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Viewing cable 09STATE22965, DEMARCHE: PRESS THE AFGHAN, PAKISTAN AND INDIAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09STATE22965 2009-03-11 18:34 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Secretary of State
VZCZCXYZ0007
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #2965 0701851
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 111834Z MAR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 9411
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 9275
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 3417
UNCLAS STATE 022965 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAGR EAID ECON ETRD IN PK PREL AF
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE: PRESS THE AFGHAN, PAKISTAN AND INDIAN 
GOVERNMENTS TO SHIP INDIA'S WHEAT DONATION TO AFGHANISTAN 
 
REF: A. KABUL 505 
     B. NEW DELHI 79 
 
1. (SBU) This is an Action Request, see paragraphs 6-8. 
 
2.   (SBU) The Indian donation of 250,000 mt of wheat to 
Afghanistan is a very welcome, generous action. The U.S. 
would like to urge the governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan 
and India to work together to realize this donation as soon 
as possible. 
 
3. (SBU) Based on the Indian aid offer, Afghanistan must 
cover the cost of a secure transport. We understand the 
Afghan government is prepared to cover reasonable transport 
costs. But given the government,s financial circumstances, 
it is critical that the parties find the cheapest possible 
means to deliver the aid. Ground transshipment through 
Pakistan would be the cheapest and fastest way to deliver the 
aid. 
 
4.   (SBU) Pakistani agriculture officials have raised 
possible phytosanitary concerns regarding the presence of 
karnal bunt fungus in Indian wheat. The U.S. understands this 
concern is scientifically based. We addressed similar 
concerns in a US wheat shipment by certifying our wheat came 
from regions where the fungus was not present. We do not know 
whether India could use a similar approach. Another way to 
overcome this issue would be to mill the wheat in India and 
deliver bagged flour to Afghanistan.  Milling would add to 
the cost, though not excessively, we believe. If Afghanistan 
is unable to absorb the cost of milling, perhaps India could 
donate a lesser quantity of flour without increasing the 
total cost of its donation. 
 
5. (SBU) Announcement of an agreed plan for transshipping the 
commodity would make a welcome deliverable for the next 
Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan.  We 
intend to pursue this question with the delegations at the EU 
preparatory meeting on March 17. If time is too short to 
achieve a resolution, we urge the three governments at least 
to use these gatherings as an opportunity to consult on 
modalities and report progress to the full conference. 
 
6. (SBU) KABUL ACTION REQUEST:Mission should urge Afghanistan 
to work with the governments of India and Pakistan to prompt 
immediate transshipment of India,s wheat donation to 
Afghanistan through Pakistan. Afghanistan should be prepared 
to cover reasonable transport and security shipping costs of 
India,s wheat donation. Afghanistan should also be 
encouraged to work with the Pakistani Government to seek 
implementation of President Zardari,s commitment to allow 
transshipment of the Indian wheat and to request that the 
Indian Government also mill the wheat prior to shipment. 
 
7. (SBU) NEW DELHI ACTION REQUEST:Mission should transmit US 
appreciation of the Government of India,s generous donation 
and encourage India to take an active hand in helping 
Afghanistan to arrange for transport of the wheat to 
Afghanistan.  In particular we want to encourage the Indians 
to mill the wheat in India and work with Pakistan on a secure 
transshipment arrangement.  We believe that milling the wheat 
in India will overcome Pakistan,s phytosanitary 
restrictions. 
 
8. (SBU) ISLAMABAD ACTION REQUEST:Mission should press the 
Government of Pakistan to implement the commitment that 
President Zardari made to President Karzai during their 
January meeting to facilitate secure transshipment of the 
Indian Wheat donation to Afghanistan. Mission should press 
for GOP support to allow the transshipment of milled wheat. 
We recognize that there may be legitimate phytosanitary 
concerns for shipping the raw wheat, but hope Pakistani 
authorities can engage with Afghan and Indian counterparts to 
find a way to address concerns. Mission should also take this 
opportunity to encourage the Pakistan government to 
officially lift its grain export ban, in light of expected 
harvest levels. This step would promote regional trade, 
promote increased predictability in regional grain markets, 
and facilitate market determination of prices. 
CLINTON