O 101828Z MAR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 
INFO DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 022422 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SU UN
SUBJECT: ACTING A/S PHIL CARTER,S MEETINGS WITH THE QATAR, 
CHINA, EGYPT, AND CALL WITH AU/UN JOINT MEDIATOR BASSOLE 
 
REF: STATE 22067 
 
¶1.    SUMMARY: (SBU) In the aftermath of last week's 
International Criminal Court (ICC) decision to issue an 
arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, Acting 
Assistant Secretary (A/S) of African Affairs (AF) Phil Carter 
held meetings with embassy officials from Qatar, Egypt, and 
China and also spoke with UN/AU Chief Mediator Djibril 
Bassole by phone.  A/S Carter specifically spoke to the USG 
concern over the GOS decision to expel numerous NGOs and 
solicited assistance from each country in pressing the GOS to 
reverse this decision.  Each embassy responded that they 
would work actively to use their country's influence with 
Sudan to request this reversal.  A/S Carter also used these 
meetings to encourage continued support for the Darfur Peace 
Process.  For his part, Bassole assured A/S Carter that this 
issue is high on his priority list, but also noted that the 
NGO expulsion has the potential to severely undermine the 
progress made so far on the peace process.  End Summary. 
 
Meeting with Qatar Ambassador Ali Bin Fahad Al-Hajri 
 
¶2.    (SBU) A/S Carter met with Al-Hajri on March 5 to get 
his views on the current situation in Sudan involving the ICC 
decision, GOS decision to expel numerous NGOs, and how this 
affects the work AU/UN joint Chief Mediator Djibrill Bassole 
and Qatar have done to advance the Darfur peace process.  A/S 
Carter expressed USG support for Bassole and the role that 
Qatar has played so far in the Darfur peace process. 
 
¶3.    (SBU) Al-Hajri stated that Qatar is pleased to have 
worked closely with the USG in Doha to achieve the 
confidence-building agreement between the GOS and JEM.  A/S 
Carter and Al-Hajri agreed that all of the movements need to 
be included in any negotiations and A/S Carter highlighted 
both the important role of the Fur community as well as their 
current lack of engagement.  He encouraged the Qataris to 
reach out to the Fur.  Amb. Al-Hajri expressed the desire and 
need to work together so that the international community 
could speak with one voice.  He stated that prior to Doha, 
all movements were contacted and invited to participate. 
Al-Hajri said that the next round of talks should start 
sometime within the next three months. 
 
¶4.    (SBU) With respect to the ICC's decision, Al-Hajri said 
that Qatar understands the issue of justice is important, but 
disagrees with the timing of the decision.  Al-Hajri said 
that it is unfortunate that a number of NGOs have been 
expelled from Sudan, but that the NGOs should not get 
involved in politics.  A/S Carter requested that Qatar use 
its influence to push Sudan to reverse its decision to expel 
the NGOs as this action is having a dampening effect on the 
Doha process. 
 
¶5.    (SBU) Amb. Al-Hajri emphasized that the Qatari Emir has 
now visited both Chad and Sudan to discuss the current 
crisis.  All neighboring countries have a role to play in any 
further Darfur negotiations.  The Chadian Ambassador to the 
U.S., Mahmoud Adam Bechir, and a Sudanese diplomat have met 
with the Qatari Ambassador about seeking the engagement of 
the USG to help mend Chad/Sudan relations.  Al-Hajri stated 
that Qatar recognizes the leading role that the USG plays in 
the world and stated that the USG will get whatever support 
it needs from Qatar. 
 
Meeting with Chinese Acting Charge Xie Feng 
 
¶6.    (SBU) A/S Carter met the Chinese Charge Xie Feng on 
March 6 at their request and delivered the U.S. perspective 
on Sudan/Darfur after the ICC arrest warrant for Bashir.  A/S 
Carter said that the U.S. saw no reason to support an Article 
16 deferral of ICC action.  He argued that ICC proceedings 
were something Khartoum would have to deal with, and that 
they also need to figure out a way to move forward on Darfur. 
 A/S Carter stressed that Sudan's expulsion of 13 NGOs 
greatly constrained engagement on Darfur.  A/S Carter 
suggested that both the U.S. and China do what they could to 
persuade Khartoum to reverse that decision, which would 
prevent needed services from reaching IDPs not just in 
Darfur, but in the "three areas" and in Khartoum proper. 
 
¶7.    (SBU) Xie stated that China is very concerned over and 
feels uneasy with the ICC decision, both on its substance and 
its timing.  China believes the primary concern in Darfur is 
maintaining stability and said anything that prevents this is 
a hindrance.  Xie expressed China's disappointment over 
Sudan's decision to expel the NGOs.  Xie encouraged direct 
dialogue between the USG and GOS as well as between the USG 
and China.  He agreed that a broadening of the lines of 
communication is desired and believes that China and the USG 
can explore more cooperation even on issues where we differ. 
 
¶8.    (SBU) Xie stated that China will continue to talk to 
its friends in Sudan to persuade them to not engage in 
further risky behavior, to continue to cooperate on 
peacekeeping issues, and on CPA implementation.  Xie does, 
however, believe that encouragement is needed from the 
international community.  Harsh statements from the UNSC or 
the USG will push Sudan into a corner.  Xie's final comment 
was that the Chinese Special Envoy to Darfur, Liu Guijin, 
would be happy to come meet with the new U.S. Special Envoy 
to Sudan, once he/she is appointed. 
 
