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Viewing cable 09SEOUL516, SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; March 31, 2009

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09SEOUL516 2009-03-31 08:25 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXRO4785
OO RUEHGH
DE RUEHUL #0516/01 0900825
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 310825Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3835
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 8339
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//DDI/OEA//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-Z//
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 9447
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5553
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5648
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 0488
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 4127
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 3125
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 6345
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0748
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2110
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1158
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1774
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 SEOUL 000516 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON KPAO KS US
SUBJECT: SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; March 31, 2009 
 
TOP HEADLINES 
------------- 
 
Chosun Ilbo 
Taekwang Industrial Chairman Park Yeon-cha: 
"I Will Get Everything off My Chest, Including Matters Involving 
Former President Roh" 
 
JoongAng Ilbo 
Yangyang International Airport Goes Out of Business 
 
Dong-a Ilbo, Hankook Ilbo 
Taekwang Industrial Chairman Park: "I Gave 5 Million Dollars to 
Son-in-Law of Roh Geon-pyong, Former President 
Roh's Brother, so that He Could Hand the Money over to Former 
President Roh" 
 
Hankyoreh Shinmun, All TVs 
President Lee Myung-bak Opposes Military Response 
to North Korea's Missile Launch 
 
Segye Ilbo, All TVs 
President Lee Opposes Military Response to North Korea's Missile 
Launch and Rules out 
Closing Kaesong Industrial Complex 
 
Seoul Shinmun, All TVs 
An ROK Worker Held at Kaesong Industrial Complex 
for Allegedly Criticizing North Korea's Political System 
 
 
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 
--------------------- 
 
President Lee Myung-bak said in a March 30 interview with The 
Financial Times that he is opposed to any military response to North 
Korea's upcoming rocket launch.  (All) This remark is designed to 
block Pyongyang's efforts to increase tensions with its missile 
launch (Dong-a) and to prevent inter-Korean ties from deteriorating 
further. (Hankyoreh) President Lee also said that he will keep the 
Kaesong Industrial Complex open for dialogue with North Korea and 
that no matter what may happen in the North, it is unimaginable that 
the North would be occupied by China. (All) 
 
As President Lee opposes any military response to North Korea's 
rocket launch and U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates said that the U.S. 
has no plans shoot down a North Korean missile, the "missile game" 
is playing out in a way that the North wants.  The U.S. is 
intentionally playing down North Korea's rocket launch for fear that 
its strong response may encourage Pyongyang further, and the ROKG 
inevitably needs to fall into step with the U.S. on the North Korean 
missile issue to avoid any conflicts with the U.S. (Chosun) 
 
The ROK and the U.S. adopted a low-key approach toward the missile 
issue because the two allies, which have no realistic measures to 
deter North Korea's missile launch, are now preparing for 
negotiations after the launch. (Hankook) 
 
The Ministry of Unification said that North Korea is investigating 
an ROK worker in the North for allegedly criticizing the political 
system there. (All) 
 
Sohn Kyung-shik, who recently took office as the 20th Chairman of 
the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, said yesterday that the 
ROK National Assembly should first ratify the ROK-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement. (Dong-a, JoongAng, Hankook, Seoul) 
 
President Lee Myung-bak heads to London today for the G-20 summit, 
where he will discuss measures against the financial crisis and 
North Korea's missile launch. (All) 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL NEWS 
 
SEOUL 00000516  002 OF 011 
 
 
------------------ 
 
North Korea's Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the 
Fatherland said on March 30 that Pyongyang will consider the ROK's 
full participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as 
a declaration of war. (Dong-a, Hankook, Seoul, Segye) 
 
U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates said on "Fox News Sunday" on March 
29 that he believes that economic penalties against North Korea are 
more likely than diplomacy to result in progress for U.S. policies 
toward the North. (Seoul) 
 
 
MEDIA ANALYSIS 
-------------- 
 
-North Korea 
------------ 
All ROK media gave prominent play to President Lee Myung-bak's March 
30 interview with The Financial Times.  President Lee Myung-bak said 
during the interview that he is opposed to any military response to 
North Korea's upcoming rocket launch, conceding, however, that Japan 
had every right to protect its citizens.  President Lee also said 
that he will keep the Kaesong Industrial Complex open for dialogue 
with North Korea and that no matter what may happen in the North, it 
is unimaginable that the North would be occupied by China. 
 
