VZCZCXYZ0003
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #0210/01 0860851
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 270851Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2708
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000210 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR 
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (BROWN AND DENYER) 
NSC FOR LUTES 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CWC: WRAP-UP FOR MARCH 16-26, 2009 
 
REF: A. STATE 23254 
     ¶B. THE HAGUE 181 
 
This is CWC-18-09. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) After Iraq's delivery of its initial 
declaration, Delreps met with the Iraqi Ambassador 
and delegate on March 17 to discuss preparation for 
Iraq's presentation at the April destruction 
informals and the importance of having Iraqi 
experts arrive in The Hague in advance of that 
meeting. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Delrep chaired a meeting of the Geneva 
Group on March 16.  The Western European and Others 
Group (WEOG) met March 17 for a presentation by the 
new head of the Implementation and Support Branch 
of the Technical Secretariat (TS), and on March 24 
in expanded format with like-minded states to 
discuss the search for a new Director-General (DG). 
The OPCW and UNICRI hosted a seminar on the 
chemical dimensions of non-proliferation on March 
18, and the Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism 
hosted a meeting with Saudi counter-terrorism 
officials on March 25.  Details on all of these 
meetings follow. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
IRAQI DECLARATION AND PREPARATIONS FOR EC-56 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) On March 17, Delreps met with Iraqi 
Ambassador Siamand Banaa and Iraqi First Secretary 
Abbas to deliver the non-paper in Ref A. Banaa 
agreed that the early arrival of experts from 
Baghdad would be important in ensuring adequate 
preparation for the destruction informals.  Abbas 
noted that Director of Verification Horst Reeps had 
also suggested this, and that he had forwarded this 
to Baghdad.  Banaa suggested that the U.S., UK, and 
Iraq meet first, followed by a later meeting with 
the TS. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Delreps informed Banaa that the non-paper 
had also been delivered to officials in Baghdad and 
suggested that logistical questions about visas and 
official invitations be directed to the TS.  In 
reviewing the non-paper, Delreps emphasized the 
importance of Iraq being able to paint a clear 
picture of the condition of the storage bunkers, as 
well as any residual production capacity, and of 
the current security situation.  Delreps reminded 
Banaa of U.S. plans to submit a declaration of the 
recovered rounds and to make a brief explanatory 
statement at the EC-56 destruction informals. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In discussing future challenges, Delreps 
raised the need for the Council to establish 
destruction deadlines.  Banaa expressed confidence 
that, "with U.S. help," a general plan for 
destruction could be developed and a destruction 
program carried out. 
 
¶6. (SBU) On March 18, OPCW Chief of Cabinet Richard 
Ekwall called to inform Delrep of the Director 
General's plan to meet with Ambassador Banaa on 
March 19 to reinforce the need for Iraq to submit a 
general plan for destruction without delay. 
Following this, the DG planned to authorize release 
of Iraq's declaration to member states by the end 
of the week.  Delrep informed Ekwall of U.S. 
discussions with Iraq, as well as the possibility 
of a U.S./UK/TS meeting with Baghdad experts before 
EC-56. 
 
¶7. (SBU) On March 19, First Secretary Abbas 
requested a meeting with Delrep and confirmed that 
the DG had spoken to Amb. Banaa.  Abbas shared the 
documents the DG had provided (forwarded separately 
to Washington) and asked for U.S. advice on 
developing a plan for destruction.  Delrep noted 
that this would need to be done by experts in 
Baghdad, but recommended Abbas contact Chemical 
Demilitarization Branch Head Dominique Anelli to 
begin discussing this matter with the TS.  Delrep 
also provided copies of the Albanian and Libyan 
general plans for destruction as a reference, and 
acknowledged the challenge that the condition of 
the bunkers presents in developing a detailed plan. 
Finally, Delrep suggested that if the plan has not 
been submitted prior to EC-56, the delegation from 
Baghdad should come to any EC-56 pre-meeting 
prepared to discuss a working draft. 
 
------------ 
GENEVA GROUP 
------------ 
 
¶8. (U) On March 16, Delrep Granger chaired a 
meeting of the local Geneva Group at the delegation 
office to discuss the Group's annual report on OPCW 
activities.  Both the UK and French delegates 
remarked that their respective assessed 
contributions for 2009 were higher than in 2008 (in 
the case of the UK, by more than EUR 200,000), 
despite a lower budget and a projected fall in 
assessments.  Canadian delegate Angela Peart 
pointedly asked when the U.S. plans to pay its 2009 
assessment.  Delrep announced that with FY09 budget 
having recently been passed the first payment was 
expected sometime in April.  Peart also noted that 
the UN scale of assessment currently is being 
negotiated in New York and might increase for a 
number of Geneva Group countries if the methodology 
is altered. 
 
¶9. (U) After concluding discussion on the draft 
annual report, Delrep asked for views on reforming 
the Advisory Body on Administrative and Financial 
Matters (ABAF).  Peart suggested contacting the 
Geneva Group coordinators in Geneva for experience 
in dealing with similar bodies in other 
organizations.  There were differing views on 
whether to fund ABAF members' travel, with the 
French delegate saying that professionalization of 
the ABAF would require financing and the German 
delegate noting Berlin's skepticism toward the idea 
given negative experiences in other organizations. 
The UK delegate stated that the ABAF's remit should 
be clarified to make it more effective and also 
questioned whether the current ad-hoc self 
nomination process should be changed. 
 
¶10. (U) Geneva Group Co-chair Diana Gosens 
(Netherlands) will host and chair the next meeting 
in late May, which will feature a debrief on the 
25-29 May ABAF meeting by ABAF members from Geneva 
Group countries. 
 
---- 
WEOG 
---- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Ruth Surkau (Germany) convened the 
regular, weekly WEOG meeting on March 17.  At his 
request,  the new Head of the Implementation and 
Support Branch (IPB), Mark Albon (former South 
African OPCW delegate), presented an overview of 
IPB's activities and priorities.  He wants to focus 
more programming on customs-related activities of 
States Parties for the important role customs 
authorities play in nonproliferation.  His branch's 
Qauthorities play in nonproliferation.  His branch's 
other focus is assisting States Parties in national 
implementation of the convention, including the 
drafting of legislation. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Albon's branch primarily interacts with 
National Authorities, but he would like to see more 
cross-interaction among states' National 
Authorities.  He sees a role for WEOG to play with 
their National Authorities providing assistance and 
expertise to those of lesser developed countries, 
and perhaps accompanying the TS on technical 
assistance missions.  Albon noted his appreciation 
for voluntary funding from western countries, which 
greatly assists his branch's activities, and then 
not surprisingly, made a subtle call for increased 
funding.  He indicated that IPB is unable to 
respond to all States Parties' requests for 
programming because of insufficient funding. 
 
¶13. (SBU) In response to Surkau's question on how 
the TS prioritizes requests from States Parties, 
Albon clarified that programs requested by SPs that 
go unfunded from the voluntary budget in a given 
year typically move to the top of the priority list 
for those programs under the regular budget for the 
next year.  Overall, Albon explained that requests 
from those States Parties without a National 
Authority have highest priority, followed by those 
without implementing legislation.  Additionally, 
Africa, as part of the Africa Program, is given 
highest priority as the region furthest behind. 
 
¶14. (SBU) In response to a question from the French 
delegate, Albon recognized that evaluating the 
effectiveness of National Authorities is a major 
challenge.  He pointed to the comprehensiveness of 
declarations and implementing legislations as two 
possible areas to measure progress.  In response to 
a question by the Italian delegate, Albon also 
recognized that it is important for the TS to 
engage and influence various stakeholders in those 
States Parties seeking assistance, in particular 
the chemical industry associations. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Albon then departed and Surkau moved onto 
the next agenda item, the selection of the Director 
General (DG).  German Ambassador Werner Burkart 
provided a read-out from the WEOG meeting with 
Executive Council (EC) Chairperson Ambassador 
Oksana Tomova (Ref B).  Burkart reviewed the points 
WEOG members delivered to Tomova, stressing how 
WEOG made it clear that no documents or open ended 
working groups would be needed for the selection 
process.  Burkart also noted how this issue was 
conspicuously left off the recently issued 
preliminary EC-56 agenda.  He opined that Tomova 
will fall under increasing pressure from the 
Nonaligned Movement (NAM) to develop a more 
defined, rigid process. 
 
¶16. (SBU) U.S. Delrep stated that WEOG members must 
be firm in their resistance to any pressure for EC- 
56 to issue some kind of document on the DG 
selection process.  She also noted Tomova's 
suggestion of meeting with WEOG-plus like-minded 
states as a good idea; many other delegations 
agreed.  Italy, the Netherlands, and Ireland all 
agreed that WEOG needed to remain firm in the 
expected wake of building NAM pressure.  The French 
delegate added that delegations should strive for 
consensus as the incoming EC Chair will become 
Qconsensus as the incoming EC Chair will become 
"king maker."  Sweden warned that consensus on this 
issue is unlikely. 
 
¶17. (SBU) The Australian delegate reminded WEOG of 
Tomova's mentioning the possibility of having two 
Deputy Director Generals.  While Burkart noted that 
this idea came out of the PrepCom, he was 
personally against this notion.  The Italian 
delegate then proposed that WEOG invite the next EC 
Chair (Mexican Ambassador) to join Tomova when she 
meets next with WEOG to brief the group on the 
developments surrounding the selection process. 
Delegates agreed that WEOG will have to, at some 
point, address its increasingly large list of 
western candidates to decide how WEOG will proceed. 
The Dutch Ambassador   proposed that WEOG address 
this issue after all the candidates had declared 
themselves. 
 
--------- 
WEOG PLUS 
--------- 
 
¶18. (SBU) On March 25, WEOG coordinator Surkau 
chaired an expanded meeting ("WEOG Plus") including 
Japan, South Korea, and all non-WEOG European Union 
countries.  EC Chair Tomova (Slovakia) gave an 
overview of her meetings with all of the regional 
groups on selecting the new DG.  Tomova said that 
there was "basic consensus in principle" among all 
regional groups on selecting a consensus candidate 
and not resorting to voting.  After all of her 
meetings, Tomova's impression is that the selection 
process must be careful, transparent, and open. 
 
¶19. (SBU) Tomova noted that the Asian Group raised 
a number of points with her.  Chinese Ambassador 
Zhang  called for a democratic process with 
established rules to guide candidates.  Zhang also 
suggested candidates needed to be nominated as 
early as possible to give them "space" and to allow 
for "graceful withdrawals."   Iran raised the 
possibility of accepting nominations after the July 
7 deadline and also reiterated their request to 
clarify the process through open-ended discussions 
on modalities.  India asked if the EC is obliged to 
choose one consensus candidate or if the EC can 
recommend more than one candidate to the CSP. 
 
¶20. (SBU) The African Group suggested that Tomova 
expand discussions on the DG appointment beyond 
regional groups or even EC members.  GRULAC said 
there is no need for complicated procedures, nor to 
discuss the process at length.  GRULAC -- as well 
as the African and Asian groups -- rejected a 
"north-south" rotation, with some preferring 
rotation among regional groups instead. 
 
¶21. (SBU) Tomova reported that she met with the DG 
after her regional group consultations and was 
surprised to learn that he had not approved the 
first provisional agenda for EC-56 that was 
released on March 13 that had conspicuously omitted 
any mention of the DG selection.  The DG felt it 
was important to follow on from the decision 
reached during EC-55 and allow for discussion of 
the issue at EC-56.  At his request, the agenda was 
revised to include an item to DG appointment. 
Tomova said that she would prepare in advance 
appropriate language on the issue for the EC-56 
report.  (Del comment:  The early provisional 
agenda appears to have been the work of Secretary 
Khodakov; the fact that neither the DG nor the 
Chairperson had seen it before publication, and 
without a Bureau meeting to discuss it, is 
disturbing.  End comment) 
 
¶22. (SBU) German Ambassador Burkart spoke in favor 
of remaining firm on the July 7 deadline, having 
EC-58 (in October) agree to a consensus candidate, 
and avoiding convening an open-ended working group 
Qand avoiding convening an open-ended working group 
or otherwise complicating the process.  Burkart's 
comments were echoed by a number of delegations, 
including the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, France, 
Ireland, the Czech Republic, and France.  Reacting 
to the point raised with Tomova by India, Burkart 
said that the EC was tasked with making "a 
recommendation" and that clearly means only one 
candidate.  Swedish delegate Christer Ahlstrom said 
that the Convention (specifically Article VIII.43) 
and past practice point to only one candidate being 
recommended by the EC and subsequently chosen by 
the CSP.  Delrep reiterated calls to keep the 
process simple and in the hands of the EC Chair and 
to keep discussion within the EC and open to all 
member states. 
 
¶23. (SBU) Under Any Other Business, Delrep 
announced that the invitation letter for the EC 
visit to U.S. Chemical Weapon Destruction 
Facilities in June had been sent to Tomova and that 
April 1 is the deadline for regional group 
representatives to be named.  Surkau promised to 
distribute the invitation and coordinate the WEOG 
nomination via email. 
 
---------------------- 
UNICRI MEETING AT OPCW 
---------------------- 
 
¶24. (U) On March 18, Delreps attended an OPCW- 
hosted seminar entitled "Multilateral Approaches to 
Non-Proliferation: the Chemical Dimension."  The 
meeting was part of a wider program developed by 
the UN's Interregional Crime and Justice Research 
Institute (UNICRI) for countries in South-Eastern 
Europe; however, the OPCW session was open to all 
member states.  Director-General Pfirter opened the 
meeting by noting the active engagement of the OPCW 
with organizations like UNICRI, and the important 
contribution the OPCW makes to preventing the 
proliferation of chemical weapons.  UNICRI Director 
Sandro Calvani then highlighted the need for 
multilateral organizations to work together, 
develop new approaches, and share knowledge.  He 
described the UNICRI "Knowledge Management System" 
project, started in May 2008, to assist countries 
in South-Eastern Europe and the Caucasus in 
communications regarding the trafficking of CBRN 
materials. 
 
¶25. (U) Filippo Sevini (European Commission 
representative) provided an overview of the 
Commission's Instrument for Stability, established 
in 2006.  The instrument consists of two parts: 
responding to emerging crises, and building 
capacity to prevent and respond to crises.  Sevini 
also reviewed three Commission priorities in this 
area:  counteracting WMD proliferation, addressing 
threats of trafficking and organized crime, and 
building emergency response capacity.  Specific 
projects include establishing "regional centers of 
excellence" to help countries in fighting illicit 
CBRN trafficking and financing. 
 
¶26. (U) OPCW Legal Advisor Santiago Onate gave a 
presentation on the legal framework of the CWC for 
transfers and import/export of scheduled chemicals. 
He reviewed the general obligations of the 
Convention and explained the need for implementing 
legislation to extend the prohibitions of the CWC 
to individuals as well as States Parties.  Onate 
also noted the connection between implementation of 
the CWC and UNSCR 1540.  He summarized annual 
reporting obligations and the importance of States 
Parties and the Secretariat working together to 
resolve issues that arise regarding transfers. 
 
¶27. (U) Steve Wade (Head, Declarations Branch) 
provided an overview of the CWC verification 
Qprovided an overview of the CWC verification 
regime, and noted that verification begins with a 
State Party's declaration.  He outlined the cycle 
of declarations, from the initial submission to TS 
evaluation, to on site inspection and monitoring, 
to analysis and reporting.  In a detailed 
description of the CW verification regime, Wade 
listed Iraq as one of the States Parties in 
possession of chemical weapons.  He described some 
of the future challenges facing the verification 
division, and concluded by mentioning work 
currently being done with the World Trade 
Organization to help customs and border officials 
more easily identify regulated chemicals. 
 
¶28. (U) The highlight of the seminar was Director 
of Special Projects Krzysztof Paturej's 
presentation on the OPCW's role in chemical safety 
and security issues.  Paturej laid out the mandate 
from the Second Review Conference in April 2008 for 
the Organization to be a platform and venue for 
supporting global cooperation on a range of issues 
-- including chemical safety and security, for 
fostering collaboration, and for raising awareness 
of best practices.  Paturej tempered this mandate 
with a list of things that the OPCW would not do 
(i.e., the Organization's "red lines"), including: 
- taking on an independent role (i.e., going beyond 
supporting member states' activities); 
- developing TS expertise on the issue; 
- including safety and security issues in 
verification and inspection activities; 
- developing regulatory measures; and 
- developing guidance or advice on chemical safety 
and security issues. 
 
¶29. (U) Again referencing a mandate from the Second 
Review Conference, Paturej also touched on the need 
to engage stakeholders, such as chemical industry 
and the scientific community, in the OPCW's work. 
He noted that the OPCW already had experience in 
this regard, citing a number of events held to mark 
the OPCW's tenth anniversary in 2007, as well as 
the industry forum and the academic forum held in 
conjunction with the Second Review Conference. 
Paturej went on to suggest developing a long-term 
strategy for the OPCW to develop its relationship 
with stakeholders.  He singled out Article X 
(Assistance and Protection) and Article XI 
(Economic and Technological Development) as two key 
areas having a direct relation to chemical safety 
and security where implementation would be 
broadened through cooperation with stakeholders. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
OPCW OPEN ENDED WORKING GROUP ON TERRORISM 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶30. (U) On March 25, Annie Mari (France) chaired a 
session of the Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) on 
Terrorism.  She opened by reiterating her sense 
that the group should build on links to Article VII 
and Article X, and should explore the topic of 
safety and security of chemical industry, given its 
direct bearing on the prevention of terrorist 
acquisition of chemical weapons.  She also 
indicated that she would be holding informal 
discussions with delegations on the future work of 
the group.  Marie then listed some of the OPCW's 
recent and upcoming events related to terrorism 
including the previous week's UNICRI seminar; the 
March 26-27 Clingendael workshop on 1540; a 
workshop in Croatia in April, a possible tabletop 
exercise in Poland; and an Algeria-hosted 
conference on chemical terrorism. 
Qconference on chemical terrorism. 
 
¶31. (U) The speakers for this meeting of the 
working group were Saudi ministry officials: 
Secretary of the National Authority Mohammed A. Al- 
Matrafi and General Director of the Ideological 
Security Directorate Dr. Abdulrahman Alhadlaq.  Al- 
Matrafi gave a largely irrelevant briefing on Saudi 
Arabia's implementation of the CWC that included a 
review of the various provisions of the Convention; 
and was related to the work of the OEWG only 
through a vague reference to the fact that 
implementation of CWC prohibitions is a preventive 
measure. 
 
¶32. (U) The briefing that followed was not only 
inappropriate for the OPCW, but also offensive. 
Dr. Alhadlaq gave a lengthy presentation on his 
area of expertise:  combating terrorist ideology. 
With the exception of a gratuitous reference to 
having seen ideology that would encourage 
terrorists to use WMD, the presentation was 
unrelated to work of the Open Ended Working Group 
and to the OPCW.  Alhadlaq provided a detailed 
overview of the cycle of recruitment and 
radicalization, the propagation of extremist 
ideology over the internet, and the work Saudi 
officials are doing to propagate more moderate 
ideology.  His explanation of factors that drove 
individuals to extremism included a desire to force 
the U.S. and UK out of Iraq and Afghanistan and the 
"fear of hellfire."  These factors were supported 
by pictures found on extremist websites of U.S. 
soldiers and Abu Ghraib.  Alhadlaq also explained 
in detail various methods Saudi officials use to 
rehabilitate terrorists.  Of his presentation, the 
one slide Mari was able to recall in her summary as 
relevant was on the physical protection of 
industrial sites (actually related specifically to 
oil processing facilities and pipelines). 
 
¶33. (U) The stunned silence following the briefings 
was broken by the Algerian Ambassador (and 
candidate for the post of Director General), who 
asked about a Saudi center for terrorism, and also 
asked the Saudi officials for their assessment of 
the level of threat of a terrorist attack using 
chemicals.  The officials responded that there have 
been "many reports" of terrorists attempting to 
acquire chemical weapons/WMD. 
 
¶34. (SBU) Del comment:  The Saudi briefings were by 
far the least relevant the working group has had to 
date.  The politically inflammatory nature of the 
second presentation, and the lack of relevance of 
either to the work of the group, would seem to 
indicate that neither the group's chair nor the 
Secretariat previewed their content before the 
meeting.  In a private conversation following the 
meeting, the UK delegate noted that this was likely 
to strengthen the case of delegations who wish to 
discontinue the Open Ended Working Group on 
Terrorism.  German Ambassador Burkart also shared 
his view that it was clearly time to assess the 
relevance and future orientation of the group.  End 
comment. 
 
¶35. (U) BEIK SENDS. 
GALLAGHER