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S E C R E T TOKYO 000579 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
OSD/APSA FOR SEDNEU/HELVEY/BASALLA/GEIS 
PACOM FOR J00/J01/J3/J5/FPA 
JOINT STAFF FOR J3/J5 
USFJ FOR J00/J01/J02/J2/J3/J5 
CIA PASS ODNI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION 
TAGS: PREL PARM MARR KN KS JA
SUBJECT: PRE-COORDINATION WITH JAPAN ON POSSIBLE DPRK TD2 
LAUNCH 
 
REF: A. TOKYO 00445 
     ¶B. TOKYO 00446 
 
Classified By: James P. Zumwalt, Charge d'Affaires, a.i.; reasons 1.4 ( 
b/d) 
 
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: The CDA and the U.S. Forces Japan Deputy 
Commander met on March 12 with Directors-General from the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense as well as 
General/Flag Officers from the Japan Joint Staff Office and 
agreed on the need for bilateral coordination, information 
sharing and security, and coordinated public messaging ahead 
of an announced missile launch by the DPRK.  The MOD 
Directors-General explained that Japan would attempt to 
intercept any object destined for Japan that would cause 
damage, but did not have the legal or physical capability to 
intercept anything overflying Japan.  MOFA DG Umemoto noted 
the ""standing request"" Japan has for the United States to 
intercept objects from space that would hit Japan and asked 
about U.S. intentions.  USFJ noted the current assessment is 
that the launch would involve a TD-2 test or space vehicle 
launch, not a missile directed against Japan.  Patriot 
batteries in Japan, not Aegis BMD ships with SM-3 
interceptors, would be most capable of dealing with debris. 
Both sides agreed to hold weekly bilateral DG-level 
interagency policy coordination meetings beginning on March 
¶19.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (S) The CDA, joined by the U.S. Forces, Japan,  (USFJ) 
Deputy Commander and members of the Country Team, met on 
March 12 with Directors-General (DG) from the Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Defense (MOD), as well as 
General/Flag Officers from the Japan Joint Staff Office 
(JSO), to discuss the modalities of bilateral coordination, 
information sharing, responses to various scenarios and the 
necessity for coordinated public messaging in preparation for 
a possible Taepodong-2 (TD-2) or other rocket launch by the 
DPRK. 
 
Bilateral Coordination Structure 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (S/NF) After reviewing the formal Bilateral Coordination 
Mechanism (BCM) and the entities within that structure, both 
sides agreed that the expected upcoming DPRK missile launch 
appears to not warrant a formal declaration of a Situation in 
the Area Surrounding Japan (SIASJ) or an attack on Japan that 
would trigger formal standing up the BCM.  Both sides also 
agreed, however, on the need for mil-mil coordination, 
interaction with other relevant ministries and agencies on 
technical issues, and policy coordination. 
 
¶4. (S/NF) The Deputy Commander of USFJ noted that routine 
mil-mil coordination continues as U.S. forces and JSDF 
monitor and share information on DPRK preparation activities. 
 If the DPRK stacks a missile on the launch pad, USFJ will 
set-up a round-the-clock entity to monitor the situation. 
USFJ will invite JSO liaison officers to that entity and 
expects to send officers to a similar JSO entity.  USFJ and 
JSO have already begun cross training liaison officers to 
ensure efficient communication and information sharing.  USFJ 
proposed using the existing peacetime Coordination Liaison 
Forum to engage with relevant Japanese ministries and 
agencies on technical issues, such as air space access or 
frequency allocation, as necessary. 
 
¶5. (S/NF) MOFA North American Affairs DG Kazuyoshi Umemoto 
noted the importance of policy and public message 
coordination, which will require timely and accurate 
operational and intelligence information sharing, both 
bilaterally and within the Government of Japan.  MOFA Foreign 
Policy Deputy Director General Masafumi Ishii proposed having 
weekly bilateral DG-level interagency policy coordination 
meetings that would include representatives from at least 
MOFA, MOD, the Cabinet Secretariat, Cabinet Intelligence and 
Research Office (CIRO) and JSO.  The CDA and USFJ Commander 
would lead the U.S. side, which would include relevant 
Embassy and USFJ representatives.  The meetings would be 
informal and, if discovered by the media, would be described 
as routine bilateral discussions on issues of mutual 
interest.  The two sides agreed to have the first meeting on 
March 19. 
 
¶6. (S/NF) While noting that bilateral information sharing had 
improved, DG Umemoto expressed frustration that bilateral 
coordination deficiencies identified after the 2006 DPRK 
missile tests still remained and suggested that the bilateral 
Roles, Missions and Capabilities Working Group work to 
rectify those deficiencies.  Embassy Political 
Minister-Counselor noted the progress on information sharing 
on missile defense, while pointing out that Japan was still 
not able to come to the aid of U.S. ships engaged in the 
defense of Japan and suggested that this too needs more 
bilateral engagement. 
 
