VZCZCXRO6367
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTL #0060/01 0701128
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 111128Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TALLINN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1059
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH NH 0025
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 3135
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2648

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TALLINN 000060 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: CMGT KFRD ASEC CVIS CPAS EN
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - TALLINN: SEPT 2008 TO FEB 2009 
 
REF: A) 07 TALLINN 280 B) 07 STATE 83571 C) TALLINN 57 
 
¶1. COUNTRY CONDITIONS:  Economic growth in Estonia, previously 
running at over 10 percent per year, has ground to a halt in the 
wake of the global economic crisis and is expected to contract 
sharply in 2009, falling to perhaps as much as negative 9 percent. 
The Estonian government (GoE) has already cut its budget once, and 
experts anticipate further cuts in the coming months as the Estonian 
economy slows.  Inflation, registering at 10.4 percent for the 
fiscal year 2008, has compounded the crisis (although economists 
note that Estonia's inflation is dropping, which - somewhat 
paradoxically - helps Estonia's case for admission to the Eurozone). 
 Estonia is also witnessing statistically significant unemployment, 
7.6 percent, for the first time in years.  Unemployment is more 
notable in the Russian-speaking northeastern parts of the country. 
Adding to these worries, rumors persist that Estonia's Baltic 
neighbors, Latvia and Lithuania, may be forced to devalue their 
currencies in the coming months, which would put further pressure on 
Estonia to devalue the kroon.  A devaluation, were it to occur, 
would result in extreme hardship for a bulk of Estonia's population, 
and the GOE rejects repeatedly devaluation as a policy option. 
Despite public concern over economic conditions, Estonia has so far 
avoided the kinds of public protests recently witnessed in Latvia 
and Lithuania. 
 
A large Russian-speaking minority (approximately 30 percent of the 
population) resides in Estonia, primarily concentrated in the 
northeast of the country and in a few larger population centers such 
as Tallinn and, to a lesser extent, Tartu.  Significant divisions 
between the Russian-speaking minority and the Estonian majority 
remain, as evidenced by the disturbances that followed the GoE's 
decision to relocate a Soviet-era, World War II Memorial in April 
2007 (reftel A).   Integration issues (that is the inclusion of the 
Russian-speaking minority into the Estonian mainstream) remain a 
priority for the GoE and a topic of public debate. 
 
Presently, approximately 105,000 persons in Estonia are considered 
stateless and travel on Estonian-issued "alien passports."  These 
gray passports accord some travel privileges to EU and Schengen 
countries but not the same as those guaranteed to Estonian 
passports.  The number of stateless persons has been decreasing, 
although a recent regulation in Russian law, allowing stateless 
passport holders from Estonia to travel visa-free to Russia, may 
slow this process. 
 
Estonia's accession to the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) on November 17, 
2008, has dramatically affected Embassy Tallinn's NIV numbers and 
will have a direct impact on our fraud outlook over the coming 
years.  Where Estonian citizens previously made up the bulk of 
Post's NIV work, Russian citizen residents of Estonia and gray 
(stateless alien) passport holders now constitute a much greater 
percentage of Post's NIV applicants.  Post expects non-Estonian 
applicants and applicants for special visa classes such as J1 or 
C1/D to dominate the NIV workload over the coming months.  Estonia 
has issued machine-readable passports since February 2002, 
photo-digitized passports since May 2005 and E-passports with 
biometric data chips since May 2007.  Alien passports are made to 
the same standard as the Estonian citizen passports. 
 
The volume of Estonian travel to the United States is relatively 
low, due largely to the country's small population, and the 
relatively small Estonian-American population in the United States. 
Moreover, the global economic crisis and a strengthening dollar have 
weakened Estonian appetites for travel to the U.S.  Estonia has a 
small but active American Chamber of Commerce which recently 
established a Discover America committee to coordinate promotion of 
U.S. tourist destinations.  However, no direct, commercial flights 
exist between Estonia and the United States.  That said, an Estonian 
travel agency took advantage of a temporary glitch in the worldwide 
airline reservation system in late August 2008 to offer round-trip 
flights to the United States (including multiple stops in the U.S.) 
for the equivalent of only USD 400.  This led to a surge of travel 
bookings for late 2008 and early 2009. 
 
