VZCZCXYZ0017
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #3333 0711356
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121338Z MAR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0000
INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0000
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 0000
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 0000
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI PRIORITY 0000
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0000
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0000
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0000
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0000
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY 0000

UNCLAS STATE 023333 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID OVIP PGOV PREL SO KPKO
KDEM, PTER 
SUBJECT: P3 + UNITED NATIONS MEETING ON SOMALIA IN LONDON 
 
 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  The United Kingdom (UK) Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office reached out to invite us to this P3 
United Nations (UN) meeting on Somalia one day prior to the 
two-day International Contact Group (ICG) on Somalia meeting 
commencing in Brussels.  Discussion topics included recent 
political developments, the Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG)/Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia Joint 
Security Force and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), 
humanitarian and development issues, and the possibility of a 
UN peacekeeping operation (UNPKO). Acting Assistant Secretary 
of State for African Affairs (AA/S) Phillip Carter urged the 
UK, France and the UN to immediately support the new unity 
government with concrete resources before the current window 
of opportunity to establish basic political stability and 
security closes, and suggested that the international 
community set pragmatic and achievable goals for three, six, 
nine months and one year from now.  AA/S Carter stressed that 
although we are currently reviewing our government-wide 
strategy on Somalia, the United States views Somalia as a 
national security issue as well as a threat to East Africa 
and the homeland.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------------------- 
RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The UN Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General (SRSG) Ahmedou Ould-Abdullah opened the 
meeting by stating that Somalia is a danger for the region 
that must be addressed by linking governance, security, 
humanitarian and development approaches, as these issues 
cannot be successfully addressed individually.  New York, 
Washington, Paris and London must coordinate more directly on 
these issues, according to the SRSG.  The SRSG also noted 
that the unity government has legitimacy in the eyes of most 
Somalis and asked that the international community consider 
removing certain individuals from sanctions lists as well as 
work more with Somali diaspora communities.  AA/S Carter 
responded that although the United States shares many of the 
same perspectives held by the SRSG, UK and France, there is 
an urgent need to address the security situation in Somalia 
quickly and at a local level to reinforce recent political 
developments.  &Supporting the (unity government) is very 
high risk, but the alternative is even worse,8 AA/S Carter 
pointed out. 
 
--------------- 
SECURITY ISSUES 
--------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) AA/S Carter noted that three components of the 
security element need to be addressed: AMISOM, including 
technical assistance and material support; the unity 
government,s joint security forces (JSF), including requests 
for support from non-traditional donors; and messaging by 
Somalis and the AU.  AA/S Carter stated that the real 
challenge is funding, and due to constrained budgets 
worldwide, non-traditional donors--such as Gulf Arab states, 
China and the diaspora--should be approached.  Participants 
agreed that establishing security in and around Mogadishu 
should be the immediate focus so the unity government can get 
on its feet.  The UN pointed out that AMISOM as it currently 
stands is incredibly underequipped and in drastic need of 
armor, an improved field hospital any many other elements to 
bring it up to par with UNPKO standards. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Participants spent a majority of the meeting 
discussing the Somalia JSF and AMISOM, with AA/S Carter 
urging that the international community and unity government 
need to move forward as quickly as possible to establish a 
Somali security force and to enhance and expand AMISOM.  AA/S 
Carter noted our funding of two additional AMISOM battalions 
and commitment to providing $5 million to support the JSF to 
aid this effort.  AA/S Carter also noted that we can likely 
fund one more additional battalion.  With the African Affairs 
Bureau,s budget of approximately $67 million in peacekeeping 
funds available in FY 2009 for Somalia, AA/S Carter stated 
that we can hold the status quo and fund two to three 
additional AMISOM battalions through November.  However, if 
the UN is able to reimburse us quickly under the 607 
Agreement being negotiated, AA/S Carter noted that we could 
potentially fund additional security efforts. 
 