Conservative Dong-a Ilbo reported in its inside-page story that 
President Lee's opposition to a military response is designed to 
block Pyongyang's efforts to increase tensions with its missile 
launch.  Meanwhile, left-leaning Hankyoreh Shinmun reported that 
President Lee's opposition to a military response is aimed at 
preventing inter-Korean ties from deteriorating further. 
Conservative Chosun Ilbo said on its front page that as President 
Lee opposes any military response to North Korea's rocket launch and 
Secretary Gates said that the U.S. has no plans to shoot down a 
North Korean missile, the "missile game" is playing out in a way 
that the North wants.  The daily said that the U.S. is intentionally 
playing down North Korea's rocket launch for fear that its strong 
response might encourage Pyongyang further, and the ROKG inevitably 
needs to fall into step with the U.S. on the North Korean missile 
issue to prevent any conflicts with Washington. 
 
Moderate Hankook Ilbo reported that the ROK and the U.S. adopted a 
low-key approach toward the missile issue because the two allies, 
who have no realistic measures to deter North Korea's missile 
launch, are now preparing for negotiations after the launch.  The 
newspaper also speculated that if the North launches a rocket, the 
UN Security Council will discuss imposing sanctions on the North, 
but the sanctions will not be strong, and in the end, the North and 
the U.S. will have high-level talks. 
 
Right-of-center JoongAng Ilbo editorialized that the comments by 
U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates and President Lee reveal close 
cooperation between the ROK and the U.S., but we can't help 
harboring considerable concern about (the alliance).  The attitude 
of the U.S., which frequently changes its stance, is not 
trustworthy.  Above all, Secretary Gates will not be able to avoid 
criticism for his careless remarks on the missile issue... The ROKG 
should now come up with specific measures to dispel the ROK people's 
concern.  It should even consider participating in the Missile 
Defense system more positively. 
 
Dong-a Ilbo editorialized: "The irresponsible responses by Seoul and 
Washington will inevitably cause serious side effects.  Military 
experts warn that President Lee's comment has given the North the 
green light to launch its Taepodong-2 missile, enabling the North to 
comfortably make its provocations.  The early retreat by Seoul and 
Washington also makes it difficult for the United Nations to impose 
strong sanctions on the North if a missile is launched.  (We fear 
that) the toleration of the North's nuclear and missile development 
will torpedo the Nonproliferation Treaty and the Missile Technology 
Control Regime." 
 
 
SEOUL 00000516  003 OF 011 
 
 
Chosun Ilbo editorialized: "Judging from the statements by Secretary 
of Defense Gates and U.S. Pacific Command Timothy Keating, the U.S. 
seems to have concluded that even if North Korea fires a missile, it 
will be difficult to do anything but raise the issue with the UN 
Security Council.  This disappoints a majority of Koreans, who 
expected the U.S. to prevent North Korea's missile launch through 
its strong preventive diplomacy or, if a missile is launched, to 
deal with the North sternly according to international norms. 
(Washington's attitude) will spread the perception that, "The U.S. 
can't help," not only to the two Koreas but also across the world, 
and it will also raise doubts and confusion about the Obama 
Administration's policy direction on North Korea." 
 
Hankyoreh Shinmun's editorial welcomed President Lee's opposition to 
a military response.  The editorial also quoted ROKG officials as 
saying that through his remarks on opposition to a military 
response, President Lee sent a message that 'even if the North fires 
a rocket, the ROK will not take the lead in aggravating the 
situation.' 
 
Dong-a Ilbo and Hankook Ilbo carried the March 30 statement by North 
Korea's Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland 
that Pyongyang will consider the ROK's full participation in the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as a declaration of war. 
 
-G-20 Summit 
------------ 
Hankook Ilbo reported that due to differences in the U.S. and 
European views on a solution to the economic crisis, skepticism runs 
high over the G-20 summit. 
 
Under the headline, "U.S. President Obama Not Expected to Stick to 
Stimulus Spending at G-20 Summit," Hankyoreh Shinmun reported that 
President Obama expressed an intention to make a compromise with 
Europe, saying during his interview with The Financial Times, "The 
most important task for all of us is to deliver a strong message of 
unity in the face of crisis." 
 
