VZCZCXRO0689
PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHTG #0176/01 0751426
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 161426Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9424
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 8045
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 1326
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHINGTON DC 0906
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHND/CDRJTFB SOTO CANO HO
RUMIAAA/USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFIUU/DIRJIATF SOUTH
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 TEGUCIGALPA 000176 
 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL SNAR PGOV KJUS EAID MOPS MARR HO
SUBJECT: Mission Honduras Merida Priorities for FY 2009-10 
 
¶1. Summary: As Merida budgets are laid out for FY 2009 and FY 2010, 
Post seeks a shift away from a focus on expensive, high-tech 
equipment toward support that host governments with limited 
resources, such as the GOH, can sustain beyond the Merida mandate, 
rather than burdening them with recurring maintenance costs.  Fixing 
a broken seized criminal assets program can harness the criminals' 
own resources against them.  Building community policing can reduce 
the need for prosecution through healthier communities that police 
themselves.  By turning the focus toward building domestic capacity 
through training, coordination and cost-effective solutions, the 
legacy of Merida can be a long-term success.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------- 
¶I. Key Law Enforcement Challenges 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶2. Challenge A -- Lack of Resources: The primary challenge facing 
the GOH in accomplishing the goals of the Merida Initiative is an 
overall lack of resources.  In the case of interdiction, the Armed 
Forces (HOAF) lack the funds to procure, fuel and maintain the 
aircraft and boats needed to intercept traffickers, especially in 
the remote Atlantic coastal region of La Mosquitia.  Furthermore, 
Honduras lacks any primary radar system to detect traffickers.  The 
Honduran National Police (HNP) lacks the budget to pay salaries 
sufficient to prevent corruption in its ranks; obtain, maintain and 
fuel the vehicles it needs to patrol its border areas and urban 
neighborhoods; or construct and maintain prisons to safely and 
humanely house the burgeoning prison population.  The Public 
Ministry lacks the funds to hire sufficient numbers of prosecutors 
to investigate and prosecute the cases presented to it by the 
police.  While conviction rates for cases prosecuted are high (over 
80%), prosecution rates hover in the 20% range for most categories 
of crime. 
 
¶3. While the USG and other donors can assist the GOH to build and 
procure facilities and equipment, recurring costs such as salaries, 
fuel and maintenance will remain problematic, requiring innovative 
solutions on all sides.  Donors must focus on programs that minimize 
recurring costs - training in procedures and maintenance will reduce 
waste, and expensive equipment should be avoided in favor of 
low-tech options wherever possible.  The GOH for its part must 
implement more efficient and effective procedures for managing the 
resources it has.  The GOH has dedicated more funds in its 2009 
budget toward law enforcement and security, but assistance must be 
targeted toward efforts that can be sustained. 
 
¶4. One potential source of additional funding for GOH law 
enforcement is through the use of seized criminal assets.  The HOAF 
and HNP seized over $4 million in cash alone in 2008, but at present 
the GOH seized asset program represents a net cost to authorities. 
The legal framework exists for a successful seized asset program, 
but prosecutors and judges require training in how to implement the 
program. 
 
¶5. As we are nearing the midpoint of FY 2009, USAID has yet to 
receive its FY 2008 funding for Merida. 
 
 
¶6. Challenge B -- Corruption: Corruption remains another key 
challenge for the HNP, prosecutors and judiciary, though the GOH 
took some important steps toward combating corruption in 2008 and 
early 2009.  The Police Organic Law created an Internal Affairs 
Division that answers directly to the Minister of Security and, once 
vetted, staffed and trained, should be a major force against police 
corruption.  In January 2009, the most independent Supreme Court in 
Honduras' history was selected; the GOH and donors should work to 
ensure the new court makes tangible inroads to reduce judicial 
corruption. 
 
