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PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHSQ #0136/01 0861225
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 271225Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8129
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 0501
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000136 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: ELECTIONS PEACEFUL AND WELL-RUN, VMRO TAKES 
COMMANDING LEAD 
 
Ref A: Skopje 49 
Ref B: Skopje 74 
Ref C: Skopje 109 
Ref D: Skopje 124 
 
Sensitive but unclassified.  Please protect accordingly. 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Macedonia held peaceful presidential and municipal 
elections March 22 with few irregularities.  Ruling VMRO 
presidential candidate George Ivanov looks set to cruise to an easy 
victory in the second round, to be held April 5.  VMRO and its 
ethnic-Albanian coalition partner DUI made gains in local elections. 
 Closely watched mayoral runoffs remain in Tetovo, Gostivar, Struga, 
Ohrid, Skopje, and a number of other municipalities.  The VMRO 
government will likely emerge April 5 with an even firmer grip on 
power, but will also have no excuses for not doing what it takes to 
join NATO and the EU.  End summary. 
 
So Far, So Good 
--------------- 
 
¶2. (U) 57% of eligible voters went to the polls March 22 in the 
first round of presidential and nationwide municipal elections.  The 
election was a significant improvement over parliamentary elections 
in 2008, which were marred by intimidation, violence, and 
significant irregularities.  This time there was no violence and the 
atmosphere was calm and peaceful in all parts of the country. 
International, domestic, and party observers as well as election 
officials all reported a good atmosphere during the campaign and on 
election day. 
 
¶3. (U) The elections were generally well-run, despite logistical 
challenges of jointly administering presidential and municipal 
elections for the first time as well as the extra challenge of a 
heavy snowstorm March 20 and 21 that made it difficult to deliver 
ballots and other required materials.  While the storm prevented 134 
polling stations from opening, this amounted to only 4% of polling 
stations and less than 1% of eligible voters. 
 
¶4. (SBU) OSCE's Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
Election Observation Mission (ODIHR EOM) gave a positive preliminary 
assessment on March 23, though its report cited instances of family 
and group voting and repeated ODIHR's concerns about intimidation 
(chiefly by the ruling VMRO, though it did not say this directly) of 
civil servants to support VMRO candidates and to deliver even more 
votes to them.  Nevertheless, EOM Head of Mission Peter Eicher 
(former U.S. FSO) called these elections a "major step forward." 
The biggest losers in the election, opposition parties SDSM and DPA, 
complained that while the voting was generally free and fair, 
intimidation and control of the institutions gave an unfair 
advantage to VMRO and its e-Albanian coalition partner, DUI. 
 
¶5. (U) Embassy and other international and domestic observers 
reported virtually none of the major problems from last year: 
gunfights, clear intimidation in polling stations by party 
"observers" and activists, menacing gatherings of young men just 
outside polling stations, ballot-stuffing, etc.  The GoM deployed 
significant police presence, especially in the predominantly 
e-Albanian municipalities.  While many units were from other areas, 
they were also mixed ethnically.  The police were calm and 
professional.  Most e-Albanians seemed relatively unconcerned with 
the police presence or even welcomed it.  We were present in only 
one polling station where a party observer (from DPA) objected to 
the police, but he was far more sanguine when we checked into the 
same polling station some hours later. 
 
Some Problems Persist 
--------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) A number of our monitors as well as ODIHR's witnessed a 
troubling trend of "assisted voting" clearly organized by the 
political parties.  Party activists would lead groups of 
"illiterate" or elderly voters into polling stations and "assist" 
them in marking their ballots. Election officials rarely challenged 
this, even though the rules state that any one person can only 
assist a maximum of two others to vote.  We will raise this issue 
with the parties and election officials.  ODIHR officials told us 
privately that while this is disturbing, it will not likely lead to 
a "failing grade" in its final assessment.  It will, however, almost 
certainly be an issue ODIHR will raise prominently in its report. 
Nevertheless, all observers credit the authorities here for running 
a much smoother process than last time.  In 2008, parties and 
others, including the U.S. Embassy, filed hundreds of formal 
complaints with the State Election Commission which resulted in 
re-runs in 196 polling stations.  For the first round this year, 
only 65 complaints were filed; we anticipate few if any re-runs this 
time. 
 
Ivanov: Ready or Not... 
--------------------- 
 
SKOPJE 00000136  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶7. (U) George Ivanov, the ruling VMRO-DPMNE's candidate (ref a), 
appears poised to claim an easy victory in the second round, 
scheduled for April 5.  Ivanov trounced the field, garnering 34% of 
the nearly one million votes cast.  His nearest rival and 
second-round opponent, Ljubomir Frckoski, claimed 20%.  New 
Democracy party chief Imer Selmani essentially tied for third with 
former VMRO Interior Minister (and ICTY-indictee, since acquitted) 
Ljube Boskovski, both winning about 14% of the vote.  SDSM 
Secretary-General Igor Ivanovski hypothesized to us March 25 that 
every vote for another candidate was a vote against Ivanov, thus 
Frckoski has a chance in the second round.  We believe it is 
unlikely that Frckoski will pick up enough new votes to prevail. 
 
