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DE RUEHC #0541/01 0900106
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 310046Z MAR 09 ZDK ALL
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 6477

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 030541 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PTER ASEC KCRM ENRG ETRD KCOR PINR
SUBJECT: UPDATED GUIDANCE ON REPORTING RADIATION ALARMS 
 
REF: (A)2007 STATE 162091, (B)2006 STATE 163201 AND 
PREVIOUS 
 
STATE 00030541  001.2 OF 006 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary and Action Request:  This guidance 
cable updates and replaces reftels to reflect national- 
level policy for reporting radiation alarms and nuclear 
smuggling.  All Embassies and other posts are instructed 
to initially notify the Department by telephone or e- 
mail, specifically to the PM/ISO Political-Military 
Action Team (PMAT) within one hour of receipt of 
information regarding all significant, special concern 
or unresolved alarms, or reports of nuclear or 
radioactive smuggling.  The PMAT is staffed 24/7 and is 
reached at 202-647-9000 or via e-mail: 
PM_AT_Team@state.gov or PM_AT_Team@state.sgov.gov. 
Instructions for notifying the PMAT are included in para 
9 while significant, special concern and unresolved 
alarms are defined in para 8.  Because of the urgent 
threat nuclear/radioactive materials may pose to the 
United States and its interests abroad, even small 
delays in reporting to Washington may severely impact 
U.S. security. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Embassies and all other posts should ensure 
that all individuals serving as duty officers and all 
agencies in country are aware of and observe the 
reporting requirements.  Please place a copy of the text 
of this cable in the duty instructions as well as a note 
in the Embassy's Emergency Action Plan indicating who to 
call in the event of a possible illicit trafficking 
incident.  A sample reporting cable is provided in para 
¶14. All cables must carry the following tags:  KNNP, 
MNUC, PARM, KCRM, PTER, ASEC, KCOR, PINR, SIPDIS and 
appropriate country tags to ensure dissemination to all 
Washington agencies.  In all cases, the Embassy Country 
Team shall remain the central coordinator for engagement 
with host governments regarding detector alarms and 
other potential cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear 
materials.  End Summary and Action request. 
 
---------- 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The proliferation of nuclear technology and 
increased threat from terrorists and transnational 
criminal networks since 9/11 has intensified U.S. 
efforts to prevent our adversaries from acquiring 
nuclear and radiological material.  The U.S. continues 
to work with international partners to identify and 
effectively respond to illicitly trafficked nuclear and 
radioactive material that could be used in terrorist 
attacks.  Previous cases involving radiation detectors 
demonstrated the need to ensure that all USG personnel 
under Chief of Mission authority follow these procedures 
in reporting overseas alarms to Washington to accelerate 
response times. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Increased reporting speed is crucial for 
giving the Agencies responsible for U.S. response 
actions adequate time to plan interdictions and avert 
threats.  Diplomatic action remains the preferred 
mechanism for responding to and resolving potential 
threats, but in the absence of a resolution, the U.S. 
must be prepared to take all necessary means to 
eliminate a potential threat.  Quick reporting of alarms 
and other significant cases of potential nuclear 
smuggling ensures maximum time is available for response 
and operational decisions. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) In this context, post reporting serves as a 
trigger to set inter-agency processes in motion. 
Although the requirement of notification within one hour 
may prove challenging for many embassies and posts, it 
is essential that it be followed.  The relevant inter- 
agency committees have agreed on the necessity of a one 
hour rule because of the potential of a genuine threat 
to U.S. security. Post should provide an unclassified 
notification if secure communication isn't possible. It 
is of paramount importance that the initial notification 
be received within one hour regardless of whether 
communication is by secure or unsecure means. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) In some instances (e.g., in case of an 
airborne cargo that has tripped a detector), it will be 
necessary for notification to take place even faster - 
within minutes of post's receipt of information. 
 
STATE 00030541  002.2 OF 006 
 
 
Particularly in situations where a potential threat to 
U.S. security may be imminent and grave, posts should 
not wait for more complete information.  If in doubt, 
posts should err on the side of reporting incomplete 
information sooner, rather than wait for a more complete 
report later. 
 
