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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 SEOUL 000480 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON KPAO KS US
SUBJECT: SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; March 25, 2009 
 
SEOUL 00000480  001.2 OF 006 
 
 
 
 
TOP HEADLINES 
------------- 
 
Chosun Ilbo 
Opposition DP Rep. Suh Gab-won and Ruling GNP Rep. Kwon Kyung-seok 
to be Summoned over Alleged Receipt of Illicit Funds from Taekwang 
Industrial Chairman Park Yeon-cha 
 
JoongAng Ilbo 
ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Advanced to Yalu River 
for First Time during Latest War Game Simulation 
 
Dong-a Ilbo, Hankook Ilbo 
Wonderful Korea!... Korea's Challenge will Continue 
Korea's National Team Loses World Baseball Classic Final, 
but their Brilliant Runner-up Performance Surprises the World 
 
Hankyoreh Shinmun 
ROK Cabinet Approves 29-Trillion-Won Extra Budget, 
the Biggest in the Country's History 
 
Segye Ilbo, Seoul Shinmun 
Korea Is a "Great Runner-up" in World Baseball Classic 
 
 
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 
--------------------- 
 
The ROK and the EU announced yesterday that they have reached a 
tentative free trade agreement, with the more politically sensitive 
issues to be resolved by their trade ministers in early April. 
(All) 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL NEWS 
------------------ 
 
Chosun Ilbo noted in an inside-page report that the Obama 
Administration has not yet finalized its North Korea specialists 
within the State Department, leading to delays in dealing with North 
Korea's imminent launch and the detention of two American reporters, 
according to critics. As evidence, Chosun explained that CSIS Senior 
Advisor Robert Einhorn, widely believed to be the Administration's 
choice to take charge of the Department's strategies for North 
Korea's weapons of mass destruction as the next U.S. Under Secretary 
for Arms Reduction and Non-proliferation, has allegedly declined to 
accept the offer. Furthermore, Kurt Campbell, a former Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense who was widely expected to become the 
next Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs, has yet to be nominated. 
 
North Korea's Foreign Ministry, in a March 24 statement, warned that 
North Korea will boycott the Six-Party Talks should the UN impose 
sanctions over its planned rocket launch. (JoongAng, Dong-a, 
Hankook, Hankyoreh, Segye, Seoul, all TVs) 
 
 
MEDIA ANALYSIS 
-------------- 
 
-North Korea 
----------- 
 
Most of the ROK media gave attention to a March 24 warning by North 
Korea's Foreign Ministry that North Korea will boycott the Six-Party 
Talks should the UN impose sanctions over its planned rocket launch. 
 The media quoted the North Korean Foreign Ministry's statement: "If 
the U.S. and Japan, two participants in the Six-Party Talks, 
discriminatorily deny us only the right to peaceful space use and 
infringe on our sovereign rights, it would directly run counter to 
the "spirit of mutual respect and equality" of the Sept. 19 Joint 
Statement.  If such a hostile activity is carried out under the name 
 
SEOUL 00000480  002.2 OF 006 
 
 
of the UN Security Council, that would be a breach of the Sept. 19 
Joint Statement by the UN Security Council itself." 
 
Conservative Chosun Ilbo ran an inside-page report noting that the 
Obama Administration has not yet finalized its North Korea 
specialists within the State Department, leading to delays in 
dealing with North Korea's imminent launch and the detention of two 
American reporters, according to critics.  As evidence, Chosun 
explained that CSIS Senior Advisor Robert Einhorn, widely believed 
to be the Administration's choice to take charge of the Department's 
strategies for North Korea's weapons of mass destruction as the next 
U.S. Under Secretary for Arms Reduction and Non-proliferation, has 
allegedly declined the offer.  Furthermore, the report went on to 
say that Kurt Campbell, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense who was widely expected to become the next Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, has yet to be 
nominated. 
 