-ROK-U.S. Summit 
---------------- 
Hankook Ilbo editorialized: "During the summit to be held on the 
sidelines of the G-20 summit, the ROK and U.S. Presidents should 
work together to come up with effective measures against North 
Korea's launch of a long-range rocket... We hope that the first 
meeting between Presidents Lee and Obama will serve as a golden 
opportunity to build mutual trust, which is essential to resolving 
pending bilateral issues." 
 
-Afghanistan 
------------ 
Under the headline, "The U.S. Passes the Burden of Afghan War to 
International Community," Hankyoreh Shinmun reported that the U.S. 
plans to use a series of international conferences to be held in 
Europe this week as an opportunity to secure assistance from the 
international community in carrying out Washington's new strategy 
for Afghanistan.  The daily also said that the U.S. is highly likely 
to ask the ROK to dispatch troops to Afghanistan. 
 
 
OPINIONS/EDITORIALS 
------------------- 
 
POWER DEFEATING MISSILE 
(JoongAng Ilbo, March 31, 2009, Page 47) 
 
By Specialist Mun Chang-geuk 
 
The Six-Party Talks aimed at blocking North Korea from going nuclear 
have been long stalled, failing to produce any visible outcome. 
Even though North Korea has been outspoken about its intention to 
launch a rocket, the ROK's professed position is merely that it has 
no choice but to resort to dialogue with North Korea after the 
North's planned rocket launch. 
 
 
SEOUL 00000516  004 OF 011 
 
 
What went wrong?  It seems that the ROK failed to understand the 
other party.  (In general), we embark on talks under the presumption 
that the other party will be as rational as we are.  The U.S. 
suffered the September 11 terrorist attack because of its failure to 
realize that al-Qaida could become so irrational.  The ROK's 
sunshine policy or the Six-Party Talks were initiated based on the 
belief that North Korea is rational. 
 
Negotiations can be made only when both parties are considered 
rational.  The sunshine policy itself is not bad, but effective only 
under the presumption that the other party is as rational as we 
are. 
 
I do not think unification will be realized through dialogue with 
North Korea.  What is more urgent than unification is to enlighten 
North Korean residents.  Even when we give a humanitarian helping 
hand to North Korea, we should make sure that it feels self-respect. 
 We should make North Koreans realize that they are not destined to 
be starved and oppressed.  What human beings require is freedom, 
human rights and happiness.  Then liberals championing "human 
reason" s should make this point to North Korea but ROK liberals 
have been mute (with regards) to North Korean. 
 
We should not be swayed by false arguments that we should talk to 
the North, closing our eyes to the truth of North Korea for fear of 
war.  The ROK should be brave enough to call for human rights and 
freedom for North Korea.  Also, we should thoroughly prepare to 
defend ourselves against North Korea's provocations.  The ROK should 
increase military costs to build a missile defense system, and also 
participate in Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). 
 
 
SEOUL SHOULD ENHANCE DIPLOMATIC COORDINATION ON NORTH KOREAN MISSILE 
ISSUE 
(Seoul Shinmun, March 31, 2009, Page 31) 
 
In an interview with the Financial Times, President Lee Myung-bak 
said he is opposed to a military response to North Korea's rocket 
launch.  President Lee's remarks came after U.S. Secretary of State 
Robert Gates said on Sunday that Washington has no plans to shoot 
down the rocket.  Earlier, with North Korea announcing its rocket 
launch, the U.S. and Japan declared that they are poised to 
intercept a rocket from North Korea.  (Regrettably,) this has 
escalated military tensions on the Korean Peninsula.  It seems that 
President Lee switched to a cautious stance to prevent anxieties 
triggered by a military response from hampering the ROK's effort to 
overcome the economic crisis. 
 
In fact, the ROK has limited options for a military response to 
North Korea's rocket launch.  There is no telling evidence denying 
North Korea's claim that the launch is a 'satellite' launch.  China 
and Russia have called on the U.S. and Japan to show restraint 
saying that there is no justification to block North Korea from 
launching a satellite.  Also there is no guarantee that the U.S. 
will succeed in its attempt to intercept the rocket.  Therefore it 
can be said that it was inevitable that the ROK and the U.S. took a 
cautious approach. 
 
