VZCZCXRO3935
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHC #6339/01 0781429
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O P 191411Z MAR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2882
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 3487
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 7649
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 6598
RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI PRIORITY 8905
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 5445
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 9642
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 8642
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU PRIORITY 8283
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE PRIORITY 0342
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 8168
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 7647
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 2383
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 5328
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 6308
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 8507
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 5407
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 4656

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 026339 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC FR IAEA KPAO PARM PREL PTER UK UNSC
SUBJECT: SEEKING VIEWS ON IAEA PROPOSAL (WMD TERRORIST 
ATTACKS COORDINATION) 
 
REF: EMAIL USUN/1540 COORDINATOR -- 2/5 WITH IAEA 
     PROPOSAL 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  (SBU) This cable requests London and Paris obtain views 
regarding a proposal by Gustavo Zlauvunin, International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) New York Representative, to 
integrate efforts of the various counterterrorism and 
nonproliferation Committees to focus on weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) post-incident response.  While we agree 
that both areas of activity are complementary, we consider it 
important to hear views on UNSCR 1540 and on how it should 
maintain its distinct character and implementation 
activities.  Regarding Zlauvunin,s proposal to conduct an 
inter and intra-organizational exercise on WMD post-incident 
response, we support the concept under the conditions that 
the exercise be properly designed, comprehensive, and produce 
a deliverable as described in paragraph 9. 
 
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OBJECTIVES 
---------- 
 
¶2.  (U) In pursuing this request, Washington requests that 
London and Paris Posts seek views from their interlocutors 
regarding Zlauvunin,s proposal, and report results NLT April 
3, 2009. 
 
-- Seek London and Paris nonproliferation views on their 
thoughts on the meshing of various Counterterrorism 
Committees and their activities, such as the UNSCR 1267 
(Al-Qaeda) and UNSCR 1373 with the Counterterrorism Committee 
Executive Directorate (CTED), with the primarily 
nonproliferation Committee focused on UNSCR 1540.  Zlauvunin 
suggested the various Counterterrorism and 
Counterproliferation Committees share a common interest of 
and emphasis on WMD post-incident response. 
 
-- Seek London and Paris nonproliferation views on support 
with reservation for an exercise involving the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Office for 
Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), the UN Interregional Crime and 
Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), and supported by the 
World Health Organization (WHO), the International Crime 
Police Organization (INTERPOL), the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO), the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) and the Experts assisting the 1540 
Committee. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), and the Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) would participate as observers, 
as well as other CT Implementation Task Force (CTITF) 
entities.  Zlauvunin envisioned such an exercise would 
promote greater inter and intra-organizational understanding 
of resources, responsibilities, and capabilities related to 
response to WMD terrorism attack; increase awareness of 
preparedness within international organizations to confront 
such attacks; strengthen communication and relationships 
among diverse organizations; and, enhance 
inter-organizational counterterrorism cooperation. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
USG Thoughts on Committees Efforts ) Views London/Paris 
 
STATE 00026339  002 OF 003 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶3. (U) We seek views on the meshing of UNSCR 1540 
counterproliferation activities with UNSCR counterterrorism 
activities.  There is no question that the 
counterproliferation objectives in UNSCR 1540 can be 
complementary to the counterterrorism efforts of the UNSCR 
1267 and 1373 Committees, but consider UNSCR 1540 should 
maintain its distinct character and implementation 
activities. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The 1540 Committee, stemming from the wake of the 
unraveling of the elaborate black market nuclear network of 
AQ Khan, is directed against the proliferation of WMD, their 
means of delivery, and related items.  While the scope of the 
resolution includes terrorist activities, the resolution was 
designed to address the full range of proliferation activity, 
including any non-state actor providing proliferation-related 
services.  The resolution 
also places requirements on state actors to ensure they do 
not in any way contribute to or support proliferation 
activities. 
 