¶7.  (U) Posts may receive information on smuggling 
and/or alarms from host governments, walk-ins, other 
informal channels, or from U.S. government personnel 
located at foreign ports or border locations.  This may 
include detections by radiation portal monitors (RPMs) 
and other equipment used or installed by the Department 
of Homeland Security's (DHS) Container Security 
Initiative (CSI); Department of Energy's (DOE) Second 
Line of Defense Program, including the Mega Ports 
Initiative; State Department's Export Control and 
Related Border Security (EXBS) program; Department of 
Defense's (DOD) Cooperative Threat Reduction program or 
by other equipment provided through other USG assistance 
programs.  USG personnel who are in-country with these 
programs have been instructed and are expected to notify 
the Country Team about detection events that involve 
special nuclear material, significant radiological 
material or ones they are unable to adjudicate with 
their local protocols.  In all cases the Embassy Country 
Team should:  1) follow up on initial reporting of an incident 
when additional information becomes available; 2) 
respond to Washington inter-agency requests for 
additional data expeditiously: and 3) immediately engage 
with host governments at all appropriate levels upon 
instruction from the Department. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Significant alarms/incidents include:  (1) 
foreign government requests for assistance, (2) material 
which cannot be identified, and (3) alarms with no 
legitimate cause and/or are indeterminate.  Unresolved 
or indeterminate alarms are alarms in which local 
protocols and/or technical reachback cannot provide 
resolution.  Special concern alarms involve special 
nuclear material (SNM) or those in which SNM cannot be 
ruled out.  Specifically, SNM is uranium enriched in the 
isotopes U-235 or U-233 and Plutonium-239.  Other 
special concern alarms may involve isotopes of concern 
including Americium-241, Californium-252, Cesium-137, 
Cobalt-60, Curium-244, Iridium-192, Plutonium-238, 
Radium-226, and Strontium-90. 
 
------------------------------- 
Outline of Reporting Procedures 
------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) To report all significant, special concern, or 
unresolved alarms or reports of nuclear or radioactive 
material smuggling, post officials should contact the 
Political-Military Action Team (PMAT) within one hour. 
The PMAT will serve as the communications focal point 
for all reports of alarms or nuclear smuggling incidents 
and will notify action officers of any case that arises. 
The PMAT e-mail address is displayed in the Global 
Address List as PM-Action Team.  The full e-mail address 
is:  PM(underscore)AT(underscore)TEAM(at symbol)state. 
sgov.gov (classified) or PM(underscore)AT(underscore)TEAM 
(at symbol)state.gov (unclassified). PMAT is reachable on 
a 24/7 basis at 202-647-9000. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) If feasible, a prompt e-mail from post to the 
PMAT reduces risk of misunderstanding that may occur in 
telephonic communications.  However, e-mail 
notifications must be preceded by a phone call from post 
warning of the impending e-mail, and post must follow-up 
the e-mail with a telephone call to the PMAT verifying 
receipt. If a rapid e-mail from post is not practical, 
telephonic communications will be used to convey the 
initial report. Until and unless an e-mail response 
acknowledging receipt of the information by the PMAT is 
received, Post must continue notification efforts. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) No more than two hours after receiving 
information about a significant, special concern or 
unresolved alarm or other case of potential nuclear 
smuggling, Posts are instructed to transmit a report on 
the incident via front channel cable with the highest 
precedence available (immediate, flash or critic).  In 
many cases, initial reports to Posts about an alarm or 
nuclear smuggling incident will not have all information 
desired by the Department. Posts are requested to not 
wait to collect all the information desired, but rather 
to alert Washington immediately upon receipt of (even 
partial) information. Posts should then follow up with 
additional information as the Country Team develops it. 
 
STATE 00030541  003.2 OF 006 
 
 
It is essential that all reporting be transmitted via 
front channel cable and includes the same tags as the 
initial notification.  Because of the time line for 
certain types of incidents (especially any involving air 
transport), any delays in notifying Washington could be 
costly. 
 
--------------------- 
Details to Report 
--------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) The initial e-mail/telephone call and front 
channel cable should answer the basic questions from the 
following four categories:  (1) physical location and 
description of material; (2) alarm and detection details 
(3) host government response; and (4) details on 
individuals involved.  If all the information is not 
available, post should answer the basic questions with 
"not yet known" in order to ensure all questions are 
reviewed.  Please also include the name, credibility, 
and contact information for all sources and classify as 
appropriate. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Location and Description of Material 
------------------------------------ 
 
--Is the material currently stationary or transit? 
--What type of material (HEU, plutonium, or other 
radioactive material)? 
--What procedures were used to identify the material? 
--What isotopes and physical form of the material? 
--How much material is involved (in grams, kilograms, 
curies, millicuries, etc?  Spell out units and provide 
as much detail as possible to avoid misunderstandings). 
--Are there detailed descriptions of container, to 
include: markings, color, size, weight, type of 
material, how hidden, etc?  Include pictures if 
possible. 
--If the material or conveyance is in transit, how is it 
moving? 
--What is the material's intended destination and 
shipping route?  Please note (e.g., between 
international ports, directly to the US, via other 
foreign ports to the US)? 
--Is there a manifest or other shipping information 
associated with the conveyance? 
--Who is the supplier of the material and/or origination 
point of material? 
 