Information Flow and Security 
----------------------------- 
 
¶7. (S/NF) USFJ Deputy Commander described the secure data 
communication and voice links between USFJ and JSO, as well 
as between USFJ and the Embassy, that USFJ would use to 
convey information on a launch.  A representative from the 
Embassy's Director for National Intelligence (DNI)office 
described how intelligence and analysis would flow in 
intelligence channels among the DNI Representative Office, 
the Defense Attache, the Japan Defense Intelligence 
Headquarters and CIRO.  Both USFJ and the DNI representative 
stated the importance of protecting the classified 
information by only using secure communication lines.  The 
U.S. side also pointed out the importance of information from 
the military and intelligence agencies flowing quickly and 
accurately to policy makers across the government and up to 
senior levels.  DG Umemoto lamented that MOFA still lacks the 
ability to communicate securely outside of its building and 
is looking forward to receiving in April the secure 
telecommunication equipment it purchased from the United 
States.  Both sides agreed to exchange issue-focused primary 
and secondary points of contact by the next meeting on March 
¶19. 
 
Response to a DPRK Launch 
------------------------- 
 
¶8. (S/NF) MOFA DG Umemoto noted that, different from 2006 -- 
when Japan was only able to monitor a DRPK launch -- Japan 
now has a ballistic missile defense system.  This presents 
new challenges and Japan needs to have processes in place to 
deal with the launch as well as the questioning that will 
occur afterwards.  MOD Defense Policy DG Nobushige Takamizawa 
explained that if a missile, debris or other object is 
heading for Japanese territory, the Japan Self Defense Forces 
(JSDF) will attempt to intercept it.  MOD does not currently 
assess that North Korea will launch medium-range Nodong or 
intermediate-range Musudon missiles and is currently only 
preparing to deploy maritime assets to monitor the TD-2 and 
try to deal with any debris that might hit Japan in the event 
of a launch failure.  Japan does not have the legal authority 
or capability to intercept a successful DPRK space launch. 
Some political leaders believe Japan should intercept objects 
flying over Japan and do not understand that the BMD system 
Japan deploys does not have this capability, according to DG 
Takamizawa. 
 
¶9. (S/NF) MOD Defense Operations DG Tokuchi presented the 
legal basis for JSDF to act against an object heading towards 
Japan.  Article 76 (Defense Operations) of the Self Defense 
Law calls for the Prime Minister to issue a Defense 
Operations Order to the JSDF when Japan is identified to be 
under or imminently under attack.  Article 82-2(1) calls for 
the Minister of Defense to issue a Destruct Order upon 
approval of the Prime Minister when a nation is preparing to 
or stated it will launch a ballistic missile, but has not 
indicated its exact intentions.  In this case, Japan would 
not consider itself under attack but would still have the 
legal basis to deploy the SDF to intercept.  MOD does not 
assess the current situation to match those scenarios and 
hence these parts of the SDF Law would not apply. 
 
¶10. (S/NF) However, Article 82-2(3) allows that when an 
object, not specifically identified as a ballistic missile, 
might fly over or fall on Japan, the Defense Minister may 
issue a Destruct Order in advance, DG Tokuchi continued. 
This order, in accordance with the Emergency Response 
Procedure approved by the Prime Minister, would provide the 
JSDF Air Defense Commander, responsible for BMD in Japan, 
with the authority to issue an intercept order. 
Implementation of Article 76 and Article 82-2(1) requires the 
Cabinet to meet and notify the public, while issuing of a 
time-limited destruct order under Article 82-2(3) does not 
require notification to the public.  MOD DG Takamizawa noted 
that the government, however, is not prohibited from 
informing the public and may find it necessary to show the 
public the deployment of the JSDF's BMD assets.  MOFA DG 
Umemoto suggested the message should be that SDF assets are 
monitoring and ready to intercept, if necessary. 
 
¶11. (S/NF) DG Umemoto asked what the United States plans to 
do to monitor the launch and to deal with debris headed 
toward Japan, as well as how U.S. forces would be 
coordinating such action with the JSDF.  USFJ stated that 
according to current intelligence, the U.S. is assessing the 
launch to be a TD-2 test or space vehicle launch, not a 
missile directed against Japan.  USFJ noted that SM-3's on 
Aegis BMD ships would likely not be capable of engaging 
debris or an out of control object heading for Japan and that 
it would be up to Patriot systems at the terminal stage to 
deal with the falling object.  MOD DG Takamizawa acknowledged 
this but noted that international and domestic political 
sensitivities to deploying Patriot units outside of Japan Air 
Self Defense Force bases.  DG Umemoto reminded the meeting 
participants that United States has a ""standing request"" from 
Japan to explain US policy on intercepting objects from space 
heading for Japan.  (NOTE: This is a reference to a note 
verbale Japan provided the United States in 2005 when the 
United States started deploying BMD assets to Japan.  Embassy 
Tokyo's files no longer have a copy of the note. End note.) 
 
Public Messaging and Agenda for Next Meeting 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (S/NF) Both sides agreed on the need to coordinate on 
public messaging in particular because there will be heavy 
Japanese public scrutiny on what actions Japan takes, or does 
not take, and on the extent of coordination with the United 
States.  Discussion on this, along with an operations and 
intelligence update, review of policy issues and continued 
examination of scenarios and responses, will be on the agenda 
for the inaugural bilateral interagency informal coordination 
meeting on March 19, the two sides concluded. 
 
 
ZUMWALT