VZCZCXRO0787
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHC #4665/01 0751650
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 161632Z MAR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 024665 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SO KPKO
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE: SEEKING ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR AMISOM 
AND THE SOMALIA SECURITY SECTOR 
 
REF: A) STATE 17205 B) PARIS 301 
 
 ¶1. This is an action request, please see paragraph 2. 
 
OBJECTIVES 
---------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Post is asked to approach the Host Government at the 
highest appropriate levels to pursue the following 
objectives, drawing from the talking points in paragraph 3. 
Tokyo should also draw from the talking points in paragraph 
4, and London and Paris from paragraph 5: 
 
-- Seek a commitment by the Host Government to make public 
statements in support of the African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM), particularly at the UN Security Council (UNSC) 
debate on Somalia scheduled for March 20. 
 
-- For Tokyo: Urge the Host Government to provide support to 
AMISOM in the form of funding for troop salaries, equipment, 
equipment reimbursements, logistical support, and/or 
infrastructure improvements.  Also urge the Host Government 
to provide support for Somali security forces loyal to the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and/or support the 
security sector reform (SSR)/capacity building activities 
that are being conducted by the United Nations (UN) and 
regional states for Somali forces. 
 
-- For London and Paris: Thank the Host Government for 
previously delivered and pledged support in the security 
sector (REFTELS) and ask for an update on the status of all 
support, both pledged and planned. 
 
TALKING POINTS 
-------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Post should draw from the following talking points 
in approaching Host Governments: 
 
-- The United States believes the election of Sheikh Sharif, 
the recent move of the unity government to Mogadishu, and the 
withdrawal of Ethiopian forces has created a narrow window in 
which real progress can be made with regard to building the 
governance capacity of the TFG and furthering the Somali 
peace process.  It is imperative the international community 
takes full advantage of this opening, before al-Shabaab and 
other spoilers can reverse these gains. Failure to take 
prompt and decisive action in the weeks and months ahead 
could result in the consolidation of a safe haven for 
terrorists, including al-Qaeda.  It is in our common security 
and humanitarian interests to provide all possible assistance 
to Somalia now. 
 
-- We are particularly encouraged that progress in Somalia 
has been made through a Somali-led process, albeit with 
assistance from the UN and international partners.  It is 
crucial this process continues to be led, and is perceived to 
be led by, Somalis.  At the same time, we believe it is 
critical the international community increases its support at 
this juncture.  The Somali people need to see that their 
current path leads to stability and economic recovery. 
 
-- The United States is the largest humanitarian donor to 
Somalia, providing more than $427 million in food and 
non-food assistance in FY 2008 and to date in FY 2009, and we 
remain committed to strengthening AMISOM and building the 
capacity of Somali security forces. The Somali Government 
cannot accomplish these goals without the help of other 
international partners, and increased assistance from your 
 
STATE 00024665  002 OF 004 
 
 
government is urgently needed if the gains of the past 
several weeks are to be consolidated, and the security 
situation stabilized. 
 
--We would be interested in hearing your views on 
developments in Somalia and your plans for supporting Somalia 
as it struggles to overcome its troubled history and retake 
its place among the family of nations. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Tokyo should also draw from the following talking 
points: Immediate donor assistance, in the form of salaries, 
equipment, equipment reimbursements, logistical support, and 
infrastructure improvements are required if the African Union 
is to attract additional troop contributors for AMISOM in the 
near-term. 
 
-- Immediate donor assistance would also help to convince the 
current troop contributing countries, Burundi and Uganda, to 
maintain their current AMISOM commitments. 
 
-- Support for Somali security forces loyal to the TFG is 
also urgently needed.  Without support from the international 
community in the form of salaries, equipment, and logistical 
support (including food and fuel), Somali security forces are 
likely to either desert or defect to al-Shabaab and other 
armed groups opposed to the TFG.  We are particularly 
interested in developing cooperation and mechanisms that will 
allow the international community to expand delivery of 
assistance inside Somalia to these forces and monitor its 
effective use. 
 
-- In addition to providing operational support, we call on 
your government to support the SSR and capacity building 
efforts conducted by the UN and regional states such as 
Uganda. 
 
-- IF THE SUBJECT OF THE TRUST FUND IS RAISED: While the 
United States will continue to provide its in-kind support to 
AMISOM through the contract mechanism we currently have in 
place, we support the concept of the trust fund called for in 
¶1863.  We are still determining the most appropriate 
mechanism through which to provide support to Somali security 
forces. 
 
¶5. (SBU) London and Paris should also draw from the following 
talking points: The USG has asked the Government of Japan to 
provide assistance to AMISOM, the Somali security force and 
SSR (see paragraph 4 above). 
 