--------------------------- 
Alarm and Detection Details 
--------------------------- 
 
--What is the source of the report? 
--What is the date and time of alarm or incident? 
--If it was a radiation alarm, include basic technical 
data such as the type of alarm (Gamma/Neutron/Both), the 
dose rates, the data log from a portal monitor, and the 
Gamma energy spectrum. 
--Is a separate email of a spectral file available? 
--What else if anything was being smuggled with the 
material? 
--What is the specific place where alarm or incident 
occurred? 
--If a radiation detector was used, what was the 
distance from the radiation detector to the object(s) 
being measured and what was the detector type (make and 
model)?  Please also note the placement of the detector. 
When gamma spectral data is provided, a calibration 
spectrum and a background spectrum should always be 
provided. 
 
 
------------------------ 
Host Government Response 
------------------------ 
 
--Who is physically responsible for the material 
presently? 
--How is it secured? 
--Are the appropriate authorities capable or willing to 
secure the material? 
--How does the host government plan to dispose of the 
material? 
--Who knows about the material (i.e. press)? 
--If seized on a border, does the neighboring government 
know? 
--Does the IAEA know or does host government intend to 
inform the IAEA in the near future? 
--Which agency(ies) have the lead in investigating the 
 
STATE 00030541  004.2 OF 006 
 
 
case? 
--Have any criminal charges been issued against the 
people involved in the incident?  Are the people 
involved in prison?  What are the next steps in the 
legal process? 
------------------------------- 
Details on Individuals Involved 
------------------------------- 
 
--Please provide biographical information for all 
individuals involved in the incident, to include: name, 
age, phone number, home address, passport number, 
employment information, and bank account information. 
--Are there indications that other individuals besides 
those apprehended by authorities were involved in the 
incident?  What is that status of the host country's 
efforts to locate these people? 
--Did the individuals involved claim access to 
additional material, or to sensitive facilities that 
store nuclear and/or radiological material? 
--Do the individuals involved have any connections to 
government officials, police/security agencies, or 
intelligence agencies?  Do they have connections to 
known criminal groups? 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
-- 
Handling Offers of Nuclear or Other Radioactive 
Materials 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
-- 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Previous reftels on handling offers of 
nuclear or radioactive material remain unchanged.  If 
post is approached by an individual or group with offers 
to sell or otherwise provide nuclear or radiological 
materials, or if post is informed of such an offer to 
another party, USG personnel should: 
 
--NOT involve USG personnel in a sting or similar 
operation involving the sale, purchase, or brokerage of 
alleged nuclear or radiological material.  If assistance 
to host government undercover operations is required, 
authorization must be granted by Washington.  In such 
cases, response assets are available on short notice. 
 
--NOT accept or examine any alleged nuclear or 
radioactive material.  Should a walk-in arrive with a 
package or container of purported nuclear or radioactive 
material, the walk-in should be instructed to remove the 
object from the premises immediately. 
 
--NOT expose U.S. facilities or their personnel to 
potentially hazardous materials.  Technical support is 
available to assist posts in determining if a suspect 
material is hazardous (see para 9-11 for reporting 
procedures). 
 
--Collect all available information (see para 12) on the 
walk-in or incident and report to Washington 
immediately, using the sample cable in para 14. 
 
--Obtain contact information from person conveying the 
offer in order to pass information to local authorities 
and Washington. 
 
--Share the information with appropriate local 
authorities only after the Country Team and Washington 
agencies have reviewed the information provided by the 
walk-in. 
 