¶7. Challenge C -- Geography: A lack of governance and infrastructure 
in La Mosquitia and along the Atlantic Coast provide traffickers 
with a broad, unguarded territory in which to operate.  The 
residents currently receive more material support from the 
traffickers than from their own government.  Economic development of 
La Mosquitia, combined with an increased permanent law enforcement 
and security presence is vital to removing this transit corridor 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00000176  002 OF 004 
 
 
from the traffickers. 
 
------------------------- 
II. Assistance Priorities 
------------------------- 
 
¶8. Priority A -- Vetted Units: 
a. The HNP's newly-created Internal Affairs Division requires 
vetting and extensive training to become an effective force against 
police corruption. 
b. Model community police precincts likewise will require extensive 
vetting, training and equipment to take back neighborhoods 
controlled by gangs and increase public participation in their own 
security. 
c. CEINCO, the HNP information analysis unit, will play a vital 
support role.  In order to do so, it requires further equipment, 
software and training; sub-units such as the FBI-supported TAG unit 
will be needed for regional information sharing and analysis. 
d. In addition to the FBI TAG unit for information analysis, an 
on-the-ground HNP-Public Ministry interagency TAG Unit must be 
vetted, trained and equipped.  This team will be the focal point for 
information, investigation and prosecution of gangs within Honduras, 
and would work in cooperation with regional partners and the CEINCO 
TAG unit. 
e. An interagency anti-kidnap unit is needed, but will require 
extensive vetting, training and equipment. 
f. Additional Tactical Response Teams (TRT) need to be vetted and 
equipped for more efficient, effective interdiction operations. 
 
¶9. Priority B -- Border Security: 
a. The HNP Frontier Police are responsible for interdiction efforts 
along the land borders and at airports.  Frontier Police currently 
lack even the most basic facilities at remote, but 
heavily-trafficked border crossing posts, and lack the means to 
patrol border areas away from the formal crossings.  Converted 
containers to use as combined office/dormitory space, motorcycles, 
inspection equipment and K-9 inspection teams will build capacity to 
reduce trafficking of people and illicit goods across Honduran 
borders.  The GOH is re-starting its own K-9 program as of 2009, and 
we will work to support this low-tech, but highly effective tool. 
Field training will also improve and strengthen their interdiction 
capabilities. 
b. Combating drug traffic by sea and air is a high priority and 
costly.  Supporting the HOAF by providing fueling stations and fuel 
along their Atlantic Coast and training both HOAF and HNP units in 
the maintenance of infrastructure will make interdiction operations 
more cost-effective. 
c. The huge ungoverned spaces that have become a haven for the 
traffickers can only be effectively accessed by helicopter or small 
fixed-wing assets that the GOH does not have in sufficient 
quantities or with proper capabilities.  Without these assets we 
cannot expect the GOH to effectively control these huge swaths of 
national territory. 
 
¶10. Priority C -- Seized Asset Program: Training police, prosecutors 
and judges on the existing legal framework, handling and use of 
evidence and information-sharing can produce a self-sustaining 
program that will diminish the top law enforcement challenge in 
Honduras if successful.  Building success in this area in 
combination with development of  inter-agency vetted units will be 
the most effective tool to improving the justice sector overall. 
 
¶11. Priority D -- Prisons Reform: The GOH has a long-term strategy 
for reforming their prisons system to reduce violence and gang 
influence in its prisons system.  The GOH has dedicated funds to 
constructing high-security administrative segregation facilities for 
its most dangerous prisoners and low-security facilities which will 
be used to develop rehabilitative prisons industries/vocational 
training programs.  The GOH is also implementing a formal 
classification system to ensure prisoners are placed in an 
appropriate level of supervision to protect prisoners, staff and the 
outside population.   Assistance is required in training, equipment 
and infrastructure in order for the prisons system to implement the 
GOH strategy. 
 