Commentaries continued on Seoul's possible full participation in the 
U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).  Conservative 
Chosun Ilbo editorialized: "The international community takes the 
position that it will not tolerate North Korea's nuclear and missile 
proliferation, irrespective of Seoul's participation in the PSI. 
This means that if North Korea transfers its nuclear weapons and 
missiles to other countries, (the international community would have 
no choice but to respond).  That response would destabilize to an 
extreme degree the political situation on the Korean Peninsula.  The 
leftist camp (in the ROK) should first denounce North Korea's 
nuclear and missile programs before taking issue with the ROKG over 
participating in PSI." 
 
 
OPINIONS/EDITORIALS 
------------------- 
 
GO SLOW TO SECURE FTA 
(JoongAng Ilbo, March 25, 2009, Page 45) 
 
By Sukhan Kim, a senior partner in the law firm Akin Gump Strauss 
Hauer and Feld LLP in Washington, D.C. 
 
"Korea must understand that the agreement, like all trade 
agreements, is a political deal and, therefore, subject to change." 
 
Korea is pushing for quick ratification of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement, insisting that it will not renegotiate the deal with 
Washington, where it remains stalled.  The FTA has already passed a 
National Assembly subcommittee toward ratification. 
 
Many in Korea believe that these moves will speed the agreement's 
ratification in the U.S. Congress.  There is a sense of optimism in 
Korea that the agreement will be finalized this year. 
 
Some believe that President Barack Obama's objections to the 
Korea-U.S. FTA during the campaign were just campaign rhetoric, and 
now that he is president, he will pursue prudent policies and will 
come to support the agreement as is. 
 
Others believe that quick action on the agreement in Korea will 
pressure the U.S. to move more quickly, or will make it harder for 
the U.S. to seek changes to the deal's auto provisions. 
 
Unfortunately, such beliefs are misplaced, given the political and 
economic reality in Washington. 
 
There are two main aspects to this reality that Korea must make sure 
to gauge properly. 
 
First, without changes to its auto provisions, the agreement is 
unlikely to be submitted to the U.S. Congress for approval, let 
alone ratified.  Second, even with changes to the agreement's auto 
provisions, 2009 will be a very difficult year for movement on the 
agreement in the United States. 
 
 
SEOUL 00000480  003.2 OF 006 
 
 
The agreement was negotiated by the Bush Administration amid growing 
fear that globalization was squeezing out the American middle class. 
 
 
In 2006, American voters elected some 45 new Democrats to Congress 
from areas that are seen as having been hurt by free trade. 
 
These Democrats sharply criticized the Bush Administration's pursuit 
of new FTAs, and its approach to the agreement, for inadequate 
protection of American jobs. 
 
Reflecting this sentiment, during the prolonged 2008 presidential 
primary, Obama was compelled to take a stronger stance against the 
agreement than he otherwise might have in order to gain labor union 
support. 
 
Then, in the 2008 election, Democrats, who are ideologically less 
favorably disposed toward FTAs, increased their majorities in 
Congress. 
 
The financial crisis and possible bankruptcy of General Motors and 
Chrysler have compounded the problem.  Under these circumstances, 
neither President Obama nor key Democrats on Capitol Hill can afford 
to backtrack and accept the agreement in its current form. 
 
Furthermore, the gravity of economic and other challenges facing the 
new administration has pushed trade issues, including the agreement, 
to the back burner.  Thus, the administration is unlikely to invest 
much time and energy into the agreement, at least in the near term. 
 
 
After all, the Obama Administration inherited this pending agreement 
from its predecessor and does not have a vested interest in its 
quick ratification. 
 
Accordingly, even if Korea were to make concessions on auto trade, 
it will be difficult for the U.S. to approve the agreement this 
year. 
 
If Korea's goal is for both countries ultimately to ratify the 
agreement, it will need to modify its current approach.  Korea is 
currently taking steps toward ratification by the National Assembly 
and is also publicly stating that it will not renegotiate the deal. 
But each such step and each such pronouncement hardens Korea's 
position. 
 
Korea's approach raises the stakes for the negotiations, leaving 
little room for maneuvering.  In short, this approach limits Korea's 
flexibility and options in resolving the remaining U.S. concerns 
about the agreement. 
 