--Refrain from initiating or agreeing to repeated 
contact without first seeking guidance from Washington. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
FORMAT FOR POST REPORTING 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Below is a sample cable for post's review. 
Cables must carry the following tags: KNNP, MNUC, PARM, 
KCRM, PTER, ASEC, KCOR, PINR and appropriate country 
tags. They should include the lowest appropriate 
classification and highest possible precedence. Cables 
should also contain the appropriate captions for 
classification and include SIPDIS as a distribution 
point. All reporting must be transmitted via front 
channel cable and include all tags indicated in the 
initial notification.  This format will route all 
messages to the following addressees: CIA, DHS (CBP, 
DNDO,OI&A), DOE, DOD, JCS, FBI, NRC, OSTP (the White 
 
STATE 00030541  005.2 OF 006 
 
 
House Science Office), NSA, DIA and NSC and other 
agencies. Within the department, automatic electronic 
distribution is made to ISN/WMDT, ISN/CPI, the country 
desk, T, DS, INR, IO/T, INR/SPM, PM/ISO, PMAT, S/CT, 
INL, S/P and S/ES-O. 
(SBU) Begin Sample Cable: 
 
To: SECSTATE 
 
FOR STATE ISN/WMDT AND PM/ISO/PMAT (24/7) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
Tags: KNNP, MNUC, PARM, KCRM, PTER, PREL, ASEC, PINR 
[country tag] 
 
Subject:  Nuclear Smuggling Incident/Portal Detection at 
[Insert Location] 
 
Reference:  State XXXXX 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Post wishes to alert the Department and 
Washington agencies per reftel that it has received a 
report indicating a potential incident of illicit 
trafficking in nuclear and/or radiological materials. 
This report came to post's attention via [e.g., host 
government report; detector alarm, etc.] Information 
concerning this report was relayed by [e-mail and 
telephone] to PMAT at [time] on [date]. 
 
¶2.  Details of the incident follow: 
 
------------------------------------ 
Location and Description of Material 
------------------------------------ 
 
A) Is the material currently stationary or transit? 
B) What type of material (HEU, plutonium, or other 
radioactive material)? 
C) What procedures were used to identify the material? 
D) What isotopes and physical form of the material? 
E) How much material is involved (in grams, kilograms, 
curies, millicuries, etc?  Spell out units and provide 
as much detail as possible to avoid misunderstandings)? 
F) Are there detailed descriptions of container, to 
include: markings, color, size, weight, type of 
material, how hidden, etc.  Include pictures if 
possible. 
G) If the material or conveyance is in transit, how is 
it moving? 
H) What is the material's intended destination and 
shipping route?  Please note (e.g., between 
international ports, directly to the US, via other 
foreign ports to the US)? 
I) Is there a manifest or other shipping information 
associated with the conveyance? 
J) Who is the supplier of the material and/or 
origination point of material? 
 
--------------------------- 
Alarm and Detection Details 
--------------------------- 
K) What is the source of the report? 
L) What is the date and time of alarm or incident? 
M) If it was a radiation alarm, include basic technical 
data such as the type of alarm (Gamma/Neutron/Both), the 
dose rates, the data log from a portal monitor, and the 
Gamma energy spectrum. 
N) Is a separate email of a spectral file available? 
O) What else if anything was being smuggled with the 
material? 
P) What is the specific place where alarm or incident 
occurred? 
Q) If a radiation detector was used, what was the 
distance from the radiation detector to the object(s) 
being measured and what was the detector type (make and 
model)?  Please also note the placement of the detector. 
When gamma spectral data is provided, a calibration 
spectrum and a background spectrum should always be 
provided. 
 
 
------------------------ 
Host Government Response 
------------------------ 
 
R) Who is physically responsible for the material 
presently? 
S) How is it secured? 
T) Are the appropriate authorities capable or willing to 
 
STATE 00030541  006 OF 006 
 
 
secure the material? 
U) How does the host government plan to dispose of the 
material? 
V) Who knows about the material (i.e. press)? 
W) If seized on a border, does the neighboring 
government know? 
X) Does the IAEA know or does host government intend to 
inform the IAEA in the near future? 
Y) Which agency(ies) have the lead in investigating the 
case? 
Z) Have any criminal charges been issued against the 
people involved in the incident?  Are the people 
involved in prison?  What are the next steps in the 
legal process? 
 
------------------------------- 
Details on Individuals Involved 
------------------------------- 
 
AA) Please provide biographical information for all 
individuals involved in the incident, to include: name, 
age, phone number, home address, passport number, 
employment information, and bank account information. 
BB) Are there indications that other individuals besides 
those apprehended by authorities were involved in the 
incident?  What is that status of the host country's 
efforts to locate these people? 
CC) Did the individuals involved claim access to 
additional material, or to sensitive facilities that 
store nuclear and/or radiological material? 
DD) Do the individuals involved have any connections to 
government officials, police/security agencies, or 
intelligence agencies?  Do they have connections to 
known criminal groups? 
 
¶3. (SBU) Action officer at post for handling incident is 
[fill in name], reachable via [telephone number] and 
[email]. 
 
CLINTON 
 
End Sample Cable. 
 
¶15. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. 
CLINTON