VZCZCXRO3319
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSF #0131/01 0890728
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 300728Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5862
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 0242

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 000131 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
EUR/NCE FOR YEAGER 
INL FOR CARROLL AND POMEROY 
DEPARTMENT PASS TO USAID 
DOJ FOR OPDAT, ICITAP, CEOS,AND CRD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2020 
TAGS: PHUM KCRM KWMN SMIG KFRD ASEC PREF ELAB BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA'S JUDICIARY:  WEAKEST LINK IN A POORLY 
PERFORMING LEGAL SYSTEM 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.   (C) Summary.  On paper, Bulgaria's judiciary system 
meets most international and EU standards.  But in practice, 
it is in shambles.  Polls show that within the EU, Bulgarians 
have the least confidence in public institutions, with the 
judicial system at the bottom of the heap.  The police and 
investigative service have 14 percent approval, prosecutors 
13 percent, and, shockingly, judges 12 percent.  Key reasons 
for distrust:  excessively long trials with unpredictable 
outcomes, even with the best evidence at hand; and known 
criminals flaunting their impunity.  A running joke is that 
OC figures do not even need a good defense attorney; bribing 
(or intimidating) a judge is cheaper.  Bulgarians and 
international partners continue to demand tangible results, 
especially a groundbreaking conviction of an organized crime 
figure or corrupt political figures and senior public 
officials.  But expectations are low.  Many critics believe 
the judicial system will not change without a purge of the 
old guard, which remains beholden to the gray economy and 
political interests.  End Summary. 
 
Long Road of Reform, with Limited Impact On Delivering Justice 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) On paper, the judicial system meets many 
international and EU norms.  Following communism's collapse, 
Bulgaria painfully revamped its judicial and legal systems, 
but many old features remained intact.  Many reforms 
streamlined internal management and other mechanical, 
procedural, or training issues.   In the five years preceding 
EU accession, the Bulgarian government rushed many more 
changes, adopting constitutional and legislative amendments 
to ensure the independence of the judiciary and improve its 
functioning, but some changes were not well thought out. 
Among the more notable changes:  defining the role of the 
Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) and establishing an 
inspectorate within the SJC to investigate misconduct 
allegations and recommend disciplinary actions.  The 
government made modest improvements to the Criminal Procedure 
Code and adopted a new Civil Procedure Code to reduce 
opportunities for continuances in civil cases. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Over the past decade, the government also took key 
personnel steps:  increasing salaries to an average of around 
1,200 leva (more than twice the 2008 average salary of 524 
leva and sufficient to attract qualified personnel); 
establishing competitive hiring and promotions; and limiting 
immunity for magistrates.  With support from USAID, the 
government developed the National Institute of Justice to 
train magistrates (judges, prosecutors, and investigators) 
and thirty-two model courts adopted improved court 
procedures.  The courts also implemented random case 
assignment, which reduced the opportunities for manipulation 
of the system.  Major undertakings also included the 
introduction of: separate administrative courts to address 
appeals of government decisions, a separate business registry 
system outside the courts, and private bailiffs to improve 
enforcement of court decisions.  Along the way, the 
Bulgarians received over $7.5 million in EU pre-accession 
funds (PHARE), with the biggest donors being Austria, the 
United Kingdom, and Spain, for code reform and judges, 
training.  The United States provided approximately $22 
million to the judiciary to support reforms. 
 