(SBU) NB: As of March 30, 2008 Estonia is a fully integrated member 
of the Schengen area.  The transition has passed smoothly, though 
some worry that a lack of human capital in the border guard will 
undermine the country's ability to police its borders.  As of 
February 2009, budgetary restraints have forced the GoE to impose a 
hiring moratorium in all of its Defense Forces and Border Guard 
units.  How this will affect Estonia's border integrity in the 
short-term remains to be seen.  GoE officials, however, express 
confidence that the customs and border protection agencies retain 
satisfactory control over mala fide travelers to Estonia. 
 
¶2. NIV FRAUD: No significant changes from the previous fraud 
summary.  Post continues to verify suspicious applicant-provided 
 
TALLINN 00000060  002 OF 003 
 
 
information using various online resources, including but not 
limited to Lexis-Nexis, CCD, and Estonian search mechanisms to 
verify personal, financial and business information.  While no 
significant NIV fraud was detected, Post continues to encounter 
applicants trying to obtain visas using false pretenses and 
illegitimate contact data. 
 
Consular Section FSNs regularly review local newspapers to seek 
names of persons engaged in crime or other illicit activities, so 
that lookouts can be entered into CLASS.  These efforts regularly 
pay off.  For example, information found in a newspaper article 
detailing an Estonian rock group's tour of the United States led the 
Section to determine that the group was playing illegally on B1/B2 
visas and may have misrepresented their cases during the interview 
process.  The Section has also been able to uncover names tied to a 
high-profile espionage case affecting Estonia and NATO. 
 
¶3. IV FRAUD: To date, no fraud has been detected among IV applicants 
in Tallinn.  Post began full IV and DV processing in May 2007. 
 
¶4. DV FRAUD: See above regarding IV fraud. 
 
¶5. ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD: None detected since previous fraud 
summary. 
 
¶6. ADOPTION: No change from previous fraud summary. 
 
¶7. DNA TESTING: Post has not seen any cases meriting the use of DNA 
testing. 
 
¶8. ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS FRAUD: No changes from previous fraud 
summary. 
 
¶9. ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORIST TRAVEL: 
Russian and Estonian organized crime groups exist in Estonia. 
However, Post has no evidence that members of organized crime groups 
or terrorist organizations have applied for U.S. visas over the last 
6 months.  Moreover, there is no evidence of individuals being 
trafficked to or smuggled to the United States.  Literature about 
the dangers of trafficking and human smuggling is available for 
applicants in the consular waiting room.  The Consular Section, in 
cooperation with our Regional Security Office and Political-Economic 
section, regularly interact with Estonian law enforcement entities 
to follow up on these issues. 
 
¶10. DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS:  DS has no ongoing criminal 
fraud investigations at Post. 
 
¶11. HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL REGISTRY: 
As part of the process to determine Estonia's eligibility for the 
VWP, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sent a team to 
Estonia to evaluate the GoE's immigration and border control 
mechanisms.  DHS determined that the GoE's citizenship and 
nationality operations were fundamentally sound.  However, as noted 
in section 12, Post continues to liaise with the GoE to make its 
citizenship and nationality procedures even more secure.  No 
evidence of fraud within these institutions has been noted since 
DHS' visit. 
 
¶12. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: Host country 
security services continue to provide information about persons and 
businesses with potentially criminal elements.  Post continues to 
see NIV applicants whose potential ineligibilities would not be 
uncovered without this ongoing information sharing.  Additionally, 
the GoE continues to feed data into Post's fully automated reporting 
of Estonian lost and stolen passports (reftel B). 
 
(SBU): Estonia joined the VWP on November 17, 2008.  Embassy Tallinn 
is holding discussions with the Estonian Ministry of Interior to 
implement a series of recommendations coming out of a Department of 
Homeland Security review of Estonia's immigrations controls, carried 
out in April 2008.  The MoI has displayed a willingness to work with 
the USG on these issues. 
 
¶13. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: With Estonia now part of the 
Schengen zone and the VWP, there is concern that third country 
nationals will try to use fraudulent Estonian travel documents to 
enter other Schengen countries and/or the United States.  There has 
been no evidence of this to date.  These concerns may be overcome, 
in the short-term, as the global economic crisis impacts immigration 
patterns worldwide. 
 
¶14. STAFFING AND TRAINING: The Consular Section consists of two 
officers and two FSNs.  A Consular Assistant will begin working for 
the Section in March 2009.  Everyone assists with fraud prevention 
work.  Both officers have completed PC-541 Fraud Prevention for 
Consular Managers. 
 
TALLINN 00000060  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
DECKER