¶6. (U) End Talking Points. 
 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) The past several months have included a number of 
positive developments with regard to the situation in 
Somalia.  The election of moderate leader Sheikh Sharif 
Sheikh Ahmed as President of the TFG, the enlargement of the 
Transitional Federal Parliament, the appointment of Omar 
Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke as Prime Minister, the appointment 
of a Cabinet, and the withdrawal of the Ethiopian National 
Defense Force (ENDF) from the country have created momentum 
behind international efforts to support the Somali peace 
process and assist Somalis in standing up a more effective 
transitional government.  Nonetheless, the security situation 
within the country remains tenuous, and the terrorist 
organization al-Shabaab and other spoilers remain determined 
to scuttle the peace process, drive out AMISOM and other 
international actors, and solidify their hold across Southern 
and Central Somalia.  Without increased, sustained 
international support for AMISOM force generation efforts and 
capacity-building programs for Somali security forces, the 
progress that has been made over the past several months may 
be reversed. 
 
STATE 00024665  003 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) With only 3,400 troops deployed in Mogadishu, AMISOM 
is still far below its authorized force strength of 8,000. 
Increasing AMISOM's troop level is central to our strategy of 
stabilizing Mogadishu and supporting the Somali peace 
process.  AMISOM is focused on protecting TFG personnel 
taking part in the peace process and securing strategic 
locations within the city, such as the airport, the seaport, 
the strategic K4 intersection, and the Presidential Palace. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The USG is bringing significant resources to bear on 
AMISOM force generation and logistical support efforts. 
Between FY2007 and FY2008, the USG provided over $67 million 
in peacekeeping operations (PKO) funds, including through the 
Global Peace Operations Initiative, to train, equip, 
transport, and sustain Ugandan and Burundian forces in 
AMISOM.  The U.S. is committed to providing at least another 
$67 million in FY 2009 PKO funds for AMISOM and Somalia SSR. 
The USG is providing logistical support (including food, 
fuel, airlift, and medical evacuations), equipment support, 
and training through the Africa Contingency Operations 
Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program to the forces on the 
ground, including for two additional battalions (one from 
Burundi, one from Uganda, for a total of 1,700 troops) slated 
to deploy in the coming weeks.  Additional donor support, 
however, is required for salaries, equipment reimbursements 
and infrastructure improvements.  USG funding set aside for 
equipment will be stretched increasingly thin, and AMISOM 
battalions will remain well below the UN standard for 
contingent-owned equipment without additional support. 
 
¶10. (SBU) UNSCR 1863 called for the establishment of a UN 
logistics support package, to include equipment and 
infrastructure support, which will eventually supplant the 
current USG support efforts, and allow our PKO funding to be 
diverted towards other urgent priorities with respect to 
Somalia, including SSR.  Nonetheless, we do not expect the 
UN,s own mechanisms to be in place for at least 6 months. 
Until these new mechanisms are in place, AMISOM will continue 
to be largely dependent on donor support for the maintenance 
of the current forces on the ground, as well as the 
generation of additional forces.  UNSCR 1863 also calls for 
the establishment of a multi-nation donor trust fund to 
support AMISOM and the all-inclusive Somali security forces. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Equally urgent is the need to provide operational 
support to Somali security forces loyal to the TFG. 
Counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations are 
outside of AMISOM,s mandate, and only Somali security forces 
will be capable of filling the gap in these areas created by 
the withdrawal of the ENDF.  Without the provision of food, 
fuel, salaries and other critical forms of support by the 
international community, the Somali forces are likely to 
desert the government, and either melt away or join armed 
groups opposed to the unity government.  The USG has already 
publicly committed to providing $5 million to support the 
creation of a joint security force as part of the SSR effort, 
but this amount is insufficient to fully develop the capacity 
of the unity government,s security forces and reform the 
Somali security institutions. 
 
REPORTING DEADLINE 
------------------ 
 
¶12. (U) The Department greatly appreciates Posts' assistance 
and engagement on this issue.  Please report results of this 
effort via front-channel cable to AF/RSA Col. Mike Skardon, 
AF/E Matthew Walsh, and IO/PSC Tanaz Khambatta no later than 
March 18th. 
 
 
POINT OF CONTACT 
---------------- 
 
 
STATE 00024665  004 OF 004 
 
 
¶13. (U) Please contact AF/RSA, Col. Mike Skardon (x7-7371) or 
Matthew Walsh (x7-8284) or via e-mail for any further 
background information or argumentation needed to meet our 
objectives. 
CLINTON