¶8. (U) All that can stop Ivanov, it appears, is if the second round 
fails to meet the 40% threshold requirement; the threshold can be 
daunting due to the bloated voter list, with 1.8 million voters 
(Macedonia's population is less than 2.1 million).  There is concern 
that Macedonia's e-Albanian population, which comprises at least 25% 
of the population, is uninspired by either candidate and may stay 
home, thus making it harder to reach the threshold.  VMRO will 
likely press DUI to deliver e-Albanian votes to Ivanov, but this 
will be a tough sell. 
 
The Selmani Effect? 
------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Estimates vary, but Selmani likely garnered the votes of at 
least 50,000 ethnic Macedonians, a first for any e-Albanian 
candidate.  He worked hard to win the trust of e-Macedonians, 
posting campaign signs in the Macedonian language in selected areas 
and holding well-attended rallies in cities like Stip and Strumica, 
where few e-Albanians reside.  He also speaks fluent, educated 
Macedonian.  Many politicians, including President Crvenkovski in a 
March 24 conversation with the Ambassador, noted the significance of 
Selmani's achievement and suggested this could be the beginning of a 
new dynamic in Macedonian politics. 
 
Local Elections: VMRO and DUI Dominate 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (U) VMRO was a big winner in local elections as well, winning 24 
of Macedonia's 85 municipalities outright, and taking a commanding 
lead in many more.  SDSM did manage to hang onto their strongholds 
in Strumica and Kumanovo, but overall had considerably weaker 
results in its heartland in the south and east.  After the second 
round, a number of eastern cities may be led by VMRO mayors for the 
first time since Macedonian independence. 
 
¶11. (U) In Macedonia's predominantly e-Albanian areas, DUI generally 
dominated, winning five municipalities outright and taking a strong 
lead in many others.  Selmani's New Democracy party did not fare 
well and will likely win no municipalities, yet ND MP Suleiman 
Rushiti told us he is still optimistic in Aracinovo and Lipkovo. 
The major battles in the second round will be in Tetovo, a dead heat 
between DUI and DPA, and perhaps in Gostivar, where independent and 
former mayor Rufi Osmani took a commanding first-round lead over DUI 
incumbent mayor Nevzat Bejta but could not quite reach the 50% 
needed to wrap it up.  Rushiti told us that Osmani - his cousin - is 
concerned since he has spent his entire war chest and has nothing 
left for between-round campaigning. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Osmani should win in Gostivar easily on April 5, but the 
personal animosity between him and Bejta as well as DUI leader Ali 
Ahmeti's own concern that Osmani will also seek to overtake him as 
Macedonia's leading e-Albanian politician could tempt DUI to seek to 
"win" by other means: intimidation and major ballot-stuffing.  We 
intend to monitor Tetovo and Gostivar very closely, and expect ODIHR 
to do the same.  Ambassador Reeker will also visit Gostivar, Tetovo, 
Ohrid, and Struga to meet the mayoral candidates, just as he did 
before the first round. 
 
¶13. (U) Struga, a municipality of mixed ethnicity on Lake Ohrid, 
will also likely be a close contest between DUI incumbent Ramiz 
Merko and wealthy Torbeshi (Muslim of Macedonian ethnicity) Fijat 
Canoski.  The municipality of Ohrid is also a close race between 
SDSM incumbent Aleksander Petreski and VMRO candidate Kiril 
Trendafilov-Nance.  Ohrid is a popular regional tourist destination 
and summer holiday spot and to many the "Jerusalem" of Macedonian 
Orthodoxy; VMRO would dearly love to take it back. 
 
Comment: No More Excuses 
------------------------ 
 
¶14. (SBU) Should GoM authorities be able to pull off another 
peaceful round of elections on April 5 with minimal irregularities, 
this will largely remove the shadow of the 2008 debacle and, 
frankly, give Greece and other critics less ammunition to aim at 
Macedonia.  But the election results will also mean a further 
consolidation of power by Gruevski and VMRO.  With no elections 
 
SKOPJE 00000136  003 OF 003 
 
 
scheduled until 2012, he and his party will be more or less free to 
do as they wish.  On the other hand, they will shoulder an even 
greater share of responsibility for Macedonia's progress, and there 
will no longer be any excuse for not pursuing an agreement with 
Greece on the name issue and the key reforms necessary for EU 
accession.  VMRO's true agenda will be evident within months. 
 
REEKER