VZCZCXYZ0012
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #9419 0852154
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 262136Z MAR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0000
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0000

UNCLAS STATE 029419 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KZ RS
SUBJECT: BAIKONUR TSA: STEPS TOWARD ENTRY  INTO FORCE 
 
REF: 07 MOSCOW 5035 AND PREVIOUS 
 
1 . Since its date of signature, January 26, 1999, the 
U.S., Russia, and Kazakhstan have applied provisionally a 
Technology Safeguards Agreement (TSA) for space launches from 
the Baikonur Cosmodrome.  The TSA provides essential 
safeguards for technical information of Russian and U.S. 
licensed spacecraft and components from the Baikonur 
Cosmodrome.  Provisional application is ensured by Article 
XII of the Agreement.  At the five-year anniversary of 
signature in January 2006, the U.S. provided a note to the 
Russian Federation, proposing provisional application for 
another five years.  The note reminded Kazakhstan that 
although the agreement was signed in English and Russian, and 
those texts were in conformity at the time of signature, a 
Kazakh-language text was to have been provided subsequent to 
the signing. 
The U.S. prefers not to rely on provisional status and Russia 
has indicated (reftel) that it also seeks entry into force, 
as such status would prevent possible access limitations, 
customs inspections or seizures, VAT liabilities or duties on 
launch-associated cargo shipments, and launch schedule 
uncertainties. 
 
THE KAZAKH-LANGUAGE TEXT 
------------------------ 
 
¶2.  Kazakhstan provided a Kazakh-language text of the 
agreement in January 2006.  The U.S. reviewed that text and 
found discrepancies that would preclude a successful 
comparison of the English and Kazakh texts as being in 
conformity and equally authentic.  Changes were proposed to 
the Kazakhstani MFA in December 2007 and accepted in April 
¶2008.  The Kazakstani side presented an updated text that has 
been compared with the English text; these texts are now 
certified to be in conformity and equally authentic. 
 
RUSSIAN TEXT STATUS 
------------------- 
 
¶3. Russia ratified the Baikonur TSA on December 29, 2000 and 
informed the U.S. that the Russian Government had completed 
its relevant domestic procedures on March 25, 2004.  In 
mid-2006, Russia also indicated that it had compared the 
original 1999 Russian and 2006 Kazakh-language text and found 
them to be in conformity. 
 
CROSSOVER-THE TEXTS, CONTINUED 
------------------------------ 
 
¶4. According to U.S. legal/treaty experts and based upon 
accepted international practice, the Russian Federation will 
now need to compare the updated 2008 Kazakh text with the 
Russian text again in order to ascertain that it continues to 
consider the Russian and Kazakh texts to be in substantive 
conformity; there have been changes to the 2006 Kazakh text, 
as noted.  If that Russian/Kazakh conformity process results 
in any additional changes to the Kazakh-language text, the 
revised Kazakh text will need to be reviewed by the U.S. 
again.  When all three texts have been found to be in 
substantive conformity, the Republic of Kazakhstan should 
present the clean, final text under cover of a diplomatic 
note to both the United States and the Russian Federation. 
The United States and the Russian Federation should then send 
a diplomatic note back to the Republic of Kazakhstan 
confirming that the Kazakh and English texts (in the case of 
the Russians, the Kazakh and Russian texts) have been 
compared and are found to be in conformity and that the 
Kazakh-language text is an authentic text for the agreement. 
 
Upon successful completion of this round of note exchanges, 
it would be appropriate for Kazakhstani officials to send the 
Agreement, in all three equally authentic language versions, 
to its legislative body for review/ratification to fulfill 
domestic procedures and requirements. 
 
ENTRY INTO FORCE, THE FINAL ROUND 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
¶5.  Article XII, paragraph 1 of the Agreement provides for 
entry into force upon exchange of notification among the 
Parties confirming that all relevant domestic procedures and 
requirements necessary for the Agreement's entry into force 
have been fulfilled.  The Russian Federation, as 
noted above, informed the U.S. that it has done so.  If the 
Russian Federation has not so informed the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, it should do so.  Upon completion by Kazakhstan 
of its internal procedures, it should inform both the U.S. 
and Russia by diplomatic note, stating in each of those notes 
that a similar note is being sent to the other government. 
Upon receipt of this notification, the United States will 
inform both Kazakhstan and Russia that the United States has 
completed its internal process, and refer to the 
corresponding notes received from both Kazakhstan and Russia, 
and provide the definitive date of entry into force of the 
Agreement (i.e., the date of the U.S. note.  As this time 
approaches, more guidance and a draft note will be 
forthcoming. 
 
¶6. Actions for Embassy Astana: First, Post is requested to 
engage with appropriate host government officials and inform 
them that the April 2008 text is in conformity with the 
English text.  Drawing on background above with regard to the 
need to allow the Russian side to review the updated text, 
Post should explain the process toward entry into force.  If 
the Russian side has changes to the updated Kazakh text, the 
GOK should inform Post and obtain that text for Washington,s 
review.  If the Russian side accepts the updated text as 
authentic, the GOK should present the new, clean, final text 
to both the Russian Federation and the United States under 
cover of a diplomatic note.  Then Post should continue to 
outline the subsequent steps toward entry into force, drawing 
on paragraphs 3-5 above. 
 
¶7.  Actions for Embassy Moscow: Post is requested to verify 
that Russia passed its entry-into-force note to Kazakhstan as 
well as to the United States in 2004.  Then Post is requested 
to outline the steps toward entry into force for Kazakhstan 
and the United States, noting that after the Republic of 
Kazakhstan has notified us both of completion of its internal 
procedures, the United States will send both Russia and 
Kazakhstan its note, referring to 
the Russian note of 2004 and the Kazakhstani note.  If the 
issue of the draft Technology Safeguards Agreement is raised 
upon presentation of the Baikonur TSA, please query MFA as to 
when the U.S. can expect a written response to the suggested 
changes that the U.S. proposed to the text in June, 2008. 
 
¶8.  Support of Posts in this process is much appreciated. 
CLINTON