VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRO #0355/01 0851712
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 261712Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1833
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 1431
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 4774

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 000355 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS KISL IT

SUBJECT: ITALY READY TO HELP ON GUANTANAMO BAY DETAINEES 

Classified By: CDA Elizabeth L. Dibble for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 

Summary 
-------- 

¶1. (C) Italian Foreign Minister Frattini confirmed to S/WCI 
Ambassador Williamson March 24 that Italy is ready to help 
the United States resolve the issue of Guantanamo detainees 
through resettlement in Italy and advocacy for the U.S. 
effort within the EU. Frattini advised that there is 
opposition to resettlement by a number of European states due 
to security concerns that resettled detainees could take 
advantage of the borderless zone created by the Schengen 
Agreement. Citing his experience as a former EU Commissioner 
for Justice and Home Affairs, Frattini said these concerns 
are valid and must be addressed at a national level and by 
the EU. He said the EU framework agreement on the subject 
would need to reassure the whole that resettlement in 
selected European states would not adversely affect 
collective European security. At the national level, 
Frattini said that Italy would need to enact a law providing 
legal status for the detainees and restricting their 
movements outside of Italy, and assured Williamson that such 
a law could be adopted on a timely basis. He speculated that 
other European states that agree to accept detainees would 
need to take similar steps tailored to their respective 
national laws and regulations. Frattini expressed concern 
that the European Commissioners and EU Council officials 
charged with handling this matter lack a vision for winning 
support, and urged the United States to engage in a public 
awareness campaign in Europe, cautioning that the upcoming 
European Parliamentary elections could adversely affect 
consideration of the matter. He also said that U.S. 
agreement to resettle some detainees in America would be 
necessary to secure European agreement to accept detainees in 
Europe. On the specific issue of Italian agreement to accept 
two Tunisian detainees in U.S. custody subject to an 
outstanding arrest warrant for terrorism in Milan, a senior 
Justice Ministry official agreed to review alternatives to 
extradition. Frattini made clear Italy is on board. The 
next step will be translating Italian political support into 
concrete action at the national level. 

Presidential Priority 
--------------------- 

¶2. (C) Williamson met March 24 with Foreign Minister 
Frattini and separately with Sergio Barbiera and Marco 
Peronaci, respectively the deputy chief of staff and 
diplomatic advisor to Justice Minister Alfano, to pursue 
Italian agreement to resettle detainees from the Guantanamo 
Bay facility, including two Tunisians in U.S. custody subject 
to an Italian arrest warrant, and to solicit Italian support 
for U.S. efforts to negotiate an EU framework agreement on 
the matter. Charge d'Affaires Liz Dibble joined the meeting 
with Frattini. Justice Department attach Don Ashley, A/DCM 
Barbara Leaf, S/WCI staffer Shaun Coughlin, and RSI officer 
Molly Phee participated in the meeting at Justice. 

¶3. (C) Williamson explained that on his second day in office 
President Obama issued three Executive Orders related to the 
Guantanamo Bay facility, signaling the high priority he 
attaches to resolving the matter. Among other directives, 
the Orders called for the closure of the facility within one 
year, and established an interagency review process under the 
authority of the Attorney General to conduct ""fresh 
assessments"" of the files of the 241 detainees currently held 
in Guantanamo. Williamson noted the significance in the 
shift of authority for detainee status decisions from the 
Defense Department to the Justice Department. 

¶4. (C) He explained that the review process will result in a 
final recommendation for each detainee and described three 
possible courses of action: prosecution in the United 
States; transfer to country of origin; or resettlement in 
third countries. Williamson estimated that some 50-60 
detainees cannot be transferred home because of reasonable 
fear of torture. The United States is seeking European 
assistance in resettling this latter category of persons. 
Williamson added that, in general, this population of 
detainees is considered to be at the ""lower end of the threat 
scale"" and consequently the United States would not ask 
European governments to prosecute or detain them. He noted 
that while the USG believed the risks associated with these 
individuals are very low, the United States could offer no 
absolute guarantees about their conduct. The nationalities 
of this category of detainees include Uighers, Uzbeks, 
Egyptians, Tunisians, Libyans, Syrians and others. He 
reported that 520 detainees had previously been transferred; 
all but 15 were returned to their home countries, including 
Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Algeria. He added 
that approximately 20 with European citizenship or legal 
residence status had been transferred to Spain, France, 
Germany and the UK. 