Conversation with UN/AU Chief Mediator Djibrill Bassole 
 
¶9.    (SBU) At the request of UN/AU Chief Mediator Djibril 
Bassole, A/S Carter called him on March 6 for a brief update 
and to discuss the current situation.  Bassole said he had 
expressed his concern over the NGO expulsion to the GOS 
Minister of Defense General Abd Al-Rahim Husayn.  Husayn 
claimed the GOS had conducted a study on the humanitarian 
impact of its decision and is taking measures to fill the gap 
the expulsion of NGOs would create.  Bassole said he 
underscored to Husayn that the expulsion was a direct 
violation of the goodwill agreement in Doha which states the 
parties would refrain from harassment and guarantee the 
unobstructed flow of relief assistance.  Bassole said he was 
concerned the rebels, especially JEM, might refuse to 
continue further discussions as participating in talks while 
their people are being targeted is a political issue for 
them.  Bassole believes we could see a dramatic situation in 
the IDP camps in the coming weeks.  He also stated that the 
Husayn is aware of that possibility. 
 
¶10.   (SBU) A/S Carter said the NGO expulsion could alter the 
character of US/GOS relations as GOS is dismantling the 
humanitarian structure in Darfur. He let Bassole know that 
without a change in circumstances, the USG may have to make a 
strong political statement, though we understand that we 
don't want to lead the GOS into further escalation.  Bassole 
said he would contact the Qatari FM Al-Mahmood to see if it 
was necessary for the Emir to get involved.  A/S Carter urged 
Bassole to press the movements to continue to negotiate and 
refrain from violence.  He expressed the USG desire to engage 
all groups, especially the Fur.  Bassole responded that he 
would meet Khalil Ibrahim (JEM) before he goes to Doha. 
Bassole explained he wants to go to Doha soon as possible to 
raise the NGO issue with the delegations. 
 
¶11.   (SBU) A/S Carter asked about other parties' 
participation.  Bassole stated he had spoken to SLA/Unity's 
Abdallah Yahia and was planning on meeting with him in El 
Fasher. Bassole said that the GOS is ready to engage 
SLA/Unity in talks and that the next step is attempting to 
join JEM and SLA/Unity and bringing other parties to the 
table (note: Bassole plans to meet Abdulwahid El Nour March 
12-13.).  In response to the question of  neighboring states, 
particularly Libya, Bassole said he is planning to go to 
Tripoli to push Libya to play a positive role as they hold 
strong leverage over all the movements.  On the NGO issue, 
Bassole expressed that Egypt could play a positive role in 
engaging the GOS but not Gaddafi.  Bassole was not optimistic 
of a GOS reversal; his view, the GOS perceived the NGOs as 
part of the international community's proxies who provided 
info that may have led to the ICC decision. Therefore, 
Bassole felt the expulsion was a survival issue for the GOS. 
Bassole encourage we press GOS to reverse its decision.  A/S 
Carter agreed and reaffirmed the USG supports Bassole's 
efforts 150 %, urging him to inform us if there are specific 
ways we can assist. 
 
Meeting with Egyptian Ambassador Sameh Shoukry 
 
¶12.   (SBU) A/S Carter met with Amb. Shoukry on March 6 at 
Shoukry's request as a follow up to a meeting between U.S. 
Special Representative for Sudan Tim Shortley and the 
Egyptian DCM Amr Ramadan two weeks ago.  Amb. Shoukry stated 
that President Mubarak's last trip to Sudan to both Khartoum 
and Juba is indicative of Egypt's willingness to promote 
peace and stability in Sudan.  However, he felt, there should 
be no surprise at the outcome of events since the ICC 
decision.  He believes the GOS response provides Bashir local 
political support by taking strong nationalistic actions. 
Egypt has encouraged the GOS to be restrained and positive, 
which it was as they made the Doha agreement.  That said, 
Egypt has been reserved in its comments on the content of the 
Doha agreement and recognizes it was done without much 
support from the neighboring states.  It was "nothing to 
write home about" in Amb. Shoukry's eyes, although it was 
probably all that could be done at the time. 
 
¶13.   (SBU) Egypt's main goal now is to help Sudan regain 
some form of tranquility.  To do this, according to Amb. 
Shoukry, the GOS needs space to absorb the effect of last 
week's decision.  The NGO expulsion is detrimental, and yet, 
Egypt is not surprised at this outcome.  Egypt believes that 
finding a way forward via an article 16 deferral would be a 
positive next step.  Egypt recognizes the humanitarian aspect 
that the NGO expulsions causes and expects that it is 
possible for the GOS to move back a bit on its decision. 
Further, Egypt hopes that with the intervention of many 
partners, the GOS will see that it has made its point and 
decide to retract its decision.  Egypt will provide whatever 
assistance it can by staying in touch with the GOS and 
advising caution and restraint. 
 
¶14.   (SBU) A/S Carter told Amb. Shoukry that the ICC 
decision should not steer the parties away from the issues of 
the Darfur peace process or CPA implementation even though 
the GOS decision to expel NGOs has had a negative effect on 
the rebels.  The USG is hopeful that the Sudanese NGO 
decision will be reversed and has expressed this directly to 
the GOS.  A/S Carter was emphatic that the USG is not 
interested in mere public displays but in actionable 
responses.  A/S Carter and Amb. Shoukry also discussed a 
possible "Friends" group which could involve the neighboring 
states as well.  Egypt was very positive towards the 
suggestion that the USG could engage in a U.S.-Sudan-UN 
dialogue and also liked the idea of a wider group involving 
neighbors.  The Ambassador believed that the Sudanese could 
look favorably on a tit-for-tat involving an exchange of high 
level direct talks for a reversal or freezing of the NGO 
expulsion. 
 
 
CLINTON