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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #1007 0902011
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 311951Z MAR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0000
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 0000
RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD PRIORITY 0000
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 0000
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 0000
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 0000

UNCLAS STATE 031007 
 
SIPDIS 
BAGHDAD FOR DAVID HOWELL 
BAGHDAD FOR NATALIE AHN 
BAGHDAD FOR MNSTC-I SAO 
BAGHDAD FOR MNSTC-I J4 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC IZ KOMC OTRA PARM PREL
SUBJECT: BLUE LANTERN: IRAQ END-USE MONITORING AND NDAA 
SECTION 1228 
 
¶1. Summary:  A joint DOS Blue Lantern/DoD Golden Sentry team 
visited Iraq February 24-28 for consultations on end-use 
monitoring (EUM) of U.S.-provided or licensed defense 
articles, and NDAA Section 1228 compliance.  The joint team 
met with Iraqi MOD, Counter-Terrorism Bureau and Special 
Operations Forces, and with the Security Assistance Office 
(SAO) for the Multi-National Security Transition Command Iraq 
(MNSTC-I), J4, U.S. Embassy Baghdad Political-Military 
Affairs Section, as well as U.S. military transition teams. 
In addition to working to develop a standard operating 
procedure (SOP) on NDAA Section 1228 compliance, discussions 
focused on EUM of night vision devices (NVDs). Significant 
challenges with NVD accountability in Iraq remain, 
particularly given ongoing combat deployments of the 
equipment with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) units.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2. Background:  Administered by the Office of Defense Trade 
Controls Compliance (PM/DTCC) in the Bureau of 
Political-Military Affairs, Blue Lantern is a global program 
designed to verify the end-use, end-users, and disposition of 
defense articles, technology, and services exported under a 
Department of State authorization pursuant to the Arms Export 
Control Act (AECA) and the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR). In effect since October 23, 2008, the 
National Defense Authorization Action (NDAA) of 2008, Section 
1228 mandates the development of a "registration and 
monitoring" system for all lethal defense articles provided 
to Iraqi end-users.  Specifically, NDAA Section 1228 requires 
the registration of serial numbers of all small arms provided 
to the government of Iraq or to other groups, organizations, 
citizens and residents of Iraq, as well as an "end-use 
monitoring" program for all "lethal defense articles" 
provided to "such entities or individuals."  As both direct 
commercial sales (DCS) licensed by the Department of State 
and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) under Department of Defense 
authorities are affected, a joint DOS-DOD team was composed 
to conduct a joint end-use monitoring (EUM) and NDAA Section 
1228 compliance assessment.  Research and Analysis Division 
Chief Ed Peartree and Compliance Specialist for Iraq 
Monitoring Kyle Ballard from PM/DTCC represented the 
Department.  CENTCOM Golden Sentry Program Manager Chuck 
Handal and CENTCOM EUM Officer Lt. Commander Martin Thomas 
represented the Department of Defense,s Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency (DSCA) 
 
¶3.    Team began the visit with MNSTC-I SAO EUM team Major 
Gene Beltran and Captain Steven Moore.  Beltran and Moore 
described their roles within MNSTC-I SAO organization as 
primarily working FMS cases for Iraqi forces and related EUM; 
they noted that since the release of NDAA Section 1228 they 
have been following DCS weapons and night vision devices 
(NVDs) as well and had developed an SOP for Section 1228 
compliance. 
 
¶4.    Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) HQ visit: 
DOS/DOD team and MNF-I Special Operations Iraqi Transition 
Team (SOITT) Lt. Col. Nelson and ordnance officer Major Kevin 
Groth met with Deputy Commander of the ISOF Brigadier General 
Falah and Colonel Husayn.  DOS/DOD team toured ISOF arms 
rooms and reviewed weapons accountability procedures. 
Security and inventory control procedures for ISOF arms rooms 
were well established and ISOF appeared to stress strict 
adherence.  Both U.S. infantry weapons and NVDs (U.S.-made 
AN-PVS 7, 10, 14, and 17) were observed.  SOITT and ISOF were 
cognizant of U.S. EUM requirements.  Nearly all U.S.-provided 
NVDs in Iraq are provided to Special Operations units; 
General Falah stressed the criticality of night vision 
capability to their operations.  Major Groth outlined key 
challenges such as the need for better maintenance, repair, 
and stockage of spare parts (particularly image 
intensification tubes).  Currently there is limited 
capability for maintenance and repair, and a significant 
backlog of damaged equipment.  Anham, a U.S. contractor, has 
a contract to do repair/maintenance at the Taji National 
Depot Complex, but ISOF has limited access and significant 
logistics challenges as Taji is many miles away.  In 
addition, Anham has no repair parts on the shelf (bench 
stock), and is currently unable to perform NVD maintenance 
until parts can be ordered and received.  This lack of 
service/bench stock had led to the inadvertent provision  of 
replacement tubes over the 1250 Figure of Merit (FOM) limit 
allowed for export to non-US forces -- a problem identified 
by an October 2008 DOD Inspector General team and resulting 
in a 15-6 report (violation). 
 