Two Tracks: Bilateral and EU 
----------------------------- 

¶5. (C) Williamson reported that the United States is in an 
advanced state of discussions about detainee resettlement 
with Lithuania, Ireland, Portugal, and Switzerland. We are 
also engaged in serious discussions with several other states 
(including Spain, Belgium, Norway and Sweden). Concurrent 
with these bilateral discussions, we are working on a 
separate but complementary track with the EU Commission in 
pursuit of a framework agreement that would allow individual 
states to conclude bilateral agreements with the United 
States. Williamson relayed that the Czech presidency agrees 
the framework agreement should create a ""permissive EU 
environment which allows member states to work out bilateral 
agreements with the U.S. to accept detainees."" Given the 
one-year deadline for closure of the Guantanamo Bay facility, 
the United States hopes to conclude the framework agreement 
during the Czech presidency to avoid delay when the 
presidency rotates. Williamson said the U.S. was 
simultaneously pursuing bilateral 
negotiations with a number of governments, and that several 
have decided to accept detainees, but will not implement 
those decisions until an EU agreement is in place. 

Request for Italian Support 
--------------------------- 

¶6. (C) Williamson emphasized the importance to the United 
States of Italian support for the resettlement effort given 
Italy's size and role in the EU. Referring to last month's 
telephone conversation between President Obama and Prime 
Minister Berlusconi, during which the Prime Minister 
expressed Italy's willingness to be helpful, Williamson asked 
for three types of Italian support. First, the United States 
seeks Italian agreement to accept additional Guantanamo 
detainees who need to be resettled in third countries. 
Second, the United States seeks Italian support within the EU 
for a framework agreement. Third, the United States seeks 
Italian agreement to accept two Tunisian detainees (one held 
at Guantanamo and one in Afghanistan) subject to outstanding 
arrest warrants for terrorism in Milan. Williamson conveyed 
U.S. willingness to be as helpful as possible in providing 
Italy with the information it needed to make a positive 
decision to accept detainees, including access to relevant 
documents and interviews with detainees. In response, 
Justice Official Barbiera requested a list of potential 
detainees to facilitate GOI review. 

FM Confirms Italian Support 
but Highlights Security Concerns 
-------------------------------- 

¶7. (C) Frattini assured Williamson of Italy's willingness to 
help the United States resolve this matter. Italy will agree 
to accept detainees and will support the U.S. effort in 
Brussels, but the Foreign Minister counseled that more work 
must be done with the EU and at the national level. 
Recalling his participation in the January 26 GAERC meeting 
that discussed the issue, Frattini reported his sense that 
there is a lot of opposition to resettling Guantanamo 
detainees in Europe. Citing the expansion of the borderless 
zone authorized by the Schengen Agreement, several states had 
expressed security concerns about the potential for unlimited 
movement of resettled detainees. Frattini agreed that the 
security concerns of Interior Ministers are valid and must be 
addressed. Therefore, he argued that the framework 
agreement, while providing for bilateral agreements with the 
United States, must also reassure other European states that 
resettlement will not adversely affect their security. 

¶8. (C) Drawing on his background as a former EU Commissioner 
for Justice and Home Affairs, Frattini further speculated 
that most states that agree to resettlement will need to take 
national action to define the legal status of the detainees 
as refugees, residents or citizens. This special status 
should also entail restriction of their movements. Other 
matters that need to be addressed at a national level include 
surveillance, witness protection programs, and funding for 
these security-related activities. Frattini said that Italy 
had enacted such a law to handle resettlement of Palestinians 
associated with the 2002 siege at the Church of the Nativity, 
and asserted that Italy would need similar legislation to 
cover resettlement of Guantanamo detainees. Frattini 
explained his view that -- absent national action to 
implement restrictions on movement -- the Schengen Agreement 
would permit the detainees to move throughout the borderless 
zone. As an example, he said a former detainee resettled in 
Italy could get in a car and drive to Slovenia, a state that 
opposes resettlement. The result would be that Frattini 
would have to respond to a call of complaint from his 
Slovenian counterpart. These situations must be avoided. 
When Williamson expressed concern that a Parliamentary 
process could complicate and delay consideration of the 
matter, Frattini reassured him that Italy could employ a 
Presidential decree in a timely fashion. 

¶9. (C) Frattini opined that the EU officials who met March 
16 in Washington with Attorney General Holder and Deputy 
Secretary Steinberg - Commissioner for Justice and Home 
Affairs Jacques Barrot, CT coordinator Gilles di Kerchove, 
and Czech Interior Minister Ivan Langer -- lacked a mandate 
to negotiate the matter and a vision on how to move forward. 
Drawing on his past experience as EU negotiator with the 
United States over PNR, Frattini criticized Barrot for 
failing to consult with the European Parliament, which he 
expects will desire to play a role, including adopting a 
resolution endorsing an EU approach to resettlement. 
Williamson reminded Frattini that the European Parliament had 
already adopted a resolution encouraging states to contribute 
to resolution of the matter. 