Korea should instead keep the agreement out of the spotlight for 
now, and remove the pressure for quick passage.  A respite from the 
public debate about the agreement should create a calmer environment 
in which Korea can quietly explore with the U.S. possible 
compromises on the agreement that would allow U.S. Democrats to 
accept it. 
 
This strategy may also afford enough time for the U.S. Congress and 
the administration to implement their strategy to save the U.S. auto 
industry, which could remove some political heat from the 
agreement's auto provisions.  Further, a slower and more deliberate 
approach would also allow Korea to seek additional concessions from 
the U.S. that might be offered in exchange for any changes to the 
auto provisions. 
 
Korea must understand that the agreement, like all trade agreements, 
is a political deal and, therefore, subject to change.  Indeed, when 
it became clear last year that the Korean public could not accept 
reopening Korea's market to all U.S. beef, Washington recognized the 
changed political reality in Korea and accepted a new, more limited 
arrangement. 
 
Now, it is Korea's turn to recognize that, in the U.S., the 
 
SEOUL 00000480  004.2 OF 006 
 
 
political reality mandates some changes to the agreement's auto 
provisions.  Indeed, during these challenging times, Korea needs to 
be both flexible and creative in dealing with the U.S. on the FTA 
because the agreement is simply too important to fail. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
REASONS WHY NORTH KOREA MUST NOT LAUNCH A MISSILE 
(Dong-a Ilbo, March 25, 2009, Page 30) 
 
By Kim Sung-han, guest editorial writer and professor of 
international studies at Korea University 
 
North Korea must not fire a missile for the following four reasons. 
 
 
First, regardless of whether it is a satellite or a missile, North 
Korea's rocket launch would violate United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1718, which was passed right after North Korea's nuclear 
test in October 2006 banning the North from all activities related 
to its ballistic missile program. 
 
Second, North Korea's test-firing of a missile would pose a serious 
threat not only to its neighboring countries but also to the 
international community. 
 
Third, the precision of North Korea's satellite and missile 
technologies is not yet internationally recognized.  Therefore, if 
North Korea's missile flies over Japan, Japan would have no choice 
but to assume a defense posture.  North Korea's missile firing would 
change the attitude of the Obama Administration which has been 
seeking the improvement of its relations with Pyongyang.  The ROK 
would also review its security strategies, including the Missile 
Defense system, and would also fully participate in the 
Proliferation Security Initiative. 
 
Lastly, North Korea's launch of a missile disguised as an artificial 
satellite would not ultimately help sustain the North Korean regime. 
 According to missile experts, it costs about 400 million dollars to 
develop a projectile alone.  Considering that North Korea has a 
population of 24 million and its per-capita income is 900 dollars, 
its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) totals about 21.6 billion dollars. 
In this situation, spending 400 million dollars (2 percent of the 
GDP) to fire a missile is an extreme example of the "distortion of 
resources."  If the North continuously rejects outside food aid and 
misleads its people into believing that the North will soon become a 
powerful and prosperous nation, its missile launch in April would go 
down in history as an event accelerating the collapse of the Kim 
Jong-il regime. 
 
 
THE PSI IS NOT AN IDEOLOGICAL ISSUE 
(Chosun Ilbo, March 25, 2009, Page 35) 
 
Leftwing activists have been protesting in front of the Foreign 
Ministry building since Friday, when Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan 
said North Korea's missile launch would prompt South Korea to 
consider full participation in the U.S.-led Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI).  Former president Kim Dae-jung on Monday said 
South Korea's participation in the PSI would require it to search 
ships carrying strategic goods and that North Korea would oppose it. 
 He added that if a gun battle ensues, it could escalate into a 
naval battle, and if coastal batteries take part in the clash, the 
situation could escalate into a war.  The left is trying to turn the 
PSI issue into an ideological confrontation. 
 
The PSI is an international effort conceived by the Bush 
Administration to intercept the transfer of banned weapons of mass 
destruction and weapons technology to rogue states or to 
international terrorist organizations.  Launched in September of 
2003, 94 countries are full participants in the PSI.  During the Roh 
Moo-hyun Administration in 2006, South Korea said it would merely 
 
SEOUL 00000480  005.2 OF 006 
 
 
take briefings on intercept efforts by participating as an 
"observer," although it supports the purpose and principle of the 
PSI.  The decision was mindful of fierce opposition from North 
Korea. 
 
