VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTV #0763/01 0901410
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 311410Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1249
INFO RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 7308
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1751

UNCLAS TEL AVIV 000763 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP, SARAH SEXTON 
DEPT FOR DS/CR/OCI, GALEN NACE 
ROME FOR DHS/ICE 
CA/FPP: PLEASE PASS DHS 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CVIS CMGT CPAS PTER ASEC KFRD IS
SUBJECT: TEL AVIV'S FRAUD SUMMARY FOR MARCH 2009 
 
REFTELS: A) TEL AVIV 423, B) TEL AVIV 538 
 
¶A. COUNTRY CONDITIONS 
¶1. Israel is a highly westernized nation with a vibrant democracy 
and strong economy. It boasts a high literacy rate, a high GDP, and 
relatively low unemployment. It is also a nation that travels. 
However, while visa demand peaked in summer 2008, it has declined 
during the reporting period, presumably due to the global economic 
crisis. 
 
¶2. As of 31 January 2008, the Israeli government estimated its 
population at 7,382,200 residents (not including foreigners), of 
whom 75.5% are Jewish and 20.2% are Arab. Almost one million of the 
1,477,000 Arab citizens are Sunni Muslim. Other 
religions/ethnicities, including Christians, Druze and Armenians 
make up 318,000 or 20 percent of Israel's non-Jewish population. 
Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) reports that Israel's 
population grew by only 1.8 percent in 2008, with higher growth 
rates reported in the Arab population. 
 
¶3. Israel has been affected by the recent global economic crisis. In 
the second quarter of 2008, Israel experienced its lowest 
unemployment rate in two decades - 5.9%. However, CBS reports that 
that downward trend has reversed: in the fourth quarter 2008 it hit 
6.3% and by the end of January 2009, it had already reached 6.9%. 
The major newspapers - Ha'aretz, the Jerusalem Post and Ynet - all 
report an increase in lay-offs compared to the previous year, 
particularly in the formerly robust high-tech sector.  In the month 
of January, YNet reported that approximately 20,000 Israelis were 
laid off.  Also of note is that the GOI estimates it has more than 
225,000 illegal foreign workers. According to Yaacov Ganot, an 
Immigration Authority official, each year approximately 5,000 are 
added to this pool of illegal workers. The majority of foreign 
workers today - legal and illegal - are from Asia and South America. 
 Foreign workers tend to be employed mainly in domestic service, 
construction, agriculture, and as caregivers. 
 
¶B. NIV FRAUD 
 
¶4. In 2008, CBS reported 2,096,300 departures out of Israel. Of 
these, 96.3% stay out of the country for one month or less. Only 
0.4% stayed out more than one year. Generally, intending immigration 
is not the main problem with Post's NIV cases because 
overwhelmingly, traveling Israelis do return home. However, with the 
economic downturn and continuing efforts to combat Dead Sea-related 
illegal work/fraud within the post-army demographic group, Post's 
NIV refusal rate steeply increased. From October 1, 2007 to March 
24, 2008, the host-country national, adjusted B1/B2 refusal rate was 
.97%; for the same period in 2008-2009, it rose to 3.46%. 
Interestingly, in February, the Australian Embassy in Tel Aviv, on 
orders from their government, tightened its visa issuance guidelines 
as they, too, discovered that quite a few Israelis were working 
illegally during their post-army trips. For this reporting period, 
92 cases of potential fraud were referred to the Fraud Prevention 
Unit (FPU). 
 
¶5. DEAD SEA PRODUCTS AND ILLEGAL WORKERS - UPDATE: Please see REFTEL 
A for specific information on the Post's efforts to combat fraud in 
the Dead Sea cosmetics and skincare industry.  FPU TLV, ICE ROME, 
ARSO/I TLV, DS/ICI/WFO, FDNS and CBP at POE continue to work closely 
to combat this fraud and illegal employment in the United States. 
Line officers continue to create detailed and specific case notes 
for applicants in this problematic post-army demographic. In 
addition, in consultation with CBP, line officers are also 
annotating visas with the applicant's stated purpose of initial 
travel as indicated during the visa interview. Annotations such as 
"FIRST TRIP: Traveling with parents" can encourage CBP to take a 
second look at these applicants if the annotation does not match 
what the applicant 
presents to CBP. The FPM, through her CBP contacts, recently was 
notified of several POE turnarounds for this very reason. Two 
otherwise qualified applicants applied for visas in Tel Aviv with 
credible stories about being university students traveling during 
their school holiday.  The adjudicating officer annotated the visa 
about the planned first trip, and added extensive notes in the CCD. 
At POE, the students' story had changed markedly and CBP discovered 
that they intended to work illegally. CBP and ICE have commended 
Post for their work in this area. 
 