¶12. Priority E -- Gang Prevention and Rehabilitation: Law 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00000176  003 OF 004 
 
 
enforcement must be coupled with efforts to prevent at-risk youth 
from joining gangs, if any anti-gang effort is to be made 
sustainable.  Programs must provide education and alternative social 
structures for youth as well as economic opportunities for their 
communities.  Under Merida, ongoing basic education and job-linked 
vocational education programs will target at-risk youth in 
vulnerable areas. When cost-effective and proven successful, 
rehabilitation programs should also be supported.  There are a 
number of NGOs finding success in rehabilitation in Honduras at 
modest cost per individual rehabilitated.  Efforts are also in place 
to expand a network of outreach centers for at-risk youth in 
high-risk areas. 
 
¶13. Priority F -- Combating Financial- and Cyber-crime: Police, 
prosecutors and judges need training in how to combat money 
laundering and cyber-crime.  The Honduran legal framework requires 
modernization as traffickers and criminal gangs become more 
sophisticated in their techniques. 
 
¶14. Priority G -- Public Education and Outreach: The HNP needs 
assistance in developing a more effective public awareness campaign 
to educate the public about their role in fighting crime, improve 
communication between law enforcement authorities and the public, 
build public trust in law enforcement institutions, and engage civil 
society as allies in efforts to reduce violence.  The HNP has 
already instituted community security roundtables, where these 
issues are discussed and NGOs have developed community outreach 
centers that reduce gang activity and membership in individual 
neighborhoods.   Both the HNP and civil society have developed 
education programs on specific topics, but an overall strategy is 
lacking for integrating these efforts and binding together 
communities against crime.  Such assistance could be provided in the 
form of a limited-term public relations advisor to the Ministry of 
Security.  Resources to implement a strategy already exist. 
 
¶15. Priority H -- Economic Development of Trafficking Zones: Remote 
areas such as La Mosquitia are in need of economic alternatives to 
supporting the drug trade.  Community-led improvements in 
infrastructure, a more permanent and engaged security presence (both 
HOAF and HNP), and greater access to basic services are necessities. 
 
 
¶16. Priority I -- Military interdiction: Maritime transportation 
moves the greatest amount of illicit drugs in and out of Honduras. 
TAT estimates approximately six high speed boat deliveries per day 
which translates to more than 9 tons of illicit drugs per month.  In 
CY 2008, the HOAF seized 8 vehicles, 8 maritime vessels, 1 aircraft 
and over 7,000 kilograms of cocaine.  SOUTHCOM has provided 
assistance vis-`-vis National Defense Authorization Act funding; 
however, those funds are restricted to selected construction, 
equipment and training.  In order to increase the rate of 
interdictions, HOAF will need funding beyond the extent of current 
National Defense Authorization Act resources and allocations. 
Dedicated inter-service and interagency counter narcotic (CN) units 
need to be established.   These additional units will need to be 
fully equipped and trained.  The Honduran Navy has recently 
established such a unit, but lacks the resources to be effective. 
The Honduran Joint Task Force, Paz Garcia, is inadequate for 
interagency operations.  In order to increase joint CN operations 
with USG and Honduran inter-service operations, Paz Garcia needs 
major repair and construction. 
 
----------------------------------- 
III. Specific Requests from the GOH 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶17. The GOH developed a list of requests in February 2008 based on 
discussions held at the January 2008 SICA Conference and the GOH's 
own 2005 National Security Strategy.  The Ministry of Security also 
provided NAS Honduras with a list of its revised priorities pursuant 
to its 2009 budget process, and these priorities have been 
integrated into section II above.  The Ministry of Security also 
requested USG support in equipping a K-9 training facility in 
Honduras to develop units for interdiction of weapons, drugs as well 
as emergency search-and-rescue units. 
 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00000176  004 OF 004 
 
 
------------------------ 
IV. Regional Cooperation 
------------------------ 
 
¶18. The GOH is working in cooperation with the INL Regional Gang 
Advisor based in San Salvador to develop a pilot community policing 
precinct, based Guatemala's Villanueva project. 
 
Llorens