¶5. (U) Since UNSCR 1673 (2006) extended the committee for two 
additional years and UNSCR 1810  (2008) extended it for an 
additional three, a robust outreach program has energized a 
broad nonproliferation dialogue in our community that 
encompasses both Treaty-based activities (NPT, CWC) as well 
as the nonproliferation dialogue in such regimes as Missile 
Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia 
Group, and others.  We have not objected to efforts to 
refine/coordinate the two CT (1267/1373) Committees and such 
efforts should proceed -- but the nonproliferation community 
in nearly all aspects is a different group with a core set of 
assistance programs and less direct overlaps.  We have 
supported 
joint briefings and workshop reciprocal overview 
presentations for late-reporting states but not viewed 
efforts to consolidate reporting requirements or technical 
implementation workshops as needed. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Each committee features legally binding obligations 
imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter, together with 
mechanisms for capacity building and technical assistance to 
encourage more robust Member State implementation of these 
obligations.  This committee 
apparatus is potentially a powerful policy tool, yet broader 
UN membership often sees these structures imposing burdensome 
requirements (particularly reporting requirements) and other 
legal obligations in which all but 15 Member States have no 
real say.  We have been 
constantly vigilant against attempts to shift the center of 
gravity within the UN system from the UNSC to the UNGA. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) We seek views on ensuring the Security Council 
carefully address efforts designed to rationalize the work of 
all three Committees.  Carefully addressing such efforts does 
not reflect opposition to improving efficiencies but does 
support the need to maintain the independence and uniqueness 
of the nonproliferation treaties and regimes.  We are 
interested in your thoughts on how, as the UNGA proceeds to 
implement the CT Strategy, and the UNSC continues its 
implementation of the CT and NP-related resolutions, there is 
coordination and cooperation between these principal organs 
as they go down their separate, mandated tracks together. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Exercise Proposal Views for London/Paris 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (U) We support the concept, with the following conditions, 
that a properly designed comprehensive exercise should take 
place that produces the following deliverables: 
 
 
STATE 00026339  003 OF 003 
 
 
-- Produce written procedural and operation guidelines prior 
to the exercise.  IAEA, OPCW, INTERPOL, UNODA, WHO, UNICRI, 
ICAO, IMO, UNDP, UNESCO and OCHA produce written procedural 
and operational guidelines due six (6) months before the 
exercise. 
 
-- Produce written policy clarification post exercise.  IAEA, 
OPCW, INTERPOL, UNODA, WHO, UNICRI, ICAO, IMO, UNDP, UNESCO 
and OCHA each produce their individual roles and 
responsibilities that define their contribution to the whole 
in support of a stricken nation due two (2) months post 
exercise. 
 
-- Produce revised written procedural and operation 
guidelines post exercise.  IAEA, OPCW, INTERPOL, UNODA, WHO, 
UNICRI, ICAO, IMO, UNDP, UNESCO and OCHA produce new written 
procedural and operational guidelines that outline response 
teams, activities, equipment, support requirements, and 
contributions on the ground that do not duplicate stricken 
nations activities for each chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear type of emergency 
operation, due two (2) months post exercise. 
 
¶9. (U) Should multiple nations show interest in, and 
contribute funding for, an exercise that includes our 
conditions, the U.S. would seek ways to support through 
expertise and other contributions, as well as possibly 
contributing to the $994,400.00 exercise cost.  Currently, 
Washington does not have funding available for this purpose. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Possible Alternatives for USUN to Underscore 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (U) As an alternative plan the U.S./Russia co-chaired 
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism offers 75 
nations opportunities to participate in a variety of 
exercises, seminars, and other activities that could lend 
themselves to developing the same deliverables as the 
proposed exercise for at potentially a lower overall 
participant cost.  Each GI participating state may be granted 
access to an activity through the Global 
Initiative Information Portal at: 
https://www.global-initiative.info. 
 
¶11. (U) In addition, more activities may be available with 
the newly formed World Institute of Nuclear Security (WINS). 
WINS was created in order to formalize the sharing of best 
governmental and industrial security practices for nuclear 
facilities and materials.  WINS is headquartered in Vienna, 
Austria and is strongly endorsed by the U.S. Department of 
Energy. 
 
---------------- 
POINT OF CONTACT 
---------------- 
 
¶12. (U) Further questions or information on this response to 
the IAEA or UNSCR 1540 can be directed to Tom Wuchte, U.S. 
1540 Coordinator.  Washington appreciates London,s and 
Paris' 
assistance. 
CLINTON