¶10. (C) Frattini also recommended that the United States 
work with its European partners on an ""awareness raising 
exercise,"" warning this issue could run afoul of the 
campaign for the European Parliamentary elections in June. 
He suggested that the United States tap the European concern 
about the importance of human rights in the struggle against 
terrorism to win public support for European action on 
resettlement. Finally, he stressed that the issue of 
resettlement must be decided on the ""basis of solidarity."" 
(Comment: By solidarity, Frattini meant that to win support 
for European resettlement, the United States must also 
resettle detainees. End Comment.) 

Tunisian Detainees 
------------------ 

¶11. (C) To date, Embassy Rome's efforts to arrange the 
transfer to Italy of two Tunisian detainees held by the 
United States (one in Guantanamo and one in Afghanistan) and 
subject to arrest warrants for terrorism in Milan have 
foundered over the mechanism of transfer. (Note: Milan 
prosecutors had approached Embassy DOJ attach to request 
assistance in arranging the transfer of the two to Italy. 
End Note.) In January, the United States proposed an 
exchange of diplomatic notes. After an initially positive 
reaction by the Justice Ministry, the Foreign Ministry became 
engaged and the Justice Ministry subsequently revised its 
position and has since argued the individuals must be 
extradited because they are not citizens of Italy. 

¶12. (C) Williamson raised this subject in some detail in his 
meeting with senior Justice Ministry official Barbiera. In 
his talk with Barbiera, Williamson explained that none of the 
Guantanamo detainees resettled to date had been transferred 
through extradition. He reported that those detainees 
previously transferred to Spain, France, Germany and the UK 
were either citizens or legal residents. Barbiera asked if 
any of the detainees transferred to Western Europe had been 
prosecuted. Williamson said that France and Spain had 
undertaken prosecutions; Germany and the UK had not. He also 
noted that the United States had resettled eight detainees in 
Albania who had agreed to go there voluntarily, although none 
of them had ties to Albania. None of these detainees were 
prosecuted or detained. All of the transfers thus far had 
been effected through an exchange of diplomatic notes. 
Barbiera asked whether the two Tunisian detainees had 
voluntarily agreed to be transferred to Italy. Williamson 
said that in preliminary discussions with their attorneys 
they had signaled a willingness to be transferred to Italy, 
but there was no final agreement. Justice Department attach 
Ashley asked Barbiera if the GOI would agree to transfer the 
two detainees via an exchange of notes if they voluntarily 
agreed to come to Italy. Barbiera said this was an 
interesting idea but would require further legal study. He 
suggested a treaty as an option; Williamson said the United 
States would prefer to avoid the lengthy process of 
negotiating a treaty. Barbiera also asked Williamson if the 
United States would allow Italy to serve legal documents on 
the two detainees. Williamson agreed to consider the 
request. He also told Barbiera that the United States would 
not be conducting any further transfers of detainees to 
Tunisia as we have reason to believe that one detainee 
previously transferred there had been tortured. 

¶13. (C) In conclusion, Barbiera assured Williamson the 
Justice Ministry would provide as much assistance as possible 
to resolve the matter of transfer. While this issue was not 
discussed in depth in Williamson's subsequent meeting with 
Frattini, the Foreign Minister deferred to MOJ's stance that 
Italy requires they be extradited. 

Comment 
------- 

¶14. (C) Frattini cleared time on his schedule to meet with 
Williamson, and delivered a strong political message of 
Italian support for U.S. efforts to resolve the Guantanamo 
detainee issue. His views on actions needed at the EU and at 
a national level were couched as friendly advice. Italy will 
help, but transforming this political support into concrete 
action will require more effort. Frattini made clear that 
the security concerns of European Interior Ministers carry 
weight. This is certainly true in Italy, where the views of 
Interior Minister Maroni (a leader of the anti-immigrant 
Northern League political party) will need to be addressed. 
We believe he is correct in asserting that the government 
will not have a problem in enacting the necessary legislation 
for detainees resettled here. The specific case of the two 
Tunisian detainees subject to Italian arrest warrants remains 
problematic due to the government's request for extradition, 
but we were encouraged by the Justice Ministry's willingness 
to consider alternatives to extradition. We agree with 
Frattini that attention to public diplomacy on this matter is 
merited. Our contacts want to know why the detainees are not 
being resettled in the United States. Continued engagement 
with Frattini by senior U.S. officials will facilitate his 
advocacy for us in EU circles. 

¶15. (U) Ambassador Williamson has cleared this cable. 



DIBBLE 
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