VZCZCXYZ0010
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #2496 0692009
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 101952Z MAR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0000
INFO RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0000
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0000
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0000
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0000
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0000
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

UNCLAS STATE 022496 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR ISN/CTR 
EUR/WE 
EAP/J 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL PTER GM JA RS CA UK IT FR TBIO
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR G-8 BIOTERRORISM EXPERTS GROUP 
WORKSHOP IN TOKYO - MARCH 12-13, 2009 
 
¶1.  (U) This message provides guidance for the U.S. 
delegation to the U.S. delegation to the G-8 Bioterrorism 
Experts Group (BTEX) workshop in Tokyo, March 12-13, 2009. 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶2.  (SBU) The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Department of Disarmament, Nonproliferation and Science - 
Chemical and Biological Weapons Division, will host a BTEX 
workshop in Tokyo March 12-13, 2009 on 'Sharing Lessons 
Learned for Advanced Management of Biological Threats.'  The 
purpose of the workshop will be to have G-8 nations share 
lessons learned and experiences related to national exercises 
on bioterrorism preparedness and response.  Japan also hopes 
the workshop will contribute new ideas for future BTEX 
discussions.  USDEL will be comprised of representatives from 
the Departments of State, Health and Human Services (Office 
of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response and 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) In addition to sharing lessons learned from U.S. 
bioterrorism exercises, USDEL will informally explore options 
to reinvigorate the BTEX forum with a view to advancing 
interagency agreed core areas upon completion of 
Administration policy review.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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BACKGROUND 
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¶4.  (SBU) BTEX was formed in 2004 under the U.S. G-8 
Presidency to strengthen collective action to prevent and 
respond to bioterrorism.  It was envisioned as an 
international exchange involving foreign policy, homeland 
security, health, agriculture, law enforcement and defense 
experts from G-8 countries.  BTEX is intended to report 
directly to the G-8 Nonproliferation Directors Group (NPDG), 
which meets approximately four times a year prior to the July 
G-8 Summit, with another meeting following the Summit.  In 
practice, BTEX has held a series of useful workshops and 
exercises, but has not had substantial policy-level dialogue 
feeding into the NPDG in several years. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) At the Sea Island Summit in 2004 and the Gleneagles 
Summit in 2005, G-8 leaders emphasized: strengthening 
national and international biosurveillance capabilities, 
increasing protection of the global food supply, and 
improving bioterrorism response and mitigation capabilities 
for G-8 efforts to defend against bioterrorism.  Since 2004, 
BTEX work plans have been developed following these 
objectives, with a series of workshops and exercises on 
decontamination, joint law enforcement-public health 
investigations, and food defense.  END BACKGROUND. 
 
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MEETING GUIDANCE 
---------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) U.S. PRESENTATION: Drawing on an 
interagency-coordinated presentation, USDEL should brief BTEX 
participants on lessons learned from U.S. national table-top 
exercises on bioterrorism preparedness and response as well 
as from after-action analysis of actual events.  As requested 
by Japan, the presentation on lessons learned will cover the 
following areas: detection and identification of biological 
threats, vaccination and countermeasure distribution, 
cooperation and coordination among national agencies 
cooperation between national authorities and local 
authorities and risk communication. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) BTEX REVITALIZATION: While BTEX has performed much 
useful work, our sense is that interest in BTEX among G-8 
members is uneven and lower than the U.S. would like.  During 
the workshop, USDEL should informally ask other participants 
about how to make BTEX more useful and how to engage Russia 
more effectively in the BTEX process.  In particular: 
 
--  (SBU) USDEL should gauge interest level from other 
participants for continued work in the current areas (food 
defense, decontamination, and forensic epidemiology), 
interest in addressing new topics related to domestic 
detection and response, and interest in expanding the mandate 
of the group to more explicitly include prevention-related 
topics, such as laboratory biosecurity. 
 
--  (SBU) USDEL should emphasize that BTEX should complement, 
but not duplicate the ongoing discussions and activities of 
multilateral initiatives, such as the 1540 Committee, 
Biological Weapons Convention, and the Ministerial level G-7 
plus Mexico Global Health Security Initiative.  Participants 
considering expansion of the BTEX mandate should beat this 
objective in mind. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) U.S. IDEAS FOR BTEX'S FUTURE: USDEL should 
informally elicit responses from BTEX participants on their 
interest in current BTEX discussion topics and future areas 
of discussion.  USDEL may outline the following illustrative 
ideas to provoke discussion: 
 
--  (SBU) Expanded scope: USDEL should suggest that the scope 
of BTEX be expanded to include preventing bioterrorism.  This 
would be useful as discussions to date have focused on 
detection and response. 
 
--  (SBU) Narrower Focus and Annual Workplans: USDEL should 
also suggest BTEX adopt one or two topics at the beginning of 
each year to focus discussion and activities on.  The 
objective would be to have the results of workshops and 
meetings identify recommendations that could be included in 
summit documents. 
 
--  (SBU) Policy Meetings: USDEL should suggest that BTEX 
should hold policy discussions more often, potentially twice 
a years on the margins of NPDG meetings.  These meeting would 
set the agenda and direction of upcoming workshops and 
exercises, and also serve as a vehicle to convey important 
policy points to the NPDG for possible reflection in Summit 
documents.  One policy meeting each year could be devoted to 
prevention topics and the other to detection and response 
topics. 
 
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RED LINES 
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¶9.  (SBU) SMALLPOX: USDEL will avoid discussion about the 
retention of the two World Health Organization authorized 
smallpox repositories (in the U.S. and Russia) within the 
G-8.  The U.S. reserves discussion of this topic for the 
World Health Assembly and bilateral discussions. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) SYNTHETIC DNA:  USDEL will avoid any discussion 
within the G-8 of synthetic DNA, which may be perceived by 
the developing world as an edict on how it should manage its 
policies in the areas of synthetic biology.  With nations 
such as China and India emerging as leaders in the field of 
DNA synthesis, the U.S. must ensure that ongoing bilateral 
discussions on this topic take precedence and inform the G-8, 
rather the other way around. 
CLINTON