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Viewing cable 09STATE28313, SUDAN: MARCH 26 UNSC BRIEFING BY THE AU-UN CHIEF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09STATE28313 2009-03-24 23:00 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Secretary of State
VZCZCXYZ0004
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #8313 0832317
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O P 242300Z MAR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0000
UNCLAS STATE 028313 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: UNSC PREL PHUM SU XA XW
SUBJECT: SUDAN: MARCH 26 UNSC BRIEFING BY THE AU-UN CHIEF 
NEGOTIATOR FOR DARFUR DJIBRIL BASSOLE [AND UN 
UNDER-SECRETARY GENERAL JOHN HOLMES]. 
 
ΒΆ1.  USUN may draw from the following points for its March 26 
briefings by the AU-UN Chief Negotiator for Darfur Djibril 
Bassole (and UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian 
Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator John Holmes.) 
 
Begin points: 
 
-- The United States would like to thank AU/UN Chief Mediator 
Bassole for his briefing on the status of the Darfur Peace 
talks and for his efforts to mediate a lasting peace (and UN 
Under-Secretary General John Holmes on the humanitarian 
crisis) in Darfur. 
 
-- We are deeply concerned with the status of the peace talks 
and worry that the irresponsible decision by the Government 
of Sudan to expel 13 international NGOs and to close 3 local 
NGOs has not only undermined recent progress made on peace 
talks in Qatar, but is also threatening the stability of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 
 
-- The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) has recently said 
that it will not return to the talks until the Government of 
Sudan returns all political prisoners (as was agreed in 
Qatar) and reverses its decision to expel these humanitarian 
NGOs.  While we continue to encourage JEM and all groups to 
come back to the negotiating table, we understand the concern 
by some of these groups over the NGO expulsions. 
 
-- We do not, however, want groups to begin looking for 
pretexts to abrogate their responsibilities agreed to under 
the talks or to undermine the possibility of reaching future 
agreements. 
 
-- We once again call on the Government of Sudan to reverse 
its decision to expel and close these NGOs before further 
damage, on both the humanitarian and political fronts, is 
done and to ensure that vulnerable populations in Darfur have 
access to life-saving aid.  Until the basic necessities of 
the people of Darfur are met, it will be hard for many of 
them to focus on the peace process. 
 
-- National NGOs and GOS ministries simply do not have the 
capacity at present to fill all of the gaps in humanitarian 
relief that resulted from the GOS decision. 
 
-- The GOS should immediately end all bureaucratic 
restrictions, such as technical agreement requirements and 
travel restrictions, and permit capable international 
agencies to fill the most urgent humanitarian gaps. 
 
-- The results of the joint UN/GoS assessment indicate 
significant gaps exists in the delivery of essential services 
to millions of vulnerable men, women and children in Darfur. 
Given the extreme complexities of operating in Darfur, all of 
these lost capacities cannot be replaced either quickly or 
easily.  It took years to put Darfur's humanitarian 
infrastructure in place and only a day to tear a good part of 
it down. 
 
-- We laud the efforts of the UN and those NGOs remaining on 
the ground in Darfur to cover the gaps created by President's 
Bashir's cruel dictate to expel NGOs who can be rightfully 
credited with saving many lives in Darfur over the past six 
years.  However, the results of the joint assessment indicate 
that their capacity will not be replaced any time soon and 
that this lost capacity will translate into needless deaths 
and suffering. 
 
 
Begin questions for Minister Bassole: 
-- Has the decision to expel and close NGOs from Darfur 
hindered your efforts to bring other rebel movements to the 
negotiating table? 
 
-- What is your assessment of the recent effort by Libya to 
unite factions of the Sudan Liberation Army? 
 
-- What is your assessment of JEM,s recent announcement of 
unification with some SLA commanders? 
 
-- How do you plan to engage JEM to bring it back into the 
negotiating fold? 
 
-- What type of timeline are you considering for the re-start 
of talks? 
 
-- How can the UNSC be helpful in your efforts? 
 
Begin questions for Under-Secretary General Holmes: 
 
-- How credible are GOS commitments to providing funding in 
the health and nutrition sector and the "water operation" 
through the end of 2009? 
 
-- What are your conclusions about the ability of the GOS and 
the international community to fill the gaps?  For example, 
is the Sudanese government willing to provide funding to 
build local capacity as recommended for the WASH and health 
and nutrition sectors? 
 
-- Several of the assessment conclusions appear to be 
contradictory, particularly regarding the capacity of 
Sudanese NGOs and Ministry of Health officials to fill 
current gaps and provide future assistance.  Recognizing the 
difficulty of an ever-changing operating environment, can you 
comment on the apparent contradictions (per the WASH section)? 
 
-- The report recommends that private sector arrangements be 
made to help fill the gaps.  Can you elaborate on what type 
of private sector arrangements are envisioned? 
 
-- The findings for the WASH sector in the executive summary 
conclude that "immediate financial and technical support is 
required for all camps" and "national NGOs cannot take over 
the responsibility unless their capacity is built, which will 
take time."  Will there be a time-frame developed to clearly 
identify needs, priorities, and entities responsible? 
 
-- It should be noted that weakness in any one sector can 
impact other sectors and ultimately increase disease and 
mortality rates in the long run, can you comment on the 
current plans to address all gaps or whether some sectors 
will receive greater support or priority than others?  Also, 
please comment on the standards for delivery and targets for 
future programming. 
 
-- Are there plans to conduct additional assessments? 
 
If raised by UN Under-Secretary General John Holmes: 
 
-- We again categorically reject the linkage of the GOS 
decision to expel these life-saving NGOs to the decision of 
the ICC to issue an arrest warrant for President Bashir. 
CLINTON