¶5. (SBU) France announced that it recently sent 40 military 
trainers to Uganda to assist in training the soon-to-deploy 
Ugandan battalion and that it would approach the Government 
of Djibouti to ask what assistance the government is willing 
to provide on the security front.  The UK, while stating that 
it will likely not/not provide any financial support for the 
JSF, stated that it intends to lobby for additional troop 
contributing countries for AMISOM and has received 
encouraging responses from Gulf Arab states regarding 
financial contributions for the JSF.  AA/S Carter also 
remarked that the international community should engage 
regional partners such as Kenya and Djibouti regarding 
potential training for the JSF, and asked participants to 
think about whether the new unity government should form a 
military or concentrate instead on internal security 
development. 
 
---------- 
Al-Shabaab 
---------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) AA/S Carter reminded participants that we see 
al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization consisting of a 
hardcore element associated with al-Qaeda and various fringe 
elements that may leave the group at any time.  The SRSG 
commented that the USG policy toward al-Shabaab is helpful in 
that it places pressure on individuals within the 
organization; however, the USG should be more willing to 
remove individuals from terrorist designation lists.  AA/S 
Carter responded by stating that the United States has 
certain redlines and AA/S Carter used as an example the fact 
that al-Shabaab spokesman Mukhtar Robow should not/not be 
allowed to enter into political discourse with the unity 
government, as Robow drives regional violence. 
 
----------------------------------- 
HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT ISSUES 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) 
Mark Bowden underscored the link between political stability, 
security and the humanitarian situation when he stated that 
the hesitance of the international community toward Somalia 
is negatively affecting the humanitarian situation.  The 
RC/HC noted that the UN is negotiating humanitarian access 
with local communities on a case-by-case basis under a common 
set of ground rules, and for the most part this approach has 
proven successful.  The SRSG indicated that he would favor 
the UN World Food Program designing a new food aid 
distribution system as the current system, in the SRSG,s 
opinion, is rife with corruption; however, the RC/HC and 
other UN representatives did not think a new system is 
necessary.  The U.S. delegation stressed that President 
Sharif and the unity government must develop a work plan with 
the international community that clearly defines how the two 
sides will interact and prioritize on the humanitarian and 
development fronts moving forward. 
 
----- 
UNPKO 
----- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Although participants did not/not discuss the 
prospects of a UNPKO for more than a minute or two, the UK 
noted that it is &pleased with recent progress on the 
political front,8 possibly indicating weakened or diminished 
opposition to deploying a UNPKO.  AA/S Carter stated that 
although the UNPKO issue will likely be addressed in the UN 
Security Council in March or April, the international 
community should focus on enhancing AMISOM and supporting the 
JSF. 
 
-------------- 
MOVING FORWARD 
-------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) All participants agreed that the planned pledging 
conference to be held in May in Sweden would be too early and 
would precede Somalis solving problems that Somalis 
themselves need to solve.  AA/S Carter noted that formal 
recognition of the TFG will likely become increasingly more 
relevant as an issue to be addressed by P3 and other 
governments.  The UN announced that the next report from the 
Secretary-General on Somalia will be released on or around 
March 9 and will include an assessment of AMISOM and a work 
plan for bringing it up to UNPKO standards.  Participants 
agreed to push countries present at the ICG in Brussels to 
commit to providing concrete resources for AMISOM, the JSF 
and the TFG as quickly as possible. 
 
¶10. (SBU) COMMENT.  This meeting helped to build consensus 
among the P3 and UN that establishing basic security and 
stability in and around Mogadishu should be the first order 
of business.  The UK made it clear that they likely will 
not/not provide any financial resources to this effort 
outside of support for AMISOM salaries and seemed rather 
skeptical of the ability of the new unity government to 
survive for more than a few months or of the ability of the 
JSF to operate without committing human rights abuses. 
France seemed willing to contribute to security sector 
efforts, while the various UN equities present seemed 
disjointed on certain issues, especially regarding the 
delivery of food aid.  END COMMENT. 
CLINTON