VZCZCXRO8532
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHJS #0025/01 0720927
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 130927Z MAR 09
FM AMCONSUL SURABAYA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0378
INFO RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0005
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 0363
RUEHJS/AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0384
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 0023

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SURABAYA 000025 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR CA/FPP AND CA/VO/KCC 
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/EAP AND DS/ICI/CR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC ID
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - (SURABAYA) 
 
REF: A) 09 SURABAYA 009, B) 08 SURABAYA 0113, C) 08 SURABAYA 0103 
 
SURABAYA 00000025  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶1.  Please find below the semi-annual fraud report for U.S. 
Consulate General Surabaya for the period September 2008 - 
February 2009. 
 
¶A.  Country Conditions 
 
Indonesia is an archipelago of over 17,500 islands spanning 
three time zones and 3,400 miles along the Equator.  Its 
population of 245 million comprises more than 300 ethnic groups 
and six official religions.  Inter-island economic migration is 
common (especially to and from Java).  Indonesia is a poor 
country -- nearly half the population earns less than two 
dollars a day -- but there is a thin layer of extreme wealth. 
Bribery and corruption are common. 
 
Consular fraud is high, but generally not very sophisticated. 
Visa brokers and document vendors take advantage of visa 
seekers' lack of familiarity with the visa process to charge 
them exorbitant amounts for mediocre documents. 
 
Consular Officers in Surabaya do not rely heavily on 
documentation and focus more on visa interviews in evaluating 
applicants' ability to overcome 214(b). When an applicant is 
suspected of being the client of a document vendor, adjudicating 
officers refer the cases to the Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU) for 
further investigation.  When fraud is confirmed and/or follow-up 
investigative interviews are likely to yield additional 
information, the Fraud Prevention Manager refers the case for a 
secondary interview.  Secondary investigative interviews 
generally involve the Regional Security Officer (RSO), the Fraud 
Prevention Manager, the Consular Fraud Prevention LES, and the 
RSO LES Investigator.  Referrals often lead to arrests and/or 
raids of document vendor operations. 
 
¶B.  NIV Fraud 
 
CCD statistics show that Surabaya referred 130 cases to the FPU 
for further investigation during the September 2008 - February 
2009 time period. Fraud was confirmed in 22 percent of cases 
that were referred to the FPU.  Note:  Post randomly selects a 
few C1/D cases each week to confirm previous employment.  Post 
also uses the FPU function within the Non-Immigrant Visa (NIV) 
application to request verification of some documents, even in 
certain cases when fraud is not suspected.  End Note. 
 
Based on Post's fraud investigations, police arrested 15 persons 
either for using and/or selling fraudulent documents, or for 
involvement in attempted alien smuggling.  Among those arrested 
were seven B1/B2 applicants, four C1/D applicants, and four 
document vendors. 
 
PPT - During the reporting period, no applicants applied using 
new passports with new identities. 
 
A3/G5 - Post received no applications for A3/G5 visas during the 
reporting period. 
 
B1/B2 - Among the 15 arrests during the reporting period, seven 
were applicants for B1/B2 visas.  All were related to either 
document fraud, the use of fraudulent immigration stamps, or 
attempts to smuggle individuals into the US for apparent illegal 
employment.  While it is likely that some applicants who were 
refused visas in accordance with Section 214(b) had fraudulent 
documents in their possession at the time of their interviews, 
adjudicating officers do not routinely ask applicants for 
unnecessary documents unless fraud is suspected.  In cases when 
fraud is clearly suspected, however, adjudicating officers ask 
applicants to submit all documents they brought to their 
interviews for follow-up investigation. 
 
C1/D - Post detected four cases (applicants applied together) of 
C1/D fraud involving fraudulent seaman's books and training 
certificates.  The four applicants and the two document vendors 
who had provided the documents were arrested and prosecuted. 
Unlike Post's usual C1/D applicants, these applicants were not 
recruited by a recruitment company. 
 
H1B - Most H1B applicants who apply in Surabaya received their 
university degrees in the United States.  For H1B applicants who 
do not have U.S. university educations, Post verifies their 
education credentials.  The same practice applies to applicants 
for L visas as well. 
 
H2B - In 2007, all H2B visa adjudications in Indonesia were 
temporarily transferred to Jakarta.  Surabaya began adjudicating 
H2B visas again on October 1, 2008.  Post conducts site visits 
 
SURABAYA 00000025  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
of local H2B agents as part of its fraud prevention program. 
Post also utilizes the same registration program for H2B agents 
that is used in Jakarta, similar to the registration process for 
C1/D agents. 
 
F1 - Among the least qualified applicants for F1 visas 
interviewed at Post are those who are enrolled in short-term 
English language programs in the United States.  In several 
cases, such applicants have indicated that distant relatives 
and/or friends whom they met on the internet would fund their 
educational programs. 
 