¶6. THIRD COUNTRY NATIONAL FRAUD: Line officers discovered a recent 
trend in which staff members of the Nigerian Embassy to Israel apply 
for visas using what appeared to be genuine diplomatic notes.  These 
staff members are Nigerians employed locally by their embassy, not 
diplomats. Post HAS established an SOP for dealing with these cases 
and their documentation. 
 
¶7. H2B FRAUD: FPU is tracking "Available Locksmiths," a company that 
purportedly brings over locksmiths from Israel to work in the United 
States on H2B visas. Most of these applicants lack the 
qualifications to work as locksmiths and locksmith assistants. 
ARSO/I and FDNS LN are jointly combating these fraudulent petitions 
while Post is working to have these petitions revoked. REFTEL A also 
mentions the locksmith issue. 
 
¶8. TRAVEL AGENT DOCUMENT FRAUD: In a true example of team work, Post 
recently uncovered what appears to be widespread fraud emanating 
from one travel agency. A line officer adjudicating two cases for 
applicants under the age of fourteen noticed discrepancies in the 
applications accepted through the postal drop-off system. The 
officer worked with FPU to interview the applicants' families. 
Through further research, FPU noticed that the cases were submitted 
via the same email address. A CCD text search revealed approximately 
270 cases with this same contact data over the past three years. The 
remarks for these refused cases have a similar narrative: travel for 
honeymoon or a friend's wedding. In the case remarks, officers 
indicated that these stories did not make sense. The majority of the 
applicants were from northern Israel and approximately two-thirds 
were Israeli Arabs. More recent applicants associated with this 
vendor have been Georgian immigrants living in the greater Tel Aviv 
area. 
 
¶9. When FPU contacted the owner of this travel agency posing as a 
potential applicant, the owner said that he was not running a travel 
agency, but that he was an Embassy employee doing business from 
home. The owner told FPU that she could pay the equivalent of 900 
USD to receive a visa and also stated that he would arrange all 
documentation, prepare her for the interview and coordinate her 
application "with his people at the Embassy." A watch phrase has 
been entered on this e-mail address, and each application 
originating from this address is now submitted for FPU 
investigation. ARSO/I is also working with FPU to research all cases 
with similar email or phone numbers associated with this travel 
agency; he feels that this case will meet the threshold for 
prosecution in Israel. 
 
¶C. and D. IV and DV FRAUD -N/A due to the transfer of Post's IV 
workload to ConGen Jerusalem in April 2008. 
 
¶E. ACS & PASSPORT FRAUD -- Egg and sperm donation continues to be an 
issue at Post. Please see REFTEL B for more information on this 
issue. 
 
¶10. FRAUDULENT PHYSICAL PRESENCE DOCUMENTATION: ACS's largest area 
of concern is fraudulent physical presence documents for CRBA cases 
under Sections 301 and 309 of the INA. For transmission under 
301(c), the definition of "residence" in the United States has not 
been fully or specifically defined by Consular Affairs or by the 
INA. However, following guidance from Consular Affairs, work, study, 
or birth in the United States constitutes residence, whereas 
vacation or visiting family in the United States does not constitute 
residence for the purpose of citizenship transmission. In several 
CRBA cases of transmission under both Sections 301 and 309, the 
family attempting to register a child as a U.S. citizen will submit 
incorrect Affidavits of Physical Presence and/or falsified documents 
in order to "prove" that the parent resided in the United States. 
The most commonly discovered fraudulent documents are falsified 
school letters, transcripts and report cards, and letters 
purportedly from neighbors. 
 
¶11. CERTIFICATES OF NATURALIZATION: Post continues to receive at 
least one case per month referred from Israeli airport immigration 
authorities involving problematic Certificates of Naturalization. 
These certificates list the holder's nationality but not the place 
of birth, enabling people to conceal POB. The referred cases involve 
naturalized U.S. citizens who concealed their Israeli nationality, 
changed their place of birth and, on some occasions, altered their 
names when they applied for their first U.S. passport. Some 
Americans claim they obtained their U.S. passports with false places 
of birth in order to protect themselves from potential terrorists. 
These cases do not appear to be linked to any serious criminality or 
terrorism. However, we remain skeptical of the stories people use to 
justify the "errors"; both CONS and DS continue to investigate the 
cases. Because the DS-11 does not require a recently-naturalized 
Amcit to present a birth certificate or other evidence documenting 
POB, Post will likely continue to see cases of falsified POBs. 
 
