on March 13: "We 
cannot approve of the plan." Later, the navy changed the schedule 
into a call on April 3-5 and informed the said office of the new 
schedule. 
 
(9) TOP HEADLINES 
 
Asahi: 
Secretary of DPJ Ozawa indicted for falsified reporting of political 
donations 
 
Mainichi, Yomiuri, Sankei & Tokyo Shimbun: 
Ozawa to stay on as DPJ head, despite secretary's indictment 
 
Nikkei: 
China plans network of 400,000 village shops to promote rural 
consumption 
 
 
TOKYO 00000668  011.2 OF 012 
 
 
Akahata: 
Hyogo Labor Bureau instructs Nippon Thompson to correct employment 
conditions 
 
(10) EDITORIALS 
 
Asahi: 
(1) Illegal donations from Nishimatsu: DPJ President Ozawa should 
step down 
 
Mainichi: 
(1) Ozawa's news conference unconvincing 
(2) Prosecutors should also investigate other suspected donation 
recipients both in ruling, opposition parties 
 
Yomiuri: 
(1) Many hardships lie ahead for Ozawa 
(2) Japan's WBC title energizing Japan 
 
Nikkei: 
(1) Will voters understand Ozawa's decision to stay on? 
(2) WBC title defense moves us 
 
Sankei: 
(1) Ozawa's decision to remain as party president unacceptable 
 
Tokyo Shimbun: 
(1) Investigate Nishimatsu donation scandals involving ruling party 
lawmakers, as well 
(2) Taking responsibility for causing public distrust in politics, 
Ozawa should resign at proper time 
 
Akahata: 
(1) Nishimatsu donation case: Indictment of Ozawa's secretary quite 
serious 
 
(11) Prime Minister's schedule, March 24 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
March 25, 2009 
 
08:40 
Attended an Ocean Policy Headquarters meeting held in the Diet 
building. 
 
09:01 
Attended a cabinet meeting. 
 
09:54 
Met with Tokyo Gov. Ishihara at the Kantei. 
 
10:26 
Met with Bangladeshi Ambassador to Japan Ashraf-ud-Doula, in the 
presence of Parliamentary Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Nishimura. Afterward met with Iranian Ambassador to Japan 
Al-Jumaily, in the presence of Japan-Iraq Friendship Parliamentarian 
Group Chairman and former Defense Minister Kyuma. 
 
13:02 
Attended a Lower House plenary session. 
 
14:17 
 
TOKYO 00000668  012.2 OF 012 
 
 
Met at the Kantei with Vice Foreign Minister Yabunaka and Asian and 
Oceanian Affairs Bureau Director General Saiki. Yabunaka stayed on. 
 
15:08 
Met with Chief Cabinet Secretary Kawamura, his deputies Matsumoto, 
Konoike, and Uruma. Matsumoto stayed on. 
 
16:05 
Met with Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda. 
 
17:06 
Met with Akira Yanagisawa and others who had received the top boy 
scout awards, followed by National Land Improvement Associations 
Federation Deputy Chairman Suita. 
 
18:34 
Attended a Decentralization Promotion Headquarters meeting. 
Afterward met with Foreign Minister Nakasone. 
 
19:04 
Dined at a Prince Park Tower Tokyo Japanese restaurant with LDP 
Election Strategy Council Vice Chairman Suga, Deputy Secretary 
General Yamaguchi, and others, joined by Matsumoto. 
21:05 Returned to his official residence. 
 
ZUMWALT