Key Challenges 
-------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) The most basic problem in the judiciary system is the 
hardest to tackle:  lack of political will to make tough 
decisions.  Police, prosecutors and judges routinely play a 
finger-pointing, blame-laying game.  Ordinary Bulgarians see 
judges as the biggest stumbling block to convictions in high 
profile cases.  Beyond political will is structure and 
process.  The judicial system is highly formalistic; it has 
confusing and at times contradictory precepts and procedures. 
 Courts are often idiosyncratic and ego-driven.  Management 
of each court is largely based on the personality and 
leadership style of the court chair, appointed by the Supreme 
Judicial Council (SJC) for five years.  In a court system 
governed by seniority, younger and more reform-minded court 
chairs are hard to find.  It is extremely difficult to purge 
the system of the old guard, who after five years of service 
as judges are tenured and cannot be removed until they 
resign, retire at the age of 65, or are dismissed for 
criminal activity, inability to perform their duties, or 
conduct damaging the prestige of the judiciary. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) From 2000 to 2008, the number of judges increased 
15 percent, reaching levels comparable to other newer EU 
members, but often judges had inadequate training, seasoning, 
or background.  Appointments sometimes depended more on 
personal and political connections rather than professional 
qualifications.  Despite the increase in judges, case 
completion rates stayed static, exacerbated by the shortage 
of courtrooms and the uneven distribution of cases.  During 
that time, investments in the judicial sector increased from 
0.2 percent in 2001 to 0.8 percent.  The court system now 
consists of 2,370 judges in 182 courts, including regional 
courts, district courts, appellate courts, the Supreme Court 
of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court.  In the 
biggest court in the country, Sofia Regional court, 100 
judges are housed in a building once planned for a prison, 
far exceeding its capacity.  In 2008, a civil judge in that 
court reviewed on average 700 civil cases and a criminal 
judge reviewed 430 cases. 
 
¶6.  (C) An overly formalistic Criminal Procedure Code means 
any defendant with a reasonably competent defense attorney 
can avoid sentencing.  All too often, judges accede to 
defense requests to delay hearings.  The case of the 
notorious OC figures the Margini brothers, arrested in 
October 2005 on the eve of EU accession for contract killings 
and money laundering, is an example.  With 18 continuances, 
mostly for purported illnesses, the Margini brothers continue 
to enjoy their lives while on bail.  Throughout the system, 
the most common excuses for continuances are:  unavailability 
of the defense attorney, irregularities in the summoning, and 
multiple requests for expert opinions.  A new cottage 
industry has sprung up:  closely watching court proceedings 
and counting the continuances in the document fraud and EU 
agricultural funds abuse case against Mario Nikolov, whose 
company is rumored to have bankrolled the Bulgarian Socialist 
party. 
 
¶7.  (C) Problems are also prevalent in lower profile fields. 
Bulgarian administrative judges have sway over key public 
sector and public integrity decisions important to business 
-- they rule on appeals of public procurements, 
government-awarded contracts for mining, use of dams, beaches 
and other natural goods.  Some judges are on personal terms 
with key gray economy figures, who have increasingly moved 
into legitimate businesses.  Ample anecdotal evidence 
substantiates cases of flagrant abuses and conflicts of 
interests:  participating in known illegal schemes; deciding 
on cases involving their family members; and deciding cases 
involving their business associates.  Privately, judges 
routinely acknowledge that some of their colleagues accept 
bribes, but in a culture where colleagues are hesitant to 
punish colleagues, they refuse to name names. 
 
¶8.  (C) The SJC, which has the power to appoint, discipline 
and dismiss judges, has been slow to establish discipline in 
the system.  Many question the SJC's structure and argue that 
political appointments within the SJC allow for political 
interference.  After a highly politicized process to select 
members of the SJC and some initial false starts, the SJC 
reviewed 102 requests for disciplinary sanctions in 2008, 
including 16 initiated by the Inspectorate.  Between 2008 and 
early 2009, the SJC dismissed four judges, two for drunk 
driving, including a vehicular death; one on charges of 
conspiracy to defraud the state revenue; and one for abuse of 
position.  Given the scale of observable problems, this 
amounted to a rather thin record of oversight and 
accountability.  This year the SJC faces another critical 
challenge as the mandates of 162 magistrates in management 
positions throughout the system (108 judges, 32 prosecutors, 
and 22 investigators) expire between April and December 2009 
and the SJC appoints their replacements. 
 
¶10.  (C) Comment.  With national elections on the horizon, 
the prospect for immediate legislative action to correct and 
reform the judicial system is dim.  Realistically, 
substantive change will be the province of a new government. 
End Comment. 
Karagiannis