However, we should not teach North Korea wrongly that provocations 
will lead to concessions from the ROK and the U.S.  The ROK, the 
U.S. and Japan have disagreed among themselves regarding the North 
Korea rocket launch.  Moreover, their positions are significantly 
different from those of China and Russia.  The ROK should enhance 
diplomatic efforts not only with the U.S. and Japan but also with 
China and Russia in order to elicit their cooperation.  They should 
make North Korea realize that a rocket launch and blackmail 
diplomacy will not be advantageous for the country. 
 
 
BRIEF BUT SIGNIFICANT ROK-U.S. SUMMIT 
(Hankook Ilbo, March 31, 2009, Page 35) 
 
President Lee Myung-bak and U.S. President Barack Obama will hold 
their first summit in London, England where the G20 financial summit 
 
SEOUL 00000516  005 OF 011 
 
 
is to take place on April 2.  The ROK-U.S. summit will be brief and 
informal but carries a significant meaning.  The summit is 
symbolically important because it will be the first bilateral 
meeting since President Obama took office.  It is also important 
because there are a host of pending issues such as North Korea's 
imminent rocket launch which require joint responses from both 
countries. 
 
This ROK-U.S. summit could gauge future bilateral relations between 
the conservative Lee Myung-bak Government and the liberal Obama 
Government.  In the past, former Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun 
Administrations and the George W Bush Administration were in 
conflict due to their differences in North Korea policy.  Even 
though it is said that Presidents Lee and Obama have broadened their 
mutual understanding through telephone calls, some people are still 
concerned about the future of bilateral relations.  Hopefully, both 
leaders will build trust and deepen mutual understanding. 
 
Most of all, the two leaders should use their collective wisdom to 
devise ways to effectively counter North Korea's long-range rocket 
launch.  They should make North Korea pay a price for what it does 
in defiance of international warnings.  Also, they should keep 
negotiations including the Six-Party Talks on track.  In an 
interview with the Financial Times yesterday, President Lee 
Myung-bak said that he is opposed to military responses to North 
Korea's rocket launch.  This came after U.S. Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates said the U.S. has no plans to intercept North Korea's 
rocket.  This shows that both countries have been engaging in prior 
coordination on this issue.  This coordination and shared 
understanding is likely to lead the two leaders to come up with 
effective joint responses through the summit. 
 
There are also plenty of pending issues that both countries should 
resolve through cooperation and coordination, such as expansion of 
the currency swap, KORUS FTA ratification and the future of the 
bilateral alliance.  The first summit between President Lee and 
President Obama should serve as a valuable opportunity to foster the 
mutual trust necessary for solving these issues. 
 
 
MISSILE MEASURES 
(JoongAng Ilbo, March 31, 2009, Page 46) 
 
ΒΆU. S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has made it clear that the 
U.S. will not try to shoot down the rocket that North Korea plans to 
launch.  President Lee Myung-bak has also announced his opposition 
to a military response. 
 
These comments represent a change from the previous positions stated 
by the ROK and the U.S.  Earlier, they pointed out that the road the 
North is taking goes against UN Security Council Resolution 1718, 
which prohibits the North from engaging in ballistic missile 
activity. 
 
It seems President Lee and Gates have reluctantly modified their 
stance, concluding that the last channels of communication with 
Pyongyang should not be completely closed even after its launch. 
 
However, although the two countries have adopted a united front 
about the use of military means to stop the North Korean launch, the 
interests of the ROK and the U.S. are not necessarily the same. 
 
Gates has dampened talk of a missile launch, saying the North Korean 
rocket is not a threat since it would not reach U.S. territory. 
 
But howabout the ROK?  The security of the ROK depends totally on 
its alliance with the U.S. Seoul's defense depends on how fast U.S. 
forces can be committed in the Korean Peninsula from bases in Japan, 
the Pacific regions and the U.S. 
 
Since North Korea's missiles could strike Hawaii, Guam or even 
Alaska, it seems they are intended to preemptively block the 
commitment of U.S. forces to the Korean Peninsula in the event of 
war. 
 
SEOUL 00000516  006 OF 011 
 
 
 
North Korea's missiles might not be a direct threat to the U.S., but 
they are to Seoul. 
 
Clearly, the comments by Gates and President Lee reveal close 
cooperation between the two countries, but we can't help harboring 
considerable concern about the Korea-U.S. alliance. 
 