¶12. FALSIFIED ADDRESS ON SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER APPLICATIONS: Post 
has recently seen a spate of FBU fraud involving falsified addresses 
on SS-5 (Social Security Number) applications.  The two FBU claims 
representatives have caught at least one dozen SS-5 applications 
listing a falsified address within Post's consular district when the 
applicant actually resides in Jerusalem's consular district.  Most 
of these applications have come from one company in Beit Shemesh. 
ACS is currently working with the ARSO/I to further investigate 
this. 
 
¶F. ADOPTION FRAUD --N/A 
 
¶G. DNA TESTING --Nothing to report. 
¶H. ASYLUM AND DHS BENEFIT FRAUD -- Nothing to report. 
 
 
¶I. ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORIST TRAVEL 
 
¶13. This quarter, Post revoked a known main organized crime (OC) 
family member's visa based upon law enforcement information received 
indicating that the person would be traveling imminently to the 
United States to "eliminate" a prosecutorial witness in a local OC 
court case.  FPU also has compiled a list of the main organized OC 
families and its members. Post is in the process of drafting a 
reporting cable on OC in Israel. Post increased its extradition 
efforts after last fall's spate of OC killings in Tel Aviv and 
nearby areas, including a car bomb that killed the head of a major 
crime family, the Alperons.  ARSO/I is now vetting FPU's OC list 
with the Israeli National Police's open source material. 
 
¶J. DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS 
 
¶14. Our ARSO/I is an invaluable member of Post's fraud prevention 
team. Currently, he has an ongoing investigation into two 
individuals working as visa fixers claiming to be U.S. Embassy 
employees. These fixers prey on the poor and vulnerable religious 
communities because they tend not to talk to law enforcement 
officials. However, the ARSO/I did convince one individual to come 
forward and press fraud charges. 
 
¶15. The ARSO/I and FPU successfully completed their first fraud case 
tried within the Israeli court system. The father and son owners of 
Baron Tours pled guilty to 26 counts of providing fraudulent 
documents in conjunction with conspiracy to commit fraud against the 
U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv. They will be sentenced in September. 
 
¶K. HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL REGISTRY 
 
¶16. Israel has begun moving towards developing a biometric database 
including identification cards and passports. This initiative 
continues to be delayed by the Israeli legislative process, which 
needs to amend laws to permit collection of additional biometric 
data. 
 
¶L. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES 
 
¶17. Post's contacts with host government officials in the Ministry 
of Interior, Israeli National Police, Border Patrol, Airport 
officials and the Israeli Defense Forces continue to be robust. As 
mentioned in section I, Embassy Tel Aviv and the GOI are working 
closely to confirm information about those who may be connected to 
organized crime or have criminal backgrounds of concern to the 
United States Government. 
 
¶M. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN --None to report 
 
¶N. STAFFING AND TRAINING 
+ 
¶18. The Fraud Prevention Team met with Israeli Border Police at Ben 
Gurion Airport to discuss entry and exit policies, as well as share 
best practices in identifying fraudulent documents, suspicious 
travelers, etc. This meeting helped the team learn more about how 
the Israelis screen incoming travelers, as well as build closer 
contacts within the host government. 
 
¶19. FPU Tel Aviv has also developed a close relationship with FPU 
Jerusalem. Applicants living in Israel are able to apply at either 
Mission (note: this is not the case for FBU), making collaboration 
between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem critical. ARSO/I has been 
coordinating information sharing between both consular sections and 
with the ARSO in Jerusalem who handles the fraud portfolio. 
 
¶20. Tel Aviv's FPU consists of a Fraud Prevention Manager (Deputy 
Consul General and NIV Chief Wendy Vincent), a full-time Fraud 
Investigator (Ariella Shamash), a JO who handles the daily fraud 
portfolio, and two NIV FSN backups for the Fraud Investigator. 
 
¶21. Post's Back-up Fraud Investigators provided one-on-one fraud 
training to two newly arrived JOs in this reporting period. 
 
CUNNINGHAM