The claims made by Kim and the Left regarding the PSI take a 
considerable leap of logic.  First of all, the PSI targets nuclear 
materials and missiles rather than "strategic goods."  If Kim used 
the ambiguous term "strategic goods" in order to condone North 
Korea's transfer of nuclear materials and missiles abroad, it would 
be difficult for South Korea to call for strengthened international 
cooperation in stopping North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. 
South Korea would lose credibility on the international stage if it 
ignores the export of North Korean nuclear materials and missiles 
yet calls for international support only when it needs it. 
 
The Roh Administration sensed it was setting itself up for such 
criticism and claimed it would prevent North Korea from transporting 
goods suspected of breaching security concerns based on an 
inter-Korean maritime pact signed in August 2005.  But as 
demonstrated by the failure of North Korean vessels passing South 
Korean waters to respond to 22 calls by South Korean maritime police 
in 2006, that agreement was no alternative to the PSI.  The 
international community takes the position that it will not tolerate 
North Korea's nuclear and missile proliferation, irrespective of 
Seoul's participation in the PSI.  This means that if North Korea 
transfers its nuclear weapons and missiles to other countries, (the 
international community would have no choice but to respond).  That 
response would destabilize to an extreme degree the political 
situation on the Korean Peninsula.  The leftist camp (in the ROK) 
should first denounce North Korea's nuclear and missile programs 
before taking issue with the ROKG over participating in PSI. 
 
At one time, the PSI was the subject of a lot of controversy for 
being the result of a unilateral U.S. decision and it drew a 
considerable amount of criticism for going against international 
maritime laws guaranteeing vessels the right to pass through the 
high seas.  But the criticism dwindled as more and more countries 
joined the PSI, which is evolving into an international security 
network. 
 
The issue of taking part in the PSI should not be turned into an 
ideological dispute but instead should be decided after strategic 
thinking about the pluses and minuses for South Korea, considering 
the future of inter-Korean relations, the South Korea-U.S. alliance 
and international cooperation in diplomacy and security. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
FEATURES 
-------- 
 
U.S. STATE DEPT. LACKING N. KOREA 'CONTROL TOWER' 
(Chosun Ilbo, March 25, 2009, Page 6) 
 
By Washington Correspondent Lee Ha-won 
 
The U.S. administration has not yet lined up its North Korea 
specialists within the State Department, leading in the view of some 
critics to delays in dealing with North Korea's impending rocket 
launch and the detention of two American reporters in the North. 
 
Robert Einhorn, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, had been expected to take charge of 
strategies for North Korea's weapons of mass destruction as the next 
U.S. Undersecretary for Arms Reduction and Non-proliferation.  But 
he has suddenly declined to accept the offer.  Ellen Tauscher, a 
seventh-term Democrat member of the House of Representatives, has 
been nominated in his place. 
 
Kurt Campbell, a former deputy assistant secretary, has not yet been 
nominated as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific 
 
SEOUL 00000480  006 OF 006 
 
 
Affairs.  Stephen Bosworth, who worked part-time as Special 
Representative for North Korea Policy, has returned to his job as 
Dean of Tufts University's Fletcher School after visiting nations 
participating in Six-Party nuclear talks. 
 
There is speculation that the reason the two reporters are still 
being held in the North is that there is no "control tower" for 
North Korean issues at the State Department.  No senior American 
officials have officially demanded their release in the week since 
they were captured.  The U.S. is ostensibly trying to solve the 
problem through quiet diplomacy, but in reality there is no senior 
U.S. government official who wants to take the initiative. 
 
A diplomatic source well versed in the atmosphere of the Obama 
Administration said, "Korean Peninsula experts do not agree on who 
is a real 'czar' to deal with the North Korean issue," adding that 
up to now, it is difficult to give good marks to the Obama 
Administration for its response to North Korean matters." 
 
(We have compared the English version on the website with the Korean 
version and added the last paragraph to make them identical.) 
 
 
STEPHENS