It is not enough to vaguely confirm the Korea-U.S. alliance. 
Instead, Seoul should talk about how to block hundreds of missiles 
that the North has targeted at the ROK. 
 
It should discuss whether we can be 100 percent confident that the 
U.S. will not neglect the security of the ROK, and also look at what 
measures the two governments are taking against North Korea's 
weapons of mass destruction. 
 
The ROKG might be forced to accept that it has no choice but to 
participate in a missile defense program, which has been delayed 
because of budget problems. 
 
We might also have to consider developing long-range missiles and 
nuclear weapons, a move that so far has been unnecessary because of 
our alliance with the U.S. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
SEOUL PUSHES `CALM` RESPONSE TO NK MISSILE THREAT 
(Dong-a Ilbo, March 31, 2009, Page 31) 
 
A few days remain before North Korea's scheduled testing of a 
long-range missile (April 4-11), but ROK President Lee Myung-bak is 
pushing a calm response. 
 
In an interview with the Financial Times yesterday, he said, "I'm 
against a broader military response to North Korea's missile test." 
His comment suggests his administration believes responses from 
other nations to the North's threat are undesirable. 
 
A high-ranking official of the Foreign Affairs and Trade Ministry in 
Seoul said, "Though the U.S. and Japan said they might shoot down 
North Korea's rocket to protect the lives and safety of their people 
from North Korea, many have misunderstood that the two nations will 
shoot down the rocket unconditionally." 
 
"President Lee talked about our policy to prevent such a 
misunderstanding from growing into a crisis." 
 
A spokesman for the North Korean People's Army general staff said 
March 9 that if Washington or Tokyo tries to intercept the 
projectile, Pyongyang will also shoot down rockets shot by the two 
nations. 
 
A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry in Pyongyang said Thursday that 
even a UN Security Council discussion of a missile launch will 
rupture the six-way nuclear talks and require strong countermeasures 
to be taken. 
 
Washington and Seoul, however, have adopted a more moderate response 
since Pyongyang seeks to raise tension as an excuse to sabotage the 
six-party talks.  A change in the responses of the ROK and U.S. 
governments was reflected in President Lee's comments, which were 
made shortly after U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates ruled out 
U.S. interception of a North Korean rocket. 
 
Nevertheless, Seoul believes it needs to respond if Pyongyang 
launches a missile.  As part of its response, the ROK will 
officially join the Proliferation Security Initiative, which is 
designed to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, and proactively participate in the Security Council's 
discussion on imposing sanctions on North Korea. 
 
 
SEOUL 00000516  007 OF 011 
 
 
ROK Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan implied that a missile launch 
will incur an international response, saying, "It's impossible to 
ignore North Korea's violation of the U.N. Security Council's 
resolution.  We just need to talk about the level of penalty." 
 
In his interview with the Financial Times, President Lee said he 
intends to keep open the Kaesong industrial complex.  He also 
implied, however, that Seoul will impose economic pressure on 
Pyongyang by saying he needs to rethink additional bilateral 
cooperation with the North. 
 
Persuading the council to impose sanctions on North Korea will be 
tough.  The ROK thinks it will be difficult to narrow the opinion 
gap among the five permanent council members since Russia and China 
oppose a hostile stance against the North. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
DOES OBAMA HAVE A N.KOREA POLICY? 
(Chosun  Ilbo, March 31, 2009, Page 27) 
 
Appearing on Fox News on Sunday, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates 
said the U.S. "was not prepared to do anything about" North Korea's 
rocket launch, which is expected to take place in the coming days. 
Gates' latest comments differ from what he said on Feb. 10, that the 
U.S. could intercept North Korea's missile "if necessary." On Mar. 
19, Admiral Timothy Keating, commander of U.S. forces in the 
Pacific, said the U.S. is "fully prepared" to shoot down the missile 
and added that the U.S. military has the capability to do it. 
 
Judging from the situation so far, the U.S. administration appears 
to have decided it would be difficult to take any measures against a 
North Korean missile launch other than discussing it with the UN 
Security Council.  And the Security Council is unlikely to impose 
new sanctions on North Korea, so the most plausible outcome could be 
a low-level censure, such as a declaration by the country which 
holds the presidency of the (Security) Council criticizing the 
launch. 
 