J1 - Surabaya has seen a few recent cases of J1 employees hired 
to work in menial jobs that would normally be filled by H2B 
workers.  Post also recently refused four J1 internship/trainee 
applicants who were recruited by APEX USA, a recruiter who 
recruited approximately 300 J1s from Bali and East Java in 2006. 
 Post's recent J1 validation study which included only issuances 
to applicants recruited by APEX during 2006 revealed a 
non-return rate of 32 percent (Ref A).  These four applicants 
were the first applicants recruited by APEX to apply in Surabaya 
since mid-2007. 
 
M1 - No new M1 fraud cases during the reporting period. 
 
R1 - No new R1 fraud cases during the reporting period. 
 
¶C.  IV fraud. 
 
Surabaya does not adjudicate Immigrant Visas. 
 
¶D.  Diversity Visa (DV) fraud. 
 
Surabaya does not adjudicate Diversity Visas, but has assisted 
with occasional DV investigations and DV visa outreach efforts. 
 
¶E.  ACS and Passport Fraud. 
 
Post did not identify any cases of ACS or passport fraud during 
the reporting period. 
 
¶F.  Adoption fraud. 
 
Surabaya does not process adoptions. 
 
¶G. Use of DNA testing 
 
There are no special circumstances with regards to DNA testing 
in Indonesia and Post receives results in a timely manner.  Post 
requests DNA testing for American citizenship cases when 
insufficient proof of parentage is provided. 
 
¶H.  Asylum/DHS benefit fraud. 
 
Post was contacted by a representative of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) in September 2008 about an Indonesian 
man who had adjusted status through marriage to an American 
Citizen.  The DHS suspected that he had not divorced his wife in 
Indonesia and had submitted fraudulent divorce documents in 
support of his marriage and subsequent application to adjust 
status.  Post confirmed with Civil Registry officials that the 
divorce certificate was fraudulent.  Disturbingly, the 
Indonesian man in question was an employee of the National Visa 
Center in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and had recently been 
terminated for allegedly removing visa records from the 
facility. 
 
¶I. Alien smuggling, trafficking, organized crime, terrorist 
travel. 
 
Post detected eleven cases of what appeared to be attempted 
alien smuggling during the reporting period.  Five B1/B2 visa 
applicants, including three young ladies and two middle-aged 
ladies, applied without a clear understanding of where they were 
going or what they would be doing in the United States.  The 
oldest lady among the applicants noted during the secondary 
interview that she did not know the other ladies, but suspected 
they were prostitutes.  Based on the bank books of the 
applicants and statements made by the travel agent, the agent 
had deposited the equivalent of $10,000 USD into each of the 
applicant's bank accounts.  He had also driven them to the 
Consulate for their interviews, arranged for "someone" to pick 
them up at the airport when they reached Los Angeles, and waited 
for the applicants nearby the Consulate.  Following a secondary 
interview with the RSO and FPM, Indonesian Police arrested the 
five applicants and the travel agent. 
 
 
SURABAYA 00000025  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
In a second case, two male applicants for B1/B2 visas applied 
with the assistance of a retired Indonesian employee of Carnival 
Cruise Lines.  The former Cruise Line employee, who had a valid 
B1/B2 visa, had arranged for the two men to spend time in 
California with his "friends."  He claimed the two applicants 
were family members, but only one of the applicants knew any 
details about the former Cruise Line employee and neither could 
provide details about where he was going or what he would be 
doing in the United States.  Based on the investigation, it was 
determined that the two men were likely going to work illegally 
in California.  Post cancelled the valid visa of the former 
Cruise Line employee.  Police arrested all three men and 
conducted additional interviews, but determined there was 
insufficient evidence to prosecute. 
 
In a third case, four C1/D applicants applied with fraudulent 
seaman's books and training certificates.  The applicants 
claimed employment that was confirmed to be non-existent.  The 
applicants had been in contact with the document vendors for a 
significant period of time, with one having initially contacted 
the vendors three years before the visa application was 
submitted.  That applicant indicated he had paid the vendors a 
total of 87 million Rupiah (approximately $7200 USD) over the 
three year period to arrange his "application package."  The 
other applicants had paid less, but still significant fees to 
the document vendors.  The four applicants and two document 
vendors were arrested and prosecuted.  The document vendors, an 
Indonesian originally from Papua who owns a travel office in 
Malang, East Java, and an Indonesian from Surabaya, face the 
potential of several years imprisonment. 
 
Note:  The U.S. Department of Justice provided Trafficking in 
Persons (TIP) training to law enforcement officers within the 
Surabaya Criminal Investigative Division in October 2008 through 
its International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance 
Program (ICITAP).  In March 2009, both the Consular Fraud 
Prevention Investigator and the RSO FSN Investigator, both of 
whom generally participate in secondary interviews of visa 
applicants who have submitted fraudulent documents and/or 
information, participated in ICITAP interview and interrogation 
techniques training at Embassy Jakarta.  End Note. 
 
¶J. DS criminal investigations. 
 
The FPM and the RSO enjoy an excellent working relationship. 
The Consular Section has employed a Standard Operating Procedure 
for referral of suspected visa fraud cases to the Fraud 
Prevention Unit and, when necessary, to the RSO for follow-up 
investigation.  The FPU leads Post's fraud prevention activities 
up to the point of secondary investigative interviews and police 
involvement, at which time the RSO takes the lead.  Results of 
investigations as well as police and court actions are always 
shared and discussed. 
 
During the past six months, FPU and RSO cooperation has led to 
15 arrests by the Indonesian Police, primarily document vendors, 
attempted alien smugglers, and their clients.  Note:  Except in 
very rare cases, police generally hold applicants only a few 
hours or overnight for questioning and do not prosecute the 
applicants.  Document vendors, on the other hand, are generally 
held for a longer period of time, with some being prosecuted. 
 
¶K. Host country documents. 
 
It is not difficult to obtain authentic documents containing 
fraudulent information. Breeder documents for passports are 
relatively easy to obtain through bribery. 
 
Post has recently improved its relationship with the Surabaya 
civil registry personnel.  Most civil registry records are paper 
and are not centralized, which creates time delays in obtaining 
verification. 
 
The Indonesian passport has been re-designed several times in 
the past decade.  For the current version, biodata is on page 
two and contains a machine-readable zone.  The 2005 version has 
a glass-bead laminate over the biodata page that contains 
holograms of the letters 'RI' (for Republik Indonesia).  The 
2008 version has the same features, but uses a thinner laminate. 
 Under UV-light, page numbers (that match the page numbers 
visible with the naked eye) appear, as do the letters 'RI'.  The 
UV-sensitive page numbers appear in a different position on each 
page.  The thread in the centerfold between pages 24 and 25 is 
also UV-sensitive.  Note:  FPM recently met with Surabaya 
Immigration officials and toured their passport operation. 
According to the Director of Immigration in Surabaya, all new 
and repeat Indonesian passport applicants' fingerprints are 
 
SURABAYA 00000025  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
checked against a central biometric database.  End Note. 
 
Indonesian residents over 18 are issued a national ID.  The card 
is valid for 5 years (until age 60 when the card is valid for 
life).  It lists the individual's name, place and date of birth, 
religion, blood type, citizenship, current address, ID number, 
photo, and signature and/or thumb print.  Though deemed a 
national ID card, they are issued at the district level and an 
individual must obtain a new one if s/he changes his/her place 
of residence.  The KTP card does not have any significant 
security features. 
 
Indonesian households are issued a family household card.  It is 
issued at the local level and varies considerably in format.  It 
lists the family members in a household and each person's place 
and date of birth, religion, occupation and their parents' 
names) on A4-size paper or cardstock. 
 
Indonesians usually obtain marriage certificates from the 
religious ceremony, which are used to obtain a civil marriage 
certificate.  A marriage is not considered legally valid unless 
a certificate is issued by a civil registry office. 
 
Indonesians commonly laminate their civil documents. 
 
¶L.  Host government authorities. 
 
The Consulate has requested the assistance of local police on 
several occasions during the reporting period, each time 
receiving good cooperation. 
 
¶M.  Areas of particular concern / general remarks. 
 
There are no areas of particular concern at this time.  However, 
Post recently conducted a validation study of J1 visas issued in 
2006 to applicants who were recruited by APEX USA (see Ref A). 
Post chose to review these specific issuances because: (1)there 
were known issues with past APEX-recruited applicants; and, (2) 
APEX had indicated plans to revive its recruitment of J1 
trainees and interns as well as the possibility of beginning 
recruitment of H2B applicants.  The J1 visa validation study 
demonstrated that applicants recruited by APEX and issued visas 
in 2006 had a non-return rate of 32 percent. 
 
While the diplomatic community in Surabaya is quite small, 
Post's FPM and Consular Fraud Prevention LES met with Consular 
Section employees of the Japanese Consulate to discuss visa and 
document fraud issues in late 2008. 
 
¶N.  Staffing and training. 
 
Consular Chief/FPM - has attended the ConGen course; Fraud 
Prevention for Consular Managers, Detecting Imposters; Detecting 
Fraudulent Documents; DHS Fraud Prevention Workshops; and a 
China-wide Fraud Prevention Conference. 
 
LES Consular Fraud Investigator - has attended the Fraud 
Prevention Course for LES (PC-542); a Customs and Border 
Protection fraud prevention training session in Jakarta; and an 
ICITAP interview and interrogation techniques course in Jakarta. 
 
Regional Security Officer (RSO) - Has not yet attended fraud 
prevention-related training. 
 
RSO LES Investigator - recently attended ICITAP interview and 
interrogation techniques training in Jakarta. 
MCCLELLAND