¶5.    DOS-DOD team met separately with SOITT to discuss these 
continuing problems and identify a way forward.  MNSTC-I SAO 
had issued a fragmentary order (FRAGO) to all U.S. training 
forces warning about providing tubes from US stocks into 
Iraqi NVDs.  (Comment: all DOS authorizations for export of 
NVDs include provisos strictly prohibiting export of any NVDs 
with FOM above 1250 and requiring end-user to sign a 
statement of compliance with these restrictions. It is 
unclear, however, that these are being provided to Iraqi 
end-users or that the statements of compliance are being 
fulfilled.)  An ideal solution would be an on-site service 
facility with an appropriately licensed agreement to provide 
services/spare parts.  Such a facility should be managed and 
funded by the Government of Iraq. 
 
¶6.     Iraqi MOD (IMOD) Central Auditing Office: Team 
provided an end-use monitoring briefing for Brigadier General 
Hakim, Brigadier General Asam, and the Director General of 
Acquisition and Supply.  Central Auditing is the IMOD focal 
point for managing disposition of weapons and other defense 
articles; Central Auditing had been working with MNSTC-I SAO 
team on tracking NVDs provided to the Iraqi Security Forces 
(ISF) by the United States.  The Director General of 
Acquisition and Supply manages logistics, procurement and 
distribution of defense articles for ISF.  Weapons and other 
defense articles to be provided by USG to ISF are logged and 
inventoried on arrival to Taji in depot property books and 
again, jointly, when they are distributed to ISF. (Comment: 
Taji National Depot Complex - Supply Depot, per MNSTC-I 
policy statement #03-08, March 24, 2008, serves as principal 
depot for distribution of all U.S.-provided defense articles 
to the ISF.)  Distribution to the ISF unit level is also 
subject to regular inventory verification procedures through 
an established chain of command.  Any damaged, lost, or 
stolen equipment is reviewed by an investigative committee 
which assesses responsibility and punitive action.  The 
General assured that strict weapons security measures were in 
place to prevent loss and theft. 
 
¶7.    DOS-DOD EUM team visited Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Bureau 
(CTB) to provide an EUM brief and discuss Section 1228 
requirements, as well as share the details of our NVD 
accountability discussion with ISOF.  CTB is the central 
bureau under which ISOF operates. 
 
¶8.    MNSTC-I SAO and J4 discussions:  Team discussed way 
forward and challenges for EUM in Iraq with MNSTC-I SAO Chief 
of Staff Colonel Russ Kern.  Blue Lantern representatives 
emphasized that DOS compliance with Section 1228 will require 
close coordination with and support from MNSTC-I; this was 
outlined in PM A/AS Ruggiero,s August 29, 2008 letter to 
DSCA Director Admiral Wieringa.  Colonel Kern confirmed that 
SAO EUM team will be POC and requested that Department of 
State clearly articulate needs from SAO EUM.  Blue Lantern 
team envisioned that Blue Lantern cables would be sent from 
Washington to Embassy Baghdad Political-Military Affairs 
section requesting end-use checks on exports of lethal 
defense articles; Pol-Mil section would then coordinate with 
MNSTC-I SAO EUM team and J4.  Given that DCS NVDs are being 
provided in support of ISF, and are not subject to DSCA 
Golden Sentry enhanced end-use monitoring as FMS NVDs are, 
Kern suggested that SAO EUM would be able to perform checks 
on these items incidentally while doing their mandatory FMS 
EUM.  Kern also emphasized the challenges of performing EUM 
in non-permissive environments where combat operations 
involving MNF-I and ISF forces are continuing; agreement was 
made that reporting standards be qualified to include "as 
security environment, force protection posture, and resources 
permit." 
 
¶9.    J4 Property Accountability Section Chief LTC Sharon 
Johnson described how serial numbers for all U.S.-provided 
weapons and other defense articles contracted by the Joint 
Contracting Command - Iraq (JCC-I) for provision to ISF -- 
whether FMS or DCS -- are sent to MNSTC-I J4 Property 
Accountability Section.  U.S. brokered foreign weapons 
purchased with USG funds would also be included, as they 
would pass through JCCI/MNSTC-I. When new weapons arrive, 
notification via Delivery Document (DD-250) is emailed to J4 
with serial numbers.  Other serialized items -- NVGs, 
vehicles, etc.  are also logged and all items are uploaded 
into a database which includes origin, delivery date, item 
description, end-user and other relevant information. 
Non-serialized items are also logged (e.g., uniforms) as 
"issue logs."  DCS weapons and other USML items to be used by 
private security firms would not/not be logged if they are 
not under JCC-I contract.  On a quarterly basis, all weapons 
serial numbers logged by J4 are forwarded to Army Logistics 
Command (LOGSA) and to DSCA Golden Sentry.  Abu Ghraib 
warehouse is soon closing and the Baghdad Police College will 
be the distribution point for the Iraqi MOI. 
 
¶10. J4 conveyed to Blue Lantern team that it is able and 
willing to verify DCS exports for which it has records by 
matching serial numbers provided to DDTC by exporters with 
those collected via DD-250 in the J4 database.  Following 
verification of export in Washington, DDTC will forward 
serial numbers to J4 via email to confirm receipt and 
delivery to appropriate ISF end-users. 
 