This would be very disappointing for a large number of ROK people 
who had hoped the U.S. administration would either prevent the 
satellite launch by engaging in strong diplomatic efforts, or be 
followed by a concerted international move demonstrating the resolve 
not to condone such acts. 
 
This would spread the view among both North and South Koreans, as 
well as the international community, that the U.S. has no magic 
formula either.  Fundamentally, it would exacerbate confusion and 
suspicions over the Obama Administration's North Korea policy. 
 
After meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi in 
Washington on Mar. 11, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said 
the ultimate goal was to get rid of North Korea's nuclear program 
and added that the U.S. had many options to deal with a North Korean 
missile launch.  Clinton said efforts would still be made to resume 
the Six-Party Talks, which have been stalled since October 2007. 
 
But the U.S. Defense Department appears to have a different view. 
Gates said Sunday the Six-Party Talks had made no progress and that 
this was a source of significant concern.  He also voiced skepticism 
about a purely diplomatic solution, saying he believes the success 
rate is higher when economic sanctions are used, whether they target 
North Korea or Iran. 
 
As demonstrated by those contrasting comments, the broad framework 
of North Korea policy within the Obama Administration has yet to be 
formulated clearly.  The basic direction, a consultation system for 
North Korea affairs within the administration and a cooperative 
network with Congress, all remain unclear, while the State 
Department has yet to appoint an Assistant Secretary for East Asian 
and Pacific affairs.  This is all happening while the Obama 
Administration reviews North Korea policy. 
 
SEOUL 00000516  008 OF 011 
 
 
 
As if it were catching the Obama Administration off its guard, North 
Korea is seeking to up the ante by staging the so-called satellite 
launch, which is a ploy, according to Secretary Gates, to develop an 
inter-continental ballistic missile.  With no significant leverage 
at its disposal, the ROK is simply sitting by with its eyes fixed on 
Washington. 
 
This helplessness cannot continue indefinitely.  Seoul and 
Washington need to hurry up and produce a set of basic principles 
and at least a rough blueprint of how they intend to deal with North 
Korea over next four years.  If there is not enough time to do this 
at the April 2 summit in London, they need to set up another meeting 
as soon as possible.  If they fail to do this, there will be no end 
to North Korea's antics. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
PRESIDENT'S REALISTIC REMARKS ON N. KOREAN AFFAIR 
(Hankyoreh Shinmun, March 31, 2009, Page 27) 
 
Yesterday, President Lee Myung-bak made notable comments regarding 
North Korea's planned launch of a "satellite."  In an interview with 
the British business daily Financial Times, in advance of the Group 
of Twenty (G-20) summit of Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors of industrialized and emerging economies on April 2 in 
London, Lee said, "I oppose any military counteraction against North 
Korea's test-firing of a missile."  In addition, Lee indicated that 
closing an inter-Korean industrial complex in the border city of 
Kaesong as a retaliatory step against the North's provocative 
actions would not necessarily be helpful, saying, "The Kaesong 
industrial complex is one conduit for us to keep that window of 
dialogue open."  Lee added his administration "has always been open 
and ready to have dialogue with North Korean.  When it comes to 
humanitarian aid, regardless of other factors, it has always been 
our consistent position that we are ready and willing with such 
assistance." 
 
Other than articulating opposition to a military response to North 
Korea's impending rocket launch, the remarks by Lee were roughly 
similar to those of other ROKG officials.  However, the statements 
from this interview are meaningful as the President publicly opposed 
a military response and reaffirmed a moderate stance.  Regarding the 
intention of Lee's remarks, government officials have explained 
that, "It sent a message to North Korea that the ROKG won't 
participate in playing a leading hard-line role to worsen the 
situation even if North Korea launches a satellite rocket."  Given 
concerns that a satellite launch by North Korea would spark a chain 
reaction and worsen situations further on the Korean Peninsula, we 
welcomed this message. 
 
Behind the reason why Lee demonstrates such a stance at this point, 
there may lie the reality that any sanctions against North Korea 
would prove ineffective without China and Russia's support.  In 
addition, going into the April 2 summit with U.S. President Barack 
Obama, the two sides seem to want to make coordinated gestures 
towards North Korea.  While taking both hard and soft lines, the 
U.S. is putting more of its weight on dialogue with North Korea to 
resolve matters, as indicated by a remark by Stephen Bosworth, the 
U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy, who said he 
wants to meet with North Korean leader (National Defense Commission 
Chairman) Kim Jong-il.  There is also concern that deteriorating 
inter-Korean relations could further create an economic burden 
during this time of ongoing global economic crisis, precipitating 
the "Korean Discount" effect. 
 
The ROKG's role in issues surrounding the Korean Peninsula is key 
because its national interests are directly at stake, especially at 
a time when the U.S. has not yet completed its review on its North 
Korean policy.  After North Korea test-fires their missile, the 
government of President Lee Myung-bak should consider all ways to 
prevent the situation from worsening and engage North Korea in 
 
SEOUL 00000516  009 OF 011 
 
 
constructive dialogue.  Moreover, the government's words should 
match their actions. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
FEATURES 
-------- 
DON'T DELAY ON THE DEAL 
(JoongAng Ilbo, March 31, 2009, Page 45) 
 
By Choi Byung-il, Dean of the Graduate School of International 
Studies at Ewha Womans University 
 
Ratifying the ROK-U.S. free trade deal first will declare that 
discussion on it has come to an end. 
 
A column that the lawyer Sukhan Kim wrote ("Go slow to secure FTA," 
March 25) seemed to deliver only the U.S.' arguments.  It ignored 
the basic fact that international negotiations are conducted in 
connection with a sovereign country's domestic political and 
economic situation.  In his column, Kim opposed the quick 
ratification of the ROK-U.S. free trade agreement, arguing that it 
would do more damage to our country than good.  He also maintained 
that considering the state of affairs in the U.S., the clauses about 
the auto industry must be revised. 
 
If I may first make one conclusion, if Seoul approves the trade deal 
before Washington does, it will not be the result of a lack of 
strategy.  This runs counter to a remark by an influential member of 
the ruling party, who said the ROK's National Assembly does what it 
has to do regardless of what Washington does.  The move is aimed at 
resolving issues Washington has with the portion of the deal that 
concerns the car industry through creative negotiation tools, rather 
than renegotiation.  This would also secure ground from which the 
U.S. administration can manage complaints from its domestic car 
industry. 
 
Although the U.S. is expressing discontent about the parts of the 
free trade deal focused on the auto sector, there is not a single 
authority who has officially proclaimed to the ROK that that 
particular portion has problems and must be negotiated again. 
Politicians make populist remarks, as they are concerned about the 
voters in the car industry.  But Washington knows that demanding 
renegotiation over a free trade agreement that has already been 
signed is like opening Pandora 's Box. 
 
Kim argued that if the ROK approves the deal first, it would limit 
our flexibility.  But a wise strategist knows that sometimes he 
needs to restrict his own flexibility in order to get what he 
wants. 
 
There are three main benefits that the ROK can obtain by ratifying 
the agreement first. 
 
First, the act will demonstrate the view shared by global leaders - 
that in order to overcome the first global economic crisis of the 
21st century, we must not resort to trade protectionism. 
 
Second, the approval of the ROK-U.S. free trade deal will declare to 
groups who are still trying to damage the agreement for their own 
ends that discussion on it has come to an end.  As a result, the 
administration will be able to focus on other important state 
affairs. 
 
Third, the ROK's approval will make it difficult for the U.S. to 
demand a renegotiation over the car industry.  That is, the ROK will 
take the upper hand. 
 
Let's think about what will possibly happen if we postpone approving 
the trade agreement, as Kim argued we should.  If the ROK does not 
approve the pact while the U.S. expresses complaints about the car 
industry, the U.S. will judge that the ROK also wants to 
 
SEOUL 00000516  010 OF 011 
 
 
renegotiate.  This will invite the U.S. to seek renegotiation. 
 
Kim must understand why the ROK does not want to deal with the car 
issue again.  If Washington asks to reopen that section of the deal, 
the ROK will try to put another issue on the agenda in an attempt to 
maintain balance. 
 
In the process, discussions over the new item will once again heat 
up in the ROK.  The controversy will hinder the workings of the ROK 
administration, which already has its hands full. It will serve as a 
tool for more political fights.  Anti-American forces are ready to 
light candles again and take to the streets at any moment. 
 
Postponing the deal's approval offers no benefits for the ROK.  The 
U.S. must know what possible effects would stem from insisting on 
renegotiation. 
 
Kim said the U.S. accepted our request to change the results of 
negotiations in April last year that ended up fully opening our beef 
market to the U.S.  Now it is the ROK's turn to accept changes in 
the U.S.' political reality and revise the section about the auto 
industry. 
 
But the beef import negotiations had only one item on the agenda. 
The results of those talks faced massive protests by the people, 
whether they were based on scientific facts or not.  In the ROK-U.S. 
free trade agreement, the car industry was only one of many items on 
the agenda.  Kim seems to have forgotten that in the U.S. some 
groups are dissatisfied with the auto portion of the deal, but 
others support the free trade agreement. 
 
We should remember that if the U.S. wants to have more talks over 
the automobile provisions and the ROK strongly resists, (thereby) 
jeopardizing the whole deal, supporters of the deal in the U.S. 
would not just sit back and watch. 
 
As the ROK's strategists have already understood, there is no reason 
to resolve the U.S.' discontent through renegotiation over the car 
industry.  There are other creative compromises to make. 
 
What's important is that the new American administration and 
Congress share the same understanding.  As such, it won't be wise 
for the ROK's National Assembly to delay ratification of the deal. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
PRESIDENT LEE "OPPOSES MILITARY RESPONSE TO NORTH KOREA'S MISSILE 
LAUNCH;" WHY DO THE ROK AND THE U.S. SUDDENLY ADOPT LOW-KEY 
ATTITUDE? 
(Hankook Ilbo, March 31, 2009, Front Page) 
 
By Reporter Chung Sung-won 
 
President Lee Myung-bak said in a March 30 interview with The 
Financial Times of the U.K., "I am opposed to a military response to 
North Korea's missile launch."  Prior to this, U.S. Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates also said in a March 29 interview with Fox News 
that as of now, he was not considering shooting down a North Korean 
rocket. 
 
With North Korea's firing of a long-range rocket imminent, the ROK 
and the U.S. seem to be getting softer in their rhetoric.  Since 
there are no realistically appropriate measures to prevent the 
launch, this move can be seen as both nations' efforts to prepare 
for negotiations following the launch. 
 
Of course, both the ROK and the U.S. are basically opposed to North 
Korea's rocket launch.  President Lee said during the interview, 
"Although (North Korea) argues that it is a space projectile, all 
nations around the world, including China and Russia, are opposing 
it because it could be a ballistic missile."  The U.S. is reacting 
more sensitively because Pyongyang's rocket launch indicates that 
 
SEOUL 00000516  011 OF 011 
 
 
(North Korea has)  completed its nuclear development program by 
developing a long-range delivery system, and it also sets a bad 
example regarding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
 
However, the ROK and the U.S. are not bringing up the issue of 
imposing sanctions on the North as easily as they did in the past. 
Instead, they are using roundabout expressions, such as "A unified 
response is needed (The ROK's Chief Delegate to the Six-Party Talks 
Wi Sung-lac on March 28)."  President Lee also noted, "Taking a 
harder stance would not necessarily be helpful," adding, "Therefore, 
we will not resort to excessive measures, such as closing the 
Kaesong Industrial Complex." 
 
This low-key attitude by Seoul and Washington is attributable to the 
lack of realistic measures to deter North Korea's missile launch. 
Unlike when the North fired a long-range missile in 1998 and 2006, 
the communist state is now removing the "seeds of controversy" by 
notifying international organizations of its planned launch. 
Another major factor is the lukewarm stance of China and Russia, 
permanent members of the UN Security Council, toward sanctions on 
the North. 
 
Therefore, if the North fires a rocket, the situation will likely 
develop this way: "discussions about sanctions at the UN Security 
Council" --> "pursuit of passive sanctions, such as the Chairman's 
Statement" --> (and finally,) "high-level talks between the North 
and the U.S."  In this context, the U.S. stated that it wants to 
meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il (U.S. Special 
Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth on March 
28). 
 
However, in this situation, the ROKG keeps saying that the ROK may 
consider participating in the Proliferation Security Initiative 
(PSI) if North Korea launches a long-range missile.  An expert 
observes that the ROK has lost its leverage such as food and 
fertilizer assistance to the North because of its insistence on 
taking a hard-line policy on North Korea.  The expert notes that 
this seems to increase the chance that the ROK will be isolated 
since the U.S and North Korea will likely have direct talks. 
 
 
STEPHENS