VZCZCXRO2267
OO RUEHAT
DE RUEHTC #0163/01 0651442
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 061442Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2633
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0720
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL IMMEDIATE 0216
RUEHAT/AMCONSUL AMSTERDAM 4176

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000163 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR CA/OCS, DS/IP/EUR, EUR/WE, DSCC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC CASC EAIR NL
SUBJECT: Details on Investigation into Turkish Airlines Plane Crash 
 
Ref: (A) THE HAGUE 00156, (B) AMSTERDAM 00027, (C) AMSTERDAM 00026 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  The Dutch Safety Board presented its preliminary 
findings into the cause of the February 25 crash of Turkish Airlines 
Flight 1951 at a March 4 press conference, pointing principally to a 
malfunctioning radio altimeter.  At the request of the Dutch, Boeing 
issued a multi-operator message to all 737 model users warning of 
the faulty altimeter.  NTSB Team Chief Joseph Sedor debriefed 
Mission personnel March 5 on its initial findings and assessed that 
the altimeter's technical malfunction alone would not have caused 
the plane to crash.  Investigation continues into the role of pilot 
error as a major factor in the crash.  End Summary. 
 
---------------- 
PRESS CONFERENCE 
---------------- 
 
¶2. (U) On March 4, the Dutch Safety Board (DSB) presented its 
preliminary findings on the causes of the plane crash in its first 
press conference.  The press conference was delivered in Dutch but 
an English statement was concurrently issued and can be found in its 
entirety at: 
 
www.onderzoeksraad.nl/docs/ 
rapporten/Persverklaring_4_maart_GB.pdf. 
 
¶3. (U) DSB key findings pointed to a technical problem with the left 
radio altimeter, which measures the plane's altitude.  The faulty 
altimeter indicated an incorrect altitude of -8 feet, essentially 
putting the plane already on the tarmac, while the plane was 
approaching its descent at an actual altitude of 1950 feet.  This 
incorrect reading was passed onto the automatic pilot system, which 
was engaged for the landing, causing the plane to slow down, lose 
engine power, and ultimately stall.  By the time the pilots realized 
the problem and subsequently applied full throttle to the engines, 
it was too late and the plane crashed.  The black box recovered in 
the crash indicated that a similar problem with the same altimeter 
occurred in two previous flights captured on the 25 hours of black 
box recording.  The DSB claimed provisional data indicated that the 
pilots did not initially regard the warning signal for the 
malfunctioning altimeter to be a problem, implying the pilots did 
not react to the issue in the most timely manner. 
 
-------------- 
MEDIA COVERAGE 
-------------- 
 
¶4. (U) Coverage of the crash has dominated Dutch media since it 
occurred on February 25.  Newspapers opened with front page headline 
reports, including officially released information, eye witness 
reports, and survivors' accounts.  Survivors and aircraft experts 
also appeared on many talk shows.   While there was initially very 
little information available about the nationalities of the 
passengers, Dutch media picked up on a February 27 "Seattle Times" 
report stating that two Boeing employees were among the victims. 
 
¶5. (U) A sample of the March 5 headline stories include the 
following: 
 
--"De Telegraaf" (sensationalist, mass-circulation, conservative 
paper):"Human Error" 
--"Algemeen Dagblad" (popular, centrist publication): "Pilots 
Responded Too Late" 
--"De Volkskrant" (influential liberal paper): "Everything Was 
Alright, Except for the Speed" 
--"Trouw" (left-of-center paper): "Faulty Altimeter Caused Crash - 
Pilots' Action at 150 Meters Was Too Late" 
--"NRC Handelsblad" (influential liberal publication): "Crew Did Not 
Act On Faulty Meter" 
 
---------------- 
BOEING STATEMENT 
---------------- 
 
¶6. (U) During the press conference, the DSB issued a warning to 
Boeing on its findings about the faulty altimeter.  In response, and 
QBoeing on its findings about the faulty altimeter.  In response, and 
with the DSB's clearance, Boeing issued an immediate multi-operator 
message to all 737 model users.  Boeing recommends that all flight 
crews operating any 737 model be informed of the preliminary results 
of the DSB investigation and reminded to carefully monitor primary 
flight instruments and the flight mode annunciation for autoflight 
modes. 
 
------------ 
NTSB DEBRIEF 
------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) NTSB Team Chief Joseph Sedor visited the Consulate General 
 
THE HAGUE 00000163  002 OF 002 
 
 
March 5 to debrief the Charge, Consul General and other Mission 
personnel on his assessment of the causes of the crash and his 
impressions of the investigation as a whole.  Sedor generally agreed 
with the DSB's findings (reflected in the DSB's English statement). 
He added that the initial review indicates pilot error played a 
larger role than the DSB has implied.  According to Sedor, the 
faulty altimeter alone should not have caused the plane to crash. 
Sedor believes that the pilots should have been able to compensate 
and recover from the technical malfunction.  According to black box 
data, 40 seconds had lapsed before the pilots even noticed the 
warning light on the altimeter, and by the time the pilots took 
action, it was too late.  During this same 40 second interval, the 
plane was experiencing a high rate of deceleration - well past the 
speed the pilots had selected - that the pilots should have noticed 
as well.  Moreover, there were three pilots in the cockpit - one 
more than is standard because this was a training flight for a new 
pilot - providing an extra set of eyes which still missed the 
warning light.  Sedor thinks the three pilots were likely 
distracted, possibly in conducting pre-landing checks that Sedor 
maintains should have been completed before this stage in the 
flight.  Sedor also noted the evidence on the crash site suggested 
the pilots took some corrective measures that limited the 
fatalities. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Sedor remarked that he and his team had received excellent 
cooperation from the DSB.  The NTSB also enjoyed good cooperation 
from Turkish authorities on the ground in the Netherlands.  Sedor 
also compared the NTSB's and DSB's different approaches to victim's 
assistance, offering to provide information on the U.S. Family 
Assistance Act and the NTSB programs addressing the human tragedy of 
such disasters.  For example, the NTSB regularly briefs family 
members of fatalities well before making any press comments.  Sedor 
and his team planned to leave the Netherlands by March 7, but some 
members are likely to return to continue to assist with the 
investigation, as requested by the DSB. 
 
GALLAGHER