¶11. Embassy Baghdad Political-Military Section:  Blue Lantern 
team briefed Political-Military Affairs Minister-Counselor 
Michael Corbin and officers Natalie Ahn and David Howell on 
NDAA Section 1228 requirements and implications for Embassy 
Baghdad,s Blue Lantern responsibilities.  Corbin asked about 
the expected increase in volume of Blue Lantern end-use 
checks that would be sent to Embassy and sought clarification 
on the scope of the law.  Peartree indicated that based on 
recent licensing volume, the number of Blue Lantern requests 
would not be excessive, and that Blue Lanterns pursuant to 
NDAA Section 1228 would generally be initiated for USG-funded 
weapons supplied to Iraqi end-users; defense articles 
acquired through FMS -- which we expect to be the bulk of 
future weapons exports -- would fall under the jurisdiction 
of DOD,s Golden Sentry EUM program.  Similarly, weapons and 
other U.S. Munitions List (USML) items provided under DOS 
license for private security contractors -- the bulk of 
recent licensed exports to Iraq -- would not in most cases 
require Blue Lantern action in Baghdad, as DDTC would work 
directly with U.S. companies/exporters to obtain necessary 
information and end-use assurances. 
 
¶12. Hotwash: Reviewing findings and outlining way forward. 
Joint Blue Lantern and Golden Sentry team met with MNSTC-I 
and Embassy Baghdad representatives to review visit and 
outline an SOP for end-use monitoring in Iraq.  Peartree 
emphasized that though there were different means to an end, 
both DSCA (Golden Sentry) and DOS Blue Lantern program were 
focused on the same mission: accountability and security of 
defense exports to Iraq.  As a notional SOP for Blue Lantern 
end-use monitoring of DCS exports subject to NDAA Section 
1228, the following guidance was outlined: 
 
Following confirmation of shipment of lethal defense articles 
licensed by the Department of State for Iraqi end-users, a 
Blue Lantern cable will be sent from Washington to Embassy 
Baghdad (Political-Military Affairs). 
DDTC will also forward to Embassy Baghdad, via email, an 
excel spreadsheet including serial numbers of lethal defense 
articles in the subject export. 
Embassy Baghdad will coordinate with MNSTC-I SAO EUM and J4 
team to confirm receipt of the subject lethal defense 
articles and verify that they have been delivered to the 
appropriate ISF end-users identified in the Blue Lantern 
cable. 
Embassy Baghdad will also forward serial numbers spreadsheet 
to MNSTC-I J4 to verify and match the serial numbers provided 
to DDTC at export with those received in Iraq. 
Results of the Blue Lantern check will be cabled back to 
Washington by Embassy Baghdad. 
DCS exports licensed by the Department of State to private 
security contractors will generally be handled directly with 
license applicant by DDTC in Washington, though they may, 
from time to time, require Blue Lantern checks in Iraq. 
 
¶13. Efforts to gain accountability of both FMS and DCS NVDs 
in Iraq will continue.  Limited responses to the first FRAGO 
would hopefully improve following a second FRAGO (deadline 
March 15) sent out across MNSTC-I seeking accountability of 
USG-provided NVDs within ISF units.  Embassy Baghdad Pol-Mil 
officer David Howell asked Colonel Kern to provide a 
timeline by which a baseline would be established for NVDs; 
estimates of the number of NVDs provided to ISF during the 
past several years varied widely and accountability will 
remain elusive until a unit by unit inventory can be taken. 
Peartree emphasized that since the DCS NVDs licensed under 
the Department,s authorities were not subject to DSCA Golden 
Sentry EUM requirements and the SAOs end-use monitoring 
checks, DDTC is dependent on regular reporting of loss, theft 
or unauthorized access stipulated in DOS license provisos; 
Iraqis will need to provide this reporting to keep us 
apprised of security problems and avoid more serious problems 
in the future that could jeopardize DCS NVD exports. 
 
¶14. Comments: Blue Lantern team is confident that Blue 
Lantern checks in Iraq pursuant to NDAA Section 1228 can be 
successfully completed by Embassy Baghdad working with 
MNSTC-I SAO EUM and J4 contacts.  Given that the ISF 
conversion from legacy Warsaw Pact infantry weapons (e.g., 
AK-47 rifles) to NATO-standard will largely be completed via 
FMS, we do not anticipate a significant increase in DCS 
exports subject to NDAA Section 1228 requirements.  EUM for 
NVDs remains a challenge; working with U.S. exporters and 
Iraqi end-users to ensure compliance with license provisos, 
and assistance from SAO EUM team in Baghdad will help improve 
accountability and controls.  We will also work to improve 
compliance with NVD provisos in Washington by reinforcing 
requirements imposed on license applicants to ensure end-user 
understandings of USG law, regulation and policy. 
 
¶15. Washington expresses gratitude for the excellent support 
provided by Embassy Baghdad Political-Military Affairs 
Officers Natalie Ahn and David Howell, and MNSTC-I Major Gene 
Beltran (USAF) and Captain Steve Moore (